

17 March 1959

## CUBA

- I. Fidel Castro's campaign against dictatorships has assumed two distinct forms: encouragement of revolutionary plotting against "dictators" and pressure for the exclusion of "dictatorships" from membership in the Organization of American States (OAS).
- A. Castro has denied any intention to intervene militarily but has publicly declared his intention to assist anti-dictator revolutionary groups. Cuba has become a meeting ground for revolutionary groups desirous of receiving Cuban arms, equipment or financial support.
- B. Argentine leftist Ernesto "Che" Guevara has been given authority by Fidel Castro to deal with revolutionary groups. Some low level members of the "26th of July" movement are probably aiding exile groups.
1. "Che" Guevara has demonstrated pro-Communist sympathies and has tended to facilitate Communist activities in Cuba.
- C. Castro's campaign against dictatorships is at variance with other liberal leaders in the area, principally Venezuelan President Betancourt and former Costa Rican President Figueres. They fear that Castro's dealings with Communist-influenced exile groups would introduce pro-Communist regimes.
1. Figueres may assist rival non-Communist rebel groups and Betancourt.
- II. Revolutionary plotting in Cuba is directed primarily against governments of Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua and Paraguay.

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 NEXT REVIEW DATE: 12-28-79  
 REVIEWED: 372064

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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A. Castro has demonstrated most interest in the downfall of Dominican dictator Trujillo.

1. Anti-Trujillo groups have also become active in several countries other than Cuba, notably in Venezuela, but so far have failed to achieve unity.
2. Castro's apparent vehicle is the Communist-influenced Union Patriotica Dominicana (UPD-Dominican Patriotic Union).
3. Anti-Trujillo preparations in Cuba are not believed to have progressed much beyond the planning stage, although there are reports that revolutionaries are being recruited for training.
4. Propaganda, including radio broadcasts, is being directed against the Dominican Republic.

B. Castro's interest in Haiti, where the Duvalier government is seriously weakened by internal deterioration as well as by external threats by exile groups, is primarily as a potential base for attack against the Dominican Republic.

1. Haitian exiles in Cuba, led by mulatto political leader Louis Dejoie, have been permitted to broadcast inflammatory propaganda attacks against the Duvalier regime.
2. There is no firm evidence that Haitian exiles are training in Cuba for an invasionary expedition despite claims that Cuba is supplying both men and arms.
  - a. However, many men are available for recruitment, including former Cuban revolutionaries, Haitian sugar workers in Cuba, and mercenaries of other nationalities.

*3. Dominican Foreign Min has warned: an attack on Haiti an attack on D.R.*

C. Plotting against Nicaragua and Paraguay is hindered by lack of unity among opposition groups involved.

1. Both countries are probably of less immediate interest to Cuba than the Dominican Republic and Haiti, although Castro is believed to support the Communist-influenced Union Patriótica de Nicaragua (UPN-Nicaraguan Patriotic Union) against Nicaraguan President Somoza. Nicaragua is more susceptible to invasions, however, than the Dominican Republic.

III. Efforts to exclude "dictatorships" from membership in the OAS will probably be limited by the reluctance of many Latin American countries to intervene in the internal affairs of member nations.

A. Venezuelan President Betancourt first proposed their exclusion.

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

26 March 1959

1007  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Briefing (398th), Thursday, 26 March 1959

1. The following items were prepared:

- ~~a.~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~b.~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~c.~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~d.~~ [REDACTED]
- ~~e.~~ Cuba
- ~~f.~~ [REDACTED]

DELETED TEXT  
NOT RELEVANT  
TO BAY OF PIGS

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

The Director next dealt with Cuba and followed his briefing notes carefully. Considerable discussion was generated, particularly in the light of Castro's forthcoming trip to the U.S. to address a convention of newspaper editors in Washington on 17 April. A major question, particularly in the light of Castro's anti-U.S. attitude, was the posture to be taken by the U.S.

[REDACTED]

4. The briefing took a full half hour.

THOMAS J. PATTON

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B. Figueres' moderate approach strongly refuted by Castro and his official news organ.

1. Favoring a "neutralist" position in world affairs, Castro implied that the US Naval Base, Guantanamo, endangers Cuban security.
2. Castro also accused the US of supporting Latin American dictators and said that the US encourages anti-Castro activities.

III. Communists, operating openly and legally, have gained footholds in the organized labor movement, the armed forces, and possibly the press.

A. The government is not now Communist dominated or controlled, however, although the potential for further Communist penetration exists.

1. Castro has indicated he will not allow the Communists to "steal the revolution" from him.
2. So far, however, there has been no serious attempt to proscribe Communist activities.
3. A vehicle for Communist penetration of the army is a new G-6 Section which is in charge of "educating" the troops. Marxist teachings are prevalent.

IV. Castro's campaign against dictatorships has assumed two forms: encouragement of revolutionary plotting against "dictatorships" and pressure for the exclusion of "dictatorships" from membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). *but if he could - he would*

A. Castro has denied any intention to intervene militarily. Cuba, however, has become a meeting ground for revolutionaries desirous of receiving Cuban arms, equipment or financial support. <sup>c</sup>

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- B. Argentine pro-Communist Ernesto "Che" Guevara has been dealing with revolutionary groups. <sup>from Haiti, San Domingo, Nicaragua, &</sup> Some low level members of the "26 July" movement are probably aiding exile groups.
1. "Che" Guevara, one of the original group who invaded Cuba with Castro, has facilitated Communist activities in Cuba. On 18 March he stated: "We are going to get a Soviet ambassador here in Cuba one way or another." <sup>now adds</sup>
- C. Castro, in his campaign against dictatorships, is at variance with other liberal leaders in the area, principally Venezuelan President Betancourt and former Costa Rican President Figueres. They fear that Castro's dealings with Communist-influenced exile groups would introduce pro-Communist regimes.
1. Figueres and Betancourt may assist rival non-Communist rebel groups.
- V. Revolutionary plotting in Cuba is directed primarily against the governments of the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Nicaragua.
- A. Castro is apparently supporting Communist-influenced Dominican & Nicaraguan exile groups.
- B. Castro's greatest interest is in overthrowing Dominican Dictator Trujillo.
1. His interest in Haiti is primarily as a potential base for operations against the Dominican Republic.
- a. An invasion of Haiti, however, might spark a "Caribbean war" since the Dominican Foreign Minister informed the Embassy that an attack on Haiti would be considered an attack on the Dominican Republic.
2. Nicaragua is of less immediate interest to Cuba but is more susceptible to invasion than the Dominican Republic.
- C. Preparations against "dictatorships" probably have not progressed much beyond the planning stage.

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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1997

104-11

23 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Briefing (401st), Thursday,  
23 April 1959

1. The following items were prepared:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]
- e. Cuba

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NOT RELEVANT  
TO BAY OF PIGS

2. [REDACTED]

He did not brief on Cuba, but did brief on Raul Castro.

3. The next Council meeting is scheduled for  
0900, Thursday, 30 April.

JOHN S. FARRINGTON

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22 April 1959

## CUBA

- I. Castro continues his one-man rule; no indications he intends relinquish control over any government policies and actions.
- A. Agrarian reform program and measures to reduce rents and utility rates alienating business groups but no sign yet of organized opposition; Castro retains overwhelming popularity among lower classes.
- II. Such nationalistic and anti-American statements as the US "sent Batista tanks and airplanes at a peso apiece to fight against the people" not repeated during visit here; but there are at least two Communists in his entourage.
- A. On 20 April Raul Castro in an attack on "enemies of Cuban revolution" savagely attacked the US, ex-President Figueras of Costa Rica, the international press, and a leader of Cuban-American cultural institute. Raul said speech not impromptu but "carefully considered."
- <sup>FIDEL</sup> B. Castro's attitudes and policies probably undergoing modification as revolutionary fervor subsides and as he gains political experience, but basic programs and beliefs will probably remain unchanged.
- C. Convinced that US influence in Cuba has retarded social, economic and political development; apparent that he distrusts US and while seeking economic benefits at the same time trying to loosen strong economic and political ties.
- III. Communists, operating openly, have gained footholds in organized labor, armed forces, and press.

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- A. Highly publicized pro-Communists "Che" Guevara and Raul Castro hold top positions of command in the military; pro-Communist Carlos Franqui edits self-styled "official" newspaper and is press advisor to President Urrutia.

IV. Way open for further Communist penetration; Castro has made no serious attempt to proscribe Communist activities.

- A. Indoctrination programs in the schools for educating the illiterate rural masses reported to be strongly anti-American; Communists believed participating in committee to rewrite text books; Marxist teaching included in military education program.
- B. Catholic church, however, is alarmed and planning measures, including formation of a Catholic political party, to combat Communism. Church irritated that last rites not permitted to some who have been executed.

V. Castro's campaign against dictatorships has undergone modification.

- A. From a position of open and aggressive support for anti-dictator movements, he claims to have moved to a more cautious one of moral support and has taken token steps to prevent the launching of invasion expeditions from Cuba.
  - 1. There has been no action, however, against Communist-infiltrated groups generally associated with "Che" Guevara and Raul Castro.
  - 2. Support for Communist-infiltrated Nicaraguan and Dominican exiles also continues; exile groups still operate freely in Cuba.

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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1997

16 July 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting (411th), 16 July 1959  
(4/3)

1. The following briefings were prepared:

- A. [REDACTED]
- B. Caribbean
- C. [REDACTED]
- D. [REDACTED]
- X E. [REDACTED]
- X F. [REDACTED]
- X G. [REDACTED]
- X H. [REDACTED]

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TO BAY C.

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

On the Caribbean, however, he confined his remarks to putting the Honduran uprising in its proper context and to referring to the establishment by the Chinese Communists of a newspaper and a propaganda center in Cuba.

4. [REDACTED]

5. The briefing required 20 minutes in its presentation.

6. The next Council meeting is scheduled for 0900, 23 July.

THOMAS J. PATTON

1 JUL 21 1959

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NSC BRIEFING

16 July 1959

CARIBBEAN AREA

- I. Diaz Lanz case has aroused Castro, as well as most other Cuban officials, against US for giving asylum and public attention to this "traitor."
- A. But case dramatizes Communist danger for Cuban public, and Castro has called Diaz' defection a "cruel blow" to the revolution.
  - B. Castro becoming irritable and jumpy, but remains determined to use any means, including force, to put over his program.
  - C. Cuban arms purchasing missions are in Europe and a cargo of semi-automatic rifles from Belgium arrived in Havana last few days.
- II. President Urrutia's public attack Monday (13 July) on Communism was strongest anti-Communist statement by any Cuban official since January, though it was coupled with attacks on US re Diaz Lanz.
- A. Urrutia accused Communists of trying to make Cuba an instrument of the Soviet cold war against the US and said Communists are traitors to Cuban revolution.
  - B. Previous anti-Communist comments were deleted by Castro from Urrutia's reply to Diaz Lanz' letter of resignation.
- III. Six Chinese Communist "newsmen" now in Cuba, some of them preparing to set up new Chinese-language newspaper to serve Cuba's Chinese community, the largest in Latin America.
- IV. "Che" Guevara, now in India, contacted Communists there on foreign policy of non-alignment, according to CIA source.

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
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A. Guevara told Indian Communists that Cuba's hands are now tied by presence in Cuba of US naval base at Guantanamo, but Cuba will eventually be rid of it, as Nasser acted re Suez Canal, and then Cuba can show true foreign policy colors.

V. Unsuccessful coup attempt in Honduras of Sunday (12 July) not directly related to Caribbean crisis.

A.

B.



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TO BAY OF PIGS

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TO BAY OF PIGS

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

19 November 1959

CASTRO EXCESSES ALIENATING OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Brazilian Ambassador Cunha in Havana fears proposed Brazilian efforts to discuss with Fidel Castro a Cuban-US rapprochement would be inopportune and he thinks it is the deliberate policy of the Cuban Government to maintain relations with the United States in a state of agitation. Cunha recently advised Foreign Minister Lafer to refuse Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's invitation to come to Havana unless the visit would clearly be useful. The ambassador felt it would be used instead to indicate Brazilian sympathy and to give prestige to the Cuban Government's "irresponsible anti-US tendency."

Lafer's apparent decision not to go to Cuba at this time seems indicative of a growing disapproval of Castro's excessive methods, an attitude which is becoming apparent in other Latin American countries.

In early November, President Betancourt of Venezuela, one of Latin America's most respected democratic leaders, criticized signs of Castro's "authoritarian rule." He told the Cuban Government that a proposed visit to Venezuela of

Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara would be "inconvenient," and personally demanded the recall of the Cuban ambassador in Caracas for indiscreet and irresponsible behavior. The Colombian ambassador recently advised the Cuban Foreign Ministry that Castro's tolerance of the activities of Colombian political exiles could disturb good relations between the two countries. To his government, he characterized Castro's accusations against the United States as ill-advised and false.

Chile's irritation over the unexpected arrival of armed Cubans with no documentation during the August meeting of the American foreign ministers in Santiago was heightened by the extradiplomatic propaganda activities of the Cuban ambassador.

Guatemalan President Ydigoras is disturbed by the visit to Cuba of ex-President Arevalo at Raul Castro's invitation and by the financial and other encouragement he believes the Castro regime has given Ydigoras' political opponents.

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NSC BRIEFING

30 November 1959

SINO-SOVIET BLOC CAMPAIGN IN LATIN AMERICA

- I. The bloc is attempting to exploit the "relaxation of tensions" since Khrushchev's visit to the US in an effort to expand commercial, diplomatic and cultural relations with Latin America and accomplish its long-run objective of decreasing US influence in this strategic area.
  - A. Mexican visit of Mikoyan--highest ranking Soviet official ever to visit Latin America--and large Soviet delegation for opening of Soviet exhibit was significant move in this direction and emphasizes increased importance USSR attaches to its propaganda and penetration efforts in area.
    1. Mexican reaction to Mikoyan and the exhibit has been cool
  - B. Recent article in Pravda, which pointed up impact on Latin America of Khrushchev's visit to US, claimed "re-establishment and development of friendly relations with USSR is a real and great cause associated with hopes for guaranteed national independence and a better life for Latin American peoples."
    1. Moscow recently doubled broadcasts to Central America and increased by a third those to Brazil.
  - C. In several Latin American countries, businessmen, some labor leaders and certain government and congressional leaders are pressing for trade and diplomatic relations with bloc.

DOCUMENT NO. 21  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS  
☒ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 1-1-70  
AUTH: RU-X  
DATE: 12-21-70 REVIEWER: 372044

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1. Important Brazilian trade delegation now in Moscow; Brazilian Foreign Minister spoke of possible review of Brazilian relations with USSR at time Khrushchev visit to US announced; other Brazilian politicians have subsequently called for diplomatic relations or more trade with bloc.
2. Venezuela is considering renewal of relations with bloc, and recently granted permission to Czechs to establish commercial agency in Caracas.
3. Bolivian congress passed resolution in Sept. calling for relations with USSR and voted funds for Bolivian mission in Moscow; reported informal Soviet offer of \$60,000,000 credit to Bolivian national oil company reinforced domestic pressure.

II. Latin American Communists are implementing some of the strategy which they planned in Moscow early this year in special clandestine conference at which 18 of 20 area parties were represented and which Soviet Presidium member Otto V. Kuusinen and other Soviet "observers" attended.

- A. Latin American Communists were told then to deemphasize Moscow direction, improve coordination of area activities, and to stress "national liberation from imperialist yoke."
- B. They are now effectively exploiting leftist-nationalist elements in developing a coordinated anti-US propaganda campaign on the themes of: US support of dictators, the "liberation movements" in Cuba and Venezuela, and Panama Canal issue.

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Latin American Communists are developing a series of regional front movements to implement the Moscow guidelines.

1. For example, a Communist-dominated women's congress met in mid-November in Santiago, Chile. Among the speakers was the pro-Communist Mrs. Raul Castro. It voted resolutions supporting Castro's revolution and the nationalization of natural resources, and denouncing ties with the US.

III. At a meeting of Latin American Communists in Peiping--following the Moscow meeting--Chinese leaders demonstrated considerable interest in an expanded role in the guidance of Latin American Communism.

- A. Peiping particularly active in augmenting exchange of visits, developing propaganda network in the area, and in training Latin American Communists in China. Three weeks ago Peiping increased broadcasts to Latin America by one-third.

IV. Communists have registered important gains this year in penetrating Cuban revolution and other aspects of Cuban life.

- A. The Cuban government continues its rapid trend to the left, emphasized by 26 November shakeup.

1. Pro-Communist "Che" Guevara, new head of National Bank, now in position to implement his precept that, to become truly independent, Cuba must shift pattern of trade away from dependence on US.
2. Guevara's minimal economic knowledge colored by his concept of Cuban revolution as a class struggle that will change economic structure and social system.

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3. New minister of public works, Osmani Cienfuegos, is probably a Communist.
  4. Officials replaced are relative moderates; others likely soon to be replaced.
- B. Communist-influenced National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) becoming all-powerful.
1. INRA's pro-Communist director said at a closed meeting in early October that the Institute is the "real government of Cuba," according to a new CIA source who attended the meeting.
  2. At the meeting Fidel Castro said he would obtain funds necessary for INRA since through it the govt will control the entire economy.
  3. INRA expropriations and other activities to date do indeed suggest plans to control production and sale of all agricultural commodities, cattle, minerals, petroleum, and other raw materials.
  4. Lands taken are organized as state-owned cooperatives, not given to peasants as promised by Castro.
  5. Wearing other hat as head of INRA's industrial section, pro-Communist Che Guevara has almost unlimited powers in formulating foreign and domestic economic policy.
- C. On the surface Castro seems to have received a setback in Cuban Labor Federation elections for executive council last week, but Communists remain strong in labor.

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1. David Salvador, who has record of cooperation with Communists, remains Fidel Castro's hand-picked secretary-general of the labor federation.
2. The resolutions passed by the congress were strongly anti-US and in general parallel international Communist propaganda.

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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2 Dec 59

1 December 1959

1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting (425th), 1 December 1959

1. The following briefings were prepared:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. Cuba
- d. [REDACTED]
- e. [REDACTED]
- f. [REDACTED]
- g. [REDACTED]
- h. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. He then presented the Cuban paper, adding to it material on the implications of Guevara's new position included in a paper prepared for him by J.C. King.

5. [REDACTED]

6. [REDACTED]

THOMAS J. PATTON.

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NOT RELEVANT  
TO BAY OF PIGS

1991 -  
CUBA

I. 26 November government shakeup is latest move by regime in its rapid trend to the left.

A. Shakeup brings pro-Communist "Che" Guevara, even more to the fore as new head of National Bank. *in place of Pasos -*

1. Guevara, 31-year-old Argentine soldier-of-fortune, is now in position to implement <sup>Stalin's</sup> his precept that, to become truly independent, Cuba must shift pattern of trade away from dependence on US.

2. Guevara has no economic background and has concept of Cuban revolution as a class struggle that will change economic structure and social system.

3. New minister of public works, Osmani Cienfuegos, is probably a Communist.

4. Officials replaced are relative moderates; others likely soon to be replaced.

B. Communist-influenced National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA) becoming all-powerful.

1. INRA's pro-Communist director said at a closed meeting in early October that the Institute is the "real government of Cuba," according to a new CIA source who [REDACTED]

2. At the meeting Fidel Castro said he would obtain funds necessary for INRA since through it the govt will control the entire economy.

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*Can do it  
if I get  
hundreds of  
Saguaros  
around.*

3. INRA expropriations and other activities to date do indeed suggest plans to control production and sale of all agricultural commodities, cattle, minerals, petroleum, and other raw materials.
  4. Lands taken are organized as state-owned cooperatives, not given to peasants as promised by Castro.
- C. On the surface Castro seems to have received a setback in Cuban Labor Federation elections for executive council last week, but Communists remain strong in labor.
1. David Salvador, who has record of cooperation with Communists, remains Fidel Castro's hand-picked secretary-general of the labor federation.



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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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30 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Latest Estimate of the Current Situation in Cuba.

Rel'd by [unclear]  
-8-DEC 1959

1. This memorandum is for the Director's information only.

2. The appointment of Ernesto Che Guevara as President of the National Bank confirms the last estimate presented to the DCI, which announced Castro's intention of making every unit of the Cuban Government subordinate to the Agrarian Reform Institute. Guevara's assumption of this position could easily be the first step towards the nationalization of all banks in Cuba and the issuance of worthless bonds in exchange for deposits now in the banks.

3. January 15th is a crucial date in Cuba. By then the harvest will be in. If Castro can collect for the entire harvest he will have about \$500,000,000 to pour into the government, i.e. the Agrarian Reform Institute. In previous years this money was available to private citizens.

4. In Cuba today there are various opposition groups scattered throughout the country. One group which, although in widely separated parts of the island, is in strong opposition to Castro is made up of the twenty thousand-plus ex-officers and ex-soldiers of Batista's army who, if not in jail, cannot get work because they are classified as enemies of the state. However, the only cohesive military group which is opposed to

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Fidel Castro is composed of some twenty-seven hundred men in the Dominican Republic under the command of General Pedraza. Pedraza appears to be the only military officer of high rank with an organized following. Pedraza is not too closely linked with Batista, as he was retired from active service by Batista in 1952, when Batista took over power from Prio. He was pressed back into active service towards the end of the revolution.

5. Pedraza has told opposition leaders that he would lead an armed force against Castro and, if successful, would obey the civil authorities who took over from the Castro government.

J. C. King  
Chief, WHD

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
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1997

16 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting (427th), 16 December 1969

1. The following briefings were prepared:

a. [REDACTED]

b. Cuba

c. [REDACTED]

d. [REDACTED]

e. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

4. There is no Council meeting scheduled for next week, but two are scheduled for the following week.

RICHARD LERMAN

DELETED TEXT  
NOT RELEVANT  
TO BAY OF PIGS

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16 December 1959

## CUBA

- I. Cuba actively pursuing neutralist foreign policy and seeking closer ties with Afro-Asian bloc.
- A. Shift toward neutralism began on return of pro-Communist "Che" Guevara in September from 3-month trip to nine Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia.
- B. Foreign Minister Raul Roa informed UN General Assembly in September that Cuba regarded US and USSR systems as twin evils and would ally itself with underdeveloped nations of world.
1. Roa planning trip to Cairo in January, which may extend to other Afro-Asian countries.
- C. [REDACTED] indicate Roa's trip may be followed by high-level economic mission and UAR ambassador to Cuba advised [REDACTED] that his suggestion that Raul Castro be invited to UAR considered "great idea" by Roa and Guevara.
- D. UAR ambassador promoting sale to Cuba of Egyptian cotton yarn which Guevara says Castro does not want to buy from US.
- E. Cuba issued public statement suggesting conference of underdeveloped countries for mid-1960 in Havana. Attendance of 28 Afro-Asian and some Latin American nations proposed, but we have no evidence that invitations have been issued.
- [REDACTED]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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107

II. Cuba ~~may~~ also be drawing closer to Sino-Soviet bloc.

A. Soviet exhibition, which closed in Mexico 15 December, to open in Havana in February.

B. Reliable embassy source said 11 December that Roa plans visit to Communist China in January.

Box 7 - Folder 37

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
1997

14 January 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting, 14 January 1960

1. The following briefings were prepared:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. Cuba
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. [REDACTED]
- e. [REDACTED]
- f. [REDACTED]
- g. [REDACTED]

DELETED TEXT  
NOT RELEVANT  
TO BAY OF PIGS

2. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The item on Cuba  
was used during discussion of a separate agenda  
item on this subject.

R. H. KNOCKE

~~SECRET~~

## CUBA

- I. Castro govt continues to take over lands and industries without legal notification or promise of compensation.
  - A. National Bank President Che Guevara continues to solidify his position in power by putting his own proteges in key economic posts.
- II. Four teams of Cuban diplomats and economists are now visiting over 30 African, Asian, Mediterranean and Latin American countries to discuss a proposed agenda for a "conference of hungry nations" which I told you last month Cuba is trying to promote.
  - A. Foreign Minister Raul Roa, in Cairo for the Aswan Dam inauguration, had three interviews with Nasir, whose government is already strengthening UAR-Cuban trade and political ties.
    1. It was announced to the press last night in Cairo that Castro and Nasir will exchange future visits.
  - B. Roa will also visit Morocco, Tunis, Libya, Yugoslavia, and Greece.
- III. The Communist-infiltrated Cuban Workers' Confederation announced on 11 January that it would invite Latin American labor organizations to meet in Havana in February to discuss plans for a congress at which a new "independent" LA labor federation would be formed.

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B. Such a federation was discussed by Latin American Communists attending the 21st Party Congress in Moscow as long ago as last February and was proposed by CTC officials in November 59 when their confederation withdrew from the Inter American Regional Organization of Workers, which is affiliated with ICFTU, Free Union.

IV. Meanwhile, recent developments indicate increasing Cuban contacts with Communist China, and we think Castro will probably recognize Peiping sometime this year.

A. ~~Peiping also received a bargain price in a recent purchase of Cuban sugar (2.95 vs 3.02 cents).~~ In keeping with <sup>Castro's</sup> ~~its~~

policy ~~initiated in 1959~~ of granting price discounts to bloc customers (but not to Free World purchasers), Cuba sold China 50,000 tons at 5 percent below the prevailing market price of \$66.00 per ton. *[Announced by Radio Peiping d/n]*

B. It is reported that 20 Chinese industrial and agricultural technicians--apparently requested by Defense Minister Raul Castro--would arrive in Cuba during January.

V. Soviet Exposition brought from Mexico City to open in Havana about 1 Feb.

A. USSR plans a simultaneous strong propaganda effort featuring films, concerts, and visits by leading Soviet cultural representatives.

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COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE  
CUBAN GOVERNMENT

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## COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT

### 1. Introduction

The objective of the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP - Cuban Communist Party) at this time is to increase its control over Fidel Castro and his government without unduly emphasizing the existence of Communist Party members in official positions. Its tactics, therefore, are to conceal the membership, recruitment, or reaffiliation of Party members who now occupy key positions in the government. This is in accord with the training in "legal and illegal activity" which Communist Party leaders from Latin America have been given in China since 1956, epitomized in a secret training manual prepared by the CP China which states, in part, that:

"All of the Party members who work in legal organizations and institutions should patiently retain their legal position for a long time, without revealing their Party affiliation. They should gain power in the organizations and institutions in which they work and they should retain their legal position as long as necessary."

Through these secret Party members, the Party is able to influence governmental policy, and bring about the appointment of additional Communist Party members (secret or known) to governmental positions, and/or the dismissal or neutralization of individuals who cannot be easily influenced or used as fronts. Thus within the Cuban government today there are some known Communists (particularly in the armed forces), some secret Communist Party members who seek to guide and direct governmental policy and administration, and numerous non-Communists, often young and inexperienced, who are used by

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the Communists to execute their plans for national and international subversion. These secret members are also used to defend "unity of action", as advocated by the Communist Party and its known leaders, in order to prepare public and official opinion for the acceptance of recognized Communists in progressively higher levels of government.

These secret Communist Party members are in close contact with known Communist Party leaders, such as Blas Roca, Joaquin Ordoqui, Severo Aguirre, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who establish public Communist Party policy and are in turn, in contact with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the international Communist apparatus. It is the intention of the Communists to eventually bring such known Communist Party officials into the government, but only after the 26th of July Movement (M-26-7) and other revolutionary political parties have been infiltrated sufficiently to insure protection for the Communists under the guise of a "popular democratic government of national liberation."

Since the victory of the Castro forces, Communist infiltration of the Cuban government and government-supported institutions has been progressing rapidly at all levels. This report cannot cover, in detail, the entire scope of the Communist effort, which is totalitarian in nature. It concentrates, therefore, on evidence of Communist policy and planning prior to the rebel victory and on three areas of major Communist effort. These three areas, on which the Communists have concentrated successively as their strength and influence have increased, are control of the armed forces, control of agrarian reform and the peasantry, and control of foreign policy in support of the USSR. These are treated in the following sections.

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2. The Development of Communist Policy and Activity during the Guerrilla War.

The nature of the Communist policy and tactics can be traced back to the Cuban Communist Party program developed in 1956-57 and officially approved in December 1957, after Cuban Communist leaders had consulted with Soviet leaders at the time of the celebration of the 40th Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in Moscow. This program, which is the prototype of that which the Castro government is now carrying out, was described by the party to be an interim program -- "no el programa socialista del desarrollo futuro sino el programa democratico, nacional-libertado y agrario del desarrollo actual" ("not the socialist program for future development, but the democratic, agrarian, and national-liberationist program for current development"). It is the program, therefore, that the Communist Party wants to see carried out under Fidel Castro's "bourgeois" government in anticipation of the next stage in which the proletarian dictatorship will be established -- after "democracy and national liberation" have served their purposes and when the Communist Party is officially in control. The Communists have avoided public discussion of their program for this next stage, however.

Following the approval of the Cuban Communist Party program by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the full weight of the international Communist apparatus began to be mobilized in support of the Cuban Communists and their effort to further penetrate and gain control over the 26th of July Movement, led by Fidel Castro. In Moscow, representatives of all the Latin American CP's were instructed in December 1957 to pass resolutions and hold solidarity demonstrations in behalf of the "Cuban People". In January 1958, the Cuban CP addressed a letter to "all socialist and workers' parties of the world" and established an office in Mexico ("care of Sr. Baldomero Albarran, Apartado 7751, Mexico, D.F.") through

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which support was coordinated. The International Students Union and the World Federation of Democratic Youth asked their affiliates to sponsor pro-Cuban demonstrations. Within Cuba the Communists intensified their efforts to gain official recognition from the 26th of July Movement. They would not support the April 1958 strike called by the 26th of July Movement so that they could use the failure of the strike as an argument in favor of collaboration with the Communists. Within the 26th of July Movement itself, pro-Communists such as Ernesto ("Che") Guevara and Raul Castro, increased their efforts to persuade non-Communists, such as Armando Hart and Jorge Almeida (currently the Minister of Education and the Chief of the Air Force respectively) to accept Communist views and support. Guevara, an Argentine who became one of the most important guerrilla commanders, is now Director of the Cuban National Bank and Director of the Industrial Department of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). Raul Castro, Fidel Castro's younger brother, is now Minister of the Armed Forces.

One of the principal coordinators of Communist Party aid to the Castro movement was Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, chief of the Cuban Communist Peace Movement, Secretary of Press and Propaganda of the PSP, and currently Director of Hoy, the PSP newspaper. Rodriguez, a known Communist Party official, holds no government position at the present time, but since 1956 has developed into one of the closest political advisors of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Guevara. He has even been considered, as of December 1959, as a possible replacement for the present Minister of the Treasury within the Cuban Cabinet. Such an appointment has not materialized because Raul Castro and other government leaders feel that the public is not yet prepared to accept "unity" on the governmental level. However, it is apparent that Communist and pro-Communist newsmen are constantly testing public opinion on this subject.

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In early 1958, Rodriguez explained the policy and strategy of the Cuban CP toward the guerrilla movement of Fidel Castro, which the Communists had criticized as being bourgeois and "putschist". Rodriguez now revealed, in meetings with foreign Communist leaders, that the Castro movement had become a "movement of the masses", and that "unity of action" (i. e. inclusion of Communists) had been achieved "at the base" on the basis of opposition to the dictatorship. He stated, however, that because the time was not yet ripe for propounding a truly Communist-inspired "National Liberation Front", the Communists were making but limited suggestions to the Castro movement which did not involve "profound changes".

In accordance with their new strategy the Communists began, about May 1958, to organize small guerrilla units or to join the 26th of July Movement as individuals opposed to Batista who made no attempt to bargain for recognition, asking only that they be allowed to fight with the Castro forces. As fighters, these individuals or small groups were accepted. The Communist Party, however, continued to bargain for public recognition as part of the anti-Batista coalition. Such recognition was rejected by the various non-Communist revolutionary groups which signed the Caracas "unity" agreement with the M-26-7 in July 1958. In August, however, reports from within the Communist Party indicate that a separate agreement was worked out between the PSP Youth Organization (the Juventud Socialista) and certain leaders of the 26th of July Movement, though not at the highest levels. This agreement was with Raul Castro who the Communists have claimed was once a member of the Juventud Socialista. It was worked out, or revealed, after he had broken out of the Sierra Maestra to form the "Second Front Frank Pais", a separate command. From this time on, evidence of Communist influence increased rapidly, particularly in the Second Front, as did provocative actions and allegations against the United States. These provocations and allegations were quickly given world-wide

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publicity through the Communist fronts and press, revealing an organized pattern of cooperation between Raul Castro and the Communists. Under Raul Castro's guerrilla command, the groundwork was laid for the reorganization of the peasants, though the Communists among the organizers concealed their Party affiliation. Significantly, Jose Pepe Ramirez, appointed by Raul Castro as Secretary of Peasant Organization of the Second Front in the early summer of 1958, finally identified himself as a Communist Party member a year later. According to the Communist Party organ Fundamentos for May 1959, a Regional Peasant Congress was held on 21 September 1958 in the Second Front with the aid of Raul Castro. Subsequently, in response to the "demands" of the peasants, Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra headquarters promulgated the "Agrarian Law" concerning the right of the peasants to the land. According to Fundamentos, by the time the victory was won there existed "hundreds" of peasant organizations in the various rebel commands, created with the help and protection of the rebel authorities.

Immediately before and after the victory of the Castro movement, the main concern of the party was to develop the guerrilla force into a "people's army" -- that is, a politically-indoctrinated force imbued with a basic Marxist and anti-United States ideology.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez went to the Sierra in July or August, and remained for seven months. His task was that of preparing and coordinating the work of political indoctrination being carried on by Communists within the guerrilla movement, including the influencing of Fidel Castro himself. The Communists developed, and then exploited, educational programs within the armed forces. From positions within the rebel movement, some close to important commanders, they encouraged political discussion in an attempt to discredit reports and discount opinions which might reflect favorably on

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United States policy, while advancing the theme of "national liberation" as the solution to all Cuban problems, economic as well as political. Among themselves, the Communists studied the works of Mao Tse-tung, Lenin, and other Communist revolutionary leaders.

3. Communist Infiltration of the Armed Forces since the Rebel Victory.

Shortly after the victory of the Castro forces, on 1 January 1959, political indoctrination classes were instituted at La Cabana fortress in Havana. This indoctrination was carried on under the protection of "Che" Guevara, who had been made Commander of La Cabana, and under the direction of Captain Antonio Nunez Jimenez (a crypto-Communist) and Captain Luis Mas Martin (a known Communist) as well as other Communists and M-26-7 leaders who had received some indoctrination in the Sierra and were known to be sympathetic to Communist ideology. These included Captain Pablo Rivalta Perez, a Communist teacher from Santa Clara who fought under the name of Moises Perez, and Luis Alberto Lavandeyra Brama, who had been indoctrinated in Marxism by "Che" Guevara while in the Sierra de Escambray. Some of the students were members of the Communist youth (Juventud Socialista) who had been sent to the Sierra to join the guerrilla movement in the last days of the campaign or who had been enrolled in the army after its victory, such as Orestes Quintana Marquez (Secretary General of the Guanabacoa regional JS committee).

As a result of such controlled assignments, La Cabana became the center for the concentration of Communist and pro-Communist personnel who were to become the agents for spreading Communist propaganda throughout the armed forces. Luis Fajardo Escalona, a Communist Party member, was made Chief of the Military Police of La Cabana. While in this

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strategic position he was secretly responsible to the Party for the administrative control of the Communist youth who joined the army and were assigned to indoctrination courses. These youths when ordered to join the army were sent to a certain recruiting office where their identification as PSP members was noted and confirmed by an officer who was a Communist. These recruits, unlike the non-Communists, were then sent to receive Party instructions from Fajardo. They were told that the Party does not now consider it wise to establish "cells" in the army, but that Party members should operate individually and make themselves "outstanding" through hard work and discipline. They were told that they should contribute five pesos monthly to the Party, read Hoy daily, and instigate political discussions whenever possible, following the line suggested in Hoy but never deviating from the positions taken by Fidel Castro and high M-26-7 leaders. Each was informed that, after his military assignment, he would soon be approached by a Communist Party member who would be his Party contact, bringing him propaganda and training literature and carrying back reports, suggestions, and complaints to the National Committee of the Party.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez was again directly involved in the organization and teaching of the political indoctrination within the army. Rodriguez and Joaquin Ordoqui Mesa were given special privileges and entree to all military establishments. Other Communists were assigned, through the influence of Raul Castro, to the "cultural department" of the Armed Forces. These included Alfredo Guevara, who had been custodian of the bank account of the M-26-7 in Mexico, and Oscar Ortiz, who became an instructor at Campo Libertad in Havana. Elsewhere in Cuba, particularly in Oriente, Communists were appointed to key positions in the Army. Although not appointed to the highest commands, they could control educational and propaganda activities, or report on officers who were actively or potentially anti-Communist. For example, Anel Escalante Colas, a close

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relative of Anibal Escalante, the editor of Hoy, was made adjutant to the Chief of Information of the rebel army in Oriente Province. Other Communists, who had not participated in the fighting, but who had worked in the Communist fronts, such as the cultural organization Nuestro Tiempo, were called on to aid in the educational work of the army. An example is Amado Palenque y Sainz de la Pena.

Cuban Communist leaders have reported to foreign Communist parties that the political indoctrination given within the army is controlled by Communists. The purpose of this indoctrination has not been to emphasize or identify the role of the Communist Party or to train Communist Party members, but rather to develop a cadre of pro-Communist and crypto-Communist instructors and propagandists who accept the elementary principles of historical materialism and its associated beliefs which make up the so-called "science" of Marxian socialism. These principles include the inevitability of the decline of capitalism, the collapse of "colonialism" and "imperialism", and the development of Socialism and Communism in the image of the Chinese and Russian systems. The emphasis in the political indoctrination course has been on the development of extreme nationalism, hatred for the United States based on "evidence" (dating from the nineteenth century to the present) of outrages and injuries suffered by Cuba as the result of United States political and economic "interference" in Cuban affairs. The courses also deal with the need for agrarian reform and other generally progressive measures, again with the emphasis on the "liberation" of Cuba from foreign controls rather than on the manner in which the agrarian reform and other measures are being executed.

As a result of the Communist-controlled indoctrination courses, the preferential appointment of Communists and pro-Communists to controlling positions in the army, and the elimination of anti-Communists, non-Communists, and

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suspected nonconformists through a variety of devices, the new Cuban army is rapidly coming under the control of the Communist fraction established within it.

Cuban Communist leaders have stated, in secret sessions, that their success is due to the influence over Fidel Castro of his brother Raul -- whom they consider to be the "brains" of the revolution -- and "Che" Guevara. The Soviet political specialist on Latin America, B. Ermolaev, went even further in a speech delivered in Moscow in May 1959. Ermolaev stated that Cuba is the "revolutionary center of Latin America", and that although Fidel Castro's government contained many "unreliable elements" from the petite bourgeoisie, Raul Castro is, "speaking among ourselves", a Communist. Raul Castro currently holds the key position of Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, and has been designated by Fidel, who is the "maximum leader", as the latter's successor in event of his death or incapacity.

Neither Raul nor "Che" have ever admitted being Communist Party members, and even within the Party this is denied. However, Raul's "former" membership in the Communist youth organization has been acknowledged, on occasion, within the Party, and as long ago as 1953 he held a responsible position on the preparatory commission for the Communist-front Congress in Defense of the Rights of Youth held in Vienna. During and since the revolution he continued to work closely with the Communist youth in Cuba. His wife, Vilma Espin, is active in several Communist fronts. It has been Raul Castro who has most actively supported the coordination of international Communist youth activities in the Caribbean area and has called for a "Latin American youth congress" to be held in Cuba in mid-1960, and has supported the convocation of a Latin American "peoples' congress", which has been a Communist objective since 1956. In view of the evidence, it is not unlikely that both Raul and his wife are, in fact, secret members of the Communist Party at the present time.

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It seems less probable that "Che" Guevara is a Communist Party member. However, his close association with Communists goes back many years, and it is known that he was a member of the Mexican-Russian Cultural Institute when in Mexico. After he joined Fidel, his wife, Hilda Gadea (a Peruvian), acted in a liaison capacity between Soviet military advisors in Mexico and various Latin American revolutionaries in exile. She also worked closely with persons identified as Soviet international intelligence agents. (Gadea, now divorced from "Che", is currently employed in the Cuban Agrarian Reform Institute.) "Che" was one of Fidel Castro's small group which invaded Cuba in December 1956. As an advisor to Fidel and later the commander of his own column, he encouraged the study of Marxism among the guerrilla forces and defended the Communists, though with emphasis always on "national liberation". Subsequent to the victory, he was charged by Fidel to organize Cuban aid to the foreign revolutionaries who flocked to Cuba (including those with whom his wife had worked in Mexico), and used his authority in an effort to force these groups to accept Communists as equals in "unified" movements. Guevara's activities as commander of La Cabana fortress, the nature and activities of his appointees, the character of his trip to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, and his policies as Chief of Industrial Development of the Agrarian Reform Institute all attest to his desire to use the Cuban revolution to support Soviet foreign policy, which seeks to promote the "national liberation struggle" in Latin America and elsewhere as a means of attacking the United States and developing a neutralist bloc which is susceptible to Communist penetration. Although Guevara has relied on known Communists as bodyguards, adjutants, and appointees, and has favored Communists among the foreign revolutionists asking for Cuban aid, his denials that the Cuban revolution is Communist-influenced or supported indicate strongly that he wishes to exploit Cuba as the model of a justifiable, popular, nationalist movement

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which will generate enthusiasm in other Latin American countries and underdeveloped countries where Communism is weak or discredited.

4. Communist Influence within the Agrarian Reform Institute.

Following the initial drive to infiltrate the revolutionary army and control the political indoctrination and loyalty of its members, the Communists shifted their attention to the next important objective -- the infiltration and control of the Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA). The Institute was officially established in June 1959 under the Agrarian Reform Law drafted by Antonio Nunez Jimenez with guidance and advice from Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara. Foreign Communists were also consulted, such as Dionisio Encina of the Mexican Communist Party, possibly because of his experience in the organization of communal farms in Mexico during the Cardenas presidency. Nunez Jimenez, who has worked publicly for the Communists since 1949 and is reliably reported to be a "secret" member of the Party, was appointed the Executive Director of the Institute.

The INRA, both in theory and practice, is a government in itself. It expropriates, manages, and disposes land and other property, it undertakes public works, creates schools, issues publications, carries on "cultural activities", operates stores, and negotiates for economic aid and trade with foreign firms. Nunez Jimenez has told his high INRA chiefs, in private, that they are in fact subservient to no other agency of government. These INRA chiefs are, in practice, considered to be "commisars" in the Soviet sense, and have authority over military and civilian officials within the districts they control. The chiefs include some known and some suspected Communists, and in the lower levels of the bureaucracy are numerous known Party members. Waldo Medina, the INRA's general counsel, is a Communist, as are a number of others on the INRA staff. Thus planning and administration of the INRA is Communist-influenced



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at the very highest levels by Communists and sympathizers, who rely on advice from the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties in an attempt to bring the functions of INRA into closer agreement with the Communist theory of state control. For example: since its formation, INRA has concentrated, not on the distribution of land to landless peasants, but on the organization of peasants into collectives or cooperatives where they are to receive "profits" rather than "wages". There is no direct tribute paid to Communist Party inspiration, nor does the PSP claim credit for INRA's activities. However, in practice, the Communists have been the only group among Castro's trusted followers in Cuba who have the experience and organization to draw up draft programs, draft regulations, or "studies" which appeal to the government. They have been careful to leave the initiative in Fidel's hands, but to guide Fidel's revolution so that it will, in time, openly rely on Communist advice. Thus, after the formation of cooperatives under INRA had been approved, the Communist theoretical organ Fundamentos, for November 1959, published an article concerning the nature and function of cooperatives, supplemented by a translation of the "Reglamento Modelo para Cooperativas Avanzadas de Productores Agrícolas" (Model Regulation for Advanced Agricultural Cooperatives) of the Chinese People's Republic. These comments allegedly were offered in a "disinterested" manner, though some had already been accepted. They present an ideal picture, but the voluntary and democratic aspects which they pretend to favor are invalidated by concessions to the "present stage of the revolution". Fundamentos states that the success of the cooperatives will depend on the quality of administration by INRA, and suggests that "in this first stage, it would be advisable for each of the cooperatives to have an assessor general, appointed directly by the INRA, who, even though he might not possess technical knowledge, would be politically prepared to orient the workers and the cooperative itself along the paths laid out by the Revolutionary Government." This suggestion, which has become a matter of

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practice, is the basis for the appointment of Communists or Communist sympathizers to control the cooperatives, inasmuch as they pose as the most faithful supporters of the revolution and are "politically prepared", despite ignorance of agricultural practices.

The INRA is only one of the government agencies which the Communists seek to control, but it is the most important one for their purpose, as it will allow control of Cuba's economic wealth through a centralized bureaucratic system. Through INRA they will also be able to organize Communist control over the peasantry, thereby preventing the development of a successful rural counterrevolution.

The Castro government has planned other agencies, such as the National Institute of Urban Reform (INRU), to extend control over other sectors of the population. The INRU is to be established in February 1960, and reportedly will have confiscatory powers over all urban land, houses, buildings, and personal property attached to real property. Owners of confiscated property are to be nominally reimbursed, INRU will develop or sell buildings or dwellings on the basis of popular or individual need, and tenants will be allowed to purchase their dwellings through payments equal to their former rent (which the government has already reduced). Through the reallocation of urban property, the INRU will be in a position to control the urban bourgeoisie and to buy the loyalty of the urban proletariat. It is believed that Communist infiltration in the INRU will follow the pattern set in the INRA, though this remains to be seen. It is already apparent, from remarks made by Fidel Castro in private, that the true pattern of "democratic" government which he plans to establish is a bureaucracy controlled by representatives of the Army, the INRA, the INRU, and other autonomous agencies, rather than one controlled by popularly elected officials. It is also apparent that the bureaucracy which is now developing under Castro will be largely controlled by the Communist Party or its

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sympathizers and that elected officials and political parties may, as in the Soviet Union and China, play but inconsequential roles in government.

5. Communist Influence on Cuban Foreign Policy.

After initiating their drive to infiltrate the Army and INRA, which were their first priorities, the Communists and their sympathizers turned to control of Cuban foreign affairs. In this, they have been more concerned with concealing direct Communist participation than in other fields, but their influence has steadily grown. They have obtained the support of high officials of the Cuban government - Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, "Che" Guevara, Armando Hart, and Raul Roa (the Foreign Minister) for various international projects which are known to be Communist inspired, some having been formulated in Moscow.

The purpose for which the Communists are using Cuban foreign policy becomes evident from a review of Soviet Communist Party objectives in Latin America, and specifically, Soviet efforts to promote a Latin American "peoples' congress".

The broad objectives of current Soviet policy toward Latin America were suggested in an article in Kommunist (an important CPSU theoretical organ) in February 1956, signed by M. Danilevich. This article attacked the United States as controlling Latin America in the interest of militarism and profit, and noted the applicability to Latin America of the communique, issued by the Bandung Conference, regarding the "subordination of nations to foreign enslavement, domination, and exploitation". Further on it claimed that "the working class, headed by the Communist parties, was emerging as the most consistent defender of national interests, political and economic independence, peace and democracy." It reported, with approval, the formation of "broad coalitions of patriotic forces" and noted that the development of relations between the

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"Socialist countries" and Latin America will "facilitate the cooperation of these states in matters concerning the supporting and strengthening of peace." The article was, in effect, both a directive to the Communist parties and an offer to nationalist elements of Soviet support.

Coinciding with the publication of the Kommunist article, a special secret conference of Latin American Communist delegates to the XX CPSU Congress was held in Moscow under Soviet auspices. This conference emphasized coordination of Communist activities in Latin America, and proposed the holding of a "peoples' congress" which would be "anti-imperialist" in nature and inspired by the Communists, though attended mainly by democratic personages not linked with international Communism. It is apparent that this "peoples' congress" was designed to circumvent the generally favorable attitude of Latin American governments toward the United States by gaining the support of prominent persons for "anti-imperialist" resolutions or demagogic proposals compromising to United States policies.

The Communists were unable to organize or find sponsors for this "peoples' congress" in 1956 or 1957, and in December 1957 were reprimanded in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party officials charged with Latin American liaison. The Soviets insisted that the "peoples' congress" had become a matter of high priority, and requested further action. Consequently various Latin American Communist party representatives met privately at the Argentine Peace Congress in May 1958 to discuss the organization of the congress, which was mentioned publicly (for the first and only time) in the Bulletin of the World Peace Council later in the year. A tentative date for the Congress (4-7 December 1958) was set, but again the Communists had difficulty in finding non-Communist sponsors and, as the Argentine government became increasingly anti-Communist, the Congress was postponed. Subsequently, it was decided to hold it in some other country, where conditions would be more favorable.

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In February 1959, the CPSU again sponsored a secret conference of Latin American Communist party delegates in Moscow, at the time of the XXI CPSU Congress. The subject of the "peoples' congress" was again discussed, and it was decided that the main theme should be the "defense of national resources." As before, the Soviets indicated that "anti-imperialist" language should be avoided in gaining support for the congress, although the final resolutions should be exploitable for the anti-imperialist campaign. The Communist initiative in calling the congress should be concealed, and leaders such as Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, and Jose Figueres of Costa Rica were suggested as persons who might be "used" to convoke the meeting, thereby assuring it of popular support. Finally, it was decided that "fraternal delegates" from Africa and Asia were to be invited.

As Communist influence in the Cuban government increased, responsibility for the organization of the "peoples' congress" was transferred to the Communist Party of Cuba. The anti-Communist statements and actions on the part of Figueres and Betancourt, otherwise relatively favorably disposed toward the Castro government, probably have eliminated them from consideration as possible sponsors of the Congress. However, a new spokesman has been found in Armando Hart, the youthful Cuban Minister of Education who had already revealed his pro-Communist tendencies by appointing Antonio Nunez Jimenez to a commission charged with rewriting the history of Cuba for use in the public schools. Hart was acting as interim Foreign Minister in July 1959, prior to the appointment of Raul Roa, and used this position to greet foreign delegates to the "Agrarian Reform Forum". He told these delegates that, as Minister of Education:

"I have the intention of convoking in Cuba a congress of political leaders and Latin American personalities,

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among whom will be intellectuals, not specifically government delegates, representatives of institutions, universities, and the workers. In that congress it will be possible to trace the lines of the political future of Latin America. ... It is necessary to establish the fact that it is not only the governments and their armies which determine the policies of countries. "

In advancing this project (which foreign Communist parties quickly identified as the "peoples' congress" planned in Moscow) Hart revealed himself as the instrument of the Communists, who through "unity from below" are seeking to circumvent and subvert legitimate governments in the conduct of their national and foreign affairs.

Subsequently, when Foreign Minister Roa went to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Santiago de Chile in August 1959, Education Minister Hart went also as head of a special mission to meet with leaders of opposition groups from various countries. These included representatives of various Communist and Socialist parties, members of labor organizations, youth movements, and political opposition fronts. Hart was accompanied by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez of the Cuban Communist Party, and was joined later by Raul Castro. These leaders met unofficially, independent of the Foreign Ministers, in order to examine (according to Radio Peiping) the problem of strengthening the "national and democratic movement" in Latin America. Subsequently, the National Action Front (FRAP) of Chile, which played host to the meeting, announced its adherence to Hart's proposal for holding a "congress of democratic personages, representatives of political parties and social and cultural organizations." Raul Castro, who went to Santiago to meet with youth representatives, announced his support of Hart's proposal in September, at which time he also proposed publicly that the Latin American youth congress be held in Havana.

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Paralleling the unofficial meetings attended by Hart and Raul Castro, the representatives of the various Communist parties met secretly at the headquarters of the Communist Party of Chile. Each leader reported on conditions in his own country, the problems which faced the Communists, and the discontent which might be exploited by them. The Cuban representative, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, was appointed to visit various Latin American countries and to prepare a study on the social and economic situation which would be used in preparation for the "peoples' congress". Subsequently, Rodriguez visited Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries where he conferred with various Communist leaders, asking them to prepare material and to visit Cuba to further discuss the matter. In October, therefore, representatives of the Communist Parties of these countries met in Havana, during the plenary session of the Central Committee of CP Cuba. They set a tentative date for the Congress in early 1960 and planned an agenda which would stress the economic development of underdeveloped nations, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and the struggle against "dictatorships". It was also decided that the congress should be formally convoked through a manifesto signed by well-known non-Communists, probably including Lazaro Cardenas of Mexico, Salvador Allende of Chile, Oswaldo Aranha of Brazil, Wolfgang Larrazabal of Venezuela, and others described by "Che" Guevara as forming the "possible nucleus of a unified position" which might lead Latin American countries to develop the "enviable cohesion maintained by the Afro-Asian countries since the Bandung Conference." Although the sponsors of the conference have not as yet issued their manifesto, and some have not even been approached on the matter, the various Communist parties involved in planning the congress already have special representatives in Havana forming a permanent organizing committee.

The Latin American "peoples congress", as planned by the Soviet and Latin American Communists, is clearly the type of

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non-governmental Communist-controlled "popular" meeting which the International Communist Movement desires prior to (or as a substitute for) action on the official level. It will, if held, be similar in purpose to the "Asian Conference for the Relaxation of International Tensions" which was held in April 1955, just prior to the Bandung Conference, and which gave rise to the Asian Solidarity Committee. It will be similar to the second "Arab Peoples' Conference", which, when united with the Asian campaign, gave rise to the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Cairo, at which was established the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee.

The campaign in Latin America to unify anti-imperialist and nationalist elements, to the detriment of the United States and the advantage of the Sino-Soviet bloc, thus follows the pattern set in Asia. The organizers have been a small group of professional Communist party members aided by reliable sympathizers already active in front activities. As in Asia, the Communists want to follow up the "popular" congress with action at an official level; thus Danilevich, writing in Kommunist in 1956, set the Bandung Conference as a model for Latin American anti-colonial action. At that time, Danilevich noted that "political development" in Latin America was not as "advanced" as in Asia, obviously referring to the anti-Communist orientation of the governments, and not to their long history of political independence. The Communist infiltration of the Castro government in Cuba has changed this picture, however, and has now given the Communists an opportunity to operate at the official diplomatic level. This has been done, apparently, largely through the influence of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara and the medium of Raul Roa, the Foreign Minister, who recently called for a "congress of underdeveloped nations" to be held in Havana.

The tour of Ernesto ("Che") Guevara to the Afro-Asian countries (June-September 1959) initiated the Cuban policy of

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attempting to draw Latin America closer to these countries in defense of a "neutralist" policy. Official formulation of the policy, however, and the accompanying reorganization of the Cuban Foreign Ministry apparently awaited the return of Guevara from his trip. The nature of the new policy was first outlined, informally, by Guevara on his arrival at the airport on 8 September. It was next described by Raul Castro on 11 September, at which time he approved the Communist-inspired plans for youth and peoples' congresses in Cuba. Guevara further defined the policy on 14 September, and finally, Foreign Minister Raul Roa officially delineated the new policy at the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September.

The new Cuban policy emphasizes sovereignty and independence; neutrality with respect to the capitalist and Communist blocs; and solidarity with the "underdeveloped nations" of Asia and Africa. Cuban officials have particularly emphasized the "third position". Guevara firmly states that he is not a Communist, and that he believes Cuba does not need a Communist system "at this moment". Roa has called capitalism and Communism "twin evils". Yet in practice, Cuban "neutralism" is used as a means of attacking the United States to the benefit of international Communism. Moreover, it is apparent that foreign policy, as carried on by the Foreign Ministry, is supplemented at all levels by government-approved activities designed to circumvent foreign governments by appealing directly to certain groups who are opposed, or potentially opposed, to their governments. Thus the Cuban government, largely through "Che" Guevara, is known to have provided training, supplies, advice, and propaganda support to revolutionary groups seeking to overthrow the governments of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and certain other Latin American countries. Communist or pro-Communist groups have been particularly favored. Representatives of youth and student organizations, labor organizations, and other groups in foreign countries are given subsidized trips

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to Cuba where they are subjected to propaganda and indoctrination. Cuban diplomatic officials, as well as non-governmental representatives, are used to facilitate organizational activities abroad. For example, Cuban Ambassador Rene Rayneri Parla in El Salvador has been actively involved in Salvadoran labor and student affairs, and reportedly supplied Cuban funds to help the Communist-dominated General Confederation of Salvadoran Labor organize a congress to which other Central American leaders would be invited. In another instance, the Guatemalan government specifically accused the Cuban Ambassador, in conjunction with other high Cuban officials, of complicity in an oppositionist plot against the government. In November 1959, the Venezuelan government rejected Cuban Ambassador Pividals' efforts to have Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara visit Venezuela.

As part of its unofficial foreign policy, and to promote "unity from below" the Cuban government has encouraged and subsidized Cuban participation in Communist-front congresses, such as the World Youth Festival in Vienna (attended by 140 Cubans) and the Communist-organized Latin American Women's Congress in Santiago de Chile. It has encouraged the holding in Cuba of international meetings, often of a Communist-front character, and the participation of foreign "observers" (including Soviet representatives) at Cuban meetings, such as the congress of the Cuban Confederation of Labor. On occasion, Cuban officials use such meetings as platforms for the exposition of Communist-line views on foreign affairs. Thus Antonio Nunez Jimenez, Communist Director of the Agrarian Reform Institute, used the "Inter-American Radio Announcers' Congress" in Havana as a forum for attacking the relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico.

The decision of the Cuban government to organize a "conference of underdeveloped nations" in Havana in late 1960 is one facet of the new foreign policy. It is apparent that the Communist parties in the various Latin American countries, through

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the research undertaken and the non-Communist support acquired in preparation for the "peoples' congress", will be prepared to offer arguments in favor of various "anti-imperialist" or "anti-colonial" views or to levy demands on the "imperialist" or "colonialist" powers. It is probable that the Communist parties in Asia and Africa, through their fronts, will also seek to encourage official participation in the congress and to influence the delegations. Under the conditions existing in Cuba, the congress, if held, will certainly be used as a forum for the presentation of demagogic appeals and denunciations based, in all probability, on the preparatory work done by the Communist parties. It is even more certain that the activities of the congress, regardless of the true outcome, will be propagandized as a victory for the unity of "hungry nations" against imperialist and colonialist oppressors. This will be possible through the controlled Cuban press, now almost completely at the service of the Castro government, and the Communist-dominated Prensa Latina, which now has working agreements with TASS, the New China News Agency, and various Satellite or Communist-infiltrated agencies in other parts of the world.

As with the "peoples' congress", it is probable that the Communists wish to avoid direct participation of known party members in the "underdeveloped nations conference". Raul Roa, the Cuban Foreign Minister, has been closely associated with Communists and Soviet agents, but is not believed to be a Communist Party member or necessarily a sympathizer. Eugenio Soler Alonso, new Cuban Ambassador to India who is visiting the Middle and Far East to seek Asian support for the congress, was well known as a Cuban Communist Party member between 1933 and 1951. He published a column in Hoy, the CP newspaper, until 1945, and has been Cuban correspondent of the Daily Worker, the organ of the CP of the United States. As of 1951, however, he was referred to in Hoy as an "expelled" Communist Party member who had joined the Autentico Party of

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President Prio. As is the case with many "expelled" or "former" Communists, it is not known whether he has, in fact, broken with the Party, or whether he remains a crypto-Communist who has been assigned, in the words of Liu Shao-ch'i, to "gain power in the organizations and institutions in which he works for as long as necessary, without revealing his party affiliation."

#### 6. Conclusion

In review, it is evident that after the increasing military strength and popular support enjoyed by Fidel Castro became apparent in early 1958, the Communists decided to take advantage of the movement's democratic nature and the youth and political inexperience of its leaders. With the aid of Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara, they infiltrated the guerrilla forces and later gained control over the political indoctrination and personnel assignments in the armed forces. They then put their organizational experience to work in the Agrarian Reform Institute, using concepts supplied by the Chinese as a means of diverting Fidel Castro from a policy of aid to individual peasant families to the organization of large-scale "cooperatives" controlled by appointed officials. Next, in the field of foreign relations, Communists sought to inspire or control government policy. Covertly, Cuban Communist Party leaders have conferred with foreign Communist leaders, including those of the USSR and China, and have drawn up plans and undertaken studies for execution by the Castro government. Overtly, Communist sympathizers in the government have encouraged participation in Communist-front congresses and have aided foreign groups in opposition to the established governments in Latin America. Finally, on the official diplomatic level, Communists have apparently provided the inspiration for an attempt to develop unity among the "underdeveloped" nations, using "anti-imperialism" and "anti-colonialism" as a basis for common action, while claiming that such unity will promote neutralism and independence.

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
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That such neutralism and independence is regarded by Communists only as a step toward international Communist domination is evidenced in the words of the Cuban Communist Party program, which are paralleled in Communist party programs throughout the world. The ultimate goal is that of leading Cuba to "Socialism" under the guidance of the Communist Party, which signifies the incorporation of Cuba into the "Socialist Bloc" headed by the USSR and China and controlled by the international Communist party apparatus.

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TO BAY OF PIGS

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#### LATIN AMERICA

4.

Communists Continue to Expand Role in Castro Regime:  
The Castro regime is believed to be considering the appointment of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez as minister of finance to replace Rolando Diaz Astarain, the compliant but ineffective incumbent, who was an obscure naval officer until his appointment to the cabinet last November. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a leading member of the Communists' Popular Socialist party and editor of the party daily, has long been among Castro's close advisers. The heavy workload of Fidel Castro and his chief aides, "Che" Guevara, Antonio Nunez Jimenez, and Raul Castro--all three of them indistinguishable from Communists--may dictate the sharing of administrative responsibilities with Rodriguez, even though his open Communist affiliation would be a political handicap in the rest of Latin America. Shortage of trained personnel is seriously affecting the Foreign Ministry. The sixth Cuban ambassador to defect in the past 30 days, the ambassador in Bonn, announced on 11 July that he will seek asylum in the United States.

12 July 60

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST  
Supplement

Page 2

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
1997

[REDACTED]

In a move of considerable potential significance, all provincial officers of the powerful Cuban Workers' Confederation (CTC) have been replaced by "men who truly respond to the revolutionary movement in which the country now lives," according to the Cuban press. The CTC, the regime's chief instrument of control over labor, is now almost completely Communist dominated.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the presence of Czech technicians at Campo Libertad, Cuba's chief military base.

Two prominent Panamanian politicians and the Brazilian and Mexican ambassadors in Panama, reacting to Khrushchev's 9 July offer of Soviet support to the Castro regime, agree that the US now has ample basis to call immediately for OAS action against Castro. They are convinced that Khrushchev has overplayed his hand.

Foreign Minister Roa, who landed in New York without requesting prior permission to come to the United States, on 11 July requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council to consider the worsening relations between the United States and Cuba. As early as 7 July, according to [REDACTED], Roa informed the UAR ambassador in Havana that Cuba would submit its case to the UN and asked UAR help in getting the support of the governments of Ceylon and Cambodia. Roa added that the Soviet Union has already offered its support. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

14 July 1960

## CUBA

- I. Enthusiastic initial response of Castro officials to Khrushchev's public support was reflected in speeches at 10 July mass rally, but there was an interesting contrast between "Che" Guevara's and Fidel Castro's speeches that suggests Fidel's possible embarrassment at Soviet embrace of his regime.
- A. Guevara told crowds "Cuba today is a glorious island defended by the rockets of the greatest military power in history... We are practically the arbiters of world peace."
- B. But Fidel, in his sickbed TV talk on the same day, while recognizing Khrushchev's "spontaneous" declaration of support, said: "Cuba does not depend for the defense of its sovereignty and independence on Soviet rockets, but rather on the reason and justice of its cause."
- C. By 13 July, Guevara indicated that he may have had a change of heart when he said in an interview: "Any Soviet attempt to establish a Communist satellite in Cuba would be resisted to the last drop of blood."
- D. Most educated Cubans oppose alignment with Soviet bloc, and though opposition still unorganized and leaderless, US embassy believes implications of Khrushchev's speech should be a powerful influence in developments over next few weeks.
- II. Internally, trends continue toward tighter dictatorship and enhanced Communist influence.
- A. [REDACTED] growing number of arrests of "counterrevolutionaries."
- [REDACTED]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS SANITIZED  
1997

- [REDACTED]
1. [REDACTED] on 7 July ordered detention 17 officers of Castro's army.
- B. Pro-Castro lawyers, some in militia uniform, seized offices Havana Bar Association and on 8 July named new governing board.
1. The duly elected board is protesting to President Dorticos, who is president of National Bar Association, but probably to no avail.
  2. Ambassador Bonsal comments: "This is another important step in establishing monolithic support of government by professional institutions."
- C. Cuban press announced 6 July that all provincial officers of powerful Communist-controlled Cuban Workers' Confederation have been replaced by men "who truly respond to the revolutionary moment in which the country now lives."
- D. Communist leader Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is becoming increasingly prominent and we have reports that he may be named minister of finance.
1. He has long been one of Castro's closest advisers, but until recently has remained in background.
- E. Cuban ambassador in Bonn defected 11 July with strong anti-Castro, anti-Communist declaration and announcement he would work to oust Castro.
1. He was sixth ambassador to defect in last 30 days.
- F. US Embassy has growing feeling that Castro may be willing to sacrifice Cuban interests for sake of what appears to be his greater ambition--humiliation of US, wrecking of inter-American system, and eventual "liberation" of all Latin America.



[REDACTED]

G. Castro's illness apparently genuine, but we have only the reports of his doctors to go on. They say he has slight lung infection, which suggests pneumonia or pleurisy, and will be laid up for several weeks. There is nothing to confirm rumors of a mental breakdown.

III. Castro's ministers of economy and commerce reported worried over possible US embargo on foodstuffs, but are confident they can lick oil and sugar problems.

A. Reliable contact of embassy's agricultural attache says these officials feel they would face "dangerous situation" if US cuts off food shipments to Cuba (primarily lard, rice, flour, and corn.) They fear this would be worse than imminent shortage of farm and industrial machinery parts.

B. Current very depressed market for tanker charters eases Soviet effort to supply Cuba with oil.

1. ~~Market for tankers is depressed~~ <sup>The</sup> depressed market <sup>enables</sup> ~~the~~ Soviet Union <sup>to</sup> ~~can~~ deliver oil to Cuba and other distant markets at competitive prices.

2. British, Norwegian governments have already indicated to American embassies their inability to influence tanker owners against accepting Soviet charters or to violate existing arrangements.

IV. In 12 July press conference, Khrushchev ridiculed reports of Soviet interest in military bases in Cuba: "A most silly fabrication. What do we need bases in Cuba for?"

A. Highly doubtful that Soviet Union would carry its commitments to Cuba to extent of establishing base there.



[REDACTED]

V. Among the US acts of "intervention" and "aggression" cited in Cuba's request for UN Security Council action was "the recent meeting of the NSC, at which the future of Cuba was discussed as if that country were a factory or a subject people."

VI. Khrushchev's missile threat and Cuba's call for UN Security Council debate have startled many Latin American governments out of earlier aloofness, and majority favor formal inter-American consideration of problem. (end)

A. OAS Council is to meet Saturday morning to consider Peru's request for meeting of foreign ministers.

1. Meeting would be primarily concerned with Cuban problem.
2. Several high-ranking Argentine foreign ministry officials had favored a similar initiative.
3. Brazilian foreign ministry officials favor a strong stand on Cuba.
4. Chile is now expected to support a call for an OAS meeting on Cuba despite its previous insistence on an informal Latin American effort to conciliate US-Cuban differences.
5. Most smaller Latin American countries have for some time supported view that the Cuban regime is a hemisphere problem.

B. But most Latin Americans fear domestic reaction to pro-Castro groups.

1. Brazilian, Bolivian, Chilean, Peruvian, and Venezuelan officials have expressed concern that pro-Castro strength in their countries will limit their ability to support the US.

[REDACTED]

C. Mexico, probably traditionally the most sensitive to any suggestion of foreign interference in internal affairs, has taken equivocal stand.

1. Strongly pro-Cuban leftist minority attacking US policy on Cuba and pressuring Lopez Mateos government to take firmer pro-Cuban stand.

a. On 7 July influential leftist ex-president Lazaro Cardenas attacked US "economic aggression" against Cuba, compared Cuban position today to Mexican position after foreign oil interests seized there in 1938.

b. Communist leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano reliably reported planning mass rally in Mexico City at unnamed date, ostensibly to support Lopez Mateos, but probably to pressure him into firmer pro-Castro policy.

c. Leftists may further seek to exploit innate Mexican resentment of US "interference" in its affairs.

2. Only clarification of Mexico's official position on Castro regime given in 11 July press release by Foreign Minister Tello.

a. Declared recent pro-Cuban statements by Mexican congressmen do "not necessarily" reflect opinions of Lopez Mateos administration.

b. Recognized existence in Mexico of "deep affection" for Cuban people.

c. Advocated efforts to solve US-Cuban difficulties within framework of OAS.

[REDACTED]

VII. Latin Americans appear surprised at US announcement of new aid plan for hemisphere.

- A. Only official comment to date is from Brazil. President Kubitschek in press statements 11 and 12 July seemed annoyed he not consulted, expressed hope that plan, when known, would show US has adopted positive attitude toward his "Operation Pan America."
1. Said "palliatives and emergency measures" will never cure the ills that beset Pan-Americanism.
  2. Kubitschek's chief foreign policy advisor quoted privately and in press 11 July as saying "Fidel Castro had to make a pact with Russia before the US would think about OPA."
- B. Bolivian leader right-wing government forces commenting on Cuban situation 12 July said privately "unlikely any Latin American country would speak out very strongly against Castro in OAS since all grateful to him for awakening US to Latin American realities."
- 2
- [REDACTED]

LATIN AMERICA


6. Guatemalan Exiles' Contacts With Cuban Government:

[REDACTED] an Argentine communiqué regarding "subversive propaganda" found in a pouch addressed to the Cuban Embassy and expressed the opinion that one of the items proved there is a link between Guatemalan "emigrants" living in Argentina and the Cuban Government. After mentioning items found in the pouch such as books on guerrilla warfare "for use in guerrilla actions in northern Argentina," [REDACTED] called attention "forcefully" to a letter "which came for Manuel Galich with the correct address, thus proving the connection between Guatemalan emigrants and the Cuban authorities."

Manuel Galich used to be secretary general of an organization of Guatemalans who received asylum in Argentina after the revolution in Guatemala in 1954. In recent months, however, he reportedly has been connected with an international group located in Havana and Caracas and headed by former Guatemalan President Juan Jose Arevalo. According to an untested source with Cuban connections in Buenos Aires, the Guatemalan exile group in Argentina is in close contact with Cuba's press agency, Prensa Latina. Guatemala has been deeply concerned that Cuba might aid revolutionary plotting by the exiles, some of whom are friends of Argentine-born "Che" Guevara, Cuba's economic czar who lived in Guatemala before the revolution. [REDACTED]

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TO BAY OF PIGS

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#### LATIN AMERICA

6.

Venezuelan-Cuban Relations Continue to Deteriorate: In a speech of 28 July, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one of Cuba's top political leaders, made a number of disparaging remarks about Venezuelan President Betancourt which will probably intensify the division in Venezuela over the explosive issue of relations with the Cuban Government and could eventually lead to an open rift between the two countries. Referring to the recent fatal shooting by Caracas police of a pro-Cuban propagandist, Guevara termed the incident a murder, and called Betancourt "simply a prisoner of his forces of repression," and of a regime which "claims to be democratic...." Guevara added that "whenever

3 Aug 60

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Page 4

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1997



[REDACTED]

Betancourt...decides to ask for help from a sister nation, Cuba is here to teach Venezuela some of the experience it has gained in the revolutionary field."

The pro-Castro Venezuelan foreign minister subsequently announced that an energetic formal protest against Guevara's comments would be presented to Cuba, and Betancourt's Democratic Action party, which has been sympathetic toward the Cuban revolution, also condemned them.

Betancourt is known to be hostile toward Castro but has maintained superficially friendly if cool official relations toward his regime, apparently because of the strong pro-Castro elements in Venezuela, including many of the leaders of the Democratic Republican Union which is a member of the governing coalition. However, Guevara's remarks and the disturbances fomented by pro-Castro groups in Caracas on 22 and 26 July--which brought a warning from the President that the organizations involved might be outlawed--may influence Betancourt to take a firmer stand on the Cuban issue in both foreign policy and domestic politics.

[REDACTED]

7.

[REDACTED]



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

4 August 1960

CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

Fidel Castro is evidently under the care of doctors, but the extent of his illness is uncertain. He remains the symbolic embodiment of the Cuban revolution to the Cuban masses,

upon whom the regime has come increasingly to depend, and should his health dictate that he step down, any likely interregnum or immediate successor would continue to rule in his name.

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 6 of 8

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 19

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

4 August 1960

Raul Castro--who has cut short his foreign tour--would be at least the nominal head of any immediate successor or caretaker regime.

There are indications that Fidel Castro's authority in the government may have been significantly reduced in recent weeks and that the pro-Communist clique headed by the ambitious and hard-driving "Che" Guevara may have gained correspondingly in power. Guevara, whose administrative abilities contrast sharply with Castro's own disorganized methods of governing, has become the virtual tsar of Cuba's state-directed economy and exerts considerable influence in other areas of government. A usually reliable source with high-level contacts in the regime reported in late July that Guevara had replaced Castro's bodyguards with his own personal guards. Concern over Castro's present state of mind is given as the reason for Guevara's reported action, which in effect would make Castro a prisoner.

President Dorticos, a former Communist who has never recanted, has shown himself to be a stronger personality than his figurehead status would imply, and he would become an even more influential figure if Fidel Castro should temporarily or permanently leave power.

The Argentine and Brazilian ambassadors in Havana--who have shown themselves unusually astute observers--are becoming convinced that Castro has become, in fact, a prisoner. Argentine Ambassador Amoedo, a personal friend of Castro's, reached that conclusion after meeting on 23 July with the Cuban premier.

Meanwhile, the Castro regime is faced with growing problems on a number of fronts. Though serious petroleum shortages do not appear imminent, early problems could come from a shortage of refinery spare parts and special lubricants. Soviet oil deliveries to date have not been sufficient to meet normal Cuban demand, but with careful allocation, supplies should be adequate to prevent a serious oil shortage.

Scheduled deliveries on both Soviet and free-world tankers reveal that oil shipments in August will considerably exceed the 155,000 tons delivered in July.

major Cuban air bases have been under orders since early July to submit daily fuel stock reports. Two naval bases reported that their supplies were exhausted.

Bombings and shootings are on the rise in Havana, and

numerous orders for the arrest of "counterrevolutionaries" and investigation of acts of sabotage. A source with contacts in government circles reported in late July that the government has become aware of a conspiracy in the armed forces and is awaiting the opportune moment to arrest the conspirators.

On the international front, the virulent attacks on other hemisphere governments delivered



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

4 August 1960

by "Che" Guevara and others during the Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress have further aroused other Latin American governments against the Cuban regime. Venezuela, for instance, is formally protesting Guevara's description of President Betancourt as the "prisoner of his government's forces of repression." The Cuban charges may have repercussions at the forthcoming meeting of the OAS foreign ministers in Costa Rica. After convening on 16 August to discuss Venezuela's charges against the Trujillo dictatorship, the foreign ministers are to consider the dangers to the inter-American system posed by Cuba's increasingly close ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Mexico, seeking to avoid a sharp clash in the OAS on this subject, has won at least initial Brazilian and Canadian support for a joint effort to "mediate the dispute between Cuba and the United States." Such an effort would appeal to some hemisphere governments such as Chile, but others--including Argentina, Colombia, and Peru and most of the Central American countries--appear to support the United States' view that OAS action is necessary to deal with the Cuban problem, since it is more than a Cuban-US dispute and involves a direct challenge to the inter-American system, for which all OAS members are responsible.

\* \* \*



### III. THE WEST

Cuba: The potential exists for a power struggle between Raul Castro, Fidel's designated heir, and "Che" Guevara, who has already assumed much of the authority formerly exercised by the

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
1997

5 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

III



5 Aug 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 1



elder Castro. The danger to the regime of such a power struggle will increase if Fidel Castro's illness is prolonged. Neither Raul Castro, Guevara, nor the increasingly influential President Dorticos possesses Fidel Castro's great popular appeal among lower income groups, upon which the regime has come to depend.

Meanwhile, Cuban officials have exhorted delegates to the Communist-dominated Latin American Youth Congress to carry the struggle initiated by Cuba for "Latin American liberation" back to their home countries. [REDACTED]

#### LATE ITEM

\*USSR-Cuba: Two officials of the Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate--the component of Moscow's Ministry of Foreign Trade responsible for the supply of arms and military equipment to foreign countries--have been in Havana. One of these men, Yastrebov, is the Soviet official responsible for the shipment to nonbloc countries of military equipment from the Black Sea port of Nikolaev, where almost all Soviet arms shipments originate. His presence in Havana strongly suggests that Moscow has agreed to provide military aid to the Castro regime. Similar arrangements between Czechoslovakia and Cuba may have been worked out earlier this year, although no bloc arms are believed yet to have been delivered. [REDACTED]

N<sup>o</sup>

[REDACTED]

5 Aug 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

5 Aug 60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Page 1



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TO BAY OF PIGS



LATIN AMERICA

10. Argentina Concerned Over Cuban Links With Peronistas:  
The Argentine ambassador to Washington is said to have stated recently that his country is watching the Cuban situation only inasmuch as it affects Argentina because of the presence in Cuba of certain well-known Peronistas and also because of the prominence there of Argentine-born "Che" Guevara, Cuba's economic tsar. This report is attributed to a usually reliable Latin American with good contacts in Latin American social and diplomatic circles in Mexico. However, it underplays Argentine concern over possible international Communist intervention in the hemisphere, demonstrated by Buenos Aires' request of 15 July to Premier Castro to disavow Khrushchev's missile rattling, but it accurately reflects the concern over Cuban links with Peronista subversive activities.

The source reports that the Argentine ex-dictator was at first opposed to the support his followers gave the Cuban leader but, finding himself in a minority, finally agreed to "ally himself with Castro," as recommended by two important Peronista leaders now living in Cuba. Links with Cuba are still opposed by some Peronistas in Argentina, such as the Peronista Youth Group, which refused to attend the recent Latin American Youth Conference in Havana. The Dominican ambassador to Belgium, Porfirio Rubirosa, recently served as an intermediary between Peron in Madrid and his supporters in Cuba, according to the report.



CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1997





CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

15 September 1960

CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Soviet ship Ilya Mech-  
nikov arrived at Havana with a  
4,000-ton cargo on 8 September,  
the first major bloc arms ship-  
ment to the Castro regime. The  
cargo apparently included  
armored vehicles, artillery, and  
a variety of other weapons and  
equipment. Jet aircraft also  
may have been delivered. In  
July, four or five Soviet MI-4  
helicopters and at least 10,000  
Czech rifles and submachine  
guns had been delivered to  
Havana.

Following Castro's 2 Sep-  
tember announcement that Cuba  
will establish relations with  
Peiping, the head of the Ha-  
vana office of the New China  
News Agency has notified the  
Cuban Foreign Ministry that he  
had been designated by Peiping  
to negotiate the exchange of  
diplomatic missions. Numerous  
mass organizations in Communist  
China have sent congratulatory  
messages to their counterparts  
in Cuba since Castro's speech.

Khrushchev will pay his  
long-promised visit to Cuba  
after his trip to New York for

the opening of the UN General  
Assembly, according to

The Cuban Government has  
announced that Fidel Castro  
himself is to head Cuba's UN  
General Assembly delegation,  
which will also include Foreign  
Minister Roa and Munoz Jimenez,  
the head of Cuba's Communist-  
dominated Agrarian Reform In-  
stitute. Castro will use the  
world forum for further attacks  
on the United States and to  
hold up his revolution as an ex-  
ample for all underdeveloped  
nations and colonial areas. The  
Cuban delegation is expected  
to support the Soviet position  
on all important issues.

Meanwhile, open opposi-  
tion to Castro inside Cuba is  
still uncoordinated and lacks  
effective leadership. The  
Castro forces apparently have  
had no success in routing the  
guerrilla bands that have been  
forming in the Escambray Moun-  
tains of central Cuba for some

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 3 of 11

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 21

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Page 1 of 17

1997  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

15 September 1960

months. Castro publicly minimized the importance of the guerrillas on 9 September, but the regime actually appears to be taking the threat of a guerrilla build-up seriously. Unconfirmed reports allege that the head of the National Bank, "Che" Guevara, whose experience in guerrilla warfare the regime regards highly, oversaw antiguerrilla operations between 9 and 12 September.

The Cuban consul in Hong Kong broke with the Castro regime on 12 September and wants to come to the United States.

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 4 of 11

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 21

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Page 1 of 17

CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

Fidel Castro's experience at the United Nations has apparently whetted his appetite for international politics and strengthened his view of himself as a leader of the people, not only of Latin America, but of all underdeveloped countries, in their "struggle against imperialism." The virtually unqualified identification of Cuba's foreign policy with that of the USSR, evident in Castro's UN address, shows signs of being played down and the theme of Cuba's association with world neutralist leaders stressed. On his return to Cuba, Castro declared that Ghana's Nkrumah may visit Cuba late this year and Nasir may visit next March.

The Castro regime, which has given increasing propaganda support to the cause of the Algerian rebels, is apparently to act as host later this month for a conference sponsored by the "Algerian Aid Committee" based in Morocco. The committee member representing the Communists' World Federation of Trade Unions had urged Havana as the site of the conference.

On his departure from New York on 28 September, Castro declared that he expected to return to the United Nations in a few weeks, and New York hotel managers reported on 3 October that Cubans had been seeking

reservations for a party headed by Fidel or Raul Castro beginning 23 October. Castro told a Cuban television audience on 30 September that "we are thinking of presenting a motion in the United Nations against racial segregation in the United States."

Cuba's withdrawal on 4 October of its candidacy for a UN Security Council seat, which it had little hope of winning, may have been in return for a promise by some Latin American delegations for support for a council seat next year.

Cuban propaganda media continue their almost hysterical attacks on the United States, and some proclaim that the embassy's advice to American citizens to leave Cuba fore-shadows armed intervention by the United States. The \$100,-000,000 US Government - owned Nicaro nickel plant was seized by the workers' militia on 1 October following the delivery of a US note announcing closure of the plant because of confiscatory Cuban taxes. Castro responded publicly, saying, "They spend a billion dollars on espionage and 40 billion on arms, but now, after exploiting our mineral resources for many years, they object to paying a 25-percent tax.... Let the plant be closed."

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

6 October 1960

Cuban Government agencies appear fearful of the imposition of controls on exports to Cuba. According to rumors prevalent in Havana, they are forming companies in the United States to purchase scarce items for indirect shipment to Cuba.

Instructions have been sent by the National Bank of Cuba to all New York banks concerned to transfer to the United Kingdom or Canada the balances held for the account of Cuban banks. The amount of balances and securities held by Cuban banks in New York banks as of 31 August is reported to be slightly in excess of \$9,000,000. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was likewise instructed to dispose of \$1,645,000 in gold held by the Fund for the Bank of Cuba and to transfer the proceeds to the Bank of England.

These moves are probably intended to safeguard Cuban assets from any freezing action by the United States. The transfer of Cuban gold held by the IMF may presage Cuba's withdrawal from the Fund. If so, it would mean a further solidification of Cuban trade ties with the Soviet bloc. There are currently no bloc members in the IMF.

On 3 October, the National Bank of Cuba purchased in New York the equivalent of nearly \$4,500,000 in pounds sterling and ordered its deposit in London to the account of the Czech State Bank. This transaction was probably a payment for bloc arms.

A Bulgarian trade delegation, headed by the first deputy foreign trade minister, arrived in Cuba on 30 September. The expected trade agreement will be the seventh concluded by Cuba this year with bloc countries. The second major shipment of military equipment from the Soviet Union

recently arrived, and further shipments are expected.

Che Guevara is to visit Moscow in early November for the anniversary celebrations of the Soviet revolution, and Carlos Franqui, pro-Communist director of the government's newspaper, and several other newsmen left on 29 September to study Soviet journalism. Numerous other Cubans now are visiting Moscow, Peiping, and satellite capitals. At the same time, two East German and two Czech professors arrived in Cuba in late September as guests of the Cuban Government.

Chou En-lai's message to Castro in late September, on the occasion of the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between Havana and Peiping, promised "every possible support and assistance to the Cuban people, in case of need."

The "International Voluntary Labor Brigade," which came to Cuba under Communist-front sponsorship last July to work on a Cuban school center, left on 1 October after a send-off featuring an address by Guevara. Guevara told the youths, who were said to have represented 43 countries, that "we of this generation will see the world liberated completely, even if we have to undergo the greatest of sufferings."

On the domestic scene, the armed forces and militia are evidently still suffering casualties in the regime's efforts to suppress guerrilla activity in the Escambray Mountains. Press sources report the launching on 4 October of an all-out government drive to rout the guerrillas and the capture by government forces of an arms cache destined for the rebels which had been dropped by an aircraft from an unknown destination.

On 2 October the Catholic archbishop of Santiago, in



2 [REDACTED] 1

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

6 October 1960

Oriente Province, issued a pastoral letter constituting the strongest anti-Communist statement yet made by any church official in Cuba. The archbishop, according to a high church official, intends to follow up with pastoral letters about once a month, regardless of what other Cuban bishops do. Although the church is weak in Cuba, it is in

a psychologically favorable position in Oriente to head such a campaign because many priests there participated in the fight against the Batista dictatorship, and the archbishop himself is credited with saving Fidel Castro's life in 1953 after he had been captured by the Batista forces. [REDACTED]

SSR Increase Attention to Cuba

Since the US announcement of a partial embargo on shipments to Cuba, Moscow has stepped up its propaganda coverage of the Cuban situation. The Soviet press now carries daily warnings of alleged American plans for "counterrevolutionary invasions" from Guatemalan bases and denunciations of US trade restrictions and of Ambassador Bonsal's recall. On 22 October Soviet propaganda media gave full and prominent coverage to the reception of a Cuban journalist delegation by Khrushchev and top Soviet journalists, and Izvestia's front page was dominated by reports of "invasion preparations organized by the US."

At the United Nations on 19 October, Soviet delegate Zorin departed from the text of a speech on disarmament to make a statement supporting Cuba, noting Cuban accusations of "US aggression and acts of intervention" and charging the United States with a policy of "open military provocations." Moscow has, however, avoided any suggestion that the USSR might intervene militarily in Cuba, and there have been no references to Khrushchev's threat on 9 July to use rockets in support of Castro.

In its nonbloc trade the USSR is apparently giving top priority to filling Cuban requirements, and in the wake of new US economic restrictions will probably move to demonstrate still further its willingness to back up in economic terms its

moral and political support of the "national liberation struggle." Moscow already has made considerable and relatively costly readjustments in its shipping operations to accommodate Cuban petroleum requests and to make timely deliveries of such items as fertilizers, wheat, and, more recently, agricultural machinery and equipment.

Havana probably will seek additional economic support from the bloc. However, because of the nature of its industrial plant, Cuba may be forced to seek immediate alternate sources of supply in nonbloc countries--possibly Canada--which are better equipped to supply Cuban import needs. This may exert further pressure on Cuba's foreign exchange position.

"Che" Guevara, president of the Cuban National Bank, left on 21 October for an economic mission to the bloc and now is in Prague conferring with economic officials. He is scheduled to go on to the USSR, Communist China, North Korea, and East Germany.

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
1997

26 Oct 60

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST

Page 1

A HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 27 October 1960

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1997

CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Che Guevara's ten-man economic mission to Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Communist China, North Korea, and East Germany left Cuba on 21 October. On the eve of his departure, Guevara told a television audience that he was going primarily to negotiate Cuba's commercial exchange for the coming year under trade pacts with these countries. Guevara will probably seek expanded arrangements with the bloc to compensate for items that Cuba can no longer receive from the United States. However, because of the nature of Cuba's industrial plant, it may be forced to seek immediate alternative sources of supply in nonbloc countries, which are better equipped to supply Cuba's import needs.

His TV talk clearly implied efforts toward the further economic integration of Cuba with the bloc. He referred to foreign "comrades" in the Cuban Petroleum Institute "who are going to the USSR to get equipment" and implied that bloc technicians in other industries are also performing such services.

Cuba and Rumania signed a trade agreement and technical assistance protocol in Havana on 25 October, and a joint communiqué declared their intention to exchange ambassadors. The composition of the Rumanian delegation suggests that that country may provide Cuba with technical assistance for its petroleum industry.

Moscow has moved on several fronts this past week to foster the impression that there is a real danger that the US will intervene militarily in Cuba and that, in that event, the USSR stands ready to lend every assistance to Cuba. The Soviet

objectives are apparently to increase suspicion of US intentions and to stimulate some action by the neutralists in the United Nations which might put the United States in an embarrassing position.

Soviet propaganda coverage of the Cuban situation has been stepped up and now includes daily warnings of alleged American plans for "counterrevolutionary invasions," along with denunciations of US trade restrictions and of Ambassador Bonsal's recall. At the United Nations, the Soviet delegation has come out strongly in support of the Cuban complaint, which includes the charge that the US is planning to begin a large-scale invasion of the country "in a few days."

Despite these efforts to arouse concern over the possibility of US intervention in Cuba, it seems unlikely that the USSR anticipates such action. Khrushchev's threat on 9 July to use rockets "if necessary" in defense of the Castro government in the event of US aggression was so qualified as not actually to constitute a commitment to any specific course of action, and it has never been repeated. Furthermore, TASS quoted Khrushchev as saying in a press interview on 25 September, when asked about his rocket threat,

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 4 of 11

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 21

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

27 October 1960

"...you needn't worry.... Since America does not intend to attack Cuba, this means that there is no danger whatsoever."

Soviet bloc military shipments to Cuba thus far include small arms, machine guns, anti-aircraft artillery, and tanks. More shipments are expected. The quantity of this equipment is clearly excessive for Cuban internal needs and will permit release of Cuba's Western-manufactured weapons for clandestine military support elsewhere in the hemisphere, should this be the Cuban intention.

In view of the lack of qualified personnel in Cuba, the Castro regime will be required to rely heavily on the Soviet bloc for training the Cuban military in the use and maintenance of the new weapons and military-related items such as communications equipment and radar. Increasing numbers of Cubans will probably be sent to the bloc for training, particularly if the Castro regime follows through with its apparent decision to build up a qualified "defense force" based on Soviet bloc equipment.

The Cuban Government responded to the new US export restrictions by increasing its propaganda attacks on the United States for this "new act of aggression." On 25 October, most of the remaining American-owned businesses in Cuba were nationalized.

Most other Latin American governments appear to feel that the US action was justified. Official circles in Mexico and Chile, however, are critical and feel it will give Castro an important propaganda advantage in the hemisphere. Other governments, while sympathetic to the US position, have expressed concern over what they expect will

be a strong negative reaction among the Latin American public.

Some of these governments may also see the move as obviating the need for their own participation in any future multilateral sanctions against the Castro regime. Many Latin American leaders prefer to regard the Cuban issue as a bilateral problem between the United States and Cuba, and the Ecuadorean foreign minister frankly explained that a number of Latin American governments are too weak to run ahead of public opinion on this issue.

The Castro regime, which has been embarrassed by a number of defections this year among Cuban officials abroad, is apparently recalling diplomatic and consular officers to screen them. Officials in Brazil and Mexico are already returning home, and more will probably follow. A decree of 27 September removed job tenure rights from foreign service personnel. It is becoming apparent that those officials regarded as "reliable" for foreign assignment are those who unquestioningly accept and are willing to promote the Communist position on Cuban and international issues. The Cuban ambassador appointed to Paris on 20 October, for instance, has a long record of Communist associations.

Scattered opposition groups continue active inside Cuba despite elaborate government efforts to give the impression they have been wiped out.

Counterrevolutionary activity and acts of sabotage in many parts of the country. Widespread rumors in Oriente Province suggest that a new "invasion force" of about 80 persons landed on the north coast on or about 20 October, and increased government military



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

27 October 1960

activity noted in that province lends support to reports of continued guerrilla activity. There is still no indication, however, that the opposition has the unity and leadership necessary to become a genuine threat to the regime.

In the cities, tenants are reported to have reacted with enthusiasm to the 15 October urban reform law, which offers them the prospect of becoming homeowners. The government probably calculated that the solidification of its support among lower income groups would more than compensate for the further alienation of the landlords, many of whom will lose their sole source of income.

[REDACTED] the formation of "revolutionary watch committees" throughout the country. They are evidently in response to Fidel Castro's call on 28 September for the establishment of a block warden informant network in towns and cities as another instrument to combat "counterrevolutionary intrigue." The Cuban Army G-2 is to have "complete responsibility" for the committee.

[REDACTED]

The Cuban Foreign Ministry [redacted] [redacted] approval from the North Vietnamese Government for a joint communiqué announcing establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and North Vietnam on the ambassadorial level. Havana suggested that the communiqué be issued on 15 November. North Vietnam has consular posts in Burma, Indonesia, and India, but Guinea is the only nonbloc nation to which a North Vietnamese ambassador is presently accredited. Hanoi will view establishment of its first diplomatic post in the western hemisphere as a major breakthrough in its campaign for greater international acceptance.

Recognition of North Vietnam is a further move by Cuba toward solidarity with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Cuba will then have diplomatic relations with all Sino-Soviet countries except Albania, Mongolia, and East Germany. It has concluded an interbank economic agreement with East Germany, and diplomatic recognition may be imminent. The most recent economic agreement made by Cuba with a bloc country was signed on 25 October with Romania and was the eighth trade and technical assistance agreement concluded this year with a bloc country. Cuban National Bank President Guevara, now on a mission to five bloc countries, is expected to sign a trade agreement with North Korea next month.

Cuban Army Inspector General William Galvez visited Hanoi last May. In September a North Vietnamese party central committee member attending an academic conference in Mexico announced his intention to visit Cuba, but the visit apparently never materialized. [redacted] expressed their desire to send a government delegation to Cuba on a goodwill visit. This group may be on hand when recognition is publicly announced.

North Vietnam may agree to supply small quantities of rice to Cuba under a token trade agreement between the two countries. Cuba previously was considering the purchase of rice from South Vietnam, but probably will switch this order to Hanoi following the establishment of diplomatic relations. A small quantity of North Vietnamese rice has already been shipped to Cuba on Soviet account, and several shipments are being scheduled from Communist China. [redacted]

DELETED  
NOT RELEVANT  
TO BAY OF PIGS

--Che Guevara's economic mission has left Cuba for the USSR, Communist China, and other bloc states to arrange for next year's trade with these countries and to further



[REDACTED]

integrate Cuba economically with the bloc. Soviet propaganda coverage of the Cuban situation has been stepped up and now includes daily warnings of alleged American plans for "counter-revolutionary invasions," along with denunciations of US trade restrictions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

US EMBASSY  
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3 November 1960

## CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

Che Guevara, pro-Communist head of Cuba's banking system who is probably the chief architect of the country's ex-

trême economic policies, arrived on 29 October in Moscow, the second stop on his mission to five Sino-Soviet bloc countries.

In Prague, he signed an agreement increasing Czechoslovakia's original \$20,000,000 credit to Cuba to \$40,000,000 and negotiated details for the coming year of a general trade agreement signed last June.

The expanded Czech credit is reported in the Cuban press to be for the purpose of "re-activating" Cuba's automotive industry and is to be used to assemble in Cuba Czech tractors, motorcycles, and stationary engines, and eventually trucks and automobiles. Guevara may also have made arrangements to pay the Czechs for the military equipment Cuba has received.

in Moscow, Guevara is reported to be negotiating with Mikoyan, presumably on the details of Cuban-Soviet trade for 1961, and he may attempt to increase the \$100,000,000 Soviet credit negotiated last February. Thus far there is no indication that Cuba has secured promises in the bloc for the purchase of more than the approximately 40 percent of Cuba's sugar exports which the bloc is already committed to buy.

Guevara is scheduled to go next to Peiping, presumably for negotiations similar to those in Moscow. Cuba's trade and technical assistance agreements with Communist China were signed last July. Guevara is to travel from Peiping to North Korea, where trade and cooperation agreements are expected

to be concluded. Guevara's last stop is to be in East Germany; he signed a one-year agreement last March with the East German State Bank and will probably seek an extension during the visit.

There is no indication that Guevara intends at this time to travel to the other bloc countries--Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria--that have concluded trade agreements with the Castro regime.

The American naval attaché has received a report that 25 Czech technicians are in Cuba assisting the Cuban military on the weapons already delivered from the Soviet bloc. The total number of such technicians probably will eventually reach a much higher figure, and more military equipment probably will be sent to Cuba. Further units of the Cuban civilian militia are believed to have been issued Soviet bloc arms during the week of 30 October.

SECRET  
NO FORN DISSEM  
NO FORN DISSEM  
NO FORN DISSEM

~~SECRET~~

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
APRIL 1994

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RELEASE IN FULL 1997

Meanwhile, in his interview with Cuban journalists on 22 October--not released by JASS until the 28th, when Cuban charges of an imminent invasion were reaching a peak--Khrushchev again showed his reluctance to be drawn into too precise a reiteration or elaboration of his 9 July rocket threat. In a reply to a request to comment on statements that the warning was purely symbolic, he said he "would

like such statements to be really symbolic." For this, he added, it is essential that "imperialists' threat of intervention" not materialize. "Then there will be no need to test the reality of our statement...."

Although the Soviet press has maintained a large volume of comment on alleged US plans for an invasion of Cuba, it has relied heavily on citations from foreign press accounts and avoided official commentary. The US Embassy in Moscow suggests this may reflect a wish not to arouse the Soviet public unduly.

On the domestic scene, the Castro regime has put the country on a virtual war footing in anticipation of what the government repeatedly charges are plans for an imminent invasion of Cuba by US-supported "counterrevolutionary" elements. On 30 October, the national directorate of the Cuban militia called on all male militiamen in the Havana area to assemble at designated points as part of "national mobilization" to meet the invaders. Some militia units were sent from the Havana area to other points in

the country, and assemblies of militiamen took place in many parts of the island. On 1 November, radio stations in the capital urged Cubans to donate blood for "the casualties of a possible imperialist invasion."

Antiaircraft batteries have been installed in coastal areas and on the Isle of Pines. Reconnaissance flights were made on 27 and 28 October from Cuba over the Swan Islands and the Guatemalan Caribbean coast--areas where the "invasion" forces are allegedly being assembled.

Cuban propaganda on 2 November suggested that the next tactic of the regime will be to claim that the "imperialist-supported invasion forces" were frightened off from making their attack by the Cuban preparations. However, a leading member of the underground opposition movement within Cuba reported on 27 October that the Castro regime is planning to stage a bombing attack itself on certain Cuban targets with Cuban planes marked with Guatemalan insignia. This "attack" would be used to support Cuban propaganda at home and to "prove" its charges against the United States now being discussed at the United Nations.

A possible indication of future Cuban tactics with respect to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay came in an interview given by Fidel Castro to a UAR newsmen. He is quoted as saying that Cubans are not such "idiots" as to try to seize the base by force. Instead, Cuba will demand through the United Nations that the base be evacuated. (SECRET)

Electrostatic reproduction made by the  
Electronics Division for replacement  
of a 0-11 and 1-11 from the  
original

3 November 1960

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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 3 of 11

PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 21

PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Page 1 of 13

3 November 1960

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the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations between Cuba and North Vietnam. The

Cuban Foreign Ministry

to seek the approval of the North Vietnamese Government for a joint communiqué announcing such a move. Havana suggested that the communiqué be made public on 15 November. At present, Guinea is the only nonbloc nation to which a North Vietnamese ambassador is accredited. Hanoi will view establishment of its first diplomatic post in the western hemisphere as a major breakthrough in its campaign for greater international acceptance.

North Vietnam has little to offer Cuba economically, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with that satellite is important chiefly as a further move by Cuba toward solidarity with the Sino-Soviet bloc. Cuba already has diplomatic relations with all other bloc countries but Albania, Mongolia, and East Germany, and diplomatic recognition of the last may be imminent.

The American naval attaché has received a report that 25 Czech technicians are in Cuba assisting the Cuban military on the weapons already delivered from the Soviet bloc. The total number of such technicians probably will eventually reach a much higher figure, and more military equipment probably will be sent to Cuba. Further units of the Cuban civilian militia are believed to have been issued Soviet bloc arms during the week of 30 October.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

3 November 1960

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Antiaircraft batteries have been installed in coastal areas and on the Isle of Pines.

Cuban army and navy units were placed on varying degrees of alert. Chiefs of the army, navy, and air force ordered situation reports every three hours, and air and naval patrols were instituted in various areas. Stations of the internal military communications network were ordered on 24-hour duty. Reconnaissance flights were made on 27 and 28 October from Cuba over the Swan Islands and the Guatemalan Caribbean coast--areas where the "invasion" forces are allegedly being assembled.

Cuban propaganda on 2 November suggested that the next tactic of the regime will be to claim that the "imperialist--supported invasion forces" were frightened off from making their attack by the Cuban preparations. However, a leading member of the underground opposition movement within Cuba reported on 27 October that the Castro regime is planning to stage a bombing attack itself on certain Cuban targets with Cuban planes marked with Guatemalan insignia. This "attack" would be used to support Cuban propaganda at home and to "prove" its charges against the United States now being discussed at the United Nations.

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 5 of 11

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 21

PART III


PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

Page 1 of 10

5. Castro Regime Plans Arms Aid  
To Guatemalan Leftists

The Castro regime is giving financial assistance and intends to provide weapons to the Guatemalan Communist party and a Communist-infiltrated Guatemalan revolutionary group, according to a usually reliable source with contacts among high Cuban officials. "Che" Guevara, with the approval of Fidel and Raul Castro, is said to have given the Guatemalan groups \$15,000 last month on the condition that the Guatemalan Communists play the leading role in the revolution.

Former Guatemalan President Arbenz, now in Cuba, is to be the "Havana representative" of the movement. The goal is the destruction of the Guatemalan Army and the arming of the "masses," as in Cuba.



CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM  
RELEASE AS SANITIZED  
1997

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 9 November 1960

RELEASE AS SANITIZED

1997

## CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS

Observances in Havana of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution included a special reception for the Soviet ambassador given by the government-controlled labor confederation and attended by high Cuban officials. Ambassador Kudryavtsev again pledged Soviet "aid and support" for the Cuban revolution."

Che Guevara, on the Moscow leg of his five-nation Sino-Soviet bloc economic mission, issued a statement for the 7 November festivities in which he implied a similarity between the early post-revolutionary struggles of the Soviet people, "the first in the world to take power in their own hands," and Cuba's current experiences. He added that the Soviet people "supported us by your warnings to the imperialists, thus destroying their machinations against Cuba." Moscow press reporting of a recent speech by President Dorticos suggests a Cuban-Soviet decision to claim that Cuban mobilization and the Soviet rocket threat have so far averted the "imperialist aggression" that a week ago was declared imminent.

[REDACTED] at least 43 of the Spanish-speaking pilots, presumably Cubans, being trained in Czechoslovakia may have had no prior flight experience and are undergoing primary training in piston-type planes. Over 100 Cubans are believed to have gone to Czechoslovakia for training last July and August.

[REDACTED] four more Soviet helicopters left a Soviet port on 26 October for Cuba aboard the freighter Arkhangelsk. Cuba has already received perhaps as many as ten such helicopters. Meanwhile, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] confirm earlier reports that Czech sub-machine guns have been issued to units of the Cuban Army.

East German Communist leader Paul Verner, who attended the Cuban Communist party congress last August, said late last month that Cuba will probably announce its recognition of East Germany in December, according to [REDACTED]

Verner added that the possibility of closer Cuban - East German economic cooperation will be thoroughly explored in the near future. He was probably referring to the scheduled arrival of Che Guevara's economic mission in East Germany later this month or early next. Cuban journalists visiting East Germany on 4 November signed an agreement with "East German journalists" for cooperation in the "anti-imperialist struggle," according to the East German news agency.

An increasing number of Cuban delegations are now traveling in the Sino-Soviet bloc: a ballet troupe and a "peace" movement delegation are in the USSR; journalist delegations are visiting East Germany and USSR; a labor delegation is in the USSR; and a "health" mission has been visiting Communist China and North Korea.

[REDACTED] the Cuban Embassy in Prague

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

9 November 1960

[REDACTED], including Abraham Grobart. Grobart, a 55-year-old veteran of the international Communist movement, lived in Cuba between 1924 and 1950. He became a Cuban citizen in 1936, after which he was repeatedly and reliably reported to be the top Soviet agent in the Caribbean area. He is known to have been high in the councils of the Cuban Communists' Popular Socialist party. In 1950, he was smuggled out of Cuba on a Soviet vessel and since then has presumably been in Prague or Moscow.

Meanwhile, Cuba is apparently seeking to circumvent US export controls by expanding its trade relations with Canadian and Western European firms which could provide equipment unavailable in the bloc at this time. The press has reported the negotiation of a deal under which a "pool" of Canadian and British firms would sell Cuba equipment and buy Cuban sugar and gasoline --the latter presumably refined from Soviet crude. The sponsors of the "pool" would reportedly invite West European firms to join.

A Canadian Embassy officer in Havana told the US Embassy on 4 November that the press stories were presumably based on the activities in Cuba of a Canadian promoter who is known to have discussed such a scheme with Cuban economic officials. The Canadian expressed an unfavorable opinion of the promoter and doubted that any "responsible" Canadian interest would join in the scheme. However, he could not discount the possibility that some independent distributor in Canada may be interested in handling Cuban gasoline.

The Castro regime continues its active propaganda support for leftist-revolutionary groups in other Latin American countries and is reportedly aiding some of them materially. A usually reliable source with contacts among high Cuban officials reports, for instance, that Che Guevara, with the approval of Fidel and Raul Castro, is giving financial assistance and intends to provide weapons to the Guatemalan Communist party and a Communist-infiltrated Guatemalan revolutionary group on the condition that the Guatemalan Communists play the leading role in a revolution designed to destroy the Guatemalan Army and arm the masses. Former Guatemalan President Arbenz and Guatemalan Communist leaders Fortuny and Pellecer now are in Cuba and reportedly are involved in the plot.

The sudden resurgence of leftist influence in El Salvador after the 26 October coup could lead to a situation easily exploited by the Cubans and could become a serious threat to the Guatemalan and other Central American governments.

[REDACTED] the Nicaraguan ambassador in Costa Rica reported to President Somoza that an officer of the Cuban Embassy in Costa Rica had promised military aid to the Nicaraguan revolutionary movement.

Cuban propaganda media continue to attack Venezuelan President Betancourt, and to support the strong extreme leftist and Communist opposition to his government. Communist and Communist-infiltrated parties and groups in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and other countries have publicly declared their support for Castro

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

Page 5 of 9

PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Page 1 of 20

PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

9 November 1960

in recent weeks, and a usually reliable Brazilian student source reports that the Cuban Embassy in Rio de Janeiro organized and financed the pro-Castro demonstration there on 4 November.

[REDACTED]  
Peruvian concern over the reported infiltration of Cuban agents into neighboring Ecuador. The Cubans' purposes are said to be to cause disturbances during the inter-American conference scheduled to open in the Ecuadorian capital next March and to support Ecuador's position in its border dispute with Peru.

Havana continues to strengthen its military potential, particularly through the civilian militia, on the pretext of preparing for an attack by "imperialist-backed counter-revolutionaries." A usually reliable source resident in the city of Santiago reports that

the militia in Santiago Province has been notably improved in discipline and effectiveness and concludes that it is probably capable of suppressing any rebellion or invasion by counterrevolutionaries. Selected militiamen are being formed into units to handle some of the more complex weapons such as antiaircraft artillery received from the Soviet bloc.

[REDACTED]  
Communist penetration of the militia, probably extensive, [REDACTED]

the adjutant of a military district instructed a subordinate that, in order to organize the militia in his zone, he should summon various military and civilian leaders, including leaders of the Popular Socialist (Communist) party. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

GENERAL

East Germany and Cuba Establishing  
Closer Cultural Ties

Six East German university rectors, who had attended a conference in Mexico, went to Cuba in September as official guests of the Cuban Education Ministry, according to a usually reliable source. On its return to East Germany, the delegation reported that agreements had been concluded with Cuban educational organizations calling for the East German Advanced School for Economics to send teaching and correspondence-course material to the University of Havana and to the director of the Cuban Communist newspaper Hoy.

The Cubans reportedly expressed an interest in further agreements and contracts providing technical personnel, language teachers, study plans, and other teaching materials. Appropriate East German offices have been instructed to review their teaching materials for translation into Spanish. According to [REDACTED], the draft of a cultural agreement drawn

up by the Cuban Government has already been sent to East Berlin for consideration.

Paul Verner, a candidate member of East Germany's politburo, apparently spent two months in Cuba this summer and evidently made some progress in his regime's drive for expansion of economic and cultural relations and diplomatic recognition. "Che" Guevara, the Communist president of the National Bank of Cuba, is scheduled to visit East Berlin later this year. Along with other bloc countries, East Germany is expanding trade and supplying technical aid and has agreed to construct several complete industrial installations in Cuba. The television services of East Germany and Cuba concluded an agreement in August providing for continuous exchange programs.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

23 November 1960

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## THE CUBAN MILITIA

As the Castro regime continues to strengthen and tighten its police state control, it is evident that one of its primary instruments is the militia, a force of some 200,000 "volunteers" being organized with increasing efficiency throughout the island. Organizationally distinct from the regular armed forces, this militia is equiv-

alent on a population basis to a 5,600,000-man militia in the United States.

First organized after long Communist urging late last year, the militia has grown markedly in recent weeks as a result of the officially inspired "war spirit" of late October. The threat of an "imminent invasion"

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

23 November 1960

from the United States was used to justify a nationwide mobilization and an intensive training program to prepare "the people" to resist "imperialist aggression." Although the mobilization and "the defense of our revolution by the Socialist countries" now are credited with having staved off the immediate threat



Cuban Militia

of invasion, the militia continues to be strengthened.

The Cuban militia, similar in organization and purpose to that of Communist China, is not only a force for police control, but a means of subjecting a large number of Cubans to military discipline and political indoctrination. The militia also provides the regime with a cheap labor force while it reduces the threat of political unrest stemming from Cuba's chronically serious unemployment problem. It could also prove valuable against antigovernment activity in the less politically reliable regular armed forces.

Communist penetration is extensive at all levels of the militia. In Communist jargon, the organization of the militia

the organization of a militia is synonymous with "the arming of the people," an objective which Communist and pro-Castro groups throughout Latin America claim is a necessary ingredient of a successful revolution and must be accompanied by the destruction of the regular armed forces.

While the bulk of militia members--both men and women--undergo regular part-time military training and political indoctrination, a hard core is assigned full-time duties normally the responsibility of the regular armed forces.

Various militia units are being trained in antiaircraft artillery, are preparing to manufacture anti-tank mines and other similar objects, and are operating at least some of the outlying stations of the internal communications network.

Meanwhile, the economic mission headed by Che Guevara arrived in Peiping on 17 November after receiving high-level attention and lavish praise at earlier stops in Prague and Moscow. In Peiping, Guevara had an "intimate" talk with Mao Tse-tung on 19 November and hailed Communist China for its "defense of our newborn revolution," adding that Communist China's "22 years of struggle...has revealed a new road for the Americas." After a tour of a Chinese commune, Guevara said that "the Latin American people have many things to learn from the people's communes and all the other social systems adopted by China."


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31 August 1961

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

BRAZIL

The sudden resignation of Janio Quadros from the Brazilian presidency on 25 August has precipitated a constitutional crisis because of the adamant opposition of War Minister Denys and other military leaders to the assumption of Quadros' power by leftist Vice President Joao Goulart. Goulart's right to succession has been supported on constitutional grounds by most political leaders and a minority of the military, particularly former War Minister Lott and the commander of the powerful Third Army in southern Brazil. On 31 August, Congress overwhelmingly passed a resolution to amend the constitution, transforming the presidency into a figurehead office under a parliamentary form of government with a prime minister appointed by Congress.

Quadros' resignation followed a period of growing tension with the military over his policy of closer relations with bloc countries, and an outburst of public criticism for having given Brazil's highest decoration to Che Guevara. The precise motivations of his impulsive resignation are, however, still unclear. If he was counting on being swept back quickly into the presidency by a wave of public protest, he greatly misjudged public opinion. There were a number of initial expressions of dismay, but the widespread subsequent reaction was criticism of Quadros for acting irresponsibly in the face of admitted difficulties.

[REDACTED] suggested that Quadros plans an effort to swing public opinion in his favor by attributing his resignation to US pressure. Such a statement might touch off anti-US demon-

strations on a larger scale than those immediately following his resignation.

Goulart's Career

The 43-year-old "Jango" Goulart comes from a well-to-do background in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, of which his brother-in-law, Leonel Brizola, is currently governor. From the beginning of his national political career in 1950, Goulart was a protégé of President Vargas and was generally regarded as his political heir when Vargas committed suicide in August 1954. Goulart had tried particularly to build up labor support for himself, cooperating in a number of ways with the Communists for this purpose. Military resentment of his leftist views and varied activities as Minister of Labor had caused his forced resignation from Vargas' cabinet in February 1954.

Supported by his own Brazilian Labor Party and several others, and accepted as running mate by the popular Kubitschek, Goulart won the vice-presidency in the 1955 election and further strengthened his political organization during Kubitschek's Presidency. In the 1960 election both he and his presidential running-mate, ex-War Minister Lott, received Communist endorsement. He defeated Quadros' running-mate by a considerably smaller margin than Quadros' edge over Lott.

Quadros as president tended to keep Goulart at arm's length politically but sent him to the USSR and Communist China a few weeks ago on an official visit. During his Chinese visit, Goulart went out of his way to praise the successes of Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communists. He [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] that Brazil would recognize Communist China, but in gradual



CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

steps beginning with a vote against any moratorium on discussing the China admission issue at the forthcoming UN General Assembly. While in Peiping he completed a trade agreement calling for trade of \$28,000,000 each way annually.

Concern for Constitutionality

The reaction of Denys and the two other service ministers to the prospect of Goulart's wielding Quadros' powers was a natural consequence of Goulart's past career and general reputation as a political opportunist, as well as the growing concern in Brazilian military circles over Quadros' policy on closer relations with the Communist bloc. Much of the support as Goulart has received since Quadros' resignation must be attributed not to his personal political appeal but to the general feeling--much stronger in Brazil than in most Latin American countries--that constitutionality should be respected in times of crisis.

Military leaders first sought a legal solution whereby Congress would amend the constitution to bar Goulart from office and provide for an acceptable successor. A constitutional amendment can be proposed by one fourth of either chamber and becomes law if passed in two successive votes by two thirds of the total membership of each house of Congress. Congressmen apparently felt, however, that barring Goulart would offend the popular Brazilian feeling for legality.

Moreover, the Brazilian constitution provides that if both the presidency and the vice presidency should be vacated during the first half of a presidential term, elections must be held within 60 days. While such elections would normally appeal to many of Brazil's political leaders, most of the ambitious men with a good chance at the top post now hold posts which would bar them from becoming presidential candidates within the next several months. Constitutional provisions bar from candidacy those who have been governors or cabinet ministers within six months of the election, as well as "a President who may have exercised the office for any time in the term immediately preceding."

Reactions Abroad

Latin American public reaction to Quadros' resignation has reflected almost universal surprise, accompanied by a number of parallels drawn by the press between this event and President Vargas' suicide in 1954. Except from Cuba, there has thus far been little commentary on the question of the presidential succession.

Ecuadorean President Velasco, who has faced growing moderate-rightist opposition to his pro-Castro, leftist foreign policy in recent weeks, including some military plotting against his regime, is [REDACTED] alarmed by Quadros' action and fears that similar circumstances in Ecuador might force him out of office.

[REDACTED] that Brazilian developments could have a pronounced effect in Ecuador because of the

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

analogous political-military relations in the two countries. The Argentine Government, which recently confronted sharply adverse reactions from its military leaders when Cuba's economic czar Che Guevara visited President Frondizi immediately after his visit with Quadros in Brazil, has maintained a cautious reserve on the Brazilian situation. One official characterized Quadros' retirement and its aftermath as primarily an internal Brazilian affair. The Mexican Government, which along with Ecuador and Brazil has followed policies favorable to the Castro regime, has limited its comments on Brazilian developments to vague generalities. All three governments will presumably shelve their Cuban-inspired project to mediate the "Cuban-US problem"--a project which,

[REDACTED], has been under discussion since early June.

The Castro regime has attributed Quadros' resignation to pressures from the US and branded it as part of the US "imperialist" plot to encircle and isolate Cuba. The Cuban reaction reflects considerable concern over the loss of one of its principal friends in the hemisphere. In a public address on 29 August, Castro urged the Brazilian people to "take up arms...and take to the

mountains and jungles" to fight the military leaders who are trying to keep Vice President Goulart from becoming president. The Brazilian Communist party, which has often collaborated with Goulart, has generally kept in the background during the past few days but has [REDACTED] decided to agitate if necessary for his return to the country and accession to the presidency.

Both Moscow and Peiping, following a line similar to that of Cuba, have placed the responsibility for the Brazilian situation on "imperialist" US machinations designed to oust a statesman who was attempting to free his country from the US "monopolistic" and "colonialist" yoke, and have also denounced the efforts of "reactionary" elements to block Goulart.

Local Situation

Many aspects of the situation in Brazil are still fluid and confused. Denys on 30 August relieved the Third Army commander, General Machado Lopes, but orders [REDACTED] have been issued in Rio Grande to arrest any officer sent to relieve Machado Lopes. Early on 31 August a government communiqué announced that the Second Army, with air and naval support, had undertaken an "action in force" against Rio Grande do Sul, [REDACTED]

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Operations

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# STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE



A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects of intelligence.

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*Guerrilla intelligence, ways to combat it, and organizational roles in counter-guerrilla warfare.*

## COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

M. H. Schlattareggia

If one is to become proficient in counter-guerrilla operations,<sup>1</sup> one must prepare by learning everything there is to know about guerrilla operations. It follows that if one is to become knowledgeable in the specialty of counterintelligence in counter-guerrilla operations, one must know the objectives, organizational patterns, and modus operandi of typical guerrilla intelligence. It will be comforting to the counter-guerrilla intelligence officer to know something also of the counterintelligence methods employed by guerrillas, to the extent that they have a methodical counterintelligence.

### *The Guerrillas' Intelligence*

How do guerrilla intelligence needs—their Essential Elements of Information—differ from those of conventional forces? For conventional forces it has long been U.S. Army doctrine that the division commander needs to know how many battalions of infantry, artillery, or armor are on his immediate front, how many are within reinforcing distance, and how long would it take for reinforcements to arrive in supporting positions. He wants also additional order-of-battle information such as the identities of units and commanders. He seeks answers to such questions as whether the enemy is going to attack, where, when, with how many battalions, and with what objectives, whether he will defend a position and in what strength, whether he will withdraw and when and

<sup>1</sup>Note that this article is confined strictly to the counter-guerrilla aspect of the broader concept "counter insurgency" currently prominent in official communications.

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whither. Such EEI stem from the objective of conventional warfare—to impose one's will on the enemy by whatever force is necessary.

This manifestly is not and cannot be the objective of guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas' objectives are to harass, weaken, demoralize, disrupt; they cannot hope to win wars against massive conventional forces. Their EEI stem from these objectives. They need to know about movements of small convoys and troop detachments, their timing and their routes. They must know intimately the terrain along such routes to select good points for ambush or attack. They must know the terrain offering approaches to these points and possible routes of withdrawal from them. They have to know how the convoys and detachments are armed and protected.

Moreover, the guerrillas must know in detail the complete layout of installations like fortified villages, supply dumps, and command posts which they are going to attack, their defensive structures and the strength, tactical practices, and weapons of the guards, what booty the installations offer, and approaches and withdrawal routes from them. They need intimate knowledge of rail lines and roads and of bridges and other critical points on them suitable for sabotage or attack from ambush. Their main concern with the kind of intelligence needed by conventional forces is for defensive purposes: they seek information on movements of major enemy forces to be forewarned of encirclements or sweeps of their base or bivouac areas.

What are the sources for these kinds of information and what sort of intelligence organization is formed to procure it? In their early formative periods, at least, most guerrilla bands of the past have had no formal intelligence organization; many of their leaders have not had the sophistication even to harbor a conscious concept of intelligence. The Pathan tribesmen on the Northwest Frontier of old India, whose main sport and livelihood has for centuries been the ambushing of caravans in mountain passes and who make guerrilla-type attacks on their neighbors in the conduct of blood feuds, might be called natural experts at guerrilla warfare. They certainly don't sit down in council to organize intelligence collection forces or process collected information; but you can

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imagine a tribesman skulking high up on a mountainside, camouflaged by natural coloration and his clothes, watching caravan routes below for great distances and then, by runner or signals, passing the word to his fellows that it is time to get into position for attack. Despite Jomo Kenyatta's education in London and Moscow and the sophistication of several other Kikuyu leaders in the Mau Mau guerrilla actions of the early 1950's, one finds little in the writings of British analysts concerning any Mau Mau organization for acquiring intelligence; but you do find reference to the advantage the "gangster" enjoyed in knowing the area better and his "added advantage of good observation points both on the forest fringe and on the moorland areas."<sup>1</sup>

Regardless of its lack of formal organization, every guerrilla force of any size which enjoys any success has a ready-made intelligence collection agency—the people on the ground. If the guerrilla movement in fact springs from these people, if it represents a popular wave of feeling against the government or occupying power, the people on the ground—the peasant or coolie farmer, the laborer, much of whatever middle classes there are—will feed information to the guerrillas spontaneously. As the guerrilla leader becomes experienced, he will improve on this spontaneous flow by teaching the people accuracy in their reporting and by instructing the most intelligent, trustworthy, and courageous of them in what he particularly needs to know and in how to make observations and report them. He will also augment it with trained patrols and with clandestine agents, the latter particularly for penetrations. He will work to improve the speed, accuracy, and security of the communications by which this information gets to him, whether by runners, signals, or electronic means.

In Communist practices, particularly, if not all the people in the area fully support the guerrilla effort, those who do not will be harassed by pressures and if necessary by terrorist methods, and at the same time indoctrination teams will exercise persuasion on the populace. Ultimately, as the movement grows, the Communist guerrillas will develop rather

<sup>1</sup>Major P. M. Slane, M. C., The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, "Tactical Problems in Kenya," *Army Quarterly*, Vol. 69 (October 1954), pp. 45-52.

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sophisticated intelligence requirements, organization, and production. Intelligence documents captured by the French from the Ho Chi Minh forces before the 1954 Geneva agreement to divide Viet Nam included remarkably accurate order-of-battle studies on the French units and other situation reports, summaries, and estimates of a high caliber.<sup>3</sup>

The guerrillas' primary source of intelligence is then the people of the area, the sea, as Mao Tse-tung characterized it in which the guerrilla fish swims. The guerrilla intelligence effort may be anything from a primitive, instinctive activity in the casual hand of the leader to fully organized work under a true intelligence staff section at the main base or redoubt. Collection facilities can run the gamut from the spontaneous reporting of haphazard information to a system of patrols, observation posts, surveillance teams, sentries, clandestine networks, penetration agents, prisoner interrogations, and technical intelligence. Communist-directed guerrillas will tend toward the sophisticated, the more so the longer they operate successfully.<sup>4</sup>

This, then, is the intelligence target, the problem confronting the counterintelligence organization of any counter-guerrilla force. How does that organization go about its task of stopping, disrupting, manipulating, or negating the intelligence operations of the guerrillas?<sup>5</sup>

#### *Keeping the Fish from their Sea*

Certainly it appears from this analysis that the greatest single problem is that of stopping the flow of information from the people on the ground to the guerrillas. There is a choice of two approaches to this problem. The first is to move the people from the guerrilla area—particularly the peasant or coolie farmers, but also all the population of small villages—to relocation centers where they have neither access to infor-

<sup>3</sup> See G. K. Tanham, *Doctrine and Tactics of Revolutionary Warfare: The Viet Minh in Indochina*, Rand Memorandum 2395, Sept. 20, 1959.

<sup>4</sup> A survey of source materials on guerrilla intelligence is included as an appendix to this paper.

<sup>5</sup> Some current areas of confusion in delimiting the task of counter-intelligence with respect to that of positive intelligence and that of counter-insurgent action are discussed in a note appended to this paper.

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mation nor contact with the guerrillas. The second is a massive application of normal police/counterintelligence procedures—detecting and identifying the people that supply information to guerrillas, their guerrilla contacts, and their couriers, courier routes, letter drops, or other means of communication, and then taking either the defensive steps of apprehending, interrogating, and imprisoning these people or the offensive one of turning them around for double agent operations. Outlining these two choices is easy enough, but it must be obvious that carrying either one out is an absolutely staggering job.

The relocation method is not an innovation; it has been demonstrated that it can be effective. The Russians, for example, have proved the harsh effectiveness of mass deportations of population in the Baltic states and elsewhere. In Malaya the British-Malayan Security Forces carried out more humane and limited relocation operations, combining these with other forms of action to cut off the Communist Terrorists from contacts with the people, not only for counterintelligence purposes but to prevent their getting from them food, supplies, and other kinds of support.<sup>\*</sup> The French undertook rather massive relocation efforts in Algeria, where whole new towns, with schools, medical facilities, shops, water supplies, and all requirements for living were created, administered, and guarded by the French Army. At present relocation operations are being carried out in South Viet Nam along the Laotian border.

<sup>\*</sup> *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*, official manual of the British (later Malayan) forces (3rd edition, 1958, classification "confidential"), chapter III, sections 3 (Main Tasks of the Security Forces) and 4 (The Briggs Plan). This is beyond question the best counter-guerrilla operations manual extant. It is argued by some students of CGW that the peculiar conditions existing in Malaya—the Chinese "minority" (almost as numerous as the Malaysians) being the element supporting the CT's rather than the whole population, and the organization of civil government, police forces, and military forces being so uniquely British—make it not valid for application elsewhere; but it distills from many years of experience a great amount of practical guidance on modus operandi which is clearly applicable any place in the world where guerrilla movements might develop.

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There will undoubtedly continue to be situations when relocation is an essential step in counter-guerrilla action. Some of its aspects are completely outside the competence of counterintelligence forces—the construction of housing for the people, the provision of food and water, sanitation and medical care, and schools, the mounting of indoctrination programs to change the loyalties of the people, the stationing of guard or combat troops, the training of village self-defense forces. Other aspects, however, are wholly counterintelligence responsibilities.

First is the painstaking process of checking the bona fides of the people moved to the relocation site, determining that they are not guerrilla espionage agents, active members of the Communist Party, or working for any other subversive organization. This entails a requirement basic to all counterintelligence operations—effective records. The vetting and name tracing task is a very large one. To approach it practically, one must begin with personnel who have been given any official position or responsibility, with especial emphasis on the center's security forces—the police and self-defense forces, then the civil officials. When these have been vetted, the job of checking the population at large can be attacked.

Counterintelligence personnel must draft or be consulted in the drafting of plans for control of the population—identity cards, travel permits and controls, curfew, neighborhood or block registration and control systems, the selection and training of personnel for these, etc. The development of an informant net is an essential step in counterintelligence control; it forms part of what Eric Lambert, British MI-6 police assistance staff officer, speaking from the British experience in Malaya and Kenya Colony, calls the "police intelligence net at the village level." Together, the block registration system and the informant network form one of the most effective means of defensive counterintelligence, detecting the presence of subversive or espionage agents and identifying them and their contacts.

In the alternative method used to shut off contact between the guerrillas and the people in the area, the counterintelligence task is probably even more difficult than in relocation. This was the method used by the Filipinos in the Communist-

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controlled area known as "Huklandia," and it worked. Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, the officer of the Philippine Army who was primarily responsible for developing the "Battalion Combat Team" and "Hunter-Killer Team" techniques employed so successfully in destroying the Hukbalahaps on Luzon, describes elements of the counterintelligence aspect of the operation in this way:

Four teams (combined MIS & C Company) with radio sets were organized, consisting of six to eight men, with the ranking NCO in charge. Later six more teams of the same composition were added. Assigned missions were varied, but essentially the teams were required to penetrate the suspect area secretly and report all observations on the inhabitants by radio. Contact frequency was once every other hour on the hour. S-2 rented a house in the town of Pandi and hired a family to occupy the house as cover for MIS operatives. The latter group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and the town chief of police, already held suspect by S-2.

Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Huklandia since 1950, it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely. On the theory that the populace are subjected to deep-covered "terrorism," it was recommended that several individuals be "snatched" and brought to 7th BCT HQ for interrogation, hoping that these individuals, after being convinced of the protective motives of the government under skillful handling, will be made to tell the truth about Pandi. The recommendations were approved and appropriate orders were issued.

The teams were able to snatch no less than 60 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants. Suspicions grew more about hidden power of the Huks in Pandi, as in no single case did the mayor or the chief of police report the disappearances to the PC or to the 7th BCT.

With good treatment and frequent appeals to the detainees (the Secretary of National Defense participating) (ed. note: This was Sr. Magaysay, later President of the Philippines) to cooperate with the government and promises of monetary rewards, the knowledgeable eventually came up with startling information. However, all detainees agreed on their fear of Huk reprisals. Allegations from detainee-affiants were radioed back to field teams covering Pandi for verification or confirmation. These informations were carefully classified and analyzed and compared with

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past intelligence files as far back as 1948. Out of this painstaking effort, S-2 was able to establish the following intelligence pattern:

(1) Pandi was important to the Huk organizations in Luzon due to its proximity to the city of Manila, the center of underground apparatus of the Communist Party of the country.

(2) Therefore, it was important that Pandi should not catch the attention of the AFP or PC; so as not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC, the area must be kept a "quiet" sector, prohibiting the staging of raids, ambushes, or any Huk activity that will draw troops.

(3) It was commonly known in the area that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited in the area. The area, as a matter of fact, is supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging will be done through supply agents specifically appointed by the municipal mayor. Direct approach to houses or inhabitants is punishable by death.

(4) Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter in Pandi must first get proper permission from their superiors, who in turn will make proper arrangements with Pandi authorities.

(5) Huk couriers traveling to or from Manila receive briefings from Pandi Huk intelligence officers on current situations of their destinations, are given pass words, and exercised on new counter-signs.

(6) Pandi inhabitants that had been judged "reactionary" or recalcitrants are not disciplined within the municipal area, but are by long practice secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandi. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chief conspired in the kidnap-murder of individuals that were ordered punished by the Huk high command.

(7) During the past years, several PC garrisons were off and on maintained in Pandi that because of their small size and poor security could easily have been wiped out by local Huk. These garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals on the area.

(8) Names of individuals were submitted as active Huk agents in Pandi, starting off with the mayor's name, policemen, rich and prosperous businessmen, etc.

With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating with others, criminal actions were instituted against all individuals cited or involved.

The liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, which in a large way hamstrung their clandestine activities in the city and their liaison and control

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lines with their active field units in Central Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers and VIP's to and from Manila became more difficult.

This kind of counterintelligence effort resembles in many respects the criminal investigation methods employed by the police against powerful criminal gangs who have the support of large numbers of people, and for this reason and others the police are likely in most countries to be the most effective agency for carrying it out. The method calls for informants in every village, surveillance personnel, patrols disguised as guerrillas, combat squads with great mobility and advanced communications capable of reacting at once to flash reports, skillful interrogators, extensive records carefully built up and cross indexed, and counterintelligence analysts to study the guerrilla intelligence organization, define its modus operandi, and identify its personalities.

#### *Other Counterintelligence Tasks*

Aside from its major special problem deriving from support of the guerrillas by people on the ground, counterintelligence has tasks in counter-guerrilla action relating directly to the guerrilla forces and their organic intelligence capabilities which manifest the usual twin aspects, defensive and offensive.

Among the defensive aspects is first the normal job of maintaining the security of the police or military forces engaged in the counter-guerrilla operations. Counterintelligence personnel must conduct training, or must prepare training plans and material and train instructors, to indoctrinate the forces in problems of security. The importance of this responsibility is highlighted in the Malaya manual referred to above. Its chapter XIV, section 5, "Military Security and Counter Intelligence," makes the following observations:

As the MCP (Malayan Communist Party) does not possess the normal organization of a first class enemy, it must exploit every resource of intelligence to redress the balance of inferior force. Thus, in addition to the direct screen of the Min Yuen, the MCP has established a network of agents and informants throughout

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the Federation whose task is to gather information and pass it quickly to the CT (Communist Terrorists).

The G(Int) (b) staffs (counterintelligence staff sections in military headquarters) are responsible for the application of:—

- (a) Preventive measures to deny the CT all opportunity of gaining knowledge of our intentions.
- (b) Detective measures concerned with the investigation of breaches of security or covert activities detrimental to the security of the Armed Forces.

Military Security.—There is clear evidence that:—

- (a) Many successful ambushes against SF (Security Forces) have been the direct result of lack of security.
- (b) CT movement out of an area due to be the scene of impending operations has taken place because of bad security, particularly careless talk.

In operational areas contractors and their employees, who are all vulnerable to CT pressure, quickly become aware of ration strengths, the units engaged, the names and personalities of senior officers and, unless great care is exercised in ordering rations, can forecast with some accuracy future unit changes of locations.

Security is many sided and the CT do not rely on one source only for information. All ranks are prone to careless talk, usually through vanity, thoughtlessness or ignorance. To counter innumerable instances of insecurity of material, loose methods of safeguarding secret papers, inefficient guards, unauthorized entry to WD premises and other breaches of security there is only one remedy: proper security training. The supervision of this training is the task of the Unit Security Officer, assisted by the G(Int) (b) staff, and the security agencies, to ensure that all ranks become security minded.

Counterintelligence.—It is unfortunately only too true of the G(Int) (b) staff and security, as it is with the police and crime, that most of its time is taken up in the investigation of breaches of security that have already occurred.

The G(Int) (b) staff sets up certain standing controls, organizes a system of passes and permits, and arranges with the help of Special Branch for thorough vetting and verification of all employees, but these merely limit the problem. They may make it difficult for an informer or agent to gain access to military establishments or, having got in, to be able to do much harm, but

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they cannot exclude the agent or nullify the work of those already inside.

The object of standing controls is, by a process of elimination, to throw into relief incidents or persons that seem to be suspicious and to make them the subject of investigation.

Properly trained, security minded personnel will not only prevent information from getting to the CT but, in adhering to standing security controls, will be quicker to observe any suspicious departures from them and assist the counterintelligence effort.

Since the foregoing is the only section in this manual devoted to the subject of counterintelligence, its writers evidently considered counterintelligence a purely defensive matter. This would in all probability not have been the case if either the Special Branch of the Malayan CID or MI-6 counterespionage people had written it. The offensive counterintelligence operations which can be employed against guerrillas include penetrations, provocations, double agents, and defections in place—all of the classic devices of counterespionage. Of these, the most effective is undoubtedly penetrations. Even Communist guerrilla forces, who are probably more security-minded than most others, are always under pressure to build up their strength; they always are looking for additional men. It is extremely difficult for guerrillas, with their requirement for the highest degree of mobility, to build up counterintelligence records and maintain them, and they are therefore hampered in making the normal security check on new recruits who show up or are brought in by old members.

Penetrations were used by both the Abwehr and the Gestapo of the Nazi forces in Europe during World War II with varying degrees of success, depending in part on the country where they were employed. Their success was especially great in France against the "Free French" or Gaullist resistance forces, which were colossally lacking in security consciousness, but also against the compartmented sabotage groups organ-

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ized and led by the much better trained and security-conscious officers of the British SOE.<sup>7</sup>

The classical double agent operation would presumably retain in counterintelligence activity against guerrillas all the hazards and problems so well described in a recent article in the *Studies*.<sup>8</sup> Yet a distinct form of double agent operation seems to have worked very well in counter-guerrilla action in a primitive area like Kenya Colony. What other term than double agent really applies to the astonishing operations car-

<sup>7</sup> One corps of penetration agents introduced into the SOE and other groups was led by a Frenchman, thought to have been an Alsatian, known by the code name of "Grand Clément." Recruited into an early SOE group in France, he was recognized to have qualities of leadership and so was flown to England for training and brought back as an officer in the group. Not long afterward Nazi counter-intelligence forces arrested nearly all members of the group. Grand Clément "escaped" and got into contact with another group. This in turn was soon rolled up, and Grand Clément "escaped" again. After this suspicious recurrence it was impossible for him to operate personally again as a penetrator, but he set up a training school for the Germans in which he developed a whole corps of penetration agents, a fairly large number of whom were successful in getting into Maquis, SOE sabotage, or other resistance groups, with the inevitable results.

After the liberation of Paris, the present writer, then a counter-intelligence officer in the joint U.S.-British-French Special Forces, joined with officers of the SOE Security Section in trying to track down and apprehend Grand Clément, but he was never found. It was never even determined whether he had been a German agent at the time of his first recruitment into SOE—a true agent provocateur—or was recruited by the Germans later. Two other Alsations who had followed a pattern much like that of Grand Clément, however, were arrested in Paris after the liberation, given a short, fair trial, and shot. They had been recruited into an SOE sabotage group operating near the Swiss border and had shown such ability that they were flown to England for training and returned to the group as lieutenant and radio operator respectively. During the several months thereafter before the area was liberated, the Abwehr rolled up a number of neighboring groups which, in violation of good compartmentation practice, had had contact with this one, but left it strictly alone. This immunity led to an investigation and the post-liberation arrests. The confessions of the two men established that they had been agents provocateurs, but it could not be determined whether they were trainees of Grand Clément's.

<sup>8</sup> F. M. Begoun, "Observations on the Double Agent," *Studies* VI 1, p. 57.

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ried out by Inspector Ian Henderson when he turned the captured Mau Mau around and sent them out to track down their fellows? The preconditions for these operations seem to have been the primitive minds of the targets, subject to intense superstitions, loyalties which appear strange indeed to the occidental white man, and an operations officer who knew these characteristics and the people so well that he could grasp what went on in their minds. Such preconditions are not generally to be found, to be sure, but there is a large part of one whole black continent, ripe today for Communist exploitation, where they may obtain, and such operations may be desirable among other tribes than the Kikuyu. How many Hendersons do we have?

#### *Military or Civilian Counterintelligence?*

What agency should undertake the counterintelligence effort for the counter-guerrilla forces? Every country has some kind of police force, as well as its military forces, in some state of being; and it cannot be doubted that in most countries the police, whatever their type or organization, will be closer to the people, will know local conditions, will more easily be able to organize, normally in fact will already have organized, informant nets, and will therefore prove more efficacious in the collection of counterintelligence information for this type of warfare than agencies of the armed forces would.

The opinion that police will always be superior to armed forces in counter-insurgency operations was recently expressed by Slavko N. Bjelajac, chief of staff to General Mihailovic in Yugoslavia during World War II.<sup>18</sup> They can produce intelligence better than the armed forces, he said, because they get it from the people everywhere; the armed forces cannot get intelligence from the front because there is no front. He referred to the experience in Malaya, where the police were always kept on top in the operations, and the

<sup>18</sup> See Ian Henderson with Philip Goodhart, "The Hunt for Kimathi" (London, 1958), reviewed in *Studies* III 1, p. 137.

<sup>19</sup> In a speech before the joint Military Reserve units of CIA. Colonel Bjelajac is now a civilian official in the office of the U.S. Army's Special Warfare Directorate.

army supported them with strikes against concentrations of the rebels when a concentration could be located. He pointed out the greater flexibility and mobility the police have for instant blows or counterblows against guerrillas and their usually better communications for such actions.

There is much of interest along this line in the Malaya manual previously cited. The opening paragraph on "Own Forces" (Chapter III, Section 1), reads:

The responsibility for conducting the campaign in Malaya rests with the Civil Government. The Police Force is the Government's normal instrument for the maintenance of Civil Authority but, in the current Emergency, the Armed Forces have been called in to support the Civil Power in its task of seeking out and destroying armed Communist terrorism. In addition, a Home Guard has been formed.

The main elements of the operational plan for Malaya, which had been developed by a General Briggs, are discussed as follows:

1. The Briggs Plan, which came into effect on 1st June, 1950, aimed at bringing proper administrative control to a population which had never been controlled before. The main aspects of the Plan were:—

- (a) The rapid resettlement of squatters under the surveillance of Police and auxiliary police.
- (b) ...
- (c) The recruitment and training of CID and Special Branch Police personnel.
- (d) The Army to provide a minimum framework of troops throughout the country to support the Police, and at the same time to provide a concentration of forces for the clearing of priority areas.
- (e) The Police and Army to operate in complete accord. To assist in this, joint Police/Army operational control is established at all levels and there is a close integration of Police and Military intelligence.

The chain of command established by the Briggs Plan ensured that "there was always complete integration of Emergency effort," and that the Security Forces "have always been acting in support of the Civil Power."



The final paragraph on this plan is worth repeating here, for it states objectives which appear likely to be valid in every counter-insurgency situation in which the United States may participate:

The Plan was essentially a thorough but long term proposition and it would be unrealistic to look for speedy and decisive results. It envisaged a logical clearing of the country from South to North, leaving behind a strong police force and civil administration once an area or State had been cleared. It also aimed to isolate the MRLA [the Malayan Races Liberation Army, or Communist guerrilla force] from the rest of the rural population, thus enabling the latter to feel safe to come forward with information, whilst at the same time depriving the MRLA of their means of support and so forcing them into the open where they could better be dealt with by the SF.

The roles of police and military forces as described elsewhere in Chapter III are worth study as a model of the ideal organization wherever counter-insurgency or counter-guerrilla operations have to be carried out. The philosophy on which these roles were based is summed up in the second paragraph of the chapter (XIV) on "Intelligence":

Since there is no state of war in Malaya, the basic responsibility for maintaining law and order is still that of the Police. In the same way the responsibility for producing intelligence still rests with the Special Branch of the Police. In view of the size and importance of the problem, however, a special intelligence organization has been built up.

What the size of the problem required was joint intelligence operations centers manned by Special Branch and military intelligence personnel. One aspect of their division of labor is particularly interesting: "All members of the public who have information to give should be passed on to the Police, who alone will handle agents and informers. On no account will military units run their own agents or informers."

The situation in Malaya, of course, with its almost ideally developed security forces organization, is one which United States forces will rarely if ever find in a country they are invited to assist in a counter-guerrilla effort. It might be well, however, to hold up this kind of organization as the goal toward which to work, not only because the police can normally be expected to do a far better intelligence and counterintelli-

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gence job than the local military forces, but also because when the emergency situation is over the Americans will have left behind the foundations of a better governmental and internal security structure.

It is unlikely that U.S. forces will themselves ever be doing the counter-guerrilla job in any country; their role will be to assist local forces to do it competently. And presumably there will have been no declaration of war. Probably an emergency situation will have been declared, perhaps martial law, but no true belligerent situation as recognized in international law. Under these circumstances it would be desirable, in pursuit of the long-range goal of establishing a sound civil government responsive to the wishes of the governed, to keep the civil authority in control at all times.

There should certainly, in any case, be no contending between different elements of the U.S. contingent sent to support the indigenous forces as to whether the police and civil forces or the military should have primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation. This question should be settled as a matter of national policy before any U.S. elements are engaged, and it should be settled in the way which will lead most surely toward a sound, strong, democratic government when the operation is finished.

#### APPENDIX: Survey of Sources on Guerrilla Intelligence

It is a puzzling anomaly that one of the poorest sources of information concerning the intelligence methods developed and used by guerrillas is the writings of the great and alleged great guerrilla leaders. Mao Tse-tung's *Yu Chi Chan*,<sup>1</sup> a comprehensive manual on the organization, training, equipment, and tactics of guerrilla forces, makes only one explicit reference even to a need for information about the enemy; at page 80 it assigns the "anti-Japanese self-defense units," among other responsibilities, that of "securing information of the enemy." Intelligence, not to mention counterintelligence, is otherwise completely ignored.

<sup>1</sup> *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Translation and introduction by Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith, USMC, Ret. (Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).

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Ernesto "Che" Guevara, newly touted as a guerrilla authority, does include in his recent book<sup>2</sup> a section on intelligence, as follows:

"Know yourself and your enemy and you will be able to win a hundred battles." Nothing helps the combat forces more than accurate intelligence. But be sure to sort fact from fiction. As soon as post offices and mail deliveries can be set up within the guerrilla zone, try to get intelligence about the enemy. Use women to infiltrate the enemy camp. Use trained men and women to spread rumors and sow confusion and fear among the enemy.

This paragraph, with its remarkable instruction on the subject of intelligence communications, is the amazing totality of what Guevara has to say on the subject of positive intelligence. In the field of counterintelligence, however, he apparently had some afterthoughts. In Appendix 4, pages 66 to 68, he writes:

Almost all recent popular movements have suffered from inadequate preparation. Frequently, the secret service of the governing rulers learns about planned conspiracies. Absolute secrecy is crucial. The human material must be chosen with care. At times, this selection is easy; at others, extremely difficult. One has to make do with those who are available—exiles and volunteers eager to join in the fight for liberation. There is no adequate investigative apparatus. Yet there is no excuse for intelligence reaching the enemy, even if the guerrilla organization has been infiltrated by spies, for no more than one or two persons should be familiar with preparatory plans. Keep new volunteers away from key places.

Absolutely nobody must learn anything beyond his immediate concern. Never discuss plans with anyone. Check incoming and outgoing mail. Know what contacts each member has. Work and live in teams, never individually. Trust no one beyond the nucleus, especially not women. The enemy will undoubtedly try to use women for espionage. The revolutionary secretly preparing for war must be an ascetic and perfectly disciplined. Anyone who repeatedly defies the orders of his superiors and makes contact with women and other outsiders, however innocuous, must be expelled immediately for violation of revolutionary discipline.

... Of course, there is no reason why you cannot have a nucleus of 500 men, but these 500 must be split up, because (a) so large a group is bound to attract attention, and (b) in case of betrayal, the entire force could be liquidated.

<sup>2</sup> *Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare*. Translation by Major Harris-Clichy Peterson, USMCR (Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).

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The location of headquarters may be revealed to most of the group and serve as the meeting place for the volunteers, but the leaders of the conspiracy should appear there only rarely and no compromising documents are to be kept there. The leaders should stay in dispersed, secret hiding places. Locations of arsenals should not be known to more than one or two persons. Arms are not to be distributed until the operation is ready to start, so as not to endanger those involved and to avoid possible loss of costly equipment.

The military leader of the Viet Minh forces, General Vo Nguyen Giap, has written extensively about guerrilla warfare. His essays, collected in a book published in 1961,<sup>2</sup> combine a monotonous reiteration of the theme of close relationship between the people and the Communist armed forces with historical treatises on the liberation of North Viet Nam. There is much repetitive material on the manner in which guerrillas developed and were organized and some discussion of guerrilla tactics, but nothing whatever on the part played by intelligence.

General Vo's forces, however, as they have developed into a conventional army, have not so neglected their intelligence needs. The following passage from one of their training documents begins to reflect the military intelligence interests of conventional forces but applies also to guerrilla operations:

*Military Intelligence*

1. Individuals selected for service as intelligence agents must be active, courageous, perspicacious, realistic and calm in the face of danger.

2. Intelligence targets: Before mounting any attack, you must learn exactly the number of enemy troops and their armament, as our own forces must be at least equal. Learn all you can about the commander of the enemy troops. You should also study the morale of the enemy soldiers, the location of their strong points, such as blockhouses and heavy weapons emplacements, and how many men there are in a squad, a section or a company; identify enemy units by number or name. Find out the equipment of each unit, the firepower of which it is capable and the political and military training received by the enemy troops.

3. The direct and indirect methods of obtaining intelligence: The direct method is to use your own personnel and to send them out as agents. When you send agents into villages or cities, they

<sup>2</sup>General Vo Nguyen Giap, *People's War, People's Army* (Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1961).

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must adopt a cover such as that of a peasant, a fisherman or a coolie. When you send your agents into the countryside, a special cover is not needed, but your men must be able to hide in the forest and must take care to stay away from well-known places, such as water holes or springs, where the enemy will be alert for them. Agents in the countryside must be careful to leave no trails or other traces of their presence.

The indirect method is to recruit your agents from among the populace. You should study the class structure of the people, the youth particularly, and the organization of the enemy's informer nets. You should choose your agents from the groups thus studied, train them, and put them to work. Tell each one that he must submit reports at fixed intervals, and arrange for them to contact your own men using a system of signals.

4. Intelligence reporting: In obtaining a report from your agents on an enemy base, be sure that the following points are covered:

- a. The location of the base and the name of the commander.
- b. The positions of machine guns, blockhouses, trenches and all other strong or weak places in the base.
- c. The relationship between the enemy soldiers and the civilian population at that base.
- d. Communication facilities. Do they have radios or telephones?
- e. The best routes of approach to or retreat from the base.

Other sections of the Viet Minh document also contain instruction in intelligence aspects of operations:

#### Ambushes

Before mounting an ambush operation, you must thoroughly study your agents' reports on the situation among the people in the area. Especially study the routes by which and the hours at which enemy troops move through the area. How large are these enemy forces; how fast do they move; what weapons do they carry? Do they have machine guns? In obtaining this information, it is essential that the enemy be unaware of our interest. Only the commander and his agents should know that these things are being studied.

The discussion of ambushes which follows includes many items of intelligence import and puts emphasis on the effect of intelligence on plans and tactics. The same is true of the sections entitled "Raids on Enemy Bases," "General Operating Principles," and "Establishing Your Base." In the last named, an indication is given of a somewhat more sophisticated understanding of the problem of communication with intelligence sources than that displayed by Sr. Guevara: "... or

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ganize your intelligence nets in the area, especially arranging for communications between your agents and yourself." The document concludes on a realistically grim note: "Intelligence agents and senior officers must study judo and all methods of hand-to-hand combat to assist them in avoiding capture. They must plan to take the most extreme measures to avoid capture. If capture seems inevitable, they should plan to die first."

Turning to non-Communist sources, we find a large number of good books written by officers who had experience in guerilla operations during World War II. From these some kernels of wisdom can be extracted with effort, but they suffer as analytical or training texts because they were not intended for such purposes, being presented simply as exciting yarns for public consumption.

One of the few books making a deliberate attempt to bring together historical examples of guerrilla activities and to extract from them sound principles is a fairly recent one from a British source, *Guerilla Warfare*, by C. N. M. Blair, an MI-6 officer.<sup>4</sup> Chapter 7 of this book, "Summary of Guerilla Warfare" consolidates the principles distilled from a century and a half of history. Its section on Intelligence begins on page 187:

Not only to give timely information of enemy activity against them, but also for the success of their own operations against the enemy, one of the first essentials for any guerilla force is to establish an efficient intelligence system. Until the movement has developed into a large and widespread guerilla organization their main need will be tactical intelligence on such matters as enemy movements, concentrations and intentions, with—from the counterintelligence aspect—warning of enemy attempts to penetrate the guerillas' own organization. To satisfy these requirements, guerillas must have their own tactical intelligence service but—like the occupying power—they will also have to rely largely on the local populace, who in turn will have to penetrate the enemy's security services to obtain the necessary information.

Conversely, if the enemy are unable to obtain intelligence about the guerillas through the local population, they are themselves very greatly handicapped in their counter-resistance activities. It is, therefore, extremely important that the local population are

<sup>4</sup>Published by British Ministry of Defence (London, 1957), classified British Restricted (U.S. Confidential).

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in active sympathy with the guerillas, and it is interesting to note that in every successful campaign reviewed in this book this local support has been forthcoming.

Later, as the guerilla force expands, it will require strategic intelligence not only for its operations and own security but also as a basis for internal propaganda. This type of information may be provided through national guerilla or clandestine sources (as happened in the case of the Yugoslavs receiving details of the plans for the German Fourth Offensive) but is more likely to have to come through Allied channels.

#### Communications and control

One of the difficulties in the past has been to disseminate this intelligence, when received, for communications within guerilla forces have always been elementary and slow, and as late as the end of World War II still relied to a very great extent on couriers and runners . . .

It seems noteworthy that even this more sophisticated effort to identify principles does not reach to concrete particulars on subjects like means of collecting information (except to stress reliance on the population), means of communicating collected information to guerrilla headquarters or intelligence sections, and the system for intelligence processing within the headquarters.

Brig. General Samuel B. Griffith, in his introduction to the translation of Mao Tse-tung, covers the subject somewhat more completely, both for positive intelligence and for counterintelligence:

Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations. Where is the enemy? In what strength? What does he propose to do? What is the state of his equipment, his supply, his morale? Are his leaders intelligent, bold, and imaginative, or stupid and impetuous? Are his troops tough, efficient, and well disciplined, or poorly trained and soft? Guerrillas expect the members of their intelligence service to provide the answers to these and dozens more detailed questions.

Guerrilla intelligence nets are tightly organized and pervasive. In a guerrilla area, every person without exception must be considered an agent—old men and women, boys driving ox carts, girls tending goats, farm laborers, storekeepers, school teachers, priests, boatmen, scavengers. The local cadres "put the heat" on everyone, without regard to age or sex, to produce all conceivable information. And produce it they do.

As a corollary, guerrillas deny all information of themselves to their enemy, who is enveloped in an impenetrable fog. Total in-

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ability to get information was a constant complaint of the Nationalists during the first four Suppression Campaigns, as it was later of the Japanese in China and of the French in both Indochina and Algeria. This is a characteristic feature of all guerrilla wars. The enemy stands as on a lighted stage; from the darkness around him thousands of unseen eyes intently study his every move, his every gesture. When he strikes out, he hits the air; his antagonists are insubstantial, as intangible as fleeting shadows in the moonlight.

Because of superior information, guerrillas always engage under conditions of their own choosing; because of superior knowledge of terrain, they are able to use it to their advantage and the enemy's discomfiture . . .

Within U.S. Government agencies there have been recent attempts to build up a body of doctrine on guerrilla forces, including their intelligence. In an early 1962 draft entitled "An Approach to Counterguerrilla Warfare" (Confidential) prepared at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Holabird, Maryland, is this brief treatment:

A second requirement for successful guerrilla operations is intelligence. Knowledge of the enemy is the key to guerrilla success. The guerrilla leader cannot take the enemy by surprise unless he knows where the enemy is to be at a given time and in what strength. In addition to a civilian clandestine net, a guerrilla organization must have a small group of men trained in clandestine reconnaissance who can move in enemy territory, collect the required information, and return safely to report.

The Department of the Army Field Manual 31-21, "Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations" (September 1961) is authoritative with respect to the intelligence needs of the U.S. Army Special Forces, the units designed to create guerrillas. It covers the EEI for a Special Force team before it is launched into an area to organize guerrillas and also has a good list of EEI within the guerrilla area after arrival of the team. The reader is referred to Chapter 5, "Theater Support," Section II, "Intelligence," and Chapter 7, "Organization and Development of the Area Command," Section IV, "Intelligence in Guerrilla Warfare Operational Areas." The manual falls far short, however, with respect to instruction in the organization of collection means and in the modus operandi, organization, and operation of intelligence production facilities at guerrilla bases or headquarters. It also dis-

tinguishes poorly between positive and counterintelligence matters.

The most complete and probably the soundest analysis of guerrilla warfare in general and its intelligence and counterintelligence aspects in particular which the writer has been able to find is the *Guide to Guerrilla Warfare* published by the Operations School of CIA's Office of Training under date of September 1961. (Confidential). Following up a short paragraph at page 3 on the "Role of Intelligence," a comprehensive and detailed discussion of intelligence matters is contained in a section beginning on page 28 covering "General Reconnaissance," "Operational Reconnaissance" (especially valuable), "Sources of Information Which Supplement Physical Reconnaissance"—enemy personnel, friendly and neutral persons in the area, enemy documents, enemy materiel, maps, weather forecasts, enemy radio broadcasts, and aerial photographs—and finally "Espionage." A whole chapter beginning on page 49 is devoted to the subject of "Security," the first two and a half pages of which are really concerned with the defensive aspects of counterintelligence.

**NOTE: The Counterintelligence Function and Its Limitations**

One area of semantic confusion with possible practical consequences derives from the definition of counterintelligence which, approved officially by the National Security Council and incorporated into NSCID 5, makes it include countersubversion as well as counterespionage and countersabotage. Many people in recent times, including journalists and even high government officials, have referred to guerrilla warfare as the equivalent of subversion. It would be unfortunate if it should therefore be concluded that counterintelligence personnel have the sole or even the major role in counter-guerrilla action; an instant's reflection should make clear how much this is beyond their capabilities.

On the other hand, it is particularly hard in counter-guerrilla operations to distinguish between what is properly positive intelligence and what is counterintelligence. Thus a U.S. Army officer writing about counter-guerrilla operations

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in South Korea,<sup>1</sup> having emphasized as items of positive intelligence the need for complete order-of-battle information on each unit, to include each member of each unit, continued:

Personality files should include all local connections; frequently a mother can persuade her son to surrender, or a guerrilla leader can be captured while visiting his wife or girl friend. Special efforts must be made to kill or capture guerrilla leaders and seize their communications equipment. Aerial reconnaissance by trained units should also be employed.

This statement typifies the loose thinking in regard to intelligence and counterintelligence which pervades most writings about counter-guerrilla warfare. From a semantics standpoint the order-of-battle information, which in conventional warfare would be positive intelligence, must with respect to guerrilla activity, if that is the same as subversion, be counterintelligence. But this sophistry aside, the task of getting a mother to persuade a son to surrender, or of seizing communications equipment, or of getting at a guerrilla leader through his girl friend, is not positive intelligence but something that requires professional counterintelligence know-how.

The point to be emphasized is that, while it is manifestly impossible for counterintelligence forces to carry by themselves the whole responsibility for counter-guerrilla operations, their role in these operations is a critical one on which the success of the enterprise can very well hang. If anyone has any doubt about this statement, let him read Ian Henderson's fascinating book, cited above, about the final tracking down of the most dangerous of all the Mau Mau guerrilla-terrorists, Kimathi, and try to imagine military positive intelligence personnel or even skilled clandestine espionage people not trained in counterintelligence or police-type work accomplishing what this Special Branch Inspector did.

<sup>1</sup> Lt. Col. John E. Beebe, Jr., U.S. Inf., "Beating the Guerrilla," *Military Review*, December 1955 (publication of the Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas).

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

*Memorandum*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
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THE CRISIS  
USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

26 October 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION  
CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.



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26 October 1962

SC No. 08181/62

SUMMARY CONTENTS

I. Surveillance of 25 October shows that the construction of IRBM and MRBM bases in Cuba is proceeding largely on schedule; now level photography confirms that the MRBM bases will use the 1,020-nautical-mile SS-4 missile. No additional sites, launchers or missiles have been located, but there is road construction around Remedios which suggests the fourth IRBM site we have been expecting there. We estimate that it would cost the USSR more than twice as much and take considerably longer to add to its ICBM strike capability from the USSR as great an increment as the potential salvo from Cuban launching sites.

II. Only two Soviet freighters--and five tankers, one of them already past the quarantine line--still are headed for Cuba. The BELOVODSK, with twelve MI-4 helicopters, is in the North Atlantic; the PUGACHEV appears to have slowed or stopped several days west of the Panama Canal. A total of 16 dry cargo ships now are carried as having turned back toward the USSR on 23 October.

Two Soviet civil air flights are scheduled for Havana with passengers; cargo, if any, is not known. One may be turned back by Guinea today. A TU-114 is scheduled via Senegal to reach Havana 1 November.

III. There are further indications that some Soviet and satellite elements, particularly air and ground elements in Eastern Europe and European Russia, are on an alert or readiness status. No major deployments have been detected, however, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is some evidence that additional tactical aircraft have been placed on five-minute alert in East Germany, where two areas along the West German border have been closed off for exercises.


Moscow highlights Khrushchev's acceptance of U Thant's appeal in a bid to start US-Soviet negotiations. Peiping, however, is irritated that the Soviet response to US action is not stronger. The Communists still deny there are any offensive weapons in Cuba.

IV. There is no major change or significant new development in non-bloc reaction to the crisis. Most of the OAS nations have offered to participate in some form in the quarantine, and NATO members have agreed with minor reservations to deny landing and overflight rights to Soviet planes bound for Cuba.

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26 October 1962

# I. THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Photography of 25 October shows continued rapid construction activity at each of four MRBM sites. The use of camouflage and canvas to cover critical equipment at these sites continues.

No new missile sites have been identified, but road construction activity in the Remedios area suggests plans to locate the expected second IRBM site there.

Low level photography clearly indicates that the MRBM sites are for the SS-4 (SANDAL) 1,0200-nautical mile ballistic missile system. Photography of 25 October shows cables at two MRBM sites running from missile-ready tents into the woods where generators probably are located. This strongly suggests that missiles are being checked out in the tents.

It now is estimated that San Cristobal Site 2 will achieve a full operational capability on 26 October instead of 25 October. Heavy rain has recently fallen on this site.

The four Soviet cargo ships originally en route to Cuba which were suspected to be delivering ballistic missiles are continuing their eastward course towards the USSR.

[REDACTED]

The cost of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, including military equipment already supplied plus that which will be needed to complete the missile sites under construction, is estimated to amount to at least \$750 million, and may be as much as \$1 billion. One-third of this is accounted for by the IRBM and MRBM systems. Although the cost of setting up these sites in Cuba appears high, it would probably cost the USSR more than twice as much to establish a comparable increment in the USSR to the present Soviet ICBM strike capabilities against the US. Moreover, MRBM/IRBM systems can be positioned in Cuba in considerably less time than would be needed to construct ICBM bases in the USSR.

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Efforts to step up Cuban military preparedness continue. The armed forces remain under strict orders not to fire unless fired upon. There still is no indication in COMINT that Cuban tactical aircraft have resumed [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Military traffic is heavy on most of the country's highways, and several roads and beach areas have been closed to all civilian use. Press reports from Havana state that the city is bristling with gun emplacements and other evidences of military readiness. Che Guevara reportedly has established a military command post at the town of Corral de la Palma in Pinar del Rio Province, and Raul Castro is alleged to have gone to Oriente Province--his usual post during previous military alerts. Fidel reportedly remains in Havana.

[REDACTED] beneath the surface calm regime officials are apprehensive over possibilities of internal uprisings and/or invasion. Suspected dissidents are being rounded up [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is some evidence of confusion within military units over mobilization procedures and irritation with supply problems.

The general public continues its display of outward tranquility [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

A 25 October broadcast from Santa Clara, capital of Las Villas Province, reported drastic new consumption controls on gasoline and motor oil; similar measures may have been instituted elsewhere. The broadcast also described reports of food and fuel shortages as "rumors spread by the counterrevolution at the service of Yankee imperialism." The broadcast was presumably aimed at discouraging scare buying, which has been reported from several Cuban cities.

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## II. SOVIET SHIPPING AND FLIGHTS TO CUBA

Only two Soviet dry cargo ships are believed still to be en route to Cuba--apparently carrying non-military cargoes. The BELOYODSK, presently in the North Atlantic [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The other ship, the E. PUGACHEV, which is en route from Vladivostok, may have slowed down or temporarily stopped in the North Pacific, several days out from the Panama Canal.

Five Soviet tankers also are en route to Cuba, one having already passed into the quarantine zone. In addition, four European satellite ships, including an East German passenger ship, appear to be continuing their voyages to Cuba.

A total of 16 Soviet dry cargo ships now are estimated to have altered their courses and headed back toward the USSR on 23 October. Most--if not all--are believed to have been carrying military cargoes.

The USSR has scheduled two special civil aircraft flights to Havana. An IL-18, apparently routed via Guinea and Brazil, probably will arrive in Cuba tomorrow. A Guinean official told the US embassy on 25 October that permission for such flights via Conakry would be refused, and it is possible the aircraft, already en route, will not be allowed to transit Guinea. A TU-114 is scheduled to fly via Senegal to Havana, arriving there on 1 November. Some passengers are to be aboard both flights but the cargo, if any, is not known.

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26 October 1962

III. THE SITUATION IN THE BLOC

A. MILITARY

We have noted the following Soviet military developments; an assessment of their significance will be issued later this morning by the USIB Watch Committee.

[REDACTED]

Ground: Soviet forces in Germany may be preparing for a major exercise. Two temporary restricted areas have been set up in East Germany along the border with the Federal Republic, effective through 4 November. Both areas are below air corridors into Berlin and in close proximity to major east-west autobahns. Any troop buildup in these areas could be readily observed.

[REDACTED]

III-1

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[REDACTED]

Naval: Exercise activity continues in the Pacific, Baltic, and Black Seas.

[REDACTED]

A Vladivostok radio broadcast noted that the Soviet Pacific Fleet was in a readiness state as ordered by the Supreme Command.

The UK naval attaché to Moscow was denied a trip to Leningrad on 25 October. This may have been because of the return of merchant ships on the Cuban run.

The East German Navy has apparently cancelled leaves.

[REDACTED]

III-2

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## B. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Khrushchev's prompt acceptance of U Thant's appeal on Cuba is calculated to strengthen Soviet efforts to involve the US in protracted negotiations. The Soviet leaders clearly believe that a temporary suspension of arms deliveries would be a small price to pay for arrangements which, they hope, will effectively forestall further US actions against the military buildup in Cuba.

In commenting on Khrushchev's reply to U Thant, Pravda this morning urged that the US exercise caution in the present crisis. This advice is backed up by a Red Star article entitled "Cuba is Not Alone," which repeated previous claims concerning the accuracy and destructiveness of Soviet rockets and reiterated that the USSR has "successfully solved the problem of the antimissile missile." Numerous reports appear in today's Soviet press of meetings in the USSR protesting US "aggressive actions" and pledging support of the policies of the Soviet government.

There has been no change in the tone or substance of Moscow's approach to the US revelation of the presence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. In his rebuttal to US photographic evidence of missile bases in Cuba, Zorin in the UN charged that the photographs were forgeries and reiterated there was no need to establish such bases outside the USSR. Repeating this theme, Soviet propaganda continues to claim that the US is making use of the "big lie" technique in its charges against the Soviet Union and to deny that there are any offensive weapons in Cuba.

Elsewhere, bloc spokesmen remain cautious in their private statements on the Cuban issue, suggesting that they have not as yet been given a line for dissemination to foreigners. Some bloc representatives have sought to give the impression that Cuba was not important enough to the USSR to cause it to go to war at present.

Communist China apparently is irritated because the Soviet Union has not adopted a more aggressive posture. Peiping has portrayed the cautious Russian statement of 23 October as a declaration of intent to "smash" US aggression, called the US a "paper tiger," and urged a "resolute blow-for-blow struggle" to combat American moves. Chinese Communist press statements tend to minimize the Russian role in the Cuban crisis while playing up the importance of support for Cuba by the Chinese--called "the most reliable friends of the Cuban people."

III-3

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The East German regime has decreed an operational readiness alert for selected party officials, who have been authorized to carry firearms and instructed to maintain logs showing the whereabouts of those of their subordinates who occupy key positions in the district and county-level party apparatus. In addition, the regime has called for daily reports on the state of popular morale.

In the only East European comment thus far on developments at the UN, the East German news agency described the President's reply to U Thant as "a noncommittal US propaganda maneuver," adding that the announcement that the quarantine would continue "confirmed that US President Kennedy is not prepared to accept the proposals of U Thant and N. S. Khrushchev...."

Hungarian and Bulgarian authorities may have interfered with communications between the US Legations in Budapest and Sofia and the Department of State. Both legations use local, national-owned circuits, communicating with Washington via Vienna or Frankfurt. The Legation in Sofia reported the telex circuit out of operation during the night of 23-24 October and the circuit from the Legation in Budapest was subject to frequent interruptions during the day on 24 October. The US Chargé protested to Hungarian Foreign Ministry officials, who assured him that there would be no further difficulty.

Anti-American demonstrations of varying scale have been staged in four of the five East European satellite capitals where there are US missions. A Hungarian news agency reported that 10,000 inhabitants of Budapest had protested in front of the US Legation on 24 October, but the Chargé reports "the local scene is quiet."

The same day some 500 students at Warsaw Polytechnic Institute organized a protest rally, but returned to class when extra police hurriedly were stationed around the Embassy. The Gomulka regime reportedly does not intend to permit demonstrations or conduct an internal propaganda campaign for fear of sparking a war scare and a run on food stocks, which are already low.

Also on 24 October, a Bulgarian Foreign Ministry official assured the US Minister that "if a demonstration was organized, protection also would be organized." Three hours later, the arrival of a strong police guard at the Legation dampened preparations for a demonstration, and a crowd of youths dispersed.

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Yesterday, 1,000 Czechs pulled down the flag and smashed windows at the US Embassy in Prague. Police earlier refused to clear a path through the demonstrators for an embassy car returning the Chargé from an official luncheon.

The Ulbricht regime has called for "solidarity demonstrations." Yesterday East German police directed a US Army patrol into a street where such a rally was underway. The car was beat upon and lost radio contact with US headquarters in West Berlin before breaking free and returning to West Berlin.

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26 October 1962

#### IV. NON-BLOC REACTION

The UN Security Council has suspended its debate on the Cuban crisis indefinitely following the announcement by Acting Secretary General U Thant that he would consult privately with representatives of the US, USSR, and Cuba. Pending the outcome of these consultations, the "non-aligned group" has also halted its plans for sponsoring a resolution in the Council.

Except for some reduction in the nervousness of the West German press, there is little reflection in non-bloc comment of the turnaround of Soviet ships and the US and Soviet responses to U Thant's proposals for avoiding a confrontation on the high seas.

There are continuing instances of demonstrations in Asian, European and Latin American countries, but participation is limited largely to Communist and avowedly pacifist elements. At this hour none seems likely to assume massive proportions.

The Shah of Iran has not commented publicly, but Foreign Minister Aram told Ambassador Holmes on 24 October that the Iranian delegation at the UN was being instructed to give full support to the US program, including extensive lobbying among the Afro-Asians with an eye toward possible General Assembly consideration of the crisis.

[REDACTED]

General Lebanese opinion is reported almost "jubilant" at what is considered a great free world victory, particularly because the US challenge is directed at the USSR rather than "pygmy Castro." The official Greek attitude is that a NATO public endorsement of the US quarantine is preferable to statements by individual governments. Athens' permanent representative in Paris has been instructed to support a move in this direction.

[REDACTED]

Ankara is apprehensive that equation of US bases in Turkey and Soviet installations in Cuba may lead to Communist pressures on Turkey. Foreign Minister Erkin told Ambassador Hare on 24 October that it is essential for Turkey to receive needed military equipment quickly. A general

IV-1

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mobilization order has been issued by the defense and interior ministries instructing security forces to work jointly to combat subversion and sabotage.

Algerian Premier Ben Bella, granting an appointment to chargé Porter only after a two-day delay, expressed hope for continued US economic aid, but reiterated his conviction that as a matter of principle "Cuba must be supported." He charged the US violated the UN charter by resorting to unilateral military action. The Moroccan acting foreign minister concedes the U Thant plan for a moratorium on military shipments to Cuba is unrealistic without guarantees.

Foreign Affairs Secretary Diallo of Guinea has assured Ambassador Attwood that his country has no intention of granting the USSR landing or overflight rights for air movements to Cuba. He stated that Guinea had refused a Soviet request for this purpose in September.

Asian reaction remains in low key, partly because of preoccupation with the Sino-Indian border clashes. Cambodia, however, has announced its decision to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Uruguay has now joined the other members in support of the OAS resolution. All OAS members except Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay have offered to participate in some way in the quarantine.

The two Argentine destroyers to be used in the quarantine will sail on 28 October. The Argentine Ambassador to the OAS has been instructed to urge that a joint command be set up under the OAS for naval quarantine operation rather than unified US commands. Venezuela has already urged a meeting of the Inter-American Defense Board.

Mexico, traditionally against intervention, has somewhat reluctantly agreed to support whatever measures the OAS adopts. There has been no indication whether this support would include active participation in the use of force, but President Lopez Mateos has said that any action should be under the control of international organizations.

Socialist presidential aspirant Senator Allende of Chile is reportedly unhappy about the effect of the blockade on Chilean politics because he believes the firm US stand has changed the public mood against the leftist coalition, FRAP. Allende's chances of being elected in 1964 have been considered good but his pro-Castro stand now may work against him.

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Brazil sees itself as a peacemaker in the Cuban situation, proposing that the UN undertake denuclearization of Latin America. Rio feels this would permit Cuba and the Soviet Union to save face, thus diminishing the danger of direct confrontation. [REDACTED]

The Communist parties and other pro-Castro groups in Latin America were apparently caught unprepared by President Kennedy's action. They are believed to have plans for large-scale strikes, sabotage, and demonstrations in case Cuba is invaded or a counterrevolution breaks out, but they seem not to have thought out in advance what to do in less drastic situations. Actions now being organized call for demonstrations and marches and for telegrams to government officials, together with a propaganda barrage protesting the "blockade." The Communists in Latin America may feel that precipitous action in this less-than-all-out situation is likely to provoke drastic reprisals which could cripple their potential for large-scale strikes and sabotage in future emergencies. The Communist Party of Brazil has instructed the Communist-dominated maritime federations to organize a boycott of US ships.

The scattered violence and bombing which is taking place in several countries may be the work of Communists already unhappy with Moscow's reluctance to support widespread revolution in Latin America or of other hot-headed pro-Castro groups. These terrorist activities appear badly planned and largely ineffective.

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Canada placed itself solidly in support of the US action with strong speeches in Commons on 25 October by Prime Minister Diefenbaker and Liberal leader Pearson. While stressing the need to find a peaceful solution, Diefenbaker said that Cuban missiles were a "direct and immediate menace to Canada," and he brushed away arguments about the legality of the quarantine with the comment that they were largely "sterile and irrelevant." He announced that Canadian Norad forces now are on the same readiness footing as US units.

Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange, addressing parliament on 25 October, expressed support only for direct negotiation between the US and USSR. The Undersecretary in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, however, told the Yugoslav ambassador that the Soviet action in Cuba was like placing an armed aircraft carrier off US shores.

In Italy, Prime Minister Fanfani's somewhat equivocal line grows out of his fear of upsetting the delicate balance in the center-left government. We now have reports that Nenni's Socialist party will take a line sympathetic to Cuba rather than the US, although one spokesman earlier said that in any showdown a majority of Socialists would side with the West.


Officials in Spain and Portugal are supporting the US. A strong statement is expected from The Hague. The Belgian reaction is "better than expected," and officials are surprised that the US has not yet put Cuba on the COCOM list.

In the British House of Commons on 25 October, Labor leader Gaitskell expressed sympathy for the US, but also anxiety over possible Soviet retaliation. Macmillan endorsed the President's action and said the missiles were unquestionably offensive. Any Cuban settlement, he said, would have to include an accurate check on their removal, after which the world leaders should try for "wider negotiations."

At their 23 October meeting, the EEC Foreign Ministers showed "striking unanimity of support and understanding" for the US position, but felt that henceforth it will be difficult to separate the Cuban and Berlin problems. There was considerable dissatisfaction with the Berlin contingency plans, and Spaak felt that the fruitless East-West "soundings" should be replaced by a "serious" conversation.

In West Germany, where there apparently is panic buying, Defense Minister Strauss told the US MAAG chief on 25 October

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that the National Defense Council was unanimous in agreeing that Bonn should go to any length to support the US, even if it courted great danger.

The French press on 25 October reported that French armed forces have been put on "Number Two alert," the final stage before general mobilization. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, however, does not believe there will be any Soviet action in regard to Berlin.

With certain minor reservations by some countries, agreement now has been reached within NATO to deny landings and overflights to Soviet aircraft on Cuban runs. The US now is requesting that Czech and Cuban aircraft be given similar treatment, or that they be harassed. The Canadian decision to search Cuban and Czech planes is cited as an example of effective harassment.

IV-5

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M<sup>c</sup> George Bundy<sup>2</sup>

SC-11180

*cul*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum



APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: DEC 2002

THE CUBAN SITUATION

16 December 1962

EO 12958 6.1(c)>25Yrs

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[REDACTED]  
16 December 1962

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: The Cuban Situation

The Continuing Soviet Military Presence in Cuba:

1. Since the withdrawal of the Soviet strategic missiles and the IL-28s, we have not noted any significant reduction in the number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. We estimate that some 16,000 remain.
2. Recent photography of the four Soviet armored group encampments reveals continuing activity and no signs of preparation for withdrawal. Construction of barracks at the encampment near Artemisa was continuing as recently as 12 December. An estimated 6,000 Soviet troops are stationed at the four camps.
3. The 24 Soviet-controlled SAM sites remain operational and buildings are being constructed at some of the sites. An estimated 4,000 Soviet personnel man the SAM sites. There is no operational reason why these weapons could not be used against US reconnaissance aircraft at any time.
4. Three coastal defense cruise missile sites appear operational. They are manned by an estimated 1,000 Soviet military personnel. A fourth such site was abandoned last month, but the equipment has probably not been removed from Cuba. Photography indicates that it was apparently delivered to the Campo Florido installation, ten miles east of Havana, where cruise missile equipment has been noted previously.
5. The 39 MIG-21Cs known to be in Cuba are almost certainly operated solely by Soviet pilots. At least some of them are equipped with air-to-air missiles. In addition, Soviet personnel dominate the air defense system, including the early warning radar network.
6. Eleven of the 12 KOMAR-class missile-equipped patrol boats have been sighted in recent photography

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and appear still active. These boats are probably operated by mixed Soviet-Cuban crews.

7. [ ]

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8. There are no reliable indications of any planned reduction in the Soviet military presence nor of Soviet intent to turn over their sophisticated equipment to the Cubans.

Cuban-Soviet Relations:

9. Indications of the nature and extent of future Soviet economic support for the Castro regime may emerge from the discussions now underway in Moscow between Soviet leaders and veteran Cuban Communist Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Rodriguez, who accompanied the Cuban trade mission to Moscow early this month, told the press in Moscow on 12 December that his talks will "cover wider problems" than trade. After commenting on Soviet long-term credits granted Cuba in the past, he said that now Cuba's duty is to "steadily reduce the need for credits." These comments seem to reflect both a continuing Cuban effort to squeeze as much as possible from the Soviets and possible Cuban concern that Moscow may now be becoming more tight-fisted in its aid policies.

10. A clandestine source who was in contact with personnel of the Soviet embassy in Havana early this month reports that Rodriguez is seeking a ten year, \$40 million loan from Moscow, a new agreement on consumer goods imports, and a higher price for Cuban sugar sold to the bloc. The special premium price Moscow had agreed nearly two years ago to pay for Cuban sugar has now been exceeded by the world market price.

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The Internal Cuban Situation:

11. The stresses of the recent crisis period on the Cuban leadership could well lead to high-level changes in the near future. Fidel Castro's own role, however, still appears dominant and there is no information that his position is being challenged by any other Cuban leader.

12. There is still no evidence to support reports from untested clandestine sources that Che Guevara left Cuba on 8 December for a year's "leave of absence" for health reasons and that President Dorticos has been granted three months leave. Guevara's most recent public appearance was on 7 December when he delivered the latest of a series of particularly aggressive pronouncements. Guevara, in his 28 November interview for the London Daily Worker came closer than any Cuban leader has yet to publicly criticizing the Soviet missile withdrawal. He also reiterated his hatred of the US and stated in strong terms the important role of Cuba in providing the example for Latin America's "anti-imperialist revolution." He listed a number of other Latin American countries which he called ripe for revolution and where guerrillas "are already in the field."

13. Student agitation for the removal of the veteran Communist rector of Havana University, Juan Marinello, could be the beginning of a new drive against "old" Communists who have not adapted to Castro's leadership. Marinello is accused by the students of having supported the Soviet position, not Cuba's, during the recent crisis period. The University students are widely regarded as among Castro's most vigorous supporters.

14. Public statements by Cuban leaders suggest that the Cuban political machine modeled after bloc Communist parties may be formally organized early in the year, perhaps next month, at a First National Congress of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution. Preparations for the party congress have been underway for some months in what regime officials describe as "the election of the best revolutionaries by their comrades at every work center throughout the country." This suggests that the new party is to be built on a completely new base and that former political organizations such as the old Communist party and Castro's 26 of July Movement are not to be incorporated en toto. Guevara has stated that the initial membership of the party will be between 60,000 and 80,000 militants.

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Summary of Reports From a Cuban Military Officer:

15. During the past week we have received a number of reports from a Cuban military officer who has had first-hand information on a number of aspects of the Cuban military situation. Some of his information is new, much of it tends to confirm information previously received from other sources in less detail, and most of it appears true. The source appears reliable on subjects relating to Cuban military activities; his information on Soviet military activities in Cuba is generally secondhand and not as reliable.

16. The officer had first-hand knowledge of military construction activities in many parts of the island. He provides detailed information on the construction of military storage facilities in caves in various parts of Cuba and especially on three specific caves on which he is most knowledgeable. He strongly doubts that Soviet missiles are being concealed in Cuban caves, although he grants that this would be technically possible in a few of them. He reports that the items stored in caves include rifles, machineguns, ammunition, emergency rations, explosives, and gasoline. Refugee and other clandestine sources have previously reported on the utilization of caves for military purposes, but this source has provided the most detailed and useful information yet received on this subject. The general belief is that these storage sites are intended to be used by guerrilla forces in the event the island is invaded.

17. The source offers information on the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba, but on this subject he appears to rely largely on secondary sources. He doubts that all the strategic missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba, but bases this on having learned of more missiles coming into Cuba during the buildup period than he has heard of departing the island. In describing the various concentrations of Soviet military personnel in Cuba he repeatedly states that he does not know the precise numbers or functions of the personnel in these places since no Cubans have been permitted in the sites.

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18. The source states that on or about 29 November

[REDACTED] THIS IS THE FIRST  
information indicating that these installations might be

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turned over to the Cubans. The source also stated, as his personal opinion, that the SAM sites in Cuba would probably be turned over to the Cubans eventually and that Soviet forces throughout the island would gradually be reduced as the Cubans became capable of handling the equipment. He stated that the MIG-21s have not been turned over to Cuban control and, in fact, that Cuban pilots have not been permitted to fly the planes. This tends to confirm information from other sources, although the source's added comment implying that the MIG-21s might be sent back to the USSR if the "US puts pressure on" cannot be evaluated.

18. The source describes at length the numbers and functions of Chinese Communist military personnel in Cuba, confirming our earlier impressions that the Chinese Communists are playing a very minor role in the military picture in Cuba. He states, in fact, that "it is to be emphasized that in the military domain, the show is exclusively Cuban-Soviet." The Chinese Communist military personnel consist of only 20 to 25 men assigned to the Chinese Communist embassy who advise the armed forces ministry on the operation of the weapons sent by Peiping to Cuba and, in addition, about five Chinese Communist pilot instructors at the San Antonio de los Baños airbase. He does not know the quantities of Chinese weapons in Cuba, but says they include bazookas, land mines, and possibly 37mm antiaircraft guns.

19. The source's report on Castro's plans with respect to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and on Cuban military activity in the base area is consistent with information from other sources on this issue. The gist of his report is that the regime continues to regard legal action--specifically "through the United Nations"--as the only way in which it might fulfill its aspiration of winning control of the base territory.

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20. The source describes several events which lead him to conclude that the Cubans have been very careful to avoid any incident near the base that might provide the US with a provocation justifying an attack on Cuba. He states that the Cuban military buildup in the base area is extensive and in depth, but defensive in nature. This is generally confirmed by other sources, including extensive photographic reconnaissance of the area around the base.

21. The source's general comments on the Cuban-Soviet alliance are admittedly based on his own opinion; nevertheless it is apparent that it is the opinion of an intelligent and perceptive individual. He described the alliance as an "unholy" one, with each side attempting to use the other for its own ends and each constantly maneuvering to gain advantages over the other. He says Castro is trying to squeeze the Soviet Union for every bit of economic support possible and "the USSR knows this and Castro knows it does." He says the USSR is trying to make Castro expendable; "Castro knows this and the USSR knows he knows it." In general, he feels Castro remains in a strong personal position in the regime and Soviet efforts to control him or weaken his position, the source implies, have not been successful.

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1 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting at the White House 1 April 1964  
Subject - Brazil

PRESENT: The President

State Department: Secretary Rusk,  
Under Secretary Ball, Deputy Under  
Secretary Johnson, and Mr. Ralph Burton

Defense Department: Secretary McNamara,  
Deputy Secretary Vance, General Taylor  
and General O'Meara

White House Staff: Messrs. Bundy, Dungan,  
Moyers, and Reedy


CIA: The Director, Colonel King and  
Mr. FitzGerald

1. The meeting commenced with a briefing on the latest intelligence reports by Colonel King including items from the 10 o'clock telecon between State and Ambassador Gordon. Matters seemed to be more favorable to the insurgents than they had been the previous evening, particularly in view of indications that General Krueger is moving Second Army troops to the Sao Paulo border.

2. Secretary Rusk said that Ambassador Gordon was not advocating U.S. support at this time. Only the Paulistas had requested such aid and this without definition. Ambassador Gordon, with whom the Secretary agreed, believes that it would be wrong at this stage to give Goulart an anti-Yankee banner.

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3. Secretary Rusk referred to a "leak" the evening before regarding the movement of a Naval task force to the area of southern Brazil. (General Taylor said that there was not actually a leak but that it appeared to be a deduction by newsmen based on knowledge that a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs took place.) It was agreed that newspaper queries concerning the Naval movement would be treated routinely and that it would not be shown as a contingency move having to do with Brazil.

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4. [REDACTED]

5. There was an aside on Panama concerning the latest OAS language concerning U.S. discussions with the government of Panama. The President gave as his opinion that this language, which appeared to please the Panamanians, did not to him appear to differ from that which we had previously used.

6. In another interjection, the President asked what the effect of Senator Fulbright's speech had been abroad. Mr. Ball referred to his recent trip to Europe during which he addressed the NATO council (prior to the Fulbright speech). He said that the NATO people had agreed that the U.S. had not clearly stated its position vis-a-vis Cuba. Mr. Ball believes that the Fulbright speech may give ammunition to those who do not favor our Cuba policy in the first place. He also added that the Che Guevara speech in Geneva had been much too long and had therefore probably laid an egg. He said that he did not think that, as far as economic denial against Cuba is concerned, the Fulbright speech would have very much effect in Latin America as there was very little trade anyway. The President inquired whether we are endeavoring to explain the basis of our present policy to Fulbright. Secretary Rusk said that this had been and is being done. The President observed that Senator Fulbright probably is enjoying the halo set on his brow by the New York Times and the Washington Post and will probably wish to retain the headgear. Mr. Ball said.

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NIE 85-64  
5 August 1964

INTELLIGENCE

Mandatory Review

Case # N.I.E.

Document #

# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-64

## Situation and Prospects in Cuba

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

5 AUGUST 1964

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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and NSA.

**Concurring:**

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Director of the National Security Agency

**Abstaining:**

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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The information contained in this document is classified "Secret" and is to be controlled in accordance with the provisions of the Executive Order of the President, dated January 17, 1950, and the Department of Defense Directive, dated May 1950, regarding the control of information.

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# NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 85-64

## Situation and Prospects in Cuba

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM .....	1
CONCLUSIONS .....	1
DISCUSSION .....	4
I. INTRODUCTION .....	4
II. THE ECONOMY .....	4
Current Situation .....	4
Economic Outlook .....	7
III. THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE .....	9
Current Situation .....	9
Security Machinery .....	11
Outlook .....	12
IV. THE MILITARY FORCES .....	13
Current Situation .....	13
Outlook .....	16
The Soviet Military Presence .....	16
Chances of Reintroduction of Strategic Weapons .....	17
V. FOREIGN POLICIES .....	17
Cuban-Soviet Relations .....	17
The Problem of SAMs and U-2s .....	19
Overtures Toward the US .....	20
Latin American Policies .....	20

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## SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

### THE PROBLEM

To assess the Cuban situation and the outlook over the next year or two.

### CONCLUSIONS

A. Though the downward trend of the Cuban economy seems to have slowed and perhaps levelled off, we believe the economic situation will be stagnant over the next two years. Inept management and low labor morale will persist. Living levels are likely to become slightly lower, and shortages of foodstuffs, housing and many types of consumer goods will continue. Slight gains in industry are likely, but these will probably be offset by some decline in the agricultural sector. (*Paras. 3-7, 9-13, 17-19*)

B. Export earnings in 1965 and 1966 are likely to be below 1964 levels, because of lower sugar prices and poor prospects for substantially larger production of sugar and other export commodities. The value of total trade with the Free World can be expected to decline during the period. We believe that the Soviets and other Communist countries will provide sufficient credit assistance to prevent a seriously damaging drop in total imports. In these circumstances, Cuba's heavy economic dependence on the Communist world will continue. (*Paras. 8, 14-16*)

C. Depressed levels of consumption, the imposition of work norms, and forced labor and security duties will tend to narrow the regime's popular support. However, the huge security apparatus will almost certainly prevent popular dissatisfaction from bringing down the regime. We think it likely that a number of military officers have lost sympathy with certain of its policies, but we doubt that there is

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military disaffection on a scale sufficient to threaten Castro. Major deterioration in the internal situation or serious difficulties within the government could alter the picture, but would be unlikely to undermine Castro's power position in less than several years. We believe his death would lead, in fairly short order, to a power struggle of unpredictable outcome. (*Paras. 30-36*)

D. The Cuban armed forces are much the best-equipped in Latin America and, except for Brazil, the largest. Their capabilities have continued to improve, chiefly as a result of the delivery of additional weapons from the USSR and Cuban acquisition of weapon systems formerly under Soviet control. The compulsory military service program, introduced last November, will probably cause an initial drop in the level of training and efficiency, but will permit improved selectivity of recruits for the active forces, and will eventually produce a much larger trained reserve. (*Paras. 37-43*)

E. There are almost certainly no Russian combat units still in Cuba. Upon completion of current withdrawals, a Soviet MAAG-type presence, mostly technical and maintenance personnel, of about 2,000 will probably remain so long as the Cuban armed forces remain dependent on the USSR for technical and material support to maintain their complex Soviet equipment. (*Paras. 44-45*)

F. During the period of this estimate, the Soviets are highly unlikely to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba, though they have the technical capability to do so clandestinely. They might use Cuba for support of their submarines, but so long as they calculate that the risk would be high, they would not push such a venture very far. (*Paras. 46-47*)

G. The Cuban-Soviet relationship remains intact, although frictions have continued. Castro, though willing to lean to the side of the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet dispute, has refused to join in any formal condemnation of Peiping. He is concerned lest a further improvement in US-Soviet relations leave his regime more isolated and exposed. Though the Soviets almost certainly consider Castro to be erratic and undependable, they have little choice but to continue to support him. (*Paras. 48-52*)

H. The most explosive question in Soviet-Cuban relations, as well as between Castro and the US, is the continuation of U-2 overflights. Castro and Khrushchev have conducted a program of

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warnings, threats, and compromise suggestions to induce the US to desist. It is almost certain that Cuba now has full control over the SAM system—and consequently the capability to shoot down a U-2. Thus we believe that the Soviets can only give advice, backed up by their political and economic leverage, though we cannot wholly exclude the possibility that they have retained some sort of physical restraint on an actual firing. Nevertheless, we believe that Castro does not intend to force the issue until after the US elections, when he will seek UN action. If this fails, there is considerable danger that he would order a shootdown, calculating that the US would not retaliate in force or that, if it did, the resulting hue and cry would end the overflights. An impulsive reaction by Castro or even an unauthorized shootdown is always possible. (*Paras. 44, 53-56*)

I. Castro has a serious interest in improving relations with the US, as a means of reducing the pressures on his regime. He probably also considers that his recent gestures are useful to build a record of Cuban reasonableness and flexibility in preparation for Cuba's appeal to the UN on the U-2 issue. He will probably make further overtures from time to time, but there is little chance that he will accede at any early date to the conditions the US has stated. (*Paras. 57-58*)

J. Castro's efforts to foment revolution in Latin America have suffered setbacks during the past year. He is probably somewhat less sanguine about the chances for quick success. Nevertheless, he will almost certainly continue to provide aid and subversive training to potential revolutionaries. He may press for early aggressive action by some Castroist groups, even though their immediate chances seem poor, hoping that their repression would eventually produce conditions more favorable for exploitation. (*Paras. 59-62*)

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## DISCUSSION

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The appeal of Castro's revolution is wearing thinner, though his own hold on the instruments of power remains firm. During the year since our last general assessment of Cuba,<sup>1</sup> the Castro regime has had more setbacks than accomplishments, more tribulation than triumph. The economic difficulties have been particularly evident; these have brought a further narrowing in popular support and increasing resort to methods of repression and threat. The hopes of the Cuban leaders for rapid gains by sympathetic revolutionary groups elsewhere in Latin America were dealt serious blows, particularly in Venezuela last December and by the Brazilian revolution in April.

2. On the other hand, there have been some important achievements. Cuban forces have considerably improved their overall capabilities, largely through the acquisition of more Soviet weapons and weapon systems. The regime's large-scale effort in technical, vocational, and general education has moved ahead, though at some expense to the quality of education on the professional level. The program of training and indoctrinating subversives from other countries has continued. On the economic side, substantial Soviet aid is continuing and high world prices permitted good earnings from a small 1964 sugar crop, aiding Cuba's effort to expand imports of critically needed equipment from Western suppliers.

### II. THE ECONOMY

#### Current Situation

3. There were contrasting aspects to Cuba's economic performance in 1963. Regarded as a whole, it was another bad year: total production was below that of 1962 and Gross National Product (GNP) remained substantially below that of 1958, the last prerevolutionary year. On the positive side, however, the rate of economic decline, which has been rapid in recent years, seems to have slowed or levelled off. Data so far available suggest that stagnation at a low level will continue through 1964; slight gains in industrial output are likely, but these will probably be offset by some decline in the agriculture sector.

4. We estimate Cuban sugar output in 1964 at approximately the same level as in 1963—3.8 million metric tons—the smallest crop in 18 years.<sup>2</sup> The regime had hoped for a larger harvest, and the replanting of cane undertaken in 1962 and 1963 might have made this possible. However, Hurricane Flora damaged some cane and intensified transport and supply difficulties. The regime's nationalization of middle-sized farms in October (the Second Agrarian

<sup>1</sup> NIE 85-63, "Situation and Prospects in Cuba," dated 14 June 1963. Secret.

<sup>2</sup> The 1962 crop was 4.8 million tons, crops in the pre-Castro years were typically over 5 million tons.

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Reform) also created new problems in sugar production. Moreover, despite an early start at the harvest, the organizing of civilian "volunteer" brigades, and the use of army units, the regime once again failed to lure or drive an adequate labor force into the grueling work of the cane fields. Harvesting was also adversely affected by military alerts, especially the large-scale mobilization undertaken in May. Increased use was made of cane loading machines, but this seems to have made only a marginal difference. Consequently, some cane remained uncut when the harvest season ended in June.

5. The regime's general inability to manage agriculture is also evident in lower output of most other crops. Hurricane Flora, the nationalization decree, and the diversion of land from food and industrial crops to cane have been other depressing factors. The regime is trying to institute more intensive farming methods and increased application of fertilizer, but it is probable that production in nonsugar agriculture this year will be even lower than the unimpressive level of 1963.<sup>3</sup>

6. There has probably been a slight increase in industrial output since early 1963, resulting largely from an improvement in the supply of imported fuels and industrial raw materials and from the opening of some new plants, most of them built with Soviet Bloc aid and under the supervision of Soviet Bloc technicians. Nevertheless, Minister of Industries Che Guevara continues to express dissatisfaction with the slow pace of industrial expansion and the low productivity of industrial labor.<sup>4</sup> None of the longer-range, Soviet-financed mining or power projects have yet come into operation. Plans for large-scale industrialization have been shelved for the indefinite future.

7. By and large, the Cuban construction industry is still in the doldrums; its performance in 1963 dipped below that of the previous year, and the plan for 1964 calls for no increase. Cuban officials have publicly admitted that construction on a number of plants, some where the machinery was delivered long ago, has lagged behind schedule.

8. Cuban trade data for 1963<sup>5</sup> show an increase of \$25 million in exports over 1962, a rise attributable to higher prices for sugar. Imports in 1963 rose to their

<sup>3</sup>It is worth noting that the Cuban economic plan for 1964 calls for only a 1.3 percent increase over 1963 in the total amount of food available for consumption including imports. Even if this goal is fulfilled—and the Cubans have seldom met plan goals in the past—it would not be enough to keep up with the annual population growth, and per capita consumption would decrease.

<sup>4</sup>Guevara, in February of this year, discussed the unimpressive performance of the economy during 1963 and, in calling for new efforts, said, "We cannot rest on our laurels. Our industrial laurels are so tiny that they are not enough to rest on, not even to rest one finger on. We must at least create some laurels. That is our task."

<sup>5</sup>The 1963 trade figures are taken from a recently acquired document. This source appears accurate in many of its details, and we are disposed to give it more credence than our earlier projections. Those projections were, nevertheless, based upon a considerable body of evidence; they placed Cuban exports at \$475 million and imports at \$730 million for 1963. Further light will be thrown on the issue when Soviet trade statistics for the year are available, but this will not be for a month or so.

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highest level since 1955. This increase was almost entirely in imports from the Communist countries and much of it was deliveries of machinery and equipment financed by development credits. For 1964 the value of Cuban exports will again increase, largely because of the high sugar prices which prevailed when most of the crop was sold. Imports as a whole may go up slightly in 1964; a rise in imports from the Free World is likely to be largely offset by a decline in imports from the Communist countries. The level of Soviet assistance in 1964 will probably be appreciably below the \$350 million level of 1963.

#### CUBAN FOREIGN TRADE 1957-1964

	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	(in millions of dollars)	
							1963	1964
							(preliminary)	(estimated)
Exports (FOB)								
Communist countries . . . . .	40	15	15	150	480	405	350	350
Free World . . . . .	805	720	625	470	145	115	195	250
Total . . . . .	845	735	640	620	625	520	545	600
Imports (CIF)								
Communist countries . . . . .	negl.	negl.	negl.	125	515	640	705	630
Free World . . . . .	900	850	750	430	190	120*	130*	225
Total . . . . .	900	850	750	555	705	760*	835*	855

\* Excluding US ransom payments of \$13 million in 1962 and \$35 million in 1963.

9. The Castro regime has given considerable attention to the problem of obtaining the parts and other production requisites needed to maintain Cuba's capital plant, largely of US manufacture. The Soviets have not provided this material in adequate quantity, and Cuba has had to divert scarce skills and funds into uneconomic efforts to make parts by hand and to use substitute material and equipment. Costly improvisation has been necessary to establish new foreign suppliers, who have exacted maximum prices for vitally needed supplies.

10. In these circumstances, the Castro regime has intensified its efforts to expand trade relations with Western nations. By these means it hopes not only to mitigate the adverse effects of the US economic denial program but also to reduce its own political isolation. Because the Soviets and other Communist countries allowed Castro to reduce his shipments of sugar to them during 1963 and 1964, he has been able to capitalize on high sugar prices temporarily obtainable in the Free World and to increase his earnings of convertible currency. Convertible currency reserves now stand at about \$75 million, and prospects for foreign exchange earnings this year are reasonably good. Moreover, Castro has been able to secure from the UK and France some \$30 million of medium term credits for urgently needed transport and construction equipment. Some of this is being delivered in 1964; some is to be shipped in 1965.

11. The most glaring weakness of the economy has been the regime's own extraordinary mismanagement and ineptitude. After the revolution, the regime

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launched an ill-considered program of forced-draft industrialization and agricultural diversification; the most important result of this was to undermine the established basis for sugar production. Now the regime has completed the circle: sugar is again the watchword and the goal for 1970 is 10 million tons. Expanded cattle production for food and industrial supply is another primary goal of the administration. Following rapid nationalization of the great bulk of the island's economic activity, the regime adopted a doctrinaire Marxist approach toward the managerial function: in its pursuit of centralized control, more and more economic establishments were made part of large and unwieldy "consolidated enterprises," with all major decision-making authority concentrated in Havana. But so time-consuming and bureaucratic has the decision-making process become that Castro himself has damned the system and called for decentralization and the exercise of much more responsibility at local levels.

12. Cuban officials have been frank to say that their economic statistics are not accurate enough for sound planning—but they plan and plan and plan. The loss, through defection, of skilled labor and managerial talent has had a cumulative adverse effect. Not many of the new managers seem to be cost conscious; during 1963 the state industrial enterprises fell short by almost 250 million pesos of the 687 million pesos that they were supposed to turn over from their incomes to the Cuban budget. Perhaps most serious of all is the regime's continuing failure to provide meaningful material incentives for workers and farmers. The imposition of work norms and an extended work week have contributed to the decline in labor morale.

#### Economic Outlook

13. The latest in the regime's series of efforts to improve administration of the economy is the assumption by President Dorticos of the roles of Economic Minister and director of planning. But Cuba's problems of inept management and low labor morale are not quickly solvable; they represent a very basic limiting factor on the performance of the economy for the short-run future at least. Also of prime importance in appraising overall prospects for the next two years is the outlook for Cuban earnings from sugar exports.

14. Recent sharp declines in sugar futures make prospects much less promising for 1965, and probably for 1966 as well. World spot prices, which had hit a peak of 13 cents a pound a little over a year ago and were still as high as 12 cents last November, are now below 5 cents; sugar futures for 1965 indicate a further decline. Assuming prices on this general level for sales to non-Communist countries, the Castro regime would have to expand sugar production by about 20 percent to earn as much in 1965 as in 1964; moreover, it would have to sell the entire increase to the Bloc at the agreed price of 6 cents per pound.\*

\*During Castro's visit to the USSR last January, the Soviets, in effect, extended to 1970 their commitment of mid-1963 to pay six cents per pound for Cuban sugar. The January agreement also calls for increasing Soviet purchases: 1965, 2.1 million tons; 1966, 3 million tons; 1967, 4 million tons; 1968-1970, 5 million tons per year.

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15. Such an expansion of output is possible but unlikely. Although the regime is moving gradually ahead with its program of devoting additional land to cane production, it probably will not be able to overcome the serious labor shortage which has characterized the last three harvests. The regime appears now to be convinced that a solution can be found only through mechanized harvesting techniques. Soviet machinery thus far has been a disappointment. Cuban use of harvesting equipment is still at the experimental stage, and we doubt that mechanization will provide more than marginal relief during the next two years.

16. During the rest of 1964 and the first part of 1965, the *Castro government* will almost certainly obtain additional credits from Western European firms contracting to supply equipment to Cuba. Thereafter the availability of such credits will depend to a considerable degree on Cuban earnings from the 1965 sugar crop and on the prospects for exports in 1966. The outlook for both is unfavorable, and there will probably be some decline in the total value of Cuban exports. In this case, imports would almost certainly decline also, especially from the Free World, as Cuba's suppliers began to have doubts about Cuba's credit-worthiness. At least by 1966, and perhaps as early as 1965, Cuban foreign trade is likely to be below the 1964 level. However, we believe that the Soviets and other Communist countries will provide Cuba sufficient credit assistance to prevent a seriously damaging drop in total imports.

17. The outlook for development of the industrial and construction sectors of the economy is closely related to the prospects for imports. With total imports likely to be no higher—and perhaps lower—than in 1964, there will be little opportunity to increase supplies of building materials, industrial raw materials, spare parts, and fuels. Any increases in industrial production and construction in 1965 and 1966 are likely to be small.

18. The regime's emphasis on technical education in the secondary schools and universities will tend, over the long term, to aid growth, especially in the industrial sector. This factor is not likely to have a major impact during the next two years, however. The program is still relatively new, the shortage of trained teachers is serious, and the regime has so far succeeded in carrying out only part of its planned massive shift of students to technical training.

19. In sum, we believe that the Cuban economy will operate at a low level for the next two years. Because of population growth, the individual living standard is likely to become slightly worse. Shortages of foodstuffs, housing, and many types of consumer goods will persist. The regime's prolonged failure to deliver the economic benefits it promised, together with its probable need to introduce additional belt-tightening measures, will be likely to narrow further its base of popular support.

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### III. THE INTERNAL POLITICAL SCENE

#### Current Situation

20. As the revolution has lost impetus, the regime has been shifting increasingly to methods of compulsion and repression in pressing ahead with its socialization program. The Cuban leaders are applying some measures borrowed from the Soviet Bloc without successfully adapting them to Cuban characteristics; they are not putting enough Latin flavor into a system which the Swiss ambassador in Havana has referred to as "Marxism cha-cha-cha." The regime has absorbed small industrial, service, and retail businesses into the massive government-run sector of the economy and has taken a number of steps in the socialization process. It has proclaimed three new laws in the past year: the Second Agrarian Reform, the Work Norm and Wage Classification Law, and the Obligatory Military Service Law. If fully implemented, the three laws will have a profound effect on practically all Cubans. They strike not only at the interests of those already disenchanting with the regime but also at the peasants and students, who make up much of Castro's strongest support.

21. The Second Agrarian Reform of October 1963 expropriated most farms over 165 acres. Some 7,000-8,000 farms have been affected, and state ownership of agricultural land has increased from approximately 40 percent to 70 percent. This, in itself, was a tremendous blow to Cuba's conservative rural sector; moreover, many smaller farmers are convinced that their turn will come soon, despite Fidel's repeated assurances to the contrary. The regime has been attempting to force the small farmers to sell all their products to the government collection agencies; but black marketing continues on a considerable scale. Within the last few weeks, the party newspaper *Hoy* has warned peasants who work on state farms that they must no longer keep cows or grow vegetable gardens of their own.

22. The work norm and wage scale system currently being introduced throughout Cuba will apply to agricultural as well as industrial labor. The regime has been moving cautiously in this field, seeking to strike a balance between the political desirability of keeping workers reasonably satisfied and the economic need to increase output and reduce cost through reallocation of workers on a major scale, and through improvement of the performance of the individual worker. The regime launched its work norm program on an experimental basis more than 18 months ago, and it has been sharply expanded this year. Workers are being fitted into eight salary classifications. The norms themselves are not high, but those who fall below them will lose pay and the regime plans gradually to raise norms. Already the traditional Christmas and vacation bonuses have been eliminated, the typical work week has been extended from 40 to 44 hours, and some holidays have been abolished. Regimentation of the labor force has been increased by the issuance of work cards to employed and unemployed.

23. The Obligatory Military Service Law is designed in part to provide a cheap labor force which the regime can use wherever it sees fit. Popular reaction has

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been so adverse that the regime has been forced into a public relations campaign to assuage angry Cuban mothers. A number of prospective draftees have defected; a few have probably joined insurgent groups. The penalty for draft-dodging is stiff—as much as six years in prison. The regime has recently announced that students, perhaps the most privileged class in Cuba, will no longer be exempt from the draft. A further source of resentment on the part of many young people is a recent decree specifying that students must participate regularly in productive work, as well as keep up with their studies.

24. Antipathy between the "old" Communists (members of the regular party prior to Castro's revolution) and the "new" Communists (who are Fidelistas and revolutionaries first and Communists second) has persisted since the days of the revolutionary fighting—when the "old" Communists, in Fidel's own words, "hid under the bed." This behind-the-scenes conflict flared into the open once again in March of this year in the trial of Marcos Rodriguez; several important "old" Communists were accused of shielding for years a member of the regular Communist Party who had betrayed non-Communist revolutionary student leaders to Batista. Castro himself had to intervene directly in the trial; in the name of unity and to preserve some balance between the two groupings, he papered over the dispute. But the quarrel remains very much alive, and the recent appointment to second-echelon government posts of several loyal Fidelistas who had been consigned to obscurity by "old" Communist leaders suggests that the latter have lost ground.

25. Infighting of this sort has been one of the reasons that Castro's United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS) has been so long in the process of formation. He originally said it was to be completed by early 1963, but by February 1964 it claimed less than 33,000 of a projected 55,000 membership, and formation of the first PURS cell in the armed forces did not occur until 18 December 1963. Progress has also been slowed by the difficulty of training prospective members from the poorly-educated classes and by differences of opinion between leading figures in the new party and some government bureaucrats about who is to exercise what powers. But probably the most important impediment has been Fidel's own misgivings about his ability to build the kind of party he could trust. He is acutely aware that the PURS, once fully formed, will contain a potential to challenge his own highly-personalized rule. Thus he is moving slowly and cautiously, holding the partly-formed PURS largely to an advisory role, while he retains the power to make all important decisions.

26. Castro has also retained close control over the military and over the appointment of officers to key assignments. A few members of the military have defected and others, among them officers, have almost certainly lost sympathy with certain of the regime's policies, though they are not willing to take the risk of overt opposition at this time. We, nevertheless, doubt that there is military disaffection on a scale sufficient to threaten the regime.

27. Castro has not been able to put an end to insurgent activity. Small guerrilla bands continue to operate from the mountainous areas of Pinar del Rio,

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Las Villas, Camaguey, and Oriente provinces. The regime seems particularly concerned that an expansion of guerrilla activities in conjunction with a successful landing by Cuban exiles could incite elements of the population to revolt. We do not believe that the present capabilities of the exiles justify this fear, but we do think the fear is real. Indeed, it was almost certainly the primary reason for the extensive Cuban military alert and mobilization that took place in May.

28. The very fact that the regime is nervous and has moved during recent weeks to arrest and deal ruthlessly with small numbers of suspected agents and other opponents has probably increased its short-term security. The large and increasing number of potential opponents of the regime within the country has never had much opportunity to organize for any unified action. The elaborate internal security machinery which now exists makes dissident organizational activity even more difficult and dangerous.

#### Security Machinery

29. Castro's Cuba remains a police state. The principal security and counter-intelligence organization, the Department of State Security, with an estimated personnel strength of about 10,000, maintains units throughout the country and apparently has been effective in infiltrating and exposing counter-revolutionary groups. It works closely with all the other security agencies and especially with the huge and ubiquitous organization of volunteer informants—the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Throughout the country, in rural areas as well as in almost every city block, these informants report to the local committee the results of spying on their neighbors. Committee membership is claimed to be almost a million and a half. Local committees distribute food rationing cards, hand out propaganda, and organize "voluntary" work groups; committees at higher echelons assist the security agencies in maintaining control of all aspects of private life. Parallel informant roles are played by the Union of Young Communists, the Federation of University Students, and the Federation of Cuban Women.

30. The police organizations—the Bureau of Public Order, the Technical Investigation Department, and the National Identification Department—are charged with ordinary law enforcement duties; they have a total of at least 10,000 personnel, nearly half in the Havana area. The Popular Defense Force comprises about 100,000 civilian workers, men and women, who serve part time. They come primarily from the old militia reserve. Except in case of emergency, their mission is to help police and security forces maintain order.

31. The Cuban foreign intelligence service, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), with a staff of about 500, maintains field stations in every country with which Cuba has diplomatic relations and has representatives distributed throughout Europe and Latin America. In the Western Hemisphere, its mission is "export of the revolution"—promotion of revolutionary activities,

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from subversion to guerrilla warfare, by every possible technique of espionage and violence. The DGI has trained and continues to train guerrilla and intelligence agents and supports their activities throughout Central America and in most South American countries, as well as assisting leftist political candidates and penetrating Cuban exile organizations. This latter function may deprive exile raiders of the all-important element of surprise.

32. During the past year, the Castro regime has considerably expanded two counterinsurgency bodies, the "Fight Against Bandits" (LCB) and the "Fight Against Pirates" (LCP), though we still have no acceptable figures on their strength. Full-time elite organizations, they probably engage in more armed actions than any other security force. Units of the LCB, the larger and more active, have engaged in numerous helicopter-assisted sweeps and encirclements, some culminating in skirmishes with guerrilla bands. The LCP operates coastal observation posts and patrol boats, using small stations along Cuba's 2,000-mile coastline, to prevent exile infiltrations, as well as the escape of disaffected Cubans. Both groups work closely with the Department of State Security. A third organization formed in late 1963 is the National Frontier Guard Corps, under the control of the Ministry of Interior; its mission is also coastal defense.

#### Outlook

33. In view of the extensiveness and pervasiveness of this security apparatus, the chances appear very small that under present circumstances popular disaffection with the regime will be transformed into an effective effort to bring it down. Castro has demonstrated a remarkable ability to preserve a workable degree of unity among the disparate groups involved in the regime. He has been able to make the great bulk of the population accept—without active opposition—the socialization and regimentation of his revolution.

34. The ability of the regime to survive may, of course, be lessened by a major deterioration in the basic internal situation. Acrimony and disagreement within the government, over such matters as the export of revolution or the advantages and disadvantages of rapprochement with the US, could lead to a power struggle among regime leaders that would seriously weaken the government and reduce the effectiveness of the security organizations. Another possibility which might change the odds for survival would be measures so oppressive as to precipitate large-scale demonstrations, and so generally unpopular that elements in the security forces and military forces would refuse to intervene or might even side with the people. However, changes of this nature extensive enough to undermine Castro's power position would be likely to take some years.

35. If Castro were to die or be removed from the scene during the next year or two, the immediate response of the regime, including the military, would probably be a rallying together to try to hold the populace in line and to defend against a feared US intervention. There is, however, no Cuban on the scene today who appears to have sufficient personal power and popular support to

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contain and control the powerful diverse forces within the revolution. Neither Raul Castro, the designated successor, nor Che Guevara, nor any other member of the "inner circle" has the personal qualities and following required to control Cuba as Fidel has done. In his 1 May 1964 speech, Castro revealed that, if he should fall, he expected the leadership of the PURS to assume command. He apparently anticipates that his successor would be a committee, presumably led by the "inner circle," with the PURS National Directorate arrayed behind them.

36. However Castro's immediate succession is arranged, we believe that there would be no more than a brief period of unity after Castro's departure before a major power struggle began. We cannot predict with any confidence the outcome of such a struggle. Certainly the role of the Cuban military will be crucial. Among the many possible results of a power struggle would be the emergence of a regime much like Castro's, dominated by men who support him now and supported and accepted by most military elements. Another possibility would be a regime led by a non-Communist leftist individual or clique that resented Castro's communization of the original 26th of July movement.<sup>1</sup> Such an event would probably find the security forces with divided allegiances and would most likely result in civil strife or even civil war. Some non-Communist group might wish to call for US assistance. In sum, Castro's death would jeopardize the type of political pattern which now exists in Cuba—and could cause a dramatic reversal.

#### IV. THE MILITARY FORCES

##### Current Situation

37. Castro's armed forces have grown from a ragtag band of guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra to much the best-equipped military force in Latin America and, except for Brazil, the largest. We estimate the personnel strength of Cuban forces to be more than 100,000 men on active duty: Army, 90,000; Navy, 6,000; Air Force, 4,000; ground-based air defense (radar and surface-to-air missile systems), 8,000. In addition there are about 85,000 in the ready reserve and a 100,000-man homeguard militia called the Popular Defense Force; the latter, however, has only a limited combat capability and is useful primarily for local defense, rear-guard security, and a manpower pool in time of emergency.

38. The Soviets have supplied the Castro regime with more than enough modern military equipment for its forces. Its elaborate air defense system includes 24 SAM sites; an extensive air surveillance radar network; and 138 MIG fighters, including 40 MIG-21's. The Air Force's helicopters are of par-

<sup>1</sup> A non-Communist regime able to command broad support among the Cuban people would probably pursue highly nationalistic policies and maintain many of the socialistic measures introduced by Castro.

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ticular importance for operations against insurgents and exile landings, and transport aircraft are being used in coastal patrol missions.

#### ESTIMATED CUBAN HOLDINGS OF MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Tanks and self-propelled guns	700
Other Armored Vehicles	250
Field Artillery and Antitank Guns	1,300
AAA Guns	900
Mortars	900
FROG Rocket Launchers	6
Military Trucks	21,500
SAM Sites	24 (with enough equipment for 3 more sites)
SAM (SA-2 Guideline) Missiles	600
Cruise-Missile Sites	4
Cruise-Missiles	150
Air Defense Radars	200
Jet Fighters:	
MIG-15/17 (FAGOT/FRESCO)	86
MIG-19 (FARMER)	12
MIG-21 (FISHBED)	40
Helicopters	90
KOMAR Cruise-Missile Boats (60 Missiles)	12
Kronstadt and SO-I Subchasers	9
Motor Torpedo Boats (P-4/P-6)	24


39. Most of the increase in Cuban military capabilities over the past 18 months has resulted from the delivery of additional Soviet weapons and from the acquisition of weapon systems formerly under Soviet control. The Soviets have delivered tanks, patrol craft, MIG fighters, and some additional SAM launchers and missiles since the 1962 missile crisis and have transferred to the Cubans the cruise and surface-to-air missiles systems. KOMAR missile boats, MIG-21 jet fighters, and ground forces weapons, including FROG rockets. Cuban forces are well-equipped to combat internal resistance and to repel invasion short of direct US intervention, but lack experience in the use of some of the newly acquired Soviet weapons. Although Cuban forces are experienced in small unit operations, they still suffer from lack of training in large-scale exercises or in joint operations necessary for more effectively combating maritime raids and internal insurgency. Deficiencies in transportation and logistical support also hinder military readiness and operations.

40. In the event of US invasion, Cuban plans evidently envisage a strong initial resistance at the point of attack, followed by a defense of pre-selected key positions and, finally, by guerrilla warfare. Only a small proportion of Cuban forces, however, would be likely to carry on prolonged guerrilla operations.

41. The Cuban Navy and Air Force are defensively equipped, trained, and oriented. Neither force has more than a limited offensive capability: the Navy,

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for example, lacks landing craft. The Air Force, while capable of providing some support to guerrillas in the Caribbean area, lacks the airlift capacity for more than a very small effort.

#### Outlook

42. The conscription law went into effect in December 1963, and the first conscripts were called up at the end of March. The law requires all Cuban males between the ages of 17 and 45 to register and most to participate in full or part-time military service, and it extends the active duty service from two to three years.<sup>9</sup> One effect of the draft is likely to be an initial drop in the level of training and efficiency of the units to which the draftees are assigned. Over time, the most important military results will be to establish a much larger trained reserve and to supply selected personnel for operation and maintenance of the recently acquired advanced weapon systems.

43. After an initial increase in the size of the active armed forces, discharges will probably keep the Cuban military establishment close to its present strength. And following the temporary drop in the level of training and efficiency, training will probably become more advanced, to include combined operations and more technical instruction. Military organization may become somewhat more standardized. Nonetheless, Cuban forces will probably continue to display most of the same shortcomings and vulnerabilities that they have in the past. Lack of combat experience and dependence on the USSR for advanced training and material support will continue to be two of the most serious.

#### The Soviet Military Presence

44. The Soviets have continued to withdraw military personnel during 1963 and 1964 as they have gradually completed training of Cubans on various modern weapon systems and turned these systems over, one after another, to Cuban control. Soviet withdrawals have been paralleled by deliveries to Cuba of a variety of items of military equipment and supplies, primarily, it appears, for the purpose of bringing Cuban holdings in some of the systems up to full strength. The SAM system has been turned over to the Cubans, and they almost certainly have full operational control. Thus, the Cubans almost certainly have the capability to shoot down a U-2.<sup>9</sup>

45. There are almost certainly no Russian combat units still present on the island. Almost all of the Soviet personnel who manned the SAM and early

<sup>9</sup> The law provides the regime with the means of accomplishing several objectives that are not directly military. Under the new law, inductees receive seven pesos per month instead of the old 83 peso pay; this will probably result in a saving of about 60 million pesos per year. Technicians much needed by the Cuban economy will be trained. A large and cheap labor force will be created for such jobs as aiding in sugar harvests. Finally, through registration of most adults, Castro has created a new mechanism to aid in exercising control over the population.

<sup>9</sup> The SA-2 surface-to-air missile system has an estimated maximum operational range of about 25 nautical miles and a maximum effective altitude capability of about 90,000 feet.

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warning radar systems have returned to the USSR; when the rest depart, there will remain an organization of the MAAG type, the majority of whom are technical and maintenance personnel. About 2,000 personnel of this type will probably remain so long as Castro continues to be dependent on the USSR for the technical and material support necessary for maintaining the complex equipment the Soviets have supplied.

#### Chances of Reintroduction of Strategic Weapons

46. We think it highly unlikely that the USSR will, within the period of this estimate, attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba.<sup>10</sup> Even if the Soviets believed that there was a chance of completing such deployments undetected, they would recognize that, to have the desired political effect, the missiles would subsequently have to be revealed. They would be aware, therefore, that at some point a crisis of the severest kind would arise in an area where, as proved in 1962, the USSR is at a grave disadvantage. The same line of argument applies to Soviet delivery to the Cubans of other weapons that might be considered "offensive" by the US (e.g., light bombers or submarines), though the Soviets might estimate that the risk of US counteraction would not be so great.

47. The Soviets might see less risk in using Cuba for logistical support of their submarines. This fleet is very large, but regular patrols in the Western Atlantic have not been established. Refueling and repair facilities in Cuba would go far to overcome difficulties of distance and transit time and thereby would increase Soviet capabilities. The USSR would not expect to keep the US in the dark for long about such a program, but it might believe that a gradual development in this direction—occasional brief visits, say, by individual submarines—would confront the US with difficult problems of response. On the other hand, the Soviets would almost certainly expect sharp reactions from the US. So long as they calculate that the risk would be high they would not push such a venture very far.

### V. FOREIGN POLICIES

#### Cuban-Soviet Relations

48. The Cuban-Soviet relationship remains intact, although frictions have continued. Castro's contact with the Soviet ambassador has become relatively infrequent; he has failed to appear at various social functions of the Soviet Bloc embassies; he continues to treat the Chinese Communists and Albanians as close allies; and the Cuban press frequently runs in tandem a TASS article and one from the *New China News Agency*.

49. Castro has never signed the test-ban treaty. Indeed, last September he dismissed the relaxation of East-West tensions as much less important than

<sup>10</sup> We recognize that the Soviets have the technical capability of clandestinely reintroducing strategic weapons, but we believe the risk of another grave confrontation would be unacceptable to them.

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Cuba's plight as "a small country, attacked, blockaded, against which a policy of undeclared war is being followed . . ." By inference he accused the Soviets of undue friendliness toward the imperialist enemies of Cuba. Castro and Che Guevara have long expounded the necessity for violent revolution, a position much closer to the Chinese than to the Soviet doctrine. They have also remained essentially in competition with most old-line, Soviet-backed Communist parties in Latin America. And in Cuba itself, Castro has acted to prevent the Moscow-oriented "old" Communists from attaining a dominant role in the government or in his United Party of the Socialist Revolution. In short, Castro has maintained a large measure of independence of action. He has shown himself willing to lean to the side of the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet dispute, but he fails in the most important test of loyalty: willingness to join in a formal condemnation of Peiping.

50. The Soviets, for their part, cannot regard Castro as either very dependable or very consistent. His egotism must tax their patience; the administrative methods of his regime must make them wonder whether a viable Communist state can really be molded from Cuban clay. Their aid bill for keeping the Cuban economy afloat is large enough to be burdensome; certain Soviet officials, as well as some from the Eastern European countries, which carry a relatively modest part of the whole, have long muttered about pouring funds down the Cuban rat-hole.<sup>11</sup> But the Soviets have not tried to bring Castro into line by withholding aid, despite the number of occasions in which he has flouted their interests. Instead, Khrushchev has catered to his ego and, during his visits to the USSR in the spring of 1963 and in January 1964, wooed him for weeks with attention and flattery.

51. Although Castro realizes that he cannot survive without Soviet support and that he must continue to rely on the benefits of large-scale Soviet economic and military aid, he will not submit to much Soviet discipline and control. He knows that the Soviets regard their stake in maintaining a Communist Cuba as a major one. Thus he almost certainly believes that he has—and, in fact, he probably does have—appreciable room for maneuver. Castro will continue to be quite suspicious of any improvement in US-Soviet relations. Apparently his fear is not that the Soviets would sell him out in bilateral negotiations, but that they might stand by while US economic pressures, exile raids, and an accumulation of adverse factors gradually eroded his position beyond recovery.

52. The Soviets seem to have little choice but to continue their patient support for Castro. They will almost certainly counsel him to caution in dealing with the US and in fomenting revolution in Latin America; they will not, however, be able to compel him to follow such a course. They will try to make Cuba viable as an example to other small nations and as a project to which So-

<sup>11</sup> By the end of 1964, Communist economic assistance expenditures to Cuba will amount to some \$850 million. These expenditures have been approximately as follows: 1961—\$30 million; 1962—\$250 million; 1963—about \$350 million. New outlays in 1964 are likely to be at least \$200 million.

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viet prestige is committed in the face of both the US and Communist China. For, despite all their difficulties with him, Cuba under Castro represents the best victory for the Soviet camp in the last several years and their first breakthrough in the Western Hemisphere.

#### The Problem of SAMs and U-2s

53. The most explosive question in Soviet-Cuban relations, as well as between Castro and the US, is the continuation of US reconnaissance overflights. The available evidence points to the conclusion that Cuba now has full control over the SAM system, thus leaving the Soviets only the capacity to give advice backed up by their political and economic leverage. On the other hand, the evidence is not such as to permit us wholly to exclude the possibility that the USSR has retained some sort of physical restraint on an actual firing. Khrushchev would have an incentive to maintain such a restraint because the untrammelled possession of the SAMs would give the volatile Castro an important influence over a vital Soviet interest. Khrushchev must calculate that in the event of a U-2 shootdown the US would retaliate sharply against Cuba. This could confront Khrushchev with the unhappy dilemma of facing up to the US in circumstances even less propitious than those of October 1962, or of publicly reneging on his oft-repeated promises to support Castro.

54. In the past few months Castro and Khrushchev have publicly and privately elaborated a common position against the U-2 flights. They have indicated that the flights will not be tolerated much longer and that, if political persuasion fails to deter the US, then a U-2 will be shot down. They have sketched a timetable which would bring the issue to a head after the US election. Castro has reiterated that he will take his case to the next UN General Assembly and exhaust the possible political remedies before ordering a shoot-down. Khrushchev has taken pains to stress Castro's right and ability to use the SAM system and has warned that the USSR will stand by Castro in the event of US retaliation.

55. Though some surprise move in the midst of the US election campaign cannot be excluded, it seems more likely that the USSR and Cuba will continue to use the next few months to agitate the U-2 issue and sound out the US on possible compromises. Both Khrushchev and Castro have let it be known that they would not object to satellite or oblique photography. They have also hinted vaguely that some form of inspection on the ground might be arranged in return for inspection of nearby US territory. Castro and Khrushchev hope this combination of warnings, threats, and compromise offers will be effective in exerting pressure on the US. Even if this approach is fruitless, Castro probably estimates that in the process he can gain sympathy for his position, begin to mobilize UN members on his side, and raise the political costs to the US of retaliation for the shootdown of a U-2.

56. In sum, we believe that Castro will think it prudent to wait until after the US elections to force the overflights issue. At the same time, we think he is fully determined to launch a major effort for formal UN consideration of the

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matter, if he obtains no satisfaction from the US. If this campaign does not succeed, there is considerable danger that, as a last resort, he would order a shootdown, calculating that the US would not retaliate in force or that, if it did, the resulting hue and cry would bring overflights to an end. In the interim, there will be a possibility of an impulsive reaction by Castro. There is also the chance of an unauthorized shootdown, but in view of the importance to Castro of this matter, the chances of such an action seem to us to be small.

#### Overtures Toward the US

57. Khrushchev, in supporting Cuba's position on overflights, may again have urged Castro to explore the possibilities for a normalization of relations with the US. Castro probably considers such an effort useful to build a record of Cuban reasonableness and flexibility in preparation for Cuba's appeal to the UN. In any case, we believe that Castro has a serious interest in improving relations with the US. The US economic denial program has hurt Cuba and will continue to do so. Moreover, as parallel revolutions fail to materialize in Latin America, he is increasingly forced to give up the notion that relations with the US are a short-term problem destined to be swept away by the tide of hemispheric revolution. Furthermore, the longer a US-Soviet atmosphere of detente persists, the more he must concern himself with a possible lack of support from his patron in a crisis.

58. His interest in stabilizing relations with the US wars with elements in Castro's temperament, with his strong revolutionary bent, and with his recurring conviction that the US price for normalization would be nothing less than his own disappearance. He clearly considers US acceptance of his regime to be a long-range and chancy prospect to which he cannot commit his policies. Nevertheless, he has made various overtures toward the US from time to time. We expect future efforts, perhaps including some moderation of his conduct, intended to soften US resistance to a rapprochement. We think there is virtually no chance, however, that he will accede at any early date to the conditions which the US has stated.<sup>12</sup>

#### Latin American Policies

59. Castro is first of all a revolutionary and has expended much energy and effort encouraging violent revolution elsewhere.<sup>13</sup> He has provided assistance to an assortment of Communist and non-Communist revolutionaries. Primarily this has taken the form of propaganda, limited financial aid, political indoctrination, and training in subversive techniques and guerrilla warfare. (In 1963

<sup>12</sup> On 6 July 1964 a State Department spokesman reiterated the longstanding US position that there are two elements in the Cuban situation which are not negotiable: "Castro's ties of dependency with the USSR which are tantamount to Soviet domination of the regime and the continuance of Castro's promotion of subversion elsewhere in the hemisphere."

<sup>13</sup> For a detailed, country-by-country estimate of Communist and Castroist strengths, weaknesses, and opportunities, see NIE 80/90-64, "Communist Potentialities in Latin America," scheduled for USIB consideration in August 1964, Secret.

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over 2,400 Latin Americans traveled to Cuba; several hundred of them probably received training in terrorist and guerrilla methods while there.) The Castro regime has undertaken direct supply of some arms to extremist groups (e.g., the Cuban arms cache discovered in Venezuela last November) but prefers to provide funds for the purchase of weapons from other sources.

60. Although these efforts have helped strengthen extreme leftist dissidents in a number of Latin American countries, there have been no Castro-style revolutions and, except in Venezuela and Guatemala, very little violent revolutionary activity. Indeed, Castro must view developments over the past year as disappointing. In Venezuela, long the priority target in Castro's revolutionary plans, the Communist and Castroist groups failed dismally in their terrorist attempts to disrupt the December election and prevent an orderly succession of government. In Panama, the climate of opinion which came into being with the anti-US riots in January seemed to offer a special opportunity for aggressive violent action by the Castroists against a vulnerable, oligarchic regime. Havana immediately urged this course, but the Castroists in Panama preferred to give priority to tactics aimed at gradually increasing their influence within the established political system. In Brazil, the removal of Goulart in April dimmed the prospects of the extreme left for exerting and expanding political influence; the Castello Branco government has broken relations with Cuba, leftists have been removed from important Brazilian government jobs, and the various local Communists and Castroist groups are in disarray. In sum, Castro's revolutionary hopes have suffered notable setbacks during the past year, some of them occurring despite circumstances which he apparently thought propitious for action.

61. These developments have also tended to stiffen the anti-Castro position of most of the member governments of the Organization of American States. The OAS adoption on 26 July of diplomatic, trade, and shipping sanctions against Cuba is primarily important in its psychological rather than its economic impact. But Castro obviously feels that Cuba's political isolation in the hemisphere is damaging to his cause; he will try to impede implementation of the sanctions as well as other actions which would reinforce this isolation.

62. We believe that Castro and his revolutionary theorist, Che Guevara, have become somewhat less sanguine about their chances for quick revolutionary success. In their speeches and propaganda on the subject, they will probably wax hot or cold at various times as they have in the past,<sup>14</sup> but they almost certainly will continue to aid and train potential revolutionaries. They may press for early aggressive action on the part of Castroist groups in some Latin American countries, even though the immediate chances of these groups seem poor; here, their primary hope would be that the government's counter-action would antagonize larger segments of the population, eventually producing

<sup>14</sup> In a major speech on 26 July 1964, Castro once again delivered a general appeal for revolution in Latin America, adding a few words of encouragement for "the heroic revolutionaries" of Venezuela and the "courageous guerrillas" of Guatemala.

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conditions more favorable for exploitation. The Cuban leaders might, however, have difficulty in persuading even strong sympathizers to undertake the first step of this scenario; there is no plethora of willing martyrs in Latin America. A number of other factors also militate against quick Castroist revolution; these range from the dinginess of the Cuban show window to the increased effectiveness of the security forces—and the increased awareness of the potential threat—in many Latin American countries.

63. There is danger, nonetheless, that Castroists may succeed in triggering or participating in revolutions during the period of this estimate, and this danger may increase over a longer time-span. The basics of the Latin American situation—*population pressures on limited resources, and rates of economic and social development which do not keep pace with the rising expectations of the people*—mean continuing instability and growing popular dissatisfaction with established political parties and institutions. These conditions are readily exploitable by extremists of various shades; sudden change and revolutionary situations must be expected. Depending on the nature of such a situation, a few hundred Castroist activists or a small number of Cuban-supplied weapons could provide the initial impetus or even the decisive factor in an attempt to overthrow an established government. But the Castroists would not necessarily emerge as the dominant element in the revolutionary movement.

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ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY IN BOLIVIA

Guerrilla activity in Bolivia's Santa Cruz Department and unrest among tin miners continue to plague President Victor Paz Estenssoro.

The armed forces have taken over the counterinsurgency effort in the troubled San Ignacio-San Simon region of Santa Cruz Department from the national police. Police units failed to wipe out the guerrillas in early August, encountered two ambushes, and created additional antigovernment sentiment by pillaging. Army commanders are optimistic about crushing the dissidents, but the efficiency and competent leadership of the guerrilla band suggest the campaign may be a long one.

[REDACTED] subversive groups are also operating in other parts of Santa Cruz Department. [REDACTED]

they are associated with former vice president Juan Lechin's National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN) and the rightist Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB).

[REDACTED] Gulf Oil Company [REDACTED] property and personnel in Santa Cruz have been threatened by dissidents claiming to be FSB guerrillas.

Antigovernment demonstrations and violence erupted in the mine areas last week in protest against the beating of Lechin by Paz' political police. Communist and Falangist mine union leaders again called for armed insurrection, and demanded a popular government headed by Lechin. Some 2,500 militants turned out for an antigovernment demonstration in La Paz on 13 August--the largest number opposition leaders have been able to muster for some time.

Paz is also having his troubles within the party and government. Pro-Paz forces won by only a very narrow margin in the 4 August election of officers for Congress against a surprising degree of united opposition.

Party leaders, opposed to a break with Cuba, managed to maneuver Paz into a difficult position regarding timing of the formal announcement. Paz' implication in the Lechin beating and the attempted assassination of Vice President Barrientos on 14 August--the fifth attempt within a year--has created public resentment against Paz and other government officials. Barrientos feels that unless the lawlessness is quickly stopped, it could grow into a serious situation. [REDACTED]

BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT IMPOSES STRICT CONTROLS OVER OPPOSITION

The "plot" to overthrow President Victor Paz Estenssoro last weekend appears to have been fabricated by the government as an excuse to crack down on the opposition and restore law and order under a state of siege.

Former president Hernan Siles Zuazo and ex - Vice President Juan Lechin had engaged in plotting for several months, but they did not have the capability to overthrow the government at this time. The government moreover, would not have left Lechin free if it had convincing proof of his involvement in a coup attempt. No important military leaders or units were implicated in the plot, and any serious attempt at a coup would have required some military support. The government also claims that the so-called guerrilla activity in Santa Cruz Department was part of the plot; yet, the army announced last Friday that the last of the guerrillas had been driven across the border into Brazil.

Several factors contributed to Paz' decision to crack down on the opposition at this time. Riots, violence, and terrorism associated with the nationwide teachers' strike had become increasingly serious by the end of the week. Miners, threatening to strike for higher wages, had already seized four mine officials to protest the government's failure to pay salaries. Opposi-

tion leaders had been trying to turn this labor unrest into manifestations against the government, and Paz was concerned that the situation might get out of hand during De Gaulle's 28-29 September visit.

State-of-siege powers permit Paz to ensure internal security during the visit and control labor unrest. They may also provide a pretext for re-establishing government authority in the mines.

Circumstances surrounding the reported attempt to assassinate Vice President Barrientos on 20 September--the seventh try in a year--are unclear. It may be part of a campaign designed to drive him out of the country, or, Barrientos may himself have staged the bombing to bolster his public image and strength. Many people nonetheless blame the government, creating growing resentment against Paz. Barrientos has steadily gained power and strength since the elections, and is currently engaged with Paz in a struggle for control of peasants in La Paz Department. Paz has made repeated attempts to remove Barrientos from the political scene by offering him foreign diplomatic posts, but so far he has refused. It seems only a matter of time before a showdown occurs.

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BOLIVIAN DEMONSTRATIONS MOST SERIOUS IN FOURTEEN YEARS

The violent antigovernment demonstrations that have erupted in every major city in Bolivia since 21 October represent the greatest challenge to political stability in the fourteen-year rule of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR).

Both rightist and leftist opposition parties are behind the outbreaks, but they have used their followers in the universities and secondary schools to spearhead their demonstrations. At the outset the primary grievance was press censorship imposed by the government under a state-of-siege declaration issued on 20 September. However, the emphasis has switched to protests against the government's repressive measures which have caused several deaths. The government has granted some concessions to the students, including the revocation of censorship, but enough momentum had already been gathered to turn the demonstrations into demands that President Paz relinquish control of the government.

Paz is apparently determined to stand his ground and

put down this challenge to his rule. He is presently relying primarily on the national police, the peasant militia, and loyal MNR militia units to quell the disorders. In the capital, these forces have so far been able to contain the demonstrators. The situation in provincial cities, particularly in Oruro where local miners are now in full revolt, is far more serious, however. Fewer police are deployed in these localities and the loyalty of local militia units is questionable.

The ultimate outcome hinges on whether the armed forces will remain loyal to Paz. At the moment, the military does not seem inclined to shift allegiance, although there are reports that some low-ranking officers are plotting a coup.

Vice President Barrientos is maintaining an ambiguous position. If he came out strongly for Paz, the situation would probably be eased somewhat. His continued silence, however, will encourage efforts to overthrow the government.

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## TURMOIL IN BOLIVIA

The military leaders who overthrew President Paz Estenssoro on 4 November have not yet formed a government although radiobroadcasts continually refer to a military junta. General Alfredo Ovando Candia, the commander in chief of the Bolivian armed forces, supposedly heads the "junta." General Hugo Suarez Guzman, the commanding general of the army, has announced that he will be a member of the junta, but his status is unclear.

Vice President Barrientos, the key figure in the ouster of Paz, was scheduled to confer with Ovando on 5 November regarding the form of government to be established.

The military revolt was triggered by the mutiny of a por-



Paz Estenssoro

Gen. Barrientos

tion of the Ingavi Regiment, a security detachment of the army general staff, in La Paz on the morning of 3 November. Both Ovando and Suarez were held briefly by the mutineers. It is unclear whether Barrientos was directly connected with the La Paz uprising; he claims he had nothing to do with it. Nevertheless, he announced his support of the rebels. Other military units, most opposition political parties, and the miners joined the rebellion as the day progressed. Paz resigned on 4 November when it became evident that a civil war would ensue if he attempted to remain in power. He left for Lima, Peru.

The absence of any effective government, with resultant violence and chaos, provides an opportunity for Communists and other extremist elements to exert their influence in the formation of a new government. Extreme leftist Juan Lechin, ex-vice president and head of the National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN) has already tried to force his participation in the junta. He appears to have failed, but his attitude can be expected to influence those who will organize an interim government. Communist inroads can be controlled only if the new government quickly imposes strong military rule.

The nation's tin miners, who are under Communist and

6 Nov 64

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

Approved for Release  
Date

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Page 198

extreme leftist leadership for the most part, are also a force to be reckoned with. The mine leaders announced on 4 November that they will fight the army if necessary unless permitted an important role in the government.

Maintaining law and order is the most pressing problem presently facing the army leaders. Sacking of government offices and looting have continued,

and the army has been ineffective in controlling the situation. [REDACTED]

\* \* \*

**BOLIVIAN JUNTA STILL IN CONTROL**

The new military junta, headed by General Rene Barrientos, is managing to maintain a precarious hold on the reins of government by avoiding any actions which might drive certain political parties and powerful interest groups into open opposition. The junta's lack of qualified administrators is causing considerable confusion in the government's affairs.

Communist and pro-Communist supporters of former vice president Juan Lechin are making gains among urban labor and peasant organizations that were formerly controlled by Paz Estenssoro and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). In La Paz, construction workers, street vendors, factory workers, municipal employees, and flour mill unions have fallen under the domination of the Communists and Lechinists. The loyalties of the large railroad workers' federation and the teachers' federation are presently divided. In addition, a new peasant federation has been formed by Lechinist elements to absorb those peasants who used to be controlled by MNR.

Student organizations, heavily infiltrated by Communists and Lechinists, seized control of radio stations in La Paz and Cochabamba last week, apparently with the sanction of military authorities.

The junta's strategy, meanwhile, has been outlined by Minister of Economy Julio Sanjines Goitia. He says the regime recognizes its weakness, but that it is doing all it can to buy time until it is militarily strong enough to prevail in any armed conflict which might develop. A large increase in the size of the military is the cornerstone of this policy.

For tactical reasons, political parties, the students, miners, and labor groups continue to claim they support the junta. They too, however, are buying time in order to organize, strengthen their membership, and develop their strategy.

The primary objective of the Communist Party (PCB) is to infiltrate and work for a common front with Lechin's National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN). By itself, the PCB poses no immediate threat to the junta. An alliance between the PCB and PRIN, however, would represent a concentration of manpower and weaponry which could seriously challenge the military for control of the government.

The junta so far has not been recognized as the government of Bolivia by any country. Venezuela and Costa Rica broke diplomatic relations with Bolivia last week, while most Latin American governments are maintaining a wait-and-see attitude. The Latins are primarily concerned about the stability of the junta, the maneuverings of extreme leftist elements, and the junta's plans for returning the country to civilian rule. Junta members talk of holding elections in six months to a year.

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BOLIVIAN JUNTA MOVES TO WIN PUBLIC SUPPORT

Members of the Bolivian junta were busy this week bringing order to their chaotic ministries, and junta president General Rene Barrientos traveled outside La Paz in search of popular support.

As part of this effort to win public favor, the junta has abolished the "oppressive" measures and organizations of the Paz regime. The state of siege and press censorship have been lifted, and the secret police organization has been abolished.

In his public speeches, Barrientos has stressed that political parties have an "unusual climate of freedom" in which to operate, but warned that any group which attempts to provoke disorder will be dealt with severely.

Political leaders, themselves hard at work to strengthen and expand their organizations, have talked much of party alliances and national fronts. Representatives of the relatively strong center-right Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) and of the small Social Democratic (PSD) and Bolivian Democratic Action (ADB) parties have begun discus-

sions aimed at formation of a Christian Democratic Party in which they hope to include the Social Christian Party (PSC).

Lechin and the Communists appear to have the jump on other parties as they all vie for control of peasant and labor organizations in and around La Paz that were formerly under the control of Paz Estenssoro.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

13448/181

COUNTRY Bolivia  
 SUBJECT Comments by Bolivian Businessman re Overthrow of the Paz Estenssoro Government  
 REPORT NO. [REDACTED]  
 DATE DISTR. 20 Nov 64  
 NO. PAGES 3  
 REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. [REDACTED]  
 PLACE & DATE ACQ. [REDACTED]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. "As soon as all the excitement and the last events are over, I do want to pass on to you a brief information regarding the outcome of the revolution.
2. "As you are aware, the problem began with the students, about three months ago. This tension between students and teachers against the government was becoming more and more latent. etc It became the focus of the attention of the whole country. Gradually, this tension was building up constantly until the differences between students and government were notorious. The government began making things very difficult for students particularly, all over the country. This problem was complicated with something that the government called a revolution under Hernán Siles' leadership. Paz Estenssoro started to throw punches indiscriminately. I think this was the beginning of Paz Estenssoro's real problems. I also thought that deporting Siles, who gave Paz Estenssoro the Presidency, was going to demoralize his own party, since Siles undoubtedly was, from the beginning to the last moment, the undisputed head of the M.N.R.; although Paz wanted to maintain that title without the merits that Siles had obtained with his ability and determination.
3. "Following this, the students of the University with unbelievable courage, started to fight Paz and his "carabineros" openly until the rebellion was an open fight with stones, clubs, and other minor weapons. This kind of tension and demonstrations were going on almost daily between the students and the carabineros, until finally the government got tired and surrounded the University and took hostages by hundreds. It is well known that the first day the Political Control members, which will be described later, beat

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Approved for Release  
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U-Yes  
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 downgrading and  
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the students almost to death inside the University. Later, they took the students to the "Control Político" and gave them further punishment. Humiliation, physical and moral suffering was drawn upon the boys, which naturally brought anger to the families of the students, many of whom were looking for revenge, because the Control Político, which was organized by Paz in 1952, was nothing but a grotesque copy of the Gestapo. This Control Político was organized at the beginning of Paz's regime by two Spanish refugees of the Spanish Civil War, who were experts in torturing and were highly trained in the USSR. From 1952 to 1954, we had in Bolivia concentration camps such as the ones seen in Germany during Hitler's time.

4. "Fortunately, Siles became President in 1956 and one of his first acts was to abolish the concentration camps, which had hundreds of innocent people imprisoned just for their political ideas or for their connection with political parties.
5. "When Paz came back into power in 1960, he again started to reorganize the Control Político, but fortunately the concentration camps were not reopened. During 1960 to 1964 Paz had, as we might say, a rather easy government. He did not have much opposition and he thought the rest was going to be easy. Then he decided to succeed himself, violating the constitution of the country. He changed it the way he pleased and was elected with a tremendous majority. It is well known that it was a widely organized fraud. Government employees and the majority of the Indians were brought to the polls, and in that way there was complete control of the votes cast. They were practically herded to the polls.
6. "Siles immediately broke with Paz Estenssoro since he was going against the constitution, and Siles decided to fight with the rest of the political parties, which were still alive. Siles fought Paz until he was deported, as indicated above.
7. [REDACTED] that Rene Barrientos Ortuno was the man to watch, and I think I told you that he was an ambitious young man who could be, one day, the President of Bolivia.
8. "Barrientos in the last elections ran as Vice President. His ticket was supported by the Army. It was clear that Barrientos and the Army were getting ready to take over the government as soon as the opportune moment came.
9. "When the revolt of the students was destroyed by the government, Barrientos went to Cochabamba and started with the Seventh Division of the Army, the revolt against the government. Barrientos is a brilliant man with great imagination to convince the mass. In Cochabamba, there is a very large indian settlement called Urcuenas. They are well trained in the militia warfare, and they are armed to the teeth. Barrientos, who is a native son of one of the small provinces of Cochabamba, naturally speaks their tongue (quechua) and during the last two years, he was practically living with them. Once the revolt began, he felt at ease with the whole hearted support of the Urcuenas and the Seventh Division of the Army. Immediately the miners of Oruro followed suit and gradually the rest of the Army started to join Barrientos Ortuno, until 3 Nov 64 when Paz Estenssoro's cause was over. In the morning, we saw truck loads of his belongings leaving his home, and, as usual, defections within his own party started gradually the night of 3 November when quite a few of his followers were already looking for asylum in several Embassies.

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10. "The night of 3 November, Barrientos and the garrison of La Paz came to a cease fire agreement to last until 12 o'clock in the morning of 4 November. During that night, Barrientos had instructed the Santa Cruz and Cochabamba garrison to wait until 12 o'clock in the morning of 4 November before proceeding to La Paz. Barrientos was lucky enough to have in Cochabamba the Lloyd Aereo Boliviano and part of the Bolivian Air Forces, so he promised to air lift his soldiers to Oruro and to come in with the rest of 10,000 very well-armed soldiers from Oruro to La Paz.
11. "During the dramatic hours of the morning of 4 November, Paz Estenssoro and his followers were desperate. Everybody started to run for himself, trying to take as many of his belongings as he could to the Embassies. At five o'clock in the morning, it was known that Paz Estenssoro was forced to renounce the Presidency, but he did not want to do so. At ten in the morning, he was escorted to the airport and shipped, with his family and very few of his close associates, to Lima.
12. "In La Paz, for practically 24 hours, we did not have a government. Only yesterday [3 Nov 64], René Barrientos arrived and took over the government together with Alfredo Ovando Candia, the Head of the Bolivian Army.
13. "When Barrientos and Ovando Candia were to address a mass of several thousand people in the main square, Ovando Candia spoke first. The people insulted him and did not let him deliver his speech. It was brief and lasted only 25 seconds. Immediately it was apparent that the people were completely against Candia because he was not a man of decisions. He was constantly trying to follow the course of events and he was the one who guaranteed Paz Estenssoro's escape.
14. "The tremendous pressure of the mob outside the palace forced Candia to resign his post in the Junta and also as Head of the Army. Rumors are that he was later confirmed as Head of the Army.
15. "During the 36 minutes Barrientos spoke to the mass outside the Palace, he delivered a speech full of hope and promises of giving his country freedom of expression and also respect to the human rights of the Bolivians, etc., but the most encouraging statement which he emphasized was that he is not a President of a party as was Paz Estenssoro, but he is the President of all the Bolivians. He said that the Control Político, which all Bolivians feared, was abolished and completely dismantled. The members of the Cabinet are people of good will. They are well known for being honest and sincere. You know personally the Minister of Economy, Julio Sanjinés. Julio, as we call him, is very well known and he has been working in very close contact with the American Embassy for the last three years. Until yesterday, he was the Liaison Officer of the Aid Program with the Bolivian Government. Also, Julio has been until yesterday, the President of El Diario, the oldest paper in La Paz with definite democratic ideas.
16. "12 years of the M.N.R. (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) have passed and in comparison to other countries, Bolivia was stagnated and, in many instances, we have gone back.
17. "The only thing that has saved Bolivia from complete deterioration has been the American Aid. Without American Aid, I wonder what would have become of Bolivia.
18. "Barrientos is a very close friend of the Pentagon, and has maintained close relations with them. With his very friendly relations with the US Army, undoubtedly, it will be easy to obtain the recognition of the free world.
19. "We look forward to better days."

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13466/104

REPORT NO.

DATE DIED: 25 November 1964

459 PAGES

## REFERENCES

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**Figure 6**

1. I obtained little information of value with regard to Communist China and its tin industry. There has been a profound change in the situation in the last several years, and particularly in the year since my last visit. Although leaders in the Malaysian tin industry are in considerable number of Chinese origin, their once carefully nurtured ties with the homeland have been almost completely abandoned. This is due, in my opinion, to (a) greatly increased personal identification with Malaysia; (b) education efforts by the Government of Malaysia with a population - in Malaysia and Singapore - of nearly 50 percent persons 21 years of age or under; and (c) the attitude of the Malaysian Government in accepting, without apparent restraint, the important and increasing role of ethnic Chinese in wealth accumulation and the control of industry. Contrast the latter with Indonesia, for example, with its punitive measures against the ethnic Chinese.
2. I found the first reason above to exist in striking degree. Ethnic Chinese and others have virtually abandoned their visits to Communist China, and their remittances even to close relatives there. In our conversations there were many more references to "my government," "my country," "our embassy representatives," etc. In short, the population is succeeding to an almost startling degree in creating a nation out of a diversity of peoples and tribes and cultures. This is, of course, due in great part to the prosperity evident on every hand; and good management of the national assets, in education, for example. One by-product is the drying-up of my sources with regard to developments in Communist China.
3. I was able, nevertheless, to confirm the reported existence of a tinplate facility in Shanghai. This must be reasonably new. It means, of course, that there must be increased domestic consumption.
4. I found also strengthening for my earlier view that the Chinese are withholding most of their tin production from the USSR, for political reasons. However, I can cite no specific reasons for this greater assurance on my part.

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### NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

**Abstract**

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5. Some of my sources apparently believe that the Chicomas are active, probably in concert with the Soviets, in recent Bolivian coup. A number of my contacts believe there was no accident in the recent overthrow of Paz Estenssore in Bolivia. This important segment of industry opinion holds that the Soviets tried to strangle Malaysia, beginning in 1957 to 1960, by dumping great quantities of tin on the world market and thus driving down the price of the incipient nation's most important commodity. Now that this has failed so singularly, they are attempting something much more Machiavellian. They are, in effect, buying up and stockpiling all the surplus sold from the US stockpile, and from additional sources, in an attempt to price important US industrial users out of the market and into the use of substitutes. This would eventually work to "ruin" Malaysia and Bolivia, among others. While I am not yet ready to accept this view, I think it not too far-fetched a possibility to ignore.
6. In this connection I note that one Lechin has been named by new Bolivian President Barrientos to head his government's tin monopoly, COMIBOL. This may be the Lechin who formerly was Vice President but it seems more likely it is the latter's cousin Jules who is an avowed, card-carrying Communist. This must be a link to Soviet involvement in the recent coup.
7. I learned on good authority that the construction of Indonesia's tin smelter, at Muntak is proceeding more or less on schedule. The invited participants from The Netherlands have arrived and are very busy. Contracts for equipment have been let and one big dredge is to be floated out from the UK next year. Other dredges already are en route. The entrepreneurs claim steadfastly that they will have the big dredge in operation, on schedule, by August 1965, but my sources believe it will require until 1966.
8. The Indonesians are not doing any exploration for tin. Nor do they need to. They have tremendous unexploited or barely exploited sources, known for years. Failure to produce from them is the basic cause of the current serious world shortage of tin.
9. It is my personal, "educated" opinion that there is no deal between Indonesia and the USSR for tin futures - pigs or concentrates - in repayment of credits advanced for industrialization. However, I am of the opinion that this is both logical and possible with regard to credits for military supplies. While I know of no specific Indonesian shipments of this commodity to the USSR or its satellites, such sales would explain the current dearth of tin exports from that country. It is evident that the recently declared Indonesian embargo on shipments to the US is a joke. Such sales in the last year or two have been negligible.
10. The principal effect of Indonesia's shipping its tin concentrates to The Netherlands for smelting instead of to Malaya, is a financial loss to both the producers (and Indonesia's foreign exchange position), and the Malayan smelting interests. Obviously Indonesia is willing to expend this difference as a tool in its political attempt to undermine its antagonist in the Great Confrontation.
11. The construction of the new Thai smelter at Phuket (Shuket) is proceeding on schedule.
12. I was able to obtain the following confidential figures on 1964 direct export of Malayan pigged tin to the Soviet Bloc. It is important to note, in this connection, that the Malayan tin industry is very much opposed to such sales. However, they do not know from day to day who are the clients of the many buyers in the Penang market. Therefore it is impossible to limit the sales short of government controls.

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13. From coming to the European Soviet Bloc countries, all through the ports of Odessa, Gdynia and Rijeka, the following direct shipments of pig tin were made in 1964:

January	290 tons	June	100 tons
February	355 tons	July	150 tons
March	325 tons	August	975 tons
April	---	September	1300 tons
May	351 tons		

All the above was shipped in Bloc vessels except in one instance when a Japanese ship was used.

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13463/61

COUNTRY Bolivia

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT Reaction to Barrientos Revolution in Bolivian Mining Circles

DATE DISTR.

26 Nov 64

NO. PAGES

1

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO.  
PLACE &  
DATE ACQ. [REDACTED]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. A university-educated Bolivian mining engineer, [REDACTED], wrote the following in a confidential letter to one of his correspondents under [REDACTED]:
2. "As you perhaps know from the newspapers, we had a revolution here in Bolivia last week which brought a new government in the form of a military council headed by the new President, General Barrientos, who was the former Vice President. The Army says that this revolution is a 'restorer revolution,' but this is not the truth.
3. "The real situation in this country is confusing. You know that the miners are Communists and that they are working hard with their leader, Lechin, and other Communists like Pimentel and Escobar who have been freed from prison now. Lechin, as the miners' spokesman, accepts this new government. Meanwhile, Lechin has forced the President to make his brother, General Juan Lechin (sic), the head of COMIBOL (the government-owned Bolivian Mining Corporation). Things like that make the situation a little dangerous.
4. "Both the privately-owned mines and those of COMIBOL are apparently working in a normal manner, but ... they are not picking up their old orders for mining equipment. The managers of the mines say that they are 'waiting.' I do not know for what they are waiting, nor does anyone else. It is not advisable yet to travel to the Potosi, Quechisla and Colquiri mines until the situation becomes normal."

- end -

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S-Yes

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POLITICKING IN BOLIVIA

Politicking in anticipation of elections at some future date is now in full swing in Bolivia. Junta President Barrientos himself, despite his public disclaimer on 18 November of presidential ambitions, is acting like a candidate. He continues to stump the countryside drumming up popular support, and he is making efforts to create his own political organization.

There is speculation that Barrientos will resign from the junta just before the elections and run for president with the support of the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) and several minor rightist parties. He is also rumored seeking an alliance with the left.

Meanwhile other groups are busy trying to make alliances. Nothing firm has emerged from

these discussions, but the smaller parties are lining up either with ex - Vice President Juan Lechin's National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN) on the left, or with the FSB on the right.

Former president Hernan Siles Zuazo sees the possibility that a third group will emerge. This one would be based primarily on the remnants of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), which ruled Bolivia for 12 years before Paz Estenssoro's overthrow. Siles is currently attempting to revive and reorganize the MNR as his own political machine.

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13496-209

COUNTRY Bolivia

REPORT NO.

SUBJECT: Reaction of Mining Interests to  
Barrientos Revolution/Optimistic Mining  
Investment Atmosphere/Resistance of  
Private US Businesses to Encourage  
Activities of Control

DATE DISTR. 4 Dec 64

507 PAGES 2

## REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO.  
PLACE &  
DATE AC

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**SOURCE**

1. It is noted that a relatively optimistic atmosphere prevails concerning the prospects of the Barrientos Revolution. The feeling is that the new military government contains able and patriotic men most of whom have had close contact with US authorities either in Bolivia, Panama or the US. The most questionable element is General Rene Barrientos himself.
2. The political tradition of the "Ins and Outs" continues since many exiled politicians have now returned to Bolivia. These individuals form cliques and are very power hungry. They are for the most part anti-communistic and would like to cooperate with the US, probably with the hope of receiving US AID. Juan Lechin Oquendo's group, PRIM, is still intact although the army controlled their activities effectively during the days preceding the "revolution of restoration", as the Barrientos maneuver is popularly known.
3. It is hoped that US recognition will not be withheld too long since the AID program has been suspended as well, pending political clarification. Recognition of the Junta will remove the opinion held by most Bolivians that the dictatorial La Paz government deserved US AID even though using totalitarian methods, while the Junta which presently has substantial popular support does not qualify. Most of the political groups are without financial funds and the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) is badly split into factions. Under these conditions a small amount of communist influence and financing could do a great deal towards controlling any post-Junta government.
4. Labor conditions have improved slightly and, while they are not excellent in the private mines, workable arrangements can be made. Generally speaking, labor conditions on the Northern Altiplano (La Paz to the border) are poor; south of Oruro (except near Cotavi) they are fair; in the extreme south and in the areas east of the Cordillera, they are fairly good.
5. The present climate in Bolivia is believed anti-communistic and the great majority of the population has had a belly full of over-influential unions run or controlled by the Communists. While the political future is unpredictable, there is no reason for pessimism. Mining elements are

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**TABLE 1**  
 Estimated from information  
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## References

STATE	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	FM	AEC					
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**摘要**

1. The U.S. is a nation and we are not a military personnel with the intelligence response

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Date 05-17-2013

## MAP

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

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considering the increase of exploration money and prospecting is recommencing [redacted] is entertaining a multi-million dollar investment in a placer tin operation in the Altiplano south of Oruro. The present high antimony price has resulted in a flurry of prospecting, and mineral rights in antimony properties have been run out of sight. [redacted] initiated a plan in this field through its subsidiary M & T Chemicals. Placer tin possibilities across the Bolivian-Brazilian border near Rondonia, Brazil, are very good. [redacted] working for Comibol, is working in the area as of November 1964.

6. No US consultants have entered the picture since the Barricenter revolution to operate Comibol mines. Its latest costs for fine tin were US\$1.91/lb. Prospection Ltd does long range prospecting for Comibol under contract. Its working group contains many competent geologists. US investors and geologists working for private companies frown on the use of the US taxpayers' money to develop new mines for Comibol and it is the general feeling that this support money could be spent more effectively through private corporations who are involved in Bolivia.


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BOLIVIAN JUNTA LEADER PREPARES TO BE ELECTED PRESIDENT


Bolivian Junta President Rene Barrientos, during one of his weekly trips to the provinces, declared that he would "consent" to be a compromise presidential candidate in the elections scheduled for 30 May.





Meanwhile, earlier indications that Barrientos would seek political support from centrist groups, as well as his own Popular Christian Movement (MPC) which was launched on 1 January, are being borne out. He claims to have the support of Hernan Siles' reorganized National Revolutionary Movement. He also seems to be interested in recruiting the Authentic Revolutionary Party, headed by Walter Guevara Arze.


Extremist parties--the rightist Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) and Juan Lechin's National Leftist Revolutionary Party (PRIN)--apparently will be excluded from the Barrientos bandwagon. Campaign tactics, however, include efforts to undercut these parties and to draw off some of their membership. In such a maneuver last

week, Barrientos heatedly attacked pro-Communist labor leader Lechin during a press conference but refrained from criticizing the PRIN.

Barrientos continues to believe that he can trust or use a number of persons with Communist backgrounds. Antonio Arguedas, , has become one of his top campaign managers



General Barrientos appears to be growing more self-assured and seems confident that he can compete successfully with the professional politicians. Apparently he is working well with the commander of the armed forces, General Ovando, 



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TURMOIL OVER PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF

Rene Barrientos is determined to stay on as president of the Bolivian junta in spite of his presidential candidacy in the national elections now scheduled for 26 September. Barrientos fears that should he resign from the junta, his probable successor, commander of the armed forces General Ovando, would annul the elections and impose a military dictatorship.

Barrientos' resignation was requested in a cabinet meeting last month, probably on the basis of a constitutional requirement that candidates for election resign from public office 180 days before the election date. It is likely that this legal issue masked the feeling of certain officers that the military should stay out of politics. Barrientos refused to resign, and his stand has since been given a legal and public blessing in a press article by a prominent constitutional lawyer.

The relationship between Barrientos and General Ovando remains cordial on the surface. On the other hand both men are ambitious for the presidency, and their cooperation is based mainly on the respect of each for the other's assets, namely Barrientos' popularity with the civilian population and Ovando's standing with the armed forces as a respected commander.

Division within the armed forces over the two leaders does not exist as yet, but there is little doubt that opinion groups have developed over certain issues. In general, the debate is over the role of the armed forces in the life of the nation. Ovando is believed to be aiming at a condition where the military will be the final arbiter in Bolivian affairs. A Barrientos government would probably depend more upon civilians in the decision-making process.

With regard to the political parties, Barrientos still intends to seek an alignment with the left-center forces. He has broken with the rightist Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)

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
Western Hemisphere

# PRESSURE GROWING FOR BOLIVIAN JUNTA CHIEF'S RESIGNATION


There is increasing pressure on General Barrientos to resign from the junta he now heads by 26 March if he intends to remain a candidate for the Bolivian presidency in elections set for September. The case for resignation is based on a constitutional requirement that presidential candidates who hold public office resign 180 days before the election date.

Opposition parties and discontented labor groups are spearheading the drive to get Barrientos to step down. However, many Bolivians who are not politically opposed to Barrientos--including some army officers--agree that he should comply with the constitution. Thus far, Barrientos has refused to do so on the grounds that the requirement does not apply to him as head of an interim government. In reality, he fears

that should he resign, commander of the armed forces General Ovando would impose a military dictatorship.



N.B.





BOLIVIAN POWER STRUGGLE THREATENS NEW VIOLENCE

The clandestine rivalry between Bolivian junta president Barrientos and the commander of the armed forces, General Ovando, has burst into the open this week and is threatening to resolve itself by violence. Barrientos' position seems to be the stronger at the moment as recent events have worked to his advantage, while Ovando has apparently made some serious miscalculations.

Until the assassination attempt against him on 21 March, Barrientos was losing support, and his efforts to force political parties into a coalition behind him had foundered. Furthermore, the prevailing opinion within the cabinet and the military was that Barrientos had to resign from the junta if he wished to campaign for the presidency. News of the shooting however, immediately rallied civilian and military sympathy for him.

Ovando's attempt to displace Barrientos as junta president on 22 March, plus his flirtation with the offer of a presidential nomination by center and rightist political parties, has revealed his hostility to Barrientos, and is forcing all political parties

to define their positions. Barrientos' peasant supporters in Cochabamba and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) are calling for Ovando's dismissal.

MNR leader Hernan Siles Zuazo has proposed a pacification plan which includes suggestions that elections be postponed, the cabinet be purged of Ovando supporters, and the armed forces high command be reorganized. Siles has also recommended that Barrientos resign from the junta at a later date and entrust the government to a triumvirate of solid Barrientos supporters.

The MNR has called out its armed militants to demonstrate on behalf of Barrientos when he returns to La Paz from Cochabamba. The demonstrations are aimed at pressuring Barrientos into accepting the peace-keeping formula and at securing a promise of substantial MNR representation in a future government. The US Embassy considers violence in La Paz likely as a result of the demonstrations.

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Date

## INCREASING DIFFICULTIES OF BOLIVIAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The difficulties of General Rene Barrientos' military government are intensifying as time passes and no solutions are found for Bolivia's acute political and economic problems. Moreover, Barrientos' uncertain leadership gives no assurance that prospects for stability will soon improve.

Barrientos' ambition to rule as a popularly elected president has been an important factor behind his government's insecurity. Although well liked by most Bolivians, he has been unable to secure much support for his candidacy from the political parties. Moreover, he is unwilling to give up the junta presidency despite legalities requiring candidates to resign from public office 180 days before elections. As a result of this impasse, Barrientos withdrew his candidacy on 30 April but then moved last week to postpone indefinitely the presidential elections scheduled for 31 October. Barrientos probably engineered the postponement to gain time to consider another strategy by which he might become a constitutional president. This latest move has brought him under renewed criticism from most political parties, but his general popularity seems unaffected.

Bolivia's economic problems are closely tied to the political situation. When the junta first took power last November, it characterized itself as an interim government and promised

sweeping economic reforms as well as a quick return to constitutional government. However, it soon discovered that it lacked the competence to cope effectively with complex economic problems.

The most pressing of these, inherited from the Paz regime, is the ugly situation prevailing in Bolivia's vital tin-mining industry. The tin-mining areas are centers of extreme leftist and Communist influence which have not been controlled by any government since 1952. Moreover, COMIBOL, the state mining corporation, is burdened with managerial irresponsibility as well as unruly labor, and is close to bankruptcy.

International deficit financing has been obtained, but further assistance is predicated on a wide-ranging reform of present mine labor practices which inordinately favor the miners at the expense of efficient production. All attempted reforms have been strongly resisted by the miners acting under their extremist leadership.

Barrientos is aware that the miners can be brought under control only by military action. He has indicated that his government is willing to undertake such an operation, but is moving with deliberation because he is also aware that the miners will probably put up a stubborn defense. The miners are armed, they are fierce fighters, and they are under determined leadership.

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1965

## THREATS TO BARRIENTOS REGIME IN BOLIVIA

A turbulent week in Bolivia opened with a drive by the government to assert its authority over the Communist-dominated tin miners and ended with junta chief Barrientos acting to save his regime from threats posed by the personal ambitions of his principal rival, armed forces commander General Ovando.

The military campaign got off to a good start on Monday. Before the day was over, miner resistance had been reduced to a number of strongholds. Desperate mine labor leaders attempted to avert military occupation of the mines and preserve their personal power by asking the sympathetic student organization to obtain a truce. General Ovando, for reasons not yet clear, unilaterally concluded an agreement which provided both for a cease-fire and an end to the miners' strike. The agreement cost the government the initiative in that it also provided that, by 29 May, government forces would be withdrawn from the mines they had occupied. Sporadic street fighting, however, continued in La Paz as late as Thursday.

Ovando may have lost his nerve

It is more probable, however, that he acted to undermine Barrientos and thus advance his own ambitions. A decisive victory over the unruly miners, who for years have been the core of Bolivia's economic and political problems, would have greatly enhanced Barrientos' power position.

The crisis has precipitated increased plotting against the government, and there have been indications of splits developing within the military.

Skillful political maneuvering by Barrientos averted a coup attempt this week. He arranged the appointment of Ovando as junta co-president and then had himself appointed co-commander of the armed forces. His aim is to neutralize Ovando by binding him more closely to the government and forcing him to share authority over the military. The reconciliation is hypocritical and probably impermanent but has eased tensions in military and civilian sectors. A final showdown seems inevitable, however, and may only have been postponed for a short time.

The overthrow of pro-US Barrientos by Ovando would seem to facilitate an eventual leftist take-over of Bolivia, to say nothing of the encouragement it would give the Communists everywhere in Latin America. Successful or not, an Ovando move against Barrientos could provoke a civil war from which the Communists would probably emerge as the chief beneficiaries.

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Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 914-235

Document # 12

DISTR. 12 JUNE 1965

COUNTRY CUBA/COLOMBIA/ECUADOR

DATE OF  
INFO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT

REPORT THAT ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA IS DIRECTING  
GUERRILLA AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES OF THE  
COMMUNIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA

PLACE &  
DATE ACQ. [REDACTED]

REF

IN-88717

SOURCE  
AND  
APPRAISAL: [REDACTED]

FIELD REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA IS NO

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

LONGER ACTING AS A CABINET MINISTER IN CUBA. [REDACTED]

GUEVARA IS NOW DIRECTING THE GUERRILLA AND REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN LATIN AMERICA. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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CIA/NMCC FBI I&NS

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PAGE 2

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCSO, CINCLANT. [REDACTED]

END OF MESSAGE

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Case # NLI 76-2013  
Document # 6a

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15 September 1965

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The September 15th Statement on the Dominican Republic by the Honorable J. William Fulbright

1. In a lengthy statement released on 15 September Senator J. William Fulbright developed primarily two major themes concerning the role of the US in the Dominican rebellion: a. The US intervened for the purpose of the preventing victory by a revolutionary force judged to be communist dominated. He said that "There is no doubt that the threat of communism rather than danger to American lives was his (Ambassador Bennett's) primary or sole reason for recommending military action. b. At no time did the communists control the rebellion prior to the landing of US Marines. Their participation was to have been expected. We analyze below these two themes and include as annexes comments on subsidiary points made by the Senator.

2. Our analysis of the first theme shows that by April 28 Santo Domingo was in a state of anarchy. It is true that officials of the Embassy in Santo Domingo as well as government officials in Washington were concerned with growing Communist influence in the Dominican Republic and the almost immediate role that some communist activists took as early as the second day of the revolt. However, the trigger which sent US troops ashore was the mortal threat to the lives of Americans and many other nationals in a city where law and order had collapsed. Unruly groups had entered the Hotel Embajador on two occasions, once in search of an American citizen; and had fired indiscriminately into rooms and corridors. The premises of several embassies were invaded, and the British vice consul reported to the US ambassador on the afternoon of 28 April that the downtown situation was "horrible" and that mobs of 200-300 were sacking homes in the residential area of Arroyo Hondo where many Americans lived.

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3. The collapse of the local police forces was almost complete by April 23. Police Chief Despradel told the American Public Safety Adviser on that day that his men were not trained to fight against the heavy weapons being used by the rebels. Some police were in hiding, some were hiding their uniforms and mixing with the mobs, some were already the victims of atrocities.

4. By the late afternoon of April 23 as Ambassador Bennett talked to Washington shots could be heard against the Embassy building. It was in this context of anarchy that the junta leader Colonel Benoit informed the US ambassador that he could no longer guarantee the safety of foreign nationals. The following day the Papal Nuncio, who had been most active in trying to convince both sides to lay down their arms, described the marines as "performing a humanitarian purpose in protecting lives."

5. Senator Fulbright's second theme develops the point that at no time did the communists control the rebellion prior to the landing of US marines. Our view is that taken by itself this statement is correct. The point is, however, that by the evening of April 27 the moderate PRD leaders of the rebellion, hitherto in shaky control of the movement, lost their nerve and began abandoning their posts. The Molina Urena government fell and many of its principal figures went into asylum. One of the most prominent of these, Jose Pena Gomez admitted that the communists who joined the rebel force had infiltrated into positions of importance and that it was very difficult to stop them. For his part, Molina Urena is reported to have said on May 3 that he wanted to get the truth of communist infiltration of the rebellion across to the world, but that he could not face further jeopardizing his own and his family's safety by doing so. (See Tab B, Memorandum, "The Communist Role in the Dominican Revolt", 7 May 1965.)

6. There was then no one in effective leadership. It is perhaps significant that the French ambassador in Santo Domingo described events there "as following the classic communist pattern." He concluded that his British,

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Italian and West German colleagues were in agreement that the "Caamano group", which grew out of the rebellion, was directed "at its base" by communists.

7. In essence, then, on the evening of the Marines' landing the first task facing the US was protecting the lives of Americans and other foreign nationals. Its second task was more complex. The US was faced with making the agonizing determination of whether increasingly evident communist participation and influence within the rebellion would--in the absence of other leadership--soon become complete control. All available evidence pointed toward this eventuality.

#### Attachments

- Tab A: The Situation in Santo Domingo on 28 April
- Tab B: The Communist Role in the Dominican Revolt, 7 May 1965
- Tab C: The Communist Role in the Dominican Rebel Movement, 16-27 May
- Tab D: Communist Connections of Juan Bosch: A Fresh Interpretation
- Tab E: Statements from the Fulbright Speech and Facts

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• ROUTINE

## Intelligence Information Cable

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY CUBA/VENEZUELA/URUGUAY

DATE OF INFO. 8 MAY 1965

DISTR. 11 MAY 1965

SUBJECT

COMMENTS  
ABOUT THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC  
AND ITS RELATION TO CUBA

PLACE & DATE ACQ. REF IN -63789

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL: FIELD REPORT NO. 1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. ON 8 MAY 1965 1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

A. UNITED STATES SHIPS ARE PATROLLING CUBAN KEYS AND COASTS.

B. IN CUBA SPECIAL WEAPONS, INCLUDING MISSILE INSTALLATIONS, ARE READY AND PREPARED AGAINST A POSSIBLE ATTACK.

C. THE INTEGRATION OF MULTILATERAL FORCES IN SANTO DOMINGO IS VERY DANGEROUS FOR CUBA BECAUSE AN ATTACK AGAINST CUBA COULD RESULT WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES ASSUMING SOLE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IT.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

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CIA/NMCC EXD

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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

D. AT NO TIME, EXCEPT DURING THE OCTOBER 1962 MISSILE CRISIS, HAS THE UNITED STATES HAD A MORE PROPITIOUS AND JUSTIFIED OCCASION TO ATTACK CUBA.

E. IF UNITED STATES TROOPS ARE WITHEDRAWN FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC A SIMILAR SITUATION (REVOLT) WILL BE REPEATED IN VENEZUELA.

F. IN ANY EVENT, REBELLIONS WILL TAKE PLACE IN OTHER COUNTRIES. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] COMMENT:  
THERE HAVE BEEN UNSUBSTANTIATED REPORTS OF AN IMMINENT CASTRO-  
COMMUNIST COUP TO TAKE PLACE IN URUGUAY [REDACTED]

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3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] HOWEVER, NEITHER THE URUGUAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCU) NOR ANY OTHER LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION APPEARS PREPARED TO STAGE A COUP IN URUGUAY. THE PCU HAS ORGANIZED PARAMILITARY UNITS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS TO STIMULATE THE PEOPLE TO STAGE A COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE EVENT THAT MILITARY PLOTTERS TRY TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. [REDACTED] DISSEM: COMKWESTFOR, CINCLANT, CINCSO. [REDACTED]

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COUNTRY CUBA/ DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

DATE OF INFO. 8 MAY 1965

## SUBJECT

1. ALLEGED DIRECTION OF REBEL OPERATIONS IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC BY "CHE" GUEVARA
2. REPORTED ARRIVAL OF MISSILES AND ARMS IN CUBA
3. REPORTED CONFIDENTIAL ORDERS ISSUED IN CUBA

PLACE &  
DATE ACQ.

REF

IN 62705

SOURCE  
AND  
APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

1. AS OF 8 MAY 1965, MAJOR ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA Y SERNA, CUBAN MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES, WAS DIRECTING REBEL OPERATIONS IN SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. [REDACTED] COMMENT: CONJECTURE OVER GUEVARA'S WHEREABOUTS HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY CUBAN EXILES AND MANY RUMORS HAVE EVOLVED AS A RESULT OF GUEVARA'S ABSENCE FROM THE GOVERNMENT SCENE FOLLOWING HIS RETURN TO CUBA ON 14 MARCH. PRESS COVERAGE OF THIS SPECULATION WAS CITED IN THE RECENT NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE BY PAUL HOFFMAN, 4 MAY. PREMIER CASTRO HAS COMMENTED ON QUERIES CONCERNING "CHE'S" ABSENCE THAT IT CAN BE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)~~SECRET~~STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC  
AD/CI-2 CIA/NMCC AD/RR 3, AD/SI 2

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ASSUMED THAT GUEVARA'S TALENTS WILL BE PUT TO USE WHERE MOST  
NEEDED.)

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. SOVIET VESSELS CARRYING MACHINERY TO CUBA HAVE TRANSPORTED  
MISSILES AND WEAPONS IN CRATES WHICH WERE OBSERVED BEING  
UNLOADED. [REDACTED] THE UNITED

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3.4(b)(1)

STATES WAS UNAWARE OF WHAT EQUIPMENT THE CUBAN ARMY AGAIN HAS.)

[REDACTED] COMMENT: THE SOVIET VESSEL KASPIYSK EN ROUTE TO CUBA ON 5 MAY  
REPORTEDLY CHANGED COURSE TO UNLOAD SUSPECTED ARMS SHIPMENTS IN  
MARIEL BEFORE PROCEEDING TO HABANA, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. ON 6 MAY OFFICIAL CONFIDENTIAL ORDERS WERE ISSUED THAT  
CUBA WAS IN A STATE OF WAR.

4. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCSO, COMKWESTFOR [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: NO DOUBT THE ABOVE INFORMATION SHOULD BE VIEWED  
WITH SOME SKEPTICISM.)

END OF MESSAGE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)



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Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 96-283

Document # 6a-1

~~SECRET~~

6a-1

16 July 1965

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Situation in Santo Domingo on 28 April

1. Santo Domingo on 28 April 1965 was in a state of almost complete anarchy. The rebel government of Molina Urena had collapsed on the previous afternoon and the Communists and their extremist allies were attempting to fill the vacuum. The loyalist military leaders were unable or unwilling to commit their superior force against the rebel stronghold downtown. The police were impotent and their few efforts to restore order ended in disaster. Meanwhile, armed gangs and individual hoodlums were terrorizing the city, even the residential areas. The UN Embassy was under fire and American citizens were in grave danger.

2. The British vice consul who toured the downtown area of Santo Domingo on the afternoon informed Ambassador Bennett that the situation there was "horrible." He said there were armed bands running all about. The Britisher said he had taken a man who had been shot in the leg to the hospital and there he had found wounded lying all about on the floors. He added that British residents of the Arroyo Hondo suburb of Santo Domingo reported that an armed band of two to three hundred persons were looting and sacking residential houses in the area.

3. Indicative of the state of anarchy in the city that day was the problem faced by loyalist Police Chief Despradel. He told the American public safety adviser on that day that his riot control forces were almost completely inactive. They had not been trained to fight against the heavy weapons the rebels had been using against them. The police chief said that almost every patrol he had sent out in downtown Santo Domingo had been wiped out. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the police were taking off their uniforms and attempting to hide, but were nevertheless being tracked down by the mobs and killed. In the afternoon of the same day, the police chief made an attempt to use a tank to help control the mobs, but this ended in disaster when the tank was exploded by rebel bazooka fire and all occupants were killed.

1.5(c)  
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4. The Police Post at the Palace of Justice in downtown Santo Domingo was overrun by Communist-led rebels at about 10:00 am EDT on the 28th and the rebels obtained more arms and police uniforms. The American Embassy [REDACTED] during most of the day had little first-hand information as to what was going on in the downtown areas, but did receive numerous reports of killings. Sporadic sniping was underway in the residential areas where most of the American colony lived. Also, there was growing nervousness in the diplomatic corps since the promises of more than one embassy were invaded by armed mobs. These included the embassies of Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, and El Salvador. The mobs were under no control during much of the day and looting and sacking took place in many parts of the city. Some of the mob actions, however, were inspired by the rebel-controlled radio station. Radio broadcasters gave the addresses of homes of air force officers and other military officers who were on the loyalist side and incited the mobs to sack the houses. The wives and children of loyalist officers were seized and taken to the Duarte Bridge and other targets of loyalist military action.

1.5(c)  
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5. There were a number of reports reaching the embassy on the 28th of rebel atrocities. Although these have not been confirmed in detail they undoubtedly reflect an accurate general picture. A USIS staff member reported on 28 April, for instance, that twelve policemen or soldiers had been seen being summarily shot. The victims had been marched along the street, with the mobs crying "pardon." Then they were lined up against a wall and executed. The respected Colonel Calderon, who served under Juan Bosch as chief of the presidential guard, also met his death under these circumstances.

6. [REDACTED] on 28 April 13 policemen who had been guarding the house [REDACTED] were overwhelmed by rebels and their bodies dismembered and slogans written on walls with blood. There were several witnesses to this event.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

7. Late on 28 April, Colonel Benoit, an air force officer on the loyalist military junta then in power, informed

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the American Ambassador that, in regard to his earlier request for US military assistance, he now wishes to add that American lives were endangered and that "conditions are of such disorder that it is impossible to provide adequate protection." He then formally asked for US intervention to restore public order.

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Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 96-2-483

Document # 7

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE 1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY CUBA DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

DATE OF INFO. 26 APRIL 1965

DISTR 1 MAY 1965

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SUBJECT

1. ARREST OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CONSOLACION DEL SUR
2. REPORTED WILLINGNESS OF REBEL ARMY OFFICERS TO HELP IN SANTO DOMINGO

PLACE & DATE ACQ.

REF IN 57073

SOURCE AND APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

1. DURING THE NIGHT OF 26 APRIL 1965, A NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL IN CONSOLACION DEL SUR, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE, WERE ARRESTED AND CHARGED WITH THEFT. ONE OF THE MEN, DR. CEBALLO (FNU), WAS ACCUSED OF GIVING INFORMATION TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE DOCTOR'S LICENSE WAS REVOKED, BUT HE LATER WAS RELEASED WHEN THE CHARGES COULD NOT BE PROVED. THE OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL WERE SENTENCED, BUT THEIR SENTENCES WERE COMMUTED WHEN THEY AGREED TO FIGHT WHEREVER NEEDED.

(SIC)

2. UNIDENTIFIED REBEL/ARMY OFFICERS WERE

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

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STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC USIA OCI ONE OCR EXO  
AD/CI 2 CIA/NMCC FBI I&NS TREASURY

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PAGE

2

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██████████ WILLING ██████████ TO GIVE HELP TO SANTO DOMINGO, IF ASKED.

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

3. ██████████ DISSEM: COMKWESTFOR, CINCSO, ██████████

END OF MESSAGE

1.5(c)

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Mendoza  
Case # 96-2-183  
103

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STATEMENT - FACT

Statement 1. Senator Fulbright has said that it is "entirely possible, if not likely, that if the military is allowed to retain its power it will overthrow any future government that displeases it" and at the same time said that the military "must be substantially reduced in size and some of the more irresponsible generals pensioned off or sent on lengthy diplomatic holidays abroad".

Fact: Military reform was one of the major objectives of the Reid government and Hector Garcia Godoy has consistently stated that he feels military reforms must be initiated under his regime. The US country team has recommended that we press Garcia Godoy "energetically to initiate feasible reductions and reforms". Garcia Godoy has already taken the major step of removing General Wessin from command because of insubordination, thus asserting civilian supremacy over the military. The Reid regime took some very important steps to eliminate corruption in the military and General Imbert exiled eight top ranking officers who were among the most venal. Garcia Godoy has endorsed this latter action and has prohibited the reentry of these officers into the Dominican Republic.

At the same time both Garcia Godoy and the US country team are conscious of the fact that military reform should not be pushed too rapidly for two major reasons. First the hasty cutbacks in military strength would severely shake the Armed Forces confidence in the new regime. In this connection it should be noted that the Dominican military leadership is showing an awareness of the need for change and is reportedly working on plans for reform. Second, the new regime needs a competent military force that will be prepared to combat the expected insurgent activities of the extremists who have used the revolution to equip and train themselves for guerrilla warfare. For these reasons the country team has recommended a gradual cutback in the military to about 60% of their pre-crisis strength.

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Statement 2. Senator Fulbright said the US acted "unilaterally -- and illegally" and the OAS acted "after the fact". Senator Fulbright further said that intervention should not have been undertaken "without the advance consent of our Latin American allies."

Fact: The dangerous situation developed in the Dominican Republic so quickly that there was little time to obtain the support of Latin nations before taking action. On 28 April it rapidly became clear that the lives and property of US and other foreign nationals in the Dominican Republic were in danger. The incident on the morning of 27 April at the Hotel Embajador demonstrated that US lives could have been lost at any moment. That none were is only a tribute to the speed with which US Marines could reach the embattled US citizens. It has frequently been noted by students of the OAS that one of the organization's major liabilities is the slow pace with which it works. Ambassadors must be convened; receive an initial request for action; consult their governments, deliver long speeches outlining the positions of their home countries, and then finally act. It is highly improbable, given this scenario, that the OAS would have been able to act on 28 April. President Johnson did, in fact, manage to consult with most Latin American Ambassadors that night and explain why we felt it necessary to take action so quickly. It should be noted, in this context, that all major steps taken since then have been done as OAS actions. This includes the establishment of the Inter-American Peace Force, the extension of economic aid to pay the salaries of public employees during the revolution, and the long, arduous negotiations that recently culminated in the installation of the Hector Garcia Godoy government.

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Statement 3. Senator Fulbright said that "the danger to American lives was more a pretext than a reason for the massive United States intervention that began on the evening of April 28 . . . In fact, no American lives were lost in Santo Domingo until the marines began exchanging fire with the rebels after the 28th; reports of the widespread shooting that endangered American lives turned out to be greatly exaggerated".

FACT      See Tab A

Statement 4. Senator Fulbright said: "US intervention has alienated our real friends in Latin America." "It is not possible at present to assess the depth and extent of disillusion with the US on the part of democrats and reformers in Latin America. I myself think that it is deep and widespread. "Intervention reflects a grievous misreading of the temper of contemporary Latin American politics."

Fact. In February 1964, [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

Betancourt said that Bosch deserved to be overthrown because he was trying to play ball with the Communists and, in turn, was being undermined by them. Betancourt characterized Bosch as an irresponsible president who had set back the democratic process in the Dominican Republic for years to come.

Comment by US political scientist Robert Alexander, who has long been a friend of liberal parties in Latin America, described Bosch's attitude in mid-1964 as so negative and violent that his return to power in the Dominican Republic would be a "disaster."

In a conversation on 2 May 1965 between Romulo Betancourt, Arturo Morales Carrion, and Arthur Schlesinger, Betancourt said the following: "He (Bosch) is the best short story writer and the worst politician in Latin America, and he should spend the rest of his life writing short stories." Betancourt, according to Schlesinger, regards it as essential to prevent Bosch's return, and believes that Figueres (former President of Costa Rica) can persuade him to retire from politics.

Statement 5. Senator Fulbright accused the administration of confusing Communist support of a political movement and Communist control. According to the Senator, "Intervention on the basis of Communist participation as distinguished from control of the Dominican revolution was a mistake of panic and timidity which reflects a grievous misreading of ... Latin American politics."

Fact. It is interesting to note the opinion of Communist influence in the rebellion formed by a [REDACTED] diplomat who opposes US intervention on moral and legal grounds. [REDACTED] was sent by his government to Santo Domingo on an official investigating tour in mid-June reported that "Communist influence in Dominican developments had been enormous and continues to be". [REDACTED] described rebel leader Caamano as a useful stooge of the Communist, but did not say whether Caamano was a Communist. He also said that Fidel Castro had been expected to arrive in Santo Domingo in May 1965.

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Statement 6. Senator Fulbright, in criticizing the US actions in the Dominican Republic, declared that the US must recognize that most of the popular support in Chile is for a group of "rambunctious, leftist Christian Democrats." We charged that the US does not truly understand social revolution because of its "comfortable and rich conservative" status.

Fact: The US Government has since the very beginning warmly supported the election of Eduardo Frei, Christian Democrat leader, to the presidency and the subsequent election of a majority of the Christian Democrats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Senator is correct, and indeed merely echoes an official position that Chile is an example of an advanced democracy as expressed by Ambassador Stevenson at the United Nations last November. Secretary Rusk told Chile's Ambassador Tomic on 6 August 1965 that he wanted the Ambassador to know that the US is in full sympathy with the program of Chile for social and economic development. The Secretary added that "there is no ideological argument between Chile and the United States."

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MCO



18 October 1965

No. 2333/65

Copy-No. 89

# INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

THE FALL OF CHE GUEVARA  
AND THE  
CHANGING FACE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Approved for Release  
Date FEB 1977



No. 2333/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
18 October 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face  
of the Cuban Revolution

Summary

1. Fidel Castro's willingness to drop Ernesto "Che" Guevara confirms the shift in Cuban policies that has been under way for about the past year. Guevara's fall from power apparently resulted from his persistent opposition to the practical policies recommended by the Soviet Union. His views on Cuba's economic development and foreign policy--reflecting his general opposition to Soviet advice--both seem to have played a role.

2. Guevara, who has been considered Cuba's most militant revolutionary spokesman, disapproved of Castro's alignment with the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute and of his willingness to diminish Cuba's role as a catalyst and supporter of revolutions in Latin America and Africa. This side of the controversy has been amply treated elsewhere. This paper concentrates more on the dispute between the two men over economic policy.

3. While he was in favor with Fidel Castro, Che Guevara was one of the most important architects of the Cuban economy. He retained this role for some time, even after his industrialization plan had been proven wrong and some of his other policies were being challenged. Not until July 1964, when President Dorticos became the Minister of Economy and the Director of the State Planning Board (JUCEPLAN), did Guevara's position really begin to weaken. Since

[REDACTED]

that time Fidel Castro has dedicated most of his energies to Cuban internal matters, and to finding remedies for the disastrous effects of the regime's early policies--largely those engineered by Guevara.

#### Industrialization--Guevara's Greatest Failure

4. From the outset Guevara had encouraged the rapid nationalization and centralization of the economy, and by the spring of 1961 the Cuban economy was almost entirely state owned. Although he was not a trained economist, Guevara convinced Castro, against the objections of Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and others, that accelerated industrialization was necessary. He maintained that a diversification of agricultural production and increased investment in industry was required to end dependence on sugar and Cuba's "economic enslavement" by the US. By the time Guevara and Castro admitted, in late 1963, that the industrialization plan must be scaled down to reassign resources to sugar production, Guevara's policies had brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power.

#### Guevara's Dispute with the National Bank

5. Because of the failures of the economy Castro was paying increased attention to other advisers by the end of 1963. In February 1964 some of the strains and tensions within the regime came into the open. Marcelo Fernandez Font, the President of the National Bank, published an article in the ideological journal Cuba Socialista on the history and functions of a "socialist" bank. In the next issue of the same journal Guevara reacted angrily. He charged that Fernandez still thought in terms of "classical economics" and even "vulgar economics"; that he sought to make the Bank instead of the Finance Ministry the center of the Cuban economy; and that he wanted to control investment and credits through the National Bank.

6. In the May issue of Cuba Socialista Fernandez meekly tried to defend himself without taking issue with Guevara or even mentioning his name. Fernandez said that socialist planning could take a monetary form with the bank necessarily playing a prominent role. A fourth article, by Luis Alvarez Rom, Minister

[REDACTED]

of Finance and a close Guevara associate, appeared in the July issue and attacked Fernandez' position. By the time that issue appeared, Fernandez had been removed from the National Bank and given the position of Minister of Foreign Trade. He was replaced by Salvador Vilaseca Forne--another close Guevara associate. Banking and finance were both in the hands of Guevara followers.

7. Guevara's outlook, which approximated present-day Chinese--rather than Soviet--economic practice, was behind the controversy. A series of articles in Nuestra Industria, the official organ of Guevara's Ministry of Industries, spelled out his opposition to the Soviet proposals for encouraging greater financial responsibility and independence in enterprises. Guevara objected to Soviet tendencies to place individual plants on a self-supporting basis.

8. Thus Guevara's war on the role envisioned for the Cuban National Bank by Fernandez was only part of a much larger war against decentralization, relative autonomy, financial flexibility, and greater material incentives. Guevara's publication explicitly expressed disagreement with "the emphasis given to material interest" by the Soviet economist Y. G. Liberman, whom it charged with advocating change in the "methods of collective incentive, abandoning the old formula of reward based on the fulfillment of plans in order to move to more advanced plans." The new Soviet economic trends were seen by Guevara as a threat to the moral incentive as the "predominant form" in Cuba's construction of socialism.

#### Guevara's Polemic Over Centralization

9. One of Guevara's most powerful economic opponents was Professor Charles Bettelheim, a French economist of Communist persuasion. Bettelheim had made several trips to Cuba at Castro's request and had helped convince him in the latter part of 1963 that the economy should be based on agriculture for the next decade. He also warned against centralization. Because of his advice Castro made preliminary investigations into the decentralization of authority and in 1963 began experiments in local autonomy in two towns. But despite these experiments, and despite

[REDACTED]

the declaration of a six-year sugar plan, Bettelheim was outweighed by Guevara--still the strongest voice on Cuban economic affairs.

10. In March 1964 Guevara declared that "it" is supremely important for us to defend energetically on all fronts the principle of central organization of the economy." For Guevara, "centralization" was a principle from which the Cubans could not depart without sacrificing ideological purity. For Bettelheim, however, centralization was a means to be prudently employed only as it was necessary for planning. In an article in Cuba Socialista in April, Bettelheim suggested that a "certain liberty of local interchange" as well as "individual production" would be just as beneficial in Cuba as in the Soviet Union. He tried to tell Cubans that they had nationalized too much and too fast--a slap at Guevara.

11. A month later Guevara accused Bettelheim of making a "mechanical analysis," but was concerned mostly with the suggestion that it might be more profitable to nationalize only large industrial units, and leave small enterprises in private hands. Much of the argument centered on the empresas consolidadas (consolidated enterprises), the Cuban bodies under the Ministry of Industries which controlled a grouping of similar but otherwise independent units. Bettelheim said that this often meant artificial and inefficient collectivization--as in the case of garages. But Guevara replied that "to say an empresa consolidada is an aberration is to say that the Cuban revolution is an aberration." Guevara argued ultimately that administration really mattered less than the principle of collectivity, and his arguments prevailed over those of Bettelheim.

#### Dorticos Challenges Guevara

12. In July 1964 two important cabinet appointments signalled the power struggle over internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara's elimination. President Dorticos was appointed to two major posts in an attempt to improve the management of the badly disorganized economy. While this move was apparently aimed at taking a portion of the administration of economic affairs from the hands of Guevara, Che did nevertheless register a success of his own. In the same

month his closest protege, Orlando Borrego, was named to the new post of Minister of the Sugar Industry.

13. It seems, however, that the appointment of Dorticos was the turning point for the economic policies and fortunes of Guevara. Dorticos began to assume overall direction of the economy and it was rumored that the National Bank and the Finance Ministry (both headed by Guevara followers) would be merged with the Ministry of Economy and JUCEPLAN. The merger never took place, probably because the opposing sides became fixed and the growing tensions threatened to break into the open.

14. Even so, Dorticos won an important victory when one of Guevara's central points was quietly suppressed. Referring to the consolidated enterprises, Castro said in August that they "sometimes become boring, tedious, intolerable. It would be better to have a garage that works well and gives people good service. That is much more important than to go around putting up a huge sign to advertise that this place belongs to an empresa consolidada. Who knows how much paint has been wasted putting up names of empresas consolidadas?" Some empresas consolidadas were disbanded late in the year, and Castro again ridiculed them as a "mania" in January 1965.

#### Guevara's Views on Foreign Policy

15. An admirer of Chinese foreign policy, Guevara persistently had agitated for export of the Cuban revolution to the rest of Latin America and even to Africa. His manual on guerrilla warfare has been widely circulated in Latin America and he was a prominent figure in planning invasions against at least five Caribbean states in 1959. Guevara has been justly described as a roving incendiary and revolutionary. An Argentine, he reportedly assisted the pro-Communist Arbenz regime in Guatemala before it was overthrown in 1954. Later he traveled to Mexico where he met Fidel Castro in 1956.

16. Guevara never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal

[REDACTED]

problems of the revolution. Moreover, Castro's extensive popularity in Latin America decreased sharply once he committed the regime to rapid socialization. His call for Communist revolutions, after his espousal of Marxism in December 1961, had not been received with the enthusiasm of his earlier revolutionary incantations. Indeed, various Latin American parties apparently opposed Cuba's assistance to Peking-oriented revolutionary groups. Even so, Guevara continued to press for Cuban aid to Latin American revolutionaries. His policies generally prevailed.

17. About mid-1964, however, the regime began to accelerate the process of institutionalization--attending to internal economic problems and party organization. Revolutionary fervor was tempered and Cuba began to follow Soviet advice more closely. Relations with China deteriorated during 1964, as witnessed by a 50 percent drop-off in air travel between the two countries. Relations became further strained by November when Cuba took a pro-Soviet posture at the Havana Conference of Latin American Communist Parties. The presence of Raul Castro at the head of a high-level Cuban delegation to the consultative conference of Communist Parties in Moscow in March 1965 confirmed for the Chinese Havana's new "revisionist" posture. Guevara, however, apparently still strongly opposed moderation in Cuban foreign policy.

#### The Abrogation of Guevara's Policies

18. In early December 1964 Guevara had departed on a three-month trip to the United Nations, Africa, and Peking. Meanwhile, Castro had lost faith in Guevara's theories and may have already decided against his "dogmatist" views in favor of the "revisionist" economic school headed by President Dorticos and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. A clear indication of this came on 21 January 1965 when Castro announced that material incentives would be emphasized. He said that the 5,000 best cane cutters of the 1965 harvest would receive rewards such as motorcycles, trips abroad, and expensive vacations at Cuban resorts.

19. It took Guevara only a short time to respond publicly. While in Algiers he wrote a letter to the Uruguayan leftist weekly Marcha. In it he declared



[REDACTED]

that "the correct instrument for the awakening of the masses must be fundamentally of a moral nature." In Cairo the following month Guevara again criticized Cuban economic policies. Incorrectly, he called them copies of the model of economic development Moscow had imposed on the countries of Eastern Europe when "no one had the guts to object."

20. An interview published in the Egyptian periodical Al Taliah in April was the last encompassing public definition of Guevara's policies. In it he vehemently attacked the economic reforms adopted in Yugoslavia as well as "the Liberman experiment" in the USSR. In criticizing Yugoslavia, Guevara condemned its reaction against Stalinism and its resort to the use of material incentives. The two primary issues he singled out had direct application to the Cuban situation. One was workers' participation in management, which he said Cuban workers wanted in order to gain extra benefits. This, he said, constituted "social oppression" and a kind of exploitation. The second issue, that of workers' profit sharing, was one he knew had been approved in Cuba before he left. The official labor organ Trabajo in December 1964 had announced a profit-sharing scheme called the Contract Wage Pilot Plan. Guevara must have been particularly irked when Trabajo chose to identify the worker's compensation as "the prize." His statement in Al Taliah was therefore another sharp criticism of the Cuban leadership and "liberal" economic policies.

21. Guevara returned to Havana on 13 March and was greeted by both Castro and Dorticos. He was reported by the Havana press to have made an appearance on 20 March, but he then slipped out of sight. One of the first moves against his power clique came in mid-June when National Bank President Salvador Vilaseca was removed from his post and installed as rector of Havana University.

22. Castro's 26 July speech dramatized the shift away from Guevara's views. Castro spoke at length about the need for a regular system of local authority. Earlier, in the face of conflicting "conservative" and "liberal" views represented by Guevara and Bettelheim, Castro had supported Guevara in preventing the JCEBI (local coordinating boards)

[REDACTED]

From exercising any real authority. Now, however, he reversed his stand. He called for the decentralization of local administration, and announced that extensive reforms would begin to organize a completely new administrative apparatus. Castro heatedly denounced the old centralized system and graphically described the problem. He said that when a dog made a mess in the street of some provincial town, the central authorities had to be called to remove it. On 28 September Castro again made it perfectly clear that Guevara's views were in disfavor when he said: "Let me go on record that I am a defender of local development and administration." Another of Guevara's cherished theories had been abandoned.

#### Cuba Without Guevara

23. With the announcement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 1 October, it was clear that Guevara, his followers and his policies were out of favor. The only three ministers excluded from the central committee were Luis Alvarez Rom (the Finance Minister who had sided with Guevara in the National Bank dispute), Orlando Borrego (Guevara's closest protege), and Arturo Guzman (the Acting Minister of Industries). Salvador Vilaseca Forne (the former National Bank President) was also excluded. These four were the only high-level Cubans not included in the Central Committee--and were also the only ones who had been intimately involved with Guevara's economic policies. Moreover, the party's new five-man Economic Committee was headed by President Dorticos and staffed with adherents of "liberal" economic views.

24. In a speech on 2 October, Castro read what he said was a letter from Guevara. The main idea it contained was that Che felt his revolutionary talents now could be better used elsewhere. It said at one point, "I (Che) can do what is denied you (Fidel) by your responsibility as head of Cuba." Thus there is no doubt that Castro's more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led to Che's downfall. Castro recently said that the Cuban revolution must find solutions according to its own "spirit and peculiarities." But from now on Cuba will probably pattern both its domestic and foreign policies more in accord with Soviet advice.

[REDACTED]

25. With this realignment, already strained relations with China will probably deteriorate further. Last November at a meeting of Latin American Communist Party delegates in Havana, Cuba agreed to support the orthodox parties rather than Peking-oriented militant groups. Relations with China deteriorated almost immediately after the Havana conference. Guevara visited Peking in February apparently in an attempt to explain the Cuban position, only to be sharply rebuked by the Chinese. After resuming his African trip he continued to vent his "dogmatic" views, which generally reflected Chinese positions.

26. In any case China now has clear justification for attacking Cuba as a "revisionist" regime--a charge it has never publicly made. With the fall of Guevara and the general acceptance of Soviet advice in domestic and foreign policies, the Cuban revolution has entered a new phase. The shift in Cuban foreign policy which has been en train since 1964 now is confirmed with Guevara's fall.

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Intelligence Information Cable

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COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

Mandatory Review

DOI [ ] SEPTEMBER 1966

Case # NLJ 89-78

Document # 11a

SUBJECT [ ]

STATEMENT ABOUT "CHE" GUEVARA'S

STATUS AND THE CUBAN TIMETABLE FOR REVOLUTIONS IN LATIN  
AMERICA

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1.3(a)(4)

FIELD NO. [ ]

ACQ [ ]

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BATCH  
BUNDLER  
BUDGET  
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TAYLOR  
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1. [ ]

[ ] IN THE NOT TOO

DISTANT FUTURE THE WHEREABOUTS OF FORMER CUBAN MINISTER OF INDUSTRIES  
ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA DE LA SERNA WILL BE MADE KNOWN TO THE WORLD  
AND, WHEN THIS HAPPENS, THE WORLD WILL ALSO LEARN OF ANOTHER IM-  
PORTANT BUT LITTLE KNOWN REVOLUTIONARY LEADER WHO HAS BEEN WORKING

1.3(a)(4)

(classification) (dissem controls)

Approved for Release

Date 27 March 90

[ (classification) (dissem controls) ]

] 1.3(a)(4)

WITH GUEVARA, [ ] THE TIGHT SECRECY BEING PLACED 1.3(a)(4)  
ON GUEVARA'S STATUS IS TO PROTECT HIM AGAINST POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION  
ATTEMPTS BY ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ELEMENTS WHILE HIS REVOLUTIONARY  
ORGANIZATIONAL WORK IS STILL IN PROGRESS.

2. [ ] 1.3(a)(4)  
THE CUBAN TIMETABLE FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN  
AMERICA CALLS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN ONE OR TWO  
COUNTRIES AS MODEL CASES BY 1970, AND COMPLETE EXPULSION OF  
"AMERICAN IMPERIALISTS" FROM ALL OF LATIN AMERICA BY 1980. [ ]

] GUEVARA IS THE PERSON WHO IS CHARGED WITH THE TASK OF SECURING 1.3(a)(4)  
A "BRIDGEHEAD" FOR THE EXECUTION OF THESE REVOLUTIONS.

3. [ ]

] 1.3(a)(4)

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC, STATE,  
USFJ, 5AF, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

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EO 12958 3.4(b)(1)-25Yrs  
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# Intelligence Report

*Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian*

*Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966*

~~Secret~~

25

March 1967  
No. 0627/67



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## FOREWORD

Foreign and Domestic Influences on the Colombian Communist Party, 1957 - August 1966, the second of OCI's intelligence studies to deal with a free world Communist party, should be read in conjunction with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] As a category, the OCI intelligence studies are aimed at situations where study and analysis in some depth seem likely to shed new light on long-standing US security problems, to give timely warning about an emerging problem, or to assist the policy maker in considering ways of coping with any such problems. These research papers appear on no definite schedule but rather as a suitable subject happens to coincide with the availability of the special manpower resources required.

EO 12958 2.4(b)(1)-2

Assistance in the preparation of this paper has been received from various components of the Directorate of Intelligence, notably the Research Staff. It has been informally coordinated with the Office of National Estimates. Comments should be directed to the Office of Current Intelligence.

C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
FOREWORD .....	i
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS .....	vii
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL POLITICS.....	3
PCC Policies and Programs, 1957-1966 .....	6
The PCC in National Politics After 1957.....	9
Relations With Leftist Splinter Groups.....	12
The Split in the PCC.....	14
III. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC .....	19
Castroism and the PCC.....	19
PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet Dispute.....	22
Relations With Peking.....	24
IV. ASSESSMENT.....	29
ANNEX A: The Colombian Communist Party (PCC) and the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV): A Com- parison of Experiences Since 1958.....	A-1

Illustrations

	<u>Page</u>
Table: Estimated Membership of Colombian Communist and Pro-Communist Or- ganizations.....	14
Map : Selected Areas of Colombian Guerrilla Activity, June 1966, .....	16

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## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The years 1957-1966 offer a special opportunity to study foreign and domestic influences on the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) because the period covers both the rise of the Sino-Soviet dispute and an era when the chief question for the party domestically was whether a policy of violence or of orthodox political activity--the via armada or the via pacifica--provided the most promising road to power. With the overthrow of dictator Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in May 1957, the PCC found itself in circumstances seemingly conducive to growth. Like its fellow Communist party in Venezuela (PCV) the following year, it regained legality after a prolonged period of suppression; it enjoyed a reputation of consistent opposition to the despised dictatorship; and it faced bright prospects of advancing its national political status through orthodox political activity. In August 1966 the party, although still legal, was politically ostracized--regarded generally as obstructive at best and subversive at worst. Its national organization was largely intact and retained at least the nominal backing of the principal Communist rural and paramilitary forces; but a pro-Peking faction had formally broken away in 1964, and much of the party's youth following had been drained away to this and other "ultraleft" factions advocating the via armada.

After regaining legal status in 1957, the PCC had firmly adhered to a program which placed primary emphasis on the via pacifica or mass struggle. The party refused to alter this "soft line" in its fundamentals, despite its long and pragmatic experience with guerrilla warfare and other rural violence in Colombia and despite its influence over a number of active paramilitary forces in the countryside. The party did make some adjustments after 1964 to enhance the role of the "armed struggle" in Colombia in an attempt to answer the criticism of the "ultraleft," assume a more militant facade, and undercut the dissidence within its own ranks. These modifications, which gave a stronger endorsement of the Communist-influenced paramilitary bands, were probably more a

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matter of shrewd semantics than a departure from the via pacifica.

The Communist main line of action throughout this period was toward the development of a "national patriotic front" in opposition to the National Front coalition government under which the traditional Liberal and Conservative Parties shared equally and exclusively in all elective and appointive offices. Communist success in undermining this "constitutionalized" arrangement required that the party concentrate its resources and those of its pro-Communist allies in support of the strong but minority dissident faction of the Liberals--the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL). This defector organization was just as determined after 1960 to disrupt the National Front as were the Communists. This projected PCC-MRL alliance failed, however, because the moderate majority faction of the MRL increasingly shunned overt cooperation with the Communists, and the old guard Communist leaders seemed to lack the flexibility and imagination to demonstrate to the skeptical "ultra-left" elements inside and outside the party the "correctness" and efficacy of the via pacifica as a policy. The secession of the hard-liners in 1964 to form a pro-Peking rival party (the PCC-ML) contrasts with the experience of the Venezuelan Communist party which held together through 1965.

The foreign influences on the party--essentially the same as those bearing upon the PCV--were inseparable from the domestic conflict over the via pacifica versus the via armada. The example of the Cuban revolution and Cuban stimulation of the "ultraleft" were partly responsible for the hard-liners' attack on the PCC's via pacifica line, though Colombian public opinion was less stirred by the Cuban example than opinion in Venezuela. Though both the PCC and the PCV were Moscow oriented, the Colombians gave the USSR their full support in the Sino-Soviet dispute while the Venezuelans sought to avoid the issue under the guise of neutralism. Moscow gave firm backing to the PCC's program, including the attitude toward guerrilla warfare; Moscow could also be credited with substantial indirect assistance to the PCC when Castro agreed, at the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist



parties in late 1964, to coordinate his subversive efforts in the hemisphere through orthodox party channels. Peking's influence, on the other hand, seems to have consisted of little more than providing ideological support for the Colombian hard-liners.

No precise and definitive assessment is now possible as to the relative weights of the foreign and domestic influences on the PCC over this nine-year period, but it certainly seems to have been domestic factors which were mainly responsible for the principal development in party policy during 1966. This was a tendency, reflected in the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress and elsewhere, to give additional emphasis to the policy of the via armada in an apparent effort to recapture the leadership of the extreme left.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

This study seeks to identify and evaluate the principal forces influencing the course of the Colombian Communist Party during the period from the fall of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship in May 1957 to the end of the Valencia administration in August 1966. With this aim in view, the paper first examines the impact of domestic political events on the program of the PCC and then the relevant developments in international Communism.

In this examination it is useful to compare the PCC's experience with that of the Communist Party in adjacent Venezuela (the PCV) during the years which followed the ouster of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship in January 1958.\* Both parties emerged with legal status after a protracted period of suppression under authoritarian rule--a suppression much more severe in Venezuela, however, than in Colombia. Perhaps until 1962 both parties had relatively bright prospects for improving their positions in national politics through ordinary political methods; the Communist prospects in Venezuela seemed especially bright, partly because the prevailing political climate was more radical there than in Colombia. But opportunities for Communist exploitation were plentiful in both countries, as coalition regimes--with their inherent weaknesses--struggled to restore representative, constitutional government and cope with various economic and social problems left unsolved by the ousted dictators.

The PCC and the PCV were each torn with internal dissension over the issue of whether to pursue power primarily by overt political action (variously termed, in Latin American Communist parlance, the mass struggle, via parlamentaria and via pacifica) or by revolution (the armed struggle or lucha armada). On this critical issue neither party followed a policy of complete consistency. A

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variety of pressures and influences gradually led the PCV to choose the armed struggle, with emphasis on guerrilla warfare after 1963, even though it had little experience in this tactic or capability for carrying it out. On the other hand, the Colombian party, in spite of its extensive experience and substantial assets for conducting guerrilla warfare, generally held to the via pacifica as the primary way to power.

Both parties were traditionally oriented toward Moscow, yet they chose divergent paths in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Colombian party gave solid support to the USSR and the PCV took a neutral stand in an effort to reduce conflicts between hard-liners and soft-liners within the party. Each party was subject to strong pressures to follow Cuba's revolutionary example--pressures of both a direct and an indirect nature, since Castro's appeal to left-wing opinion in Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent in Colombia, was one of the political facts of life in those countries.

The Colombian party formally split in early 1964, largely as a result of differences over domestic strategy and tactics, and, to a lesser degree, over its stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The PCV maintained a facade of unity through 1965.

## II. THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN NATIONAL POLITICS

The position of the PCC has been much affected by Colombia's traditional two-party system of government (now modified by the agreement for a bipartisan National Front) and by the extensive rural violence which has troubled the country for nearly two decades.

Since its formal establishment in 1930, the PCC has been severely limited in influence by this two-party system, under which Liberals and Conservatives have monopolized power by constitutional procedures throughout most of the 20th century. The nominal membership of these two parties has included the vast majority of the people cutting across all class and regional lines of the country; each, in this sense, has been a truly national party. Liberal and Conservative affiliation, which is generally "inherited" rather than based on clear ideological conviction, approaches a kind of religious fervor, sometimes transcending loyalty to the nation. The political monopoly of the Liberal and Conservative parties explains in part the weakness of the Communist Party and other minor parties.

Partisan attitudes caused a gradual breakdown of constitutional government in the late 1940s, marked particularly by the serious rioting in the capital in 1948 (the Bogotazo) and the widespread rural strife known as la violencia which began after that date and still continues, although greatly diminished since then. This highly complex phenomenon of rural unrest cannot be attributed to any single cause; its geographical centers have been continually shifting and much of the guerrilla activity has always been apolitical and little more than organized banditry. During the years 1948-1953 rural violence was largely motivated by the deep hostility between the Liberal and Conservative parties, including family and clan vendettas. In subsequent years, the causes have been primarily economic and social, including robbery, land seizure,

and protection racketeering among the peasantry. Banditry has become a full or part-time way of life for many of the elements participating. However, political motives are still present, and are seen especially in conflicts among local caudillos to maintain their spheres of dominance and in their determined efforts to block the re-establishment of departmental and central government authority.

A number of peasant leaders in various parts of the country have been pro-Communist and in varying degrees have followed the guidance of the party. In some rural enclaves, such as Viota and Sumapaz, Communist leaders have exercised direct control. Some of the largest active or partly active guerrilla bands have been under the sway of Communist chieftains or tended to adhere to the party line. In recent years, the party's role in violence has been publicized by government counterinsurgency campaigns which have concentrated to a large degree on the centers of Communist rural paramilitary strength. The PCC, however, although consistently attempting to exploit la violencia, has not been a key factor in promoting violence.

The PCC was outlawed during most of the dictatorship of Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) but regained its legal status under the provisional military junta (1957-1958) and seemed prepared to exploit the social, economic and political problems confronting the subsequent elected government--and in particular the weaknesses inherent in the newly devised National Front.

Under this arrangement, the two traditional parties agreed to share equally and exclusively all elective and appointive offices at local and national levels for sixteen years; that is, for four presidential terms beginning in 1958 and ending in 1974. The presidency was to be alternated between them every four years. No one could hold any governmental appointment without some acceptable version of the Liberal or Conservative label. At the conclusion of this agreement, which was incorporated into the Constitution, the parties presumably were to resume normal competition for political offices.

The National Front was born of a recognition by both the Liberals and the Conservatives that their deep-rooted animosities had to be bridled; that they had to live together peacefully in order to establish an effective, stable administration and avoid another dose of dictatorial rule. In many respects it appeared to be a plausible method for re-establishing representative government, restoring economic and political stability, and implementing a bipartisan program to reduce rural violence.

All other parties were frozen out by the National Front agreement. The Communists, because of the generally right-center orientation of the two major parties, were reduced largely to working with radical minority elements of the Liberal Party--including students and organized urban labor--to develop alliances which might exert a significant influence on national politics. The Communists, nevertheless, derived certain opportunities from inherent weaknesses in the National Front. The fundamental defect was that the Liberal Party clearly commanded a majority of the electorate, and many Liberal elements were reluctant or openly opposed to a self-denying bipartisan peace treaty. Moreover, the divisions existing within each of the traditional parties placed additional strains on the arrangement which the Communists were in a position to exploit. The PCC apparently recognized that dissolution of the National Front might lead to military intervention, but thought there was a good chance that it would produce a new order in which Communists could participate directly and play a greater role in national politics.

The National Front's weaknesses were apparent even before the inauguration of the first Liberal administration under Alberto Lleras Camargo in 1958, and in early 1960 the liberal Party split. Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, son of a former president, established a strong, minority Liberal organization which eventually adopted the name Liberal Revolutionary Movement (MRL). At least until late 1962 it was strongly pro-Castro in its leadership, anti-US in many of its policies, favorable toward cooperation with the PCC in elections and other political activity, and adamantly opposed to the



National Front. These policies, which paralleled those of the PCC, suggested the makings of a powerful "national patriotic opposition front." At the height of its power in 1962, the MRL, with the backing of the Communist and pro-Communist vote, was emerging as a major challenge to the viability of the government coalition. In this year, Lopez ran as a protest presidential candidate against Conservative Guillermo Leon Valencia and won almost one fourth of the total popular vote. In addition, the MRL substantially increased its representation in Congress, many of these legislative seats being filled by Communists and pro-Communists under the camouflage of the MRL label.



ALFONSO LOPEZ MICHELSEN

Leader of the MRL, the minority Liberal Party faction which cooperated with the PCC.

Factionalism in the Conservative Party proved to be an even greater limitation on the effectiveness of the National Front. The Conservatives, traditionally hostile toward any kind of cooperation with the Communists, were even more seriously divided than the Liberals. Actually, several autonomous organizations known as the Ospinistas, Laureanistas, Alzatistas, and Leyvistas--titles derived from the names of the principal leaders--were included under the Conservative label. After Rojas Pinilla returned to the country (1958) and organized his followers under the National Popular Alliance (ANP) in 1961, still another so-called "Conservative" faction entered the electoral lists.

#### PCC Policies and Programs, 1957-1966

Throughout its 35-year history, the PCC has been strongly oriented toward Moscow and responsive to the directives of the CPSU and the twists in Soviet international

policies. The old guard leaders were products of the Stalin era but had little difficulty in giving lip service to denunciation of the "cult of personality" under the de-Stalinization program, while in fact carrying on party business as in the days of Stalin. Gilberto Vieira White and his group had seized control of the party in 1947 from the then Secretary General, Augusto Duran--who, after his expulsion by Vieira, formed a splinter party which has persisted in the region around Barranquilla but has never posed a serious threat to Vieira's leadership. As Secretary General, Vieira was virtually unchallenged in his dictatorial control over party policy at least until the Sino-Soviet dispute became public and the Castro revolutionary example began to have an impact on Colombian radicals.

A shrewd interpreter of the Colombian political scene, Vieira developed skill over the years as a party bureaucrat and manipulator of the Central Committee. In contrast to the party situation in neighboring Venezuela, Vieira's control faced no serious competition from younger dynamic leaders possessed of strong followings within the party ranks and inclined toward experimentation with radical programs. Moreover, Vieira managed to avoid exile or imprisonment, either of which would have paved the way for others to pre-empt his position. His long tenure thus provided continuity of programs, but meant conservatism and even stagnation. The clandestine operations of the party had been limited and ineffective during the regime of Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) and even the Communist guerrillas were used only to maintain the status quo in the areas where the party exercised strong influence, such as Viota, Sumapaz and northern Tolima. The objective of retaining legality was evidently a prime consideration in party policy.



GILBERTO VIEIRA WHITE  
Secretary General of the PCC, 1947-

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In its personal characteristics the CCP leadership had little to attract help from anyone outside the party who might be interested in disrupting the National Front. At least to the Colombian public, the Communist leaders were notably lacking in dynamism, imagination and political opportunism; they seemed content to receive their modest stipends, occasional junkets to the bloc countries, and such limited foreign subsidies and other support as might fall to their lot.

The principal Colombian Communist policy was a firm and unconditional advocacy of the primacy of the via pacifica, or parliamentary struggle. The party did accept the armed struggle under appropriate circumstances in designated local areas, but during the late '50s and early '60s it insisted that the political consciousness of the worker class had not matured to the requisite level for launching a general revolution.

As the principal action for developing the party's mass strength, the PCC has on more than one occasion since 1957 called for the organization of a "great patriotic front of national liberation." At the time the party reacquired legal status in 1957, Vieira insisted that Communists would have to emerge from their cocoon of isolation, cast off their dogmatic orientation, and work with any group opposed to the National Front. At the 9th Congress in 1961, the party identified the MRL as the principal vehicle for this purpose.

On the critical issue of armed struggle the party's statements up to 1965 were ambiguous and essentially semantic modifications of its traditional theme of "self-defense" by the peasant masses where justified by the oppressive actions of the "oligarchic" security forces. In 1965, however, the PCC formulated what it claimed to be a unique policy which it hoped would satisfy those who were clamoring for action and yet not risk the party's legal status. The political resolution of the party's Tenth Congress in January 1966 stated:

In Colombia there is opening an original revolutionary way, based on the use of all methods

-8-

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and forms of mass struggle, combined according to concrete local and general conditions. Peasant guerrilla war is one of the highest forms of mass struggle and only prospers and grows where it is linked with the masses. At present, although peasant guerrilla war is not yet the principal form of struggle it is becoming more important every day.

In this "unique policy," the PCC recognized that "the guerrilla movement forms a part of the combined political situation" and that "its perspective should be analyzed in relation to this over-all situation." The party further asserted that guerrilla action "tends to promote and create certain subjective and indispensable factors for the emergent triumph of the revolutionary situation in Colombia." It defended its ancient policy of self-defense of the rural masses as "correct," and as having produced a "vigorous guerrilla movement wherever the official forces in cooperation with the Yankee military had waged war against the masses in the countryside."

#### The PCC in National Politics After 1957

When the PCC regained freedom to operate overtly in 1957, its political position and prospects were better than at any time in the past decade, but less favorable than the PCV's in Venezuela when the dictatorship was overthrown there. Unlike their comrades in Venezuela in 1958, the Communists could take no credit for helping overthrow the hated authoritarian regime, and they were excluded from office by the provisions of the National Front.

The party did have substantial support in the organized labor movement, among university students, and in the various intellectual classes. Even among the students, however, the Communist potential was markedly less than in Venezuela, where the university population was concentrated in the strategically located Central University in Caracas. Colombian students, being dispersed among a number of universities in Bogota and in provincial cities, have been more difficult to organize for large-scale demonstrations and

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have been generally less inclined to challenge the government on purely political issues than students in various other Latin American countries.

On the other hand, the party had one asset which was unique among all Latin American Communist organizations: prolonged experience in rural violence (la violencia) and guerrilla warfare, including a knowledge of the problems connected with coordinating scattered paramilitary groups of leftist and Communist orientation. However, not until Castro had demonstrated successfully the application of guerrilla warfare methods in Cuba did this Communist paramilitary strength assume special significance in party eyes.

Despite the many deficiencies in party thinking, the serious domestic problems confronting the National Front and the divisions within that coalition gave the PCC a chance to expand its national influence. In the MRL and the "national democratic front" the Communists had a promising means of exploiting these divisions, and in 1960 they estimated their prospects for disrupting the traditional two-party system in Colombia to be the best in the entire history of the party.

These prospects depended, however, on the maintenance of a basic unity among a number of competing leftist elements. There was some reason for the PCC's optimism until the end of 1962, when serious dissension began to plague the MRL, and various pro-Communist leftist elements began to challenge the PCC's line on the via pacifica. These elements were much influenced by Cuban developments and by Chinese revolutionary ideology (as will be discussed later) and with good reason the Communists publicly blamed the "Chinese party directors"--and privately the "Che Guevara faction" of the Cuban regime--for provoking the attacks on the via pacifica which absorbed the party's attention.

The dissension inside the MRL, partly attributable to the issue of armed struggle and indirectly to foreign influence, was mainly caused by conflicting

-10-

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personal ambitions among the leaders. One group, nominally a part of this maverick Liberal organization, was the undisciplined "Youth of the MRL" (JMRL), founded and led by ex-Communist Luis Villar Borda, who was a proponent of lucha armada for Colombia. Other pro-Castro MRL factions included the "hard-line" group of Alvaro Uribe Rueda and the clique of Camilo Aluma in Cali.

But it was Lopez who held the support of the majority of the MRL after 1962. He moderated the party's policies. Among other things, he rejected Cuban-style revolution as applicable to Colombia and muted the party's pro-Castro propaganda output. More important, he shied away from entering into a formal alliance with the PCC--as advocated by some radical elements in the MRL--although he did not eschew informal cooperation with the Communists or reject their electoral support. (His influence on the PCC contrasted with that exerted by the principal ally of the Communists in Venezuela, where the Castroite Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) was more committed to the armed struggle than the PCV itself and pushed the PCV in that direction.) Lopez' position in refusing formal alliance with the PCC did, however, provide the pro-Chinese minority in the PCC with further ground for insisting that the via parlamentaria would never bring the Communists to power in Colombia.

The MRL, which had reached its high point in national influence in the congressional and presidential elections of 1962, fared very badly in the elections of early 1966--reflecting in part its internal dissension. The majority Lopez faction of the MRL therefore seriously considered returning to the regular Liberal party, a move which would strengthen the National Front and the Liberal administration of Carlos Lleras Restrepo, inaugurated in August 1966. Since the Communist via parlamentaria was directly tied to the destinies of the MRL as an opposition party, the PCC prospects were similarly reduced to a new low by the 1966 election results--a decline which had been under way during the previous two years. The PCC apparently had only limited influence remaining

-11-

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among some of the radical cliques of the MRL and their pro-Communist leaders.

#### Relations with the Leftist Splinter Groups

The Communists' problems were compounded by sterile battles with organizations which should logically have been natural allies in developing the united front tactic against the government. After 1958, a number of radical leftist groups of limited strength were formed in Colombia to promote urban and rural violence. Most of them were inspired by the Castro revolution and the Chinese line on wars of national liberation; their leaders maintained liaison with the Cuban and Chinese governments and probably obtained some financial support in those capitals. Some of these groups were led by apostate Communists --for example, Luis Villar, Alfonso Romero Buj and Pedro Abella Larotta--who, after being expelled from the PCC, had siphoned off many Communist youths and sympathizers to build the new organizations. They also occasionally attempted to recruit among pro-Communist guerrilla bands. The PCC eventually branded most of these groups as "charlatans, false revolutionaries, and ultra-leftists."

The first of these subversive organizations to launch into the armed struggle was the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), initially organized in early 1959 under another name. Cuba supplied training for the key leaders and also some financial aid. Antonio Larrota, one of the founders, had just returned from a long sojourn in Cuba as a revolutionary protege and agent of the Castro regime. Eduardo Aristizabal and such other MOEC leaders as Eduardo Arismendi and Pedro Abella also found encouragement and sponsorship in Havana.

The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) likewise had the blessing of Castro, who sent it funds through Gloria Gaitan and Luis Emiro Valencia. It was organized in early 1962

-12-

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
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by renegade Communists and native Marxists to promote the armed struggle, and tried to absorb all the small revolutionary groups and to enlist some active guerrilla leaders under the FUAR banner. These efforts were largely unproductive, however, and most of the Cuban subsidies appear to have been squandered or to have been appropriated by the less idealistic members. The FUAR dissolved itself in 1965.

Like the MOEC and FUAR, the National Liberation Army (ELN) was inspired and financed in part by Havana. The ELN, initially the paramilitary arm of the Youth of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement (JMRL), has engaged in limited guerrilla action. It was responsible for the attack made in January 1965 on the town of Simacota in northeastern Colombia--an attack which may have been directly financed by Cuba, since the ELN leader, Fabio Vasquez, is known to have been in Havana in late 1964.

The short-lived United Front, established in 1964 by the renegade Catholic priest Camilo Torres Restrepo to promote revolutionary change in Colombia, also seems to have been largely inspired by the Cuban example. The United Front gained some popular support and hence received qualified endorsement from the PCC. However, Torres was killed when his guerrilla unit was engaged in action with Colombian military forces in early 1966. His activities received extensive eulogies from the Cuban propaganda machine, including special praise from Castro for his choice of the "path of revolution"; but there is no evidence that Cuba financed them.



FABIO VASQUEZ CASTANO

Leader of the ELN, the Cuban-supported National Liberation Army.

ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP OF COLOMBIAN  
COMMUNIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS

	<u>1962</u>	<u>Mid-1966</u>
Colombian Communist Party (PCC)	10,000*	8,000*
PCC-Marxist/Leninist		Less than 2,000 (2,000-2,500 in 1964)
Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC)	1,500	200-300
National Liberation Army (ELN)	-	100 active guerrillas
United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)	10,000	Inactive
Youth of the Liberal Revolu- tionary Movement (JMRL)	3,000	Inactive
Excludes youth auxiliary		

The Split in the PCC

The major blow to the PCC came when the party split in early 1964 over the armed struggle issue and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The splinter party formed by the dissidents and expelled leaders called itself the PCC-Marxist-Leninist (PCC-ML), thus laying claim to the mantle of "true" Colombian Communism. This revolt cost the regular party prestige, the loss of a substantial number of members--including many party youth--and disruption in its national organization.

Although the PCC-ML attempted to proselytize among the pro-Castro revolutionary organizations,

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its inspiration and ideology were largely influenced by China. After the Havana Conference of Latin American parties in late 1964, at which Castro implicitly abandoned his "neutralism" in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the PCC-ML turned hostile toward the Cuban regime. It alleged that the Cuban leader had fallen prey to the "revisionists," and had transformed himself into an enemy of "the working class and the Chinese people...and hence of the Communist parties of the world."

Even the timing of the rift was tied to the debate over armed struggle. In one of its initial publications, the PCC-ML denounced the old guard central committee leaders for not adequately supporting a major bastion of Communist guerrilla strength in Marquetalia, after the government forces launched a sizable campaign there in May 1964 to eradicate subversion. The PCC-ML insisted that

Marquetalia must be the beginning of the war of liberation in Colombia.... It is necessary to substitute the revolutionary principle of active guerrillas for the false and conservative principle of 'self-defense.' ...any peaceful method, as a principal form of taking power, is definitely out of the question in Colombia; parliamentary and legal resources, together with other forms of mass struggle, can only be used as secondary and complementary aspects of the principal form of struggle--the use of arms.... The national leadership [of the PCC] is mistaken in its policy....

The top leaders of the PCC closed ranks in the face of the party revolt, and admitted that the ideological roots of their problems "originated in the subjective concessions which the party has been making to those extremist tendencies of the so-called left." They denounced local extremists and openly accused Peking of being the inspiration and major cause of dissension within the party. But even though the split had come largely on the issue of the lucha

-15-

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# **SELECTED AREAS OF COLOMBIAN GUERRILLA ACTIVITY** **JUNE 1966**



ELN guerrillas in training



Colombian Army patrol in Communist guerrilla territory

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armada, of which Castro was the best known Latin American practitioner, the PCC leaders not only refrained from condemning the Castro regime for promoting revolutionary adventurism of the left, but actually praised the Cuban socialist experiment and its significance for the Communist movement in the hemisphere, although they were rather noncommittal when relating the Cuban revolution to the armed struggle in Colombia. This propaganda treatment of Cuba derived from the PCC leaders' consciousness of Castro's ties with Moscow and of his appeal to various leftist elements in Colombia rather than from any possible enthusiasm of their own for imitating his rise to power.

The PCC's extensive experience with guerrilla warfare and the phenomenon of rural violence (la violencia), and its involvement in various attempts to combine scattered guerrilla groups into a coordinated movement probably led to an awareness among the PCC leadership that Castro's guerrilla success was a product of unique conditions and circumstances rather than a universally applicable experience. The decimation of the resources of the Venezuelan Communist Party and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left was additional confirmation of its belief.

PCC antagonism toward the ultraleft promoters of the lucha armada was expressed frequently both before and after the party split. While the PCC-ML was slinging epithets at the old Guard, such as "Khrushchevist revisionists"--and raising Castro to the rank of "No. 1 Khrushchevist"--the PCC was denouncing the pro-Chinese as "anti-Soviet divisionists." The verbal conflict assumed some of the features of the Sino-Soviet dispute in a teapot, but was limited to the issue of armed struggle and particularly guerrilla warfare.

The 10th Congress of the PCC in early 1966 formally stigmatized the PCC-ML as "traitors who have deserted the great party and who pretend to carry out a revolution without a party, a revolution without Marxism-Leninism." A key resolution of the Congress stated:

-17-

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The party must pursue its firm ideological struggle against the disastrous 'ultraleftist' tendencies, which are characterized by empty revolutionary phraseology without foundation in Colombian reality; against the dogmatic thesis that the via armada is the only form of struggle worthy of revolutionaries, accompanied in practice by passive opportunism before Yankee imperialism and its oligarchic-militarist instruments; against the depreciation of the just struggles for the worker masses and toward the political activities which can advance them in overt and legal form.

By Communist definition the "ultraleft" thus included not only the party traitors and defectors but the pro-Communist splinter groups seeking to launch the lucha armada. Occasionally, the PCC singled out specific names in its counterattacks against these groups, always reserving special invective for the apostate Communists who went to Peking in search of aid.

The renegade priest Camilo Torres was described more sympathetically by the PCC leadership, which, nevertheless, lamented his departure from the original parliamentary path of his United Front organization to join the lucha armada--a departure made without "consulting" the PCC. The sacrifice of his life in a guerrilla action "was a valiant and heroic deed, but this is not the principal form of struggle for the majority of the Colombian people."

Criticism of "ultraleftists," however, has been muted since early 1966 as the PCC has been making tentative efforts to collaborate with and gain control over the violence-prone ELN and MOEC. In retrospect, the Tenth Congress may have marked the beginning of a new PCC policy phase which will feature a somewhat greater emphasis on armed struggle without necessarily abandoning the over-all precepts of the via pacifica policy.

### III. FOREIGN INFLUENCES ON THE PCC

Varied foreign pressures on the PCC, when seen against the backdrop of domestic political factors, have also contributed to dissension in the party. The example of the Cuban revolution, in combination with tangible Cuban aid for programs of violence, stirred the splinter groups of the "ultraleft" to actions which opposed the efforts of orthodox PCC leaders to promote the mass struggle through a national patriotic front. These groups also found supplementary encouragement from Peking and, at least until the PCC split and the Havana Conference of Latin American Communist parties in 1964, the Cuban influence apparently acted as an indirect stimulus to the pro-Chinese hard-line elements within the PCC.

#### Castroism and the PCC

In many parts of Latin America the principal impact of the Cuban revolution was its provocative example for radical leftist elements. Colombia was a special case, ranking high on the Cuban priority list for external subversion, probably second on the South American continent only to Venezuela. Moreover, the experienced Colombian guerrilla bands of Communist and pro-Communist orientation undoubtedly made the target more attractive to the Cubans. Castro himself seemed to regard Colombia in a special way. He had been in the country at the time of the bloody Bogotazo of April, 1948 and was a personal friend of Gloria Gaitan, daughter of the leftist liberal leader Jorge Gaitan whose assassination had touched off the rioting. Yet it was probably Che Guevara, a principal architect of Cuban subversive policy in Latin America, who was largely responsible for Havana's decision to circumvent the PCC and turn to the militant leftist groups to promote rural and urban violence in Colombia.

During the 1961-65 period, the MOEC, FUAR, ELN, and JMRL were the principal recipients of Cuban aid which was dispensed in a sporadic, poorly planned, and largely ineffective manner. Direct cash grants probably totaled less than \$250,000 but political and guerrilla



training, propaganda subsidies, and travel for members of these organizations probably cost Cuba several times that amount. In addition to tangible forms of aid, all of these groups were the beneficiaries of stimulation and guidance from Cuba; and sooner or later, all of them, with the possible exception of the ELN, fell out with the PCC over the latter's program of mass struggle.

The PCC was well aware of Cuban relations with the leftist groups in Colombia. Castro's cash grants to the FUAR, for example, were public secrets in Colombia, only the specific sums being in doubt. The PCC had good reason to resent this Cuban meddling deeply. As previously noted, Castro's aid went in many cases to men who had been expelled from the party. In addition, the PCC feared the government might charge it with complicity in the subversive activities of these Cuban-supported organizations and suspend its legal status.

Nevertheless, the PCC's public position toward Cuba, as expressed in party statements and propaganda, was invariably eulogistic after 1959. The Communist press in Colombia gave extensive coverage "in defense of" the Cuban revolution and government, called for solidarity with Havana against the "imperialists," praised Castro's achievement as an example in the construction of socialism, and even acknowledged that Cuban experience had been incorporated into the tactics of the "self-defense" guerrilla organizations in Colombia. The party probably spoke with greater sincerity in its repeated endorsements of the decisions taken at the Havana Conference, at which the Cubans agreed to curb their scattered subversive efforts in Latin America and coordinate their activities through orthodox Communist channels. The PCC gave similar unqualified approval to the Havana Tri-Continent Congress in early 1966 which called for active "solidarity" with Latin American revolutionary movements.

Despite such public praise, there nevertheless is reason to believe that the PCC was sharply critical and resentful of Castro's "extracurricular" subversive antics in Colombia. Top PCC leaders in early 1964, when discussing the problems arising from the ultra-leftist groups which followed the "Cuban and Chinese lines," reportedly stated that the "Guevara faction"

in Cuba openly backed revolution in Latin America through groups other than the Communist parties. Pedro Abella of the MOEC and Luis Villar Borda of the JMRL, both ex-Communists, were pointed up as examples of ultra-left leaders who had used Cuban and Chinese aid to corrupt the Colombian Communist Youth. The PCC is reported to have sent a letter of protest on Abella's activities in Cuba and to have received a reply from the Cuban Communist Party promising appropriate action. At about the same time, the PCC--when answering a circular from the Brazilian Communists inquiring about attitudes on holding a Latin American Communist conference to discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute--stated that it approved such a meeting but not in Cuba. The PCC pointed out that participants in any meeting in Havana would be restricted in their discussion of "certain actions of Cuba" against other parties in the hemisphere.

The PCC had learned, apparently just before sending this letter to the Brazilian comrades, that Che Guevara had been disparaging its position and policies. In a meeting with a Colombian Communist delegation in Havana, also attended by ex-Communist Luis Villar Borda, Guevara reportedly had insisted that conditions were ripe for revolution in Latin America. He noted, however, that in many countries, including Colombia, the Communist Party was a hindrance to such a program; and he added that the PCC would lose popular support if it continued to act and think in a "passive" manner.

After the Havana Conference of Latin American parties, the Cuban regime apparently altered its subversive policies toward Colombia and conformed to its agreement to work through orthodox channels. The Cuban-financed Simacota incident which occurred in January 1965 seems to be an exception. It was probably too well advanced to be stopped by the Cuban regime. Meanwhile, the ultraleftist Colombian leaders are believed to have lost their Cuban subsidies and other support. The Colombian Communists and the Cuban leaders also probably reconciled some of their differences on armed struggle in Colombia and discussed a coordinated approach to this facet of the PCC program at the Tri-Continent Congress in Havana early in 1966.

There is some evidence that the rapprochement was based, at least in part, on the PCC's greater willingness to support armed action in Colombia beginning possibly in late 1965. The Cuban Government has not abandoned its preference for the lucha armada in Colombia. In his anniversary address on 26 July 1966, Castro praised the Colombian guerrilla movement and indirectly berated the PCC leadership and its policies.

The extensive Cuban propaganda coverage on Colombia is almost entirely devoted to the Communist-influenced guerrilla bands and their activities. For example, Havana radio disseminated the decisions of the "Second Conference of the Southern Guerrilla Bloc," which was held "somewhere in the forest" in the spring of 1965.

For its part, the PCC has faithfully carried out the bargain reached at Havana in 1964, which required that the Latin American parties give ample expression of "solidarity" with the Cuban regime. However, solidarity is probably still defined by the party as it was when Secretary General Vieira wrote, in an article in Problems of Peace and Socialism in 1963,

Our solidarity with Cuba can best be shown by propaganda and explanation and carrying out extensive work among the masses to explain the results of the Cuban revolution.

#### PCC-Soviet Relations and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

The PCC has traditionally displayed an unconditional adherence to Moscow; hence, its early endorsement of the Soviet position in the dispute with China merely reflected historical consistency. The Colombian party's response included periodic homage to the Declarations of Moscow in 1957 and 1960, recognition of the CPSU as the "vanguard of the Communist and working class movement," and ample condemnation of the "divisionist Chinese leaders." The story is accurately and succinctly outlined in a TASS dispatch in early 1966, describing an interview between CPSU Central Committee Secretary Suslov and Colombian Secretary General Vieira: "Once again the complete unity of views of the CPSU and the PCC was affirmed on the problems examined."

Vieira has long been regarded by the Kremlin as one of the most trustworthy of the Latin American Communist leaders. He has attended almost all CPSU congresses and other key international Communist meetings over the past several years, including the Havana meeting of Latin American Communist parties in late 1964 and the subsequent gathering in Moscow. He has made other special trips to the Soviet capital, presumably to coordinate PCC policy. For example, he was reportedly there in August 1964 at the time when the party had split and the pro-Chinese elements were organizing the PCC-ML. Other PCC leaders, such as the late Filiberto Barrero and Jose Cardona Hoyos, have also been held in high regard by the Kremlin.

In the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Colombian party held firmly to the Soviet line in contrast to the evasive "neutrality" of the generally pro-Soviet party in Venezuela. The PCC gave unqualified and regular praise to the CPSU as the vanguard of the international movement, the savior of world peace, the defender of peaceful co-existence, and the genuine fount of Marxism-Leninism. It just as consistently upbraided the "Chinese leaders" with such epithets as divisionists, schismatics, tools playing into the hands of the imperialist camp, exporters of artificial revolution, and Maoist defilers.

The PCC's formal commitment to the CPSU side came at the 9th Congress in 1961 and was reiterated at the 10th Congress in early 1966. Similar resolutions reaffirming this position were adopted at various intervening plenums of the central committee. In addition, the party followed the Soviet lead at international meetings, such as those held in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 and at the East German Party Congress in Berlin in 1963.

In return for the PCC's stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute, the CPSU has backed the PCC in such propaganda media as TASS, Novosti, Radio Moscow, Pravda, and Izvestia. Ample space has also been allotted to the Colombian party in Problems of Peace and Socialism.

Vieira's speech at the 23rd CPSU Congress of March and April 1966 was well publicized. At that time, he lauded the CPSU as the builder of socialism and peaceful coexistence and the defender of "world peace." He

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then outlined the decisions of the 10th PCC Congress indicated that "a new and original revolutionary" path was opening up in Colombia, based on the use of all forms and methods of struggle of the masses, among them armed struggle. But he admitted that the struggle would be "long and arduous" and that the PCC "cannot conquer a still strong and cruel enemy with mere ultra-revolutionary phrases." Acknowledging the CPSU as "the vanguard detachment of the international movement," and "the glorious Cuban revolution as our greatest stimulus," he then denounced "the stubborn campaigns to downgrade the indestructible work of the Soviet power and the schismatic maneuvers against the Communist international movement."

#### Relations With Peking

The militant Chinese advocacy of wars of national liberation was an inspiration and moral comfort to the various elements both inside and outside the PCC who insisted on the armed struggle. After 1961 when the PCC had unequivocally sided with Moscow in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the party's problems with the pro-Chinese elements began to multiply, particularly when the latter began to seek material aid and guidance from China. The attitude of the radicals within the party is clearly reflected in a letter to the central committee written by Carlos Arias, a former candidate member who had been expelled from the party in 1963 and was later a top leader of the PCC-ML. Arias denounced the party's arbitrary handling of

The Sino-Soviet problem which you /The central committee/ had tried to conceal against all evidence;...the treason which you will commit by supporting nonrevolutionaries in the coming elections;...History will decide who and how many are to blame for delaying the Colombian revolution and who scourged the revolutionaries of the PCC. The people already know who insults the revolution and the Chinese leaders; who insults the revolution and the Cuban leaders; who refers to Venezuelan revolutionaries as

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adventurers; and who insults the real Colombian revolutionaries.\*

Arias further noted that the central committee had not only expelled him from the party but, in the same session, had also "condemned Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese revolution. This is a splendid task which North American imperialists are probably applauding."

The Chinese sought to inspire the ultraleftist groups and the dissident elements within the PCC in an attempt to promote the armed revolution in Colombia and to undercut the policies and prestige of the orthodox party. Travel of pro-Chinese leaders to Peking was heavy and included representatives of the MOEC, FUAR, JMRL, and the PCC-ML. Pedro Abella, Luis Villar Borda, Leon Arboleda, Pedro Vasquez Rendon, Eduardo Aristizabal, and Manuel Manotas Manotas were among those who went to China during the years 1963-65 to present their plans to the Chinese and to obtain assistance and guidance. After the PCC-ML was formed in 1964, however, the Chinese apparently limited their paramilitary training, financial aid, and other support primarily to this organization and to the MOEC.

China's aid to its sympathizers in Colombia seems to have been niggardly. Although some of the travelers to Peking may have received small cash grants, the one regular source of financing has been through the NCNA agency in Bogota. The amounts paid in salaries and for other services to the local Communist NCNA representatives are not believed to exceed \$150 per month.

*\* Emphasis added*



PEDRO VASQUEZ RENDON

A leading figure in the PCC-ML, the pro-Peking Communist splinter party.



Although the PCC attempted to prohibit the dissemination of Chinese propaganda in Colombia after 1963 and expelled the pro-Chinese NCNA employees from the party, the latter still retain their agency positions and apparently still receive the small monthly payments. There is some ground for considering the PCC-ML to be a poorly disciplined party, not in close touch with Peking, since its two factions have contended for control of the NCNA agency and the agency has remained independent of both.

Peking's promises to its sympathizers in Colombia for propaganda support, scholarships, paramilitary training, and other assistance have probably been far more lavish than the actual cash outlays. Peking has disseminated sporadic propaganda in support of the PCC-ML, branding the "orthodox" leaders "revisionists" and endorsing the "revolutionary struggle to seize power through a patriotic anti-imperialist popular revolution...." The Chinese have also financed guerrilla warfare training and "scholarship" programs, reportedly in North Korea and Vietnam as well as in China.

The PCC response to Chinese collaboration with its enemies has been sharp. Top central committee members, well aware of the travels to Peking of such "traitors" as Pedro Abella (and the purpose of such pilgrimages), are known to have discussed in early 1964 the pressures and problems which such activities were placing on the party. Besides trying to stop Chinese propaganda emanating from the NCNA office in Bogota, the PCC also attempted to stifle party discussion of the Chinese line and of Peking's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Chinese sympathizers were threatened with expulsion.

Whether Vieira and his colleagues exaggerated the Chinese responsibility for the PCC's internal problems is debatable, but they certainly sought to link the pro-Chinese dissidents with the "ultraleft charlatans" who insisted on immediate revolution in Colombia. Vieira wrote in 1965 that such groups had seized upon the false and misleading Chinese position to attack the PCC and its program.



The PCC's general sensitivity to the effects of the party split was illustrated by its sharp response to a September 1964 article in El Tiempo, the leading daily of Bogota, which had described the expulsion of leaders from the party, the splits in regional Communist committees, and the disintegration of the PCC organization. In its rebuttal in Voz Proletaria, the party insisted that the great majority of members had remained loyal to the orthodox PCC, attacked "the methods of the Chinese leaders" and charged that the principal objective of the deviationist "ultrarevolutionaries" was to attack the PCC rather than the true enemies--"the reactionary national forces and Yankee imperialists."

#### IV. ASSESSMENT

During the period under review (May 1957 - August 1966) the PCC managed to maintain its legal status and the unity of the old-line leaders headed by Vieira. It kept the party organization intact and retained the loyalty of the majority of the rank and file membership as well as its influence over traditional rural enclaves and the principal pro-Communist paramilitary leaders in the countryside. The close ties with the Soviet party were challenged only by a few defectors.

Balanced against these accomplishments, which were largely holding operations, are the substantial reverses to Communist strength and potential in comparison to the party's outlook as late as 1962. The program failed to prevent an internal split or to satisfy the demands of the radical leftist groups who were inclined to pursue the armed struggle.

During this period, foreign and domestic influences on the party were intertwined and, of course, reacted on each other. No firm conclusions are possible about their relative weights. Nevertheless, the developments rehearsed in this paper do suggest certain very tentative generalizations on how these influences have operated in the case of the Colombian party.

The PCC was run throughout this period by an old guard leadership whose own inclinations--particularly on the key issue of the armed struggle--seem to have accorded fairly well with the Moscow line; if Moscow had favored intensifying the armed struggle, there might have been some test of their allegiance. The party's formal split in 1964 over the Sino-Soviet dispute of course reflected its previous support of Moscow's side in international Communist meetings, as contrasted with the "neutralist" position taken by the Venezuelan Communist party; but it also probably reflected somewhat less flexibility in the PCC leadership at dealing with party dissension. The PCV,

plagued with more serious internal conflict over the armed struggle issue, did stay together through 1965.

The Cuban influence on the PCC was indirect and in one sense more a domestic influence than a foreign one, in that it had a strong appeal (though, as time went on, a diminishing one) to the radical leftist opinion in Colombia, and Havana subsidized to some extent the splinter groups which competed with the PCC for leftist support. This situation was reflected in the PCC's attitude toward the Castro regime. The PCC split in 1964 came largely over the issue of the armed struggle, of which Fidel Castro was the hemisphere's leading exponent, but it was Peking that was publicly blamed by the PCC leadership; Cuba, both on that occasion and subsequently, was praised. Castro's known alignment with Moscow would of course have made it embarrassing for the PCC to be publicly critical of him, but his Moscow tie did not prevent the PCC from being critical of his regime in a 1964 communication to Brazilian Communists.

The extent of Peking's actual influence in Colombian Communist circles has been very small, despite the readiness of the proponents of the armed struggle to invoke Chinese ideological support.

Domestic, rather than foreign, factors seem to have been mainly responsible for the principal 1966 development in PCC policy: a reappraisal of party policy on the lucha armada in an apparent effort to recapture the leadership of the extreme left through more tangible support and guidance for the guerrilla forces. The propaganda facet of this modified policy appeared in the resolutions of the 10th Party Congress, which recognized that the armed struggle was the "principal form" in certain local areas and that guerrilla warfare had reached a "new stage" of development. It is similarly reflected in the PCC's formation in 1966 of the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), a "general staff" for coordinating rural Communist subversion; the FARC has issued an open invitation to membership for all leftist guerrilla elements, active or in process of being organized. The reported Communist liaison with the ELN and the favorable Communist attitude toward this organization's

guerrilla activity also suggest increased emphasis by the PCC on this aspect of its program. In addition, there is evidence of closer cooperation between the PCC and the Cuban regime since the Havana Conference in late 1964 and particularly since the Tri-Continent Congress in early 1966, as partly revealed in Cuban and Colombian propaganda and in the appointment of Central Committee member Manuel Cepeda Vargas as permanent PCC representative in Havana.

The changes of early 1966 probably do not add up to a basic shift in the PCC's long adherence to the primacy of the via pacifica, but they do suggest a greater sensitivity to domestic pressures and possibly some increased tactical flexibility.

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ANNEX A

THE COLOMBIAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCC)  
AND THE VENEZUELAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCV):  
A COMPARISON OF EXPERIENCES SINCE 1958

PCC

PCV

I. DOMESTIC CONDITIONS  
AND INFLUENCES

Legal status

Party outlawed, 1954-57;  
regained legal status  
after ouster of dictator  
Rojas Pinilla, May 1957;  
retained legal status  
throughout period

Outlawed 1950-58;  
regained legal status  
after ouster of dictator  
Perez Jimenez, Jan-  
uary 1958; the gov-  
ernment suspended  
political activity  
of party and princi-  
pal ally, Movement of  
the Revolutionary  
Left (MIR), 1962.

Public and polit-  
ical status  
after overthrow  
of dictator

Little change from pre-  
vious period; limited  
national influence; po-  
litical atmosphere con-  
servative compared to  
Venezuela; strong poten-  
tial opportunity through  
cooperation with dissi-  
dent Liberal faction,  
MRL, and other leftist  
groups

Highly favorable;  
party had consider-  
able public credit  
for contributing to  
ouster of Perez  
Jimenez; strong left-  
ist orientation of  
all political groups;  
united front in labor  
movement; potential  
close allies for PCV  
in factions of Demo-  
cratic Action Party  
(AD) and Democratic  
Republican Union (URD)

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	PCC	PCV
Party program	Consistently emphasized primacy of <u>via pacifica</u> ; rejected <u>lucha armada</u> as principal form for entire country; certain modifications to defend pro-Communist guerrilla forces	<u>Via pacifica</u> until 1962, with increasing use of violence; <u>lucha armada</u> became principal form after 1962; initial emphasis on urban violence; after 1963, emphasis on the "prolonged struggle" through guerrilla warfare
Program impact on top leadership	Central committee retained close-knit unity in support of <u>via pacifica</u>	Serious divisions over <u>lucha armada</u> ; leaders shifted in attitude over the period, but no overt split; MIR ally split
Program results	PCC split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese organizations in 1964; running battle with other radical groups favoring <u>lucha armada</u> ; split in youth auxiliary	Principal leaders imprisoned; party and MIR ally seriously divided internally and between themselves; party political assets sharply depleted; national organization disrupted.
Alliances	Informal cooperation with MRL for political and electoral action; MRL factionalism reduced effectiveness of front tactic after 1962	Marxist, pro-Castro MIR; pro-Castro elements of URD; sympathy or "solidarity" from other leftist elements.
Potential for conducting guerrilla war	Relatively strong; party had long experience with rural violence and guerrilla warfare, enclaves of rural support, and varying control over several active guerrilla leaders.	Negligible; peasant support limited; no trained leaders in guerrilla warfare and no experience with this form of subversion

PCC

PCV

II. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

Traditional orientation	Pro-Soviet	Pro-Soviet
Position on Sino-Soviet dispute	Unconditionally pro-Soviet from the outset; condemnation of Peking	Sought to avoid the issue under guise of neutralism; followed Cuban stand; refused to criticize the Chinese
Cuban impact	Disrupted PCC relations with the leftist groups favoring the <u>lucha armada</u> ; contributed to dissension in the MRL	Strong, dominant, and direct; equally strong on MIR and other allies; probably largely determined the adoption of the <u>lucha armada</u>
Party relations and attitudes toward Cuba	Publicly eulogistic; privately resentful and critical	Close; party sensitive to Cuban views and guidance
Cuban aid	Ineffectual shotgun approach to radical leftists favoring guerrilla warfare and violence; a challenge to the PCC program of <u>via pacifica</u> ; Cuban <u>propaganda</u> in part a criticism of party leaders	Substantial training, propaganda, and other aid; assistance granted PCV allies provoked no resentment in party
Chinese influence	Contributed to party split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese organizations in 1964; party blamed Chinese for its troubles with the ultra-left	Limited; PCV <u>lucha armada</u> program coincided with Peking revolutionary line, but Cuban example predominant



	PCC	PCV
Chinese aid	Limited financial and training assistance to PCC-ML and to ultra-left leaders; Colombians often took initiative in seeking aid from Peking	Considerable solidarity and propaganda support; negligible financial assistance; some training and guidance
Party relations with Peking	Hostile	Friendly; occasional liaison
Party relations with Moscow	Party completely servile to Moscow throughout period; reciprocal approval from CPSU	Strained by Sino-Soviet dispute; steadily improving since Khrushchev's political demise in 1964 and Havana Conference of Latin American parties
PCC-PCV relations	Propaganda support for the PCV <u>lucha armada</u> and other difficulties; party concerned by the Venezuelan program; occasional liaison; some operational assistance	Party absorbed in its own problems and hence little cooperation with PCC; borrowed from Colombian "self-defense" theory to justify guerrilla warfare; radical MIR elements conducted liaison with pro-Chinese faction and other <u>lucha armada</u> leftists in Colombia

*Robert F. Kennedy*  
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Submitted by

*Richard Helms*

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Concurred in by the

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As indicated overleaf

14 September 1967

Authenticated:

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*[Redacted]*  
Nº 1  
Approved for Release

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
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## CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
THE PROBLEM .....	1
CONCLUSIONS .....	1
DISCUSSION .....	2
I. THE INSURGENCY .....	2
II. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND .....	4
III. THE BARRIENTOS REGIME .....	5
IV. THE MILITARY .....	8
V. THE OPPOSITION .....	9
VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS .....	9
VII. THE OUTLOOK .....	10

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[ ]



56986 8-67 CIA

Area of guerrilla operations

Possible other guerrilla activity

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## THE SITUATION IN BOLIVIA

### THE PROBLEM

To estimate the situation in Bolivia and the probable impact of the present insurgency on it, over the next year or so.

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### CONCLUSIONS

A. The present insurgency in Bolivia is organized and supported by Cuba. Its seriousness lies in the possibility that the insurgents may eventually provide a rallying point for many disaffected elements which hitherto have been unable to coalesce. [ ]

[ ]

B. Over the next year or so, there is little chance that the insurgents will be able to bring about the overthrow of the Barrientos regime, but it is also unlikely that the regime will be able to stamp out the insurgency.

C. A prolongation and expansion of the insurgency would impose severe financial and psychological strains on Bolivia, greatly hindering the economic development and social amelioration that are essential to the achievement of stability in that country. Defense costs for a protracted guerrilla war would add heavily to the already serious deficit in the national budget, would further limit public investment, and would threaten the government's stabilization program. [ ]

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[ ]

D. If the government's counterinsurgency operations are protracted and unsuccessful, that would encourage other disaffected elements to undertake more active opposition to the government. It would also seriously damage the morale of the military. In these circumstances, the tenure of the Barrientos regime would become precarious.

[ ]

[ ]

## DISCUSSION

### I. THE INSURGENCY

1. Armed resistance to central authority has long been commonplace in the Bolivian hinterland. Concern regarding the present insurgency is a consequence of conclusive evidence that it is organized and supported by Cuba. From this source the insurgents have received leadership and training, modern automatic weapons, and a body of revolutionary doctrine. [ ]

2. In March 1967 a Bolivian army patrol clashed with a guerrilla band north of Camiri, in southeastern Bolivia (see map). A month later Jules Regis Debray, a French intellectual, and Ciro Roberto Bustos, an Argentine Communist, were captured in the same area. Debray is a friend of Fidel Castro and a publicist for his revolutionary theories; his arrest in itself ensured worldwide publicity for the Camiri band. Debray and Bustos added to the sensation by declaring that the leader of the guerrilla movement in Bolivia was none other than Ernesto ("Che") Guevara. [ ]

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3. "Che" disappeared in March 1965 under circumstances which raised some doubt that he was still alive. Since then there have been scores of conflicting and unconfirmed reports and rumors as to his whereabouts. Somewhat stronger evidence has recently become available: it suggests Guevara's presence in Bolivia at some time during the past year. But whether or not "Che" is in Bolivia, it is clear that the Camiri guerrillas are led by someone who keeps in contact with Cuba and who is well versed in the Guevara doctrine of revolution.

4. A main theme of the Castro-Guevara-Debray doctrine is that city-bred "revolutionary" parties cannot effect a real revolution—that, as in Cuba, the revolution must originate as a guerrilla movement in the remote hinterland. By its survival and continuing defiance, such a guerrilla movement will demonstrate the powerlessness of the regime and will draw to itself true revolutionary spirits. Eventually the guerrilla movement will win the sympathy and support of the oppressed population and will itself constitute the basis for the development of the truly revolutionary political party. This theory is, of course, a recapitulation of the Cuban experience from the Castroist point of view.

5. The available evidence indicates that the Camiri band numbers only about 100 men. Although the nominal commander is a Bolivian, it is evident that the cadre is composed of Cubans and of Bolivians trained in Cuba. [ ]

[ ] It appears that the group had planned to spend more time in recruitment and training, that it was discovered before it was ready to begin active operations, and that its leaders realize that its consequent dependence on its Cuban cadre may prove politically disadvantageous by provoking a nationalistic Bolivian reaction.

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[ ]

6. Since their discovery these guerrillas have operated in an area extending from Camiri northward for 150 miles to Samaipata on the Cochabamba-Santa Cruz highway (see map). This area lies in the eastern foothills of the Andes; the elevation varies from 1,500 to 9,000 feet. It is sparsely populated; the availability of supplies, especially food, is meager. Access is limited by the north-south pattern of the ridgelines. Moreover, thick foliage on the slopes provides concealment for the guerrillas. They are well protected from observation and attack from the air. Army patrols approaching on foot up rugged streambeds are highly vulnerable to being ambushed.

7. Counter guerrilla operations in such terrain would be extremely difficult for well-equipped, well-trained, and well-motivated forces. [ ]

[ ] The guerrillas have several times managed to ambush army patrols, inflicting casualties without permitting the army units to close. The guerrillas, however, have been compelled to abandon their base camp, and the Bolivian army has recently killed or captured a few of them.

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8. The Bolivian army numbers about 15,000 men, of whom only about 5,000 in MAP-supported units are reasonably well-equipped.<sup>1</sup> Its effectiveness is limited by the fact that its conscripts serve only a one-year tour of duty, leaving a minimal period of service after the completion of basic training. The army has committed more than 2,000 men to containing the 100 Camiri guerrillas, but few of them are from MAP-supported units. [ ]

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[ ]

9. Several small guerrilla bands, in addition to that in the Camiri-Samaipata area, probably exist in other similarly inaccessible areas (see map). Some may be composed of ordinary, undisciplined Bolivian outlaws, but there are indications that two such bands (those in the Alto Beni and Chaparé areas) may be organizationally connected with the Camiri insurgents. As yet they have engaged in no active operations, but they could of course be used to divert and distract the Bolivian counter guerrilla forces.

10. It is evident that the initiative in launching the Bolivian insurgency came from Havana rather than from any of the three local Communist parties.<sup>2</sup> [ ]

[ ] Since the Camiri band became engaged, the Central Committee of the pro-Soviet party has publicly endorsed the guerrilla

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<sup>1</sup> In addition, there are 2,400 men in the air force and 1,400 in the river and lake naval force.

<sup>2</sup> See the table (pp. 6 and 7) for brief descriptions of political organizations in Bolivia.



movement

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In short, the guerrillas are quite willing to accept local Communist assistance as and when it suits their own plans, but are careful not to identify themselves with or subordinate themselves to any local Communist party. In accordance with Cuban doctrine, they expect to organize the true revolutionary party on the basis of the guerrilla movement itself.

11. It is unclear whether the guerrillas have won the sympathy of the sparse rural population in the areas in which they operate, although it is notable that they have paid well for the food supplies they have taken and have provided medical services to the villages they have entered. Their greatest potential source of recruits is the large number of unemployed and bitterly disaffected tin miners, but the miners are generally reluctant to leave the Altiplano and so far only a small number of them have actually been recruited. The distance of the guerrilla zone from urban centers discourages the participation of disaffected students.

12.

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## II. THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

13. Bolivia experienced a real political and social revolution in 1952, but the resulting governments made only limited progress toward solving basic political and economic problems. The fervent nationalism of the revolutionary leaders could not transform the country into an integrated nation. More than half the population are Indians who speak Quechua or Aymará rather than Spanish; there are strong geographical and cultural barriers to the development of national unity.

14. Initially the 1952 revolution, sparked by *campesino* and miner militias and directed by the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), attempted to alter radically the existing social conditions.<sup>\*</sup> It nationalized the tin mines, expecting

<sup>\*</sup>Although it is a major producer of tin, Bolivia's per capita gross national product (GNP), about \$150, exceeds only that of Haiti and is well below the \$400 average for Latin America. Bolivia's population is about 60 percent illiterate.

[ ]

thereby to gain the means to carry out its other intended reforms. It freed the Indian from the control of absentee landlords, gave him land and the vote, and sought to give him education. But the nationalized tin mines produced deficits instead of profits<sup>4</sup> and agricultural production fell. These factors, combined with fiscal and managerial irresponsibility, produced a staggering inflation. The government's efforts to control inflation and to rationalize tin production were bitterly resisted by the miners, who virtually controlled the mines, as well as by a left-wing faction of the MNR under Juan Lechin Oquendo. [ ]

[ ] By running for a third presidential term in 1964, Paz drove a sizable faction of the MNR (including former President Hernan Siles Zuazo, 1956-1960) into opposition. Forced thereby to seek military support, Paz grudgingly accepted the Air Force commander, General Rene Barrientos Ortuno, as his running mate. Mutual suspicion grew between the two, and Paz, unable to control increasing resistance to his rule, was finally ousted by the military leadership in November 1964.

### III. THE BARRIENTOS REGIME

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15. Although the discredited MNR leadership was thrown out, the military leaders who took control pledged continuance of the MNR revolution. The two main figures in the provisional government were General Barrientos and General Alfredo Ovando Candia, who became co-presidents. Barrientos enjoyed considerable popularity, based largely on the bold bearing he had shown in the face of several previous attempts to assassinate him. He prepared for election to the constitutional presidency by presenting himself as an advocate of Christian democracy and by forming a coalition of miscellaneous political fragments called the Bolivian Revolutionary Front (FRB) — see table. In the election held on 3 July 1966 Barrientos won 61 percent of the vote. This impressive victory was as much a tribute to his skillful manipulation of disparate political forces as it was to his popular appeal.

<sup>4</sup>The government tin enterprise, COMIBOL, suffering from low world tin prices and worn equipment, was further plagued by a high level of mismanagement and corruption. As a result, production fell from 27,000 tons in 1952 to 15,000 in 1960 and the mines lost \$1 million a month in the latter year.

## BOLIVIAN POLITICAL PARTIES

### *The Bolivian Revolutionary Front (FRB)* (Dissolved, July 1967)

Popular Christian Movement (MPC)	This party was created by Barrientos as his personal vehicle for the 1966 presidential election. It is composed of his personal followers without much regard to ideology; its popular support is drawn almost exclusively from the <i>campesinos</i> of the Cochabamba area.
Authentic Revolutionary Party (PRA)	This party is an off-shoot of the MNR. It is led by Walter Guevara Arze, a moderate who left the party over Paz's decision to seek a second term in 1960. It then polled 100,000 votes, but since then has dwindled.
Party of the Revolutionary Left (PIR)	Although it was started in the 1940's as a Marxist party and still professes those leanings, it is now far more moderate than Lechin's PRIN and among other things recognizes the need for US aid. The PIR has an estimated membership of 2,000 and is strongest among students in Cochabamba.
Social Democratic Party (PSD)	Founded as a discussion group after the MNR revolution, by businessmen and professionals, it is considered conservative in the post-1952 political context. Its present membership is estimated to be 1,000.

### *Non-Communist Opposition*

National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) (Outlawed in 1967)	This is probably still the largest political party in Bolivia, but is split into three factions led by Paz, Siles, and Andrade, with the first two in exile. The Paz faction won 5.5 percent of the vote in the 1966 election; the Andrade faction, 8 percent. The Siles faction did not participate in the election.
Revolutionary Party of the Nationalist Left (PRIN) (Outlawed in 1967)	This party was formed in 1964 as a vehicle for Juan Lechin's aspirations after his expulsion from the MNR. It drew its strength from labor, being most influential among the miners, but its influence has declined since 1965.
Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB)	Begun by upper and middle class elements in the late 1930's, it originally drew its inspiration from Spanish and Italian fascism. During the MNR era it was constantly plotting against the government, even to the extent of launching an insurgency. It has regained some prestige since the 1964 coup and now is the only opposition party with substantial representation in congress. In 1966 it polled 12 percent of the vote.
Christian Democratic Party (PDC)	Never influential, the party is now bogged down in dialectics between youthful activists and old pragmatists. It has flirted unsuccessfully with Barrientos and with most opposition parties.

[ ]

BOLIVIAN POLITICAL PARTIES (Continued)

*Communist Opposition*

Communist Party of Bolivia  
("Pro-Soviet")  
(Outlawed in 1967)

This party has an estimated membership of 5,000. Politically it has been relatively docile, having been content to cooperate with Paz in the past and being seriously limited by lack of funds at present. Most of its strength is concentrated in La Paz, the region around the mines, and Cochabamba. A leftist front organized by this party received 33,000 votes in the 1966 election, 3 percent of the total.

Communist Party of Bolivia  
("Pro-Chinese")  
(Outlawed in 1967)

This party split from the PCB in 1965, largely because of personal rivalries within the PCB leadership. Subsequently it accepted Chinese recognition and financial aid and so came to be labeled pro-Chinese. Its present active membership is estimated at 500 to 1,000.

Revolutionary Workers' Party  
(POR)  
(Outlawed in 1967)

After being split for several years, this "Trotskyite" organization theoretically has been unified since February 1966. Its total membership is not more than a few hundred. The POR is most influential in the mining region and among La Paz factory workers.

[ ]

16. The electoral arrangement between Barrientos and the FRB proved to be no more than a temporary expedient. Barrientos' sure victory gave patronage and second wind to parties hitherto destined to oblivion. In return he was given political respectability and legitimacy. Despite constant avowals of support for the Front, Barrientos showed little subsequent interest in it. He prefers to rule as a sort of constitutional caudillo. Opposition parties, on occasion, have negotiated with him about joining the government, but he has rejected overtures from both the Bolivian Socialist Falange (FSB) and the Andrade faction of the MNR. As his most crucial support comes from the military, the breakup of the Front in July 1967 and the reshuffling of the cabinet in August were of little real import. The individual parties of the former coalition continue to be aligned with the Barrientos government and their more important leaders are in the new cabinet.

#### IV. THE MILITARY

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18. Both Barrientos and the military realize that they depend on each other. Barrientos could not have become president and could not remain in office without the united support of the military. The military, for their part, doubt that they could control the country without such political and popular support as Barrientos is able to contribute to the partnership. Both the military leaders and Barrientos realize that a split within the military would spell disaster. Both are therefore careful to avoid provoking such a split.

19. [ ]

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[ ]  
20. [ ]

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[ ]  
V. THE OPPOSITION

21. Cut off from patronage and influence, Bolivian opposition parties are fragmented and powerless. They represent regional or special interests and find cooperation with other parties difficult. Even the MNR is now divided, leaderless, and with little influence in important sectors of the population. Paz is in Peru, Lechin in Chile, and Siles in Uruguay. [ ]

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22. Opposition parties have sought to take advantage of the government's unpopularity among students and miners as well as its inability to end the insurgency. Elements of the FSB have from time to time attempted to form alliances [ ]

[ ] After the outbreak of the insurgency the MNR and PRIN were outlawed along with the three Communist parties.

23. The Bolivian Communists are as fragmented as the non-Communist opposition. During the MNR era the PCB maintained a live and let live relationship with the Paz Administration. [ ]

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[ ] it behaved prudently enough to maintain its legal status. [ ]

[ ] The 1964 coup caught the PCB just as it was about to split into "pro-Soviet" and "pro-Chinese" factions. A further blow was dealt to the party in May 1965, when the government occupied the mines and arrested Communist and leftist labor leaders.

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

24. The revolution in 1952 was followed by a protracted period of economic deterioration and a raging inflation. Since 1962, however, the economy's growth rate has averaged over five percent annually, prices have been relatively stable, and international reserves have climbed from a low of \$4 million in 1962 to \$37 million in June 1967. For the most part, this recovery has been spurred by substantial growth of imports and exports, increased domestic and foreign private investment, and large inflows of economic assistance.

[ ]

25. High tin prices have contributed to this improvement, but so has the government's economic policy.<sup>5</sup> Barrientos has pledged his government to a program of stabilization and development and has instituted fiscal policies that seek to bring public revenues in approximate balance with public expenditures. He has also taken advantage of his freedom from doctrinaire political commitments to seek new foreign private investment, a heresy to most Bolivian politicians.

26. Nowhere has this effort to improve the economy been more evident than in Barrientos' policy toward the state enterprises. Prior to the 1964 coup these enterprises constituted a major drain on the economy.<sup>6</sup> Now their efficiency has been increased, and in the case of tin has combined with higher world prices over the last three years to produce an operating surplus which has been used for public investment. On the other hand, the overall fiscal situation has weakened since 1964 because of the growing budgetary deficits of the central government. These deficits have had to be financed increasingly by the central bank since the elimination of US direct budget support. This inflationary form of financing has risen from less than one percent of central government expenditures in 1964 to 10 percent in 1965 and about 16 percent in 1966, but has not yet had a marked effect on prices.

27. For most Bolivians, however, stabilization and development programs have little meaning. The 1952 revolution raised expectations, but did not permanently improve the standard of living for many. Impatience over the lack of progress in fulfilling its goals has created pockets of resentment in urban areas and among students and miners. The 1964 coup not only ended the domination of labor over mine management, but the government's subsequent efforts to achieve efficiency threw hundreds of miners out of work and cut wages drastically. Although Barrientos has subsequently raised miners' wages, their political emasculation by him has left deep hatreds. While it succeeded in forcing the miners back to work, the government's decisive and ruthless suppression of demonstrations in May and June has intensified the miners' disaffection.

## VII. THE OUTLOOK

28. The Castro regime, during the session of the Latin American Solidarity Organization in Havana in July and August 1967, once again publicized its determination to encourage violent revolutions in Latin America. Fidel Castro probably regards the opportunities for the insurgents in Bolivia as more favorable (at least in the long run) than is the case with other active insurgency movements. [ ] Consequently we believe he will make special efforts to sustain the guerrilla operations in Bolivia through financial and technical aid. This does not imply substantial logistical support.

<sup>5</sup> In 1965, tin exports accounted for 72 percent of foreign exchange earnings from commodity exports. The average world price for Bolivian tin rose from \$1.13 in 1963 to \$1.50 in 1964, reached a high of \$1.74 in 1965, and dropped to \$1.61 in 1966 and to about \$1.50 in mid-1967.

<sup>6</sup> In addition to COMIBOL, the most important public enterprises are the National Petroleum Corporation, the Bolivian Development Corporation, and the Bolivian National Railroad Enterprise.



[ ]

The guerrillas will be operating in almost inaccessible areas. Moreover, Cuban doctrine anticipates that, once launched, they will live off the country, obtaining even arms by capture. In any case, the ultimate success or failure of the Bolivian insurgency will depend on its ability to win adherents from the already disaffected elements of the Bolivian population.

29. Over the next year or so, there is little chance that the insurgents will be able to bring about the overthrow of the Barrientos government. They themselves contemplate a more prolonged operation. The government is in firm control of the vital areas of the country: La Paz, Cochabamba, and the mines. It will probably continue to receive the united support of the military establishment, on which its tenure of office depends; the fragmented political opposition is not likely to be able to combine effectively against it. But it is unlikely that the government will be able to stamp out the insurgency.

30. The longer the guerrilla movement survives, the more it will tend to undermine the Barrientos government. Up to now guerrilla activity has had little effect on economic performance. Defense costs for a protracted guerrilla war would add heavily to the already serious deficit in the national budget, would further limit public investment, and would threaten the government's stabilization program. Prolonged insecurity would also discourage the foreign capital investment that Bolivia needs to exploit its untapped resources. Moreover, labor unrest, especially in the mines, would hinder production, with widespread economic repercussions.

31. A protracted and futile counter guerrilla campaign would encourage opposition elements to increase their opposition to the government, whether or not they allied themselves directly with the guerrillas. Even some of Barrientos' present political supporters might defect. The government itself could stimulate resentment and opposition (as did the Batista regime in Cuba) if, through its frustration over the insurgency, it reacted brutally to student or miner protests.

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32. Military morale would also be seriously damaged by a long and unsuccessful campaign [ ]

[ ] Repeated failure against the insurgents, combined with strain in maintaining control at the mines, might lead eventually to disaffection in the army, particularly among junior officers [ ]

33. Barrientos will almost certainly seek increasing aid, principally from the US, in coping with the insurgency and with its economic and financial consequences. Although eager to obtain increased technical and material military aid, he would be extremely reluctant to sanction a military intervention in force, by either the already concerned neighboring states or by the OAS, lest that provoke a nationalistic reaction and make patriotic heroes of the insurgents. [ ]

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CITE

DIST 14 OCTOBER 1967

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3.4(b)(1)

COUNTRY: VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOI:

SUBJECT:

INTENTIONS OF STUDENT AT CENTRAL UNIVERSITY OF  
VENEZUELA TO LAUNCH ANTI-UNITED STATES DEMONSTRATIONS  
TO PROTEST U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN DEATH OF ERNESTO "CHE"  
GUEVARA.

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ACQ:

SOURCE:

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1.

STUDENTS AT CENTRAL

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

12 FEB 1997

(dissem/action)

(dissem controls)

UNIVERSITY OF VENEZUELA (UCV), TO PROTEST THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DEATH OF ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, ARE ORGANIZING DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST ONE OR SEVERAL OF THE FOLLOWING: A UNITED STATES BUSINESS, THE HOME OF A UNITED STATES CITIZEN, THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY OR SIMILAR TARGETS.

2. [REDACTED] COMMENT: CLASSES ARE NOT IN SESSION AT UCV AND THE CAMPUS IS ALMOST DESERTED. ALSO, PRESS REACTION TO DATE ON GUEVARA'S DEATH HAS NOT IMPLICATED THE UNITED STATES.)

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCSO, CINCLANT, MILGROUP.

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**MSG 17 OCTOBER 1967**

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COUNTRY CUBA/USSE By CU NAFA Date 9-6-8

DO: SEPTEMBER 1966, JUNE 1967

SUBJECT 1. BACKGROUND OF SOVIET PREMIER ALEKSEY KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO HAVANA

2. CONTENT OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN MOSYGIN AND CUBAN

**PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO**

OCTOBER 1967

FILED NO.

**source**

4.392

(SUMMARY:

**IN LATE 1966**

4324

**BREZHNEV STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE DISPATCH OF ERNESTO "CHE"**

GUEVARA TO BOLIVIA AND CASTRO'S POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE SUPPORT

OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. DURING KOSYGIN'S VISIT

CASTRO EXPLAINED THE BASIS OF HIS REVOLUTIONARY POLICY. CUBA EVALUATED

1.2/554

**Reference:**

1994

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THE KOSYGIN VISIT AS PRODUCTIVE, ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEAR THAT DIVERGENT VIEWS CONTINUED TO EXIST REGARDING REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA. END SUMMARY)

1.

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IN THE FALL OF 1966 CASTRO

INFORMED BREZHNEV THAT ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA, WITH MEN AND MATERIAL FURNISHED BY CUBA, HAD GONE TO BOLIVIA TO MOUNT A REVOLUTION WITHIN THAT COUNTRY.

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IN JUNE 1967, BREZHNEV, IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT GUEVARA, REPLIED THAT HE (GUEVARA) WAS THERE IN LATIN AMERICA "MAKING HIS REVOLUTIONS."

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BREZHNEV EXPRESSED HIS DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE FAILURE OF CASTRO TO GIVE THE SOVIET UNION ADVANCE NOTICE CONCERNING THE DISPATCH OF GUEVARA, AND IN STRONG TERMS CRITICIZED THE

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DECISION OF CASTRO TO UNDERTAKE GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN BOLIVIA OR OTHER LATINAMERICAN COUNTRIES. BREZHNEV STATED THAT SUCH ACTIVITIES WERE HARMFUL TO THE TRUE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNIST CAUSE AND INQUIRED AS TO "WHAT RIGHT" CASTRO HAD TO FOMENT REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA WITHOUT APPROPRIATE COORDINATION WITH THE OTHER "SOCIALIST" COUNTRIES.

2.

IT

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APPEARS THAT CASTRO WAS IRRITATED AT BREZHNEV THE SOVIETS DECIDED THAT A VISIT TO CUBA BY ONE OF THE SOVIET LEADERS WAS ADVISABLE. PLANS FOR THE VISIT HAD BEEN COMPLETED BEFORE THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS ERUPTED IN THE SPRING OF 1967. SUBSEQUENTLY, WHEN IT WAS DECIDED THAT PREMIER KOSYGIN WOULD VISIT THE UNITED STATES TO ADDRESS THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, IT WAS AGREED THAT KOSYGIN WOULD RETURN TO MOSCOW VIA HAVANA.

3. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF KOSYGIN'S TRIP TO HAVANA 26-30 JUNE 1967 WAS TO INFORM CASTRO CONCERNING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, NOTABLY TO EXPLAIN SOVIET POLICY REGARDING THE CRISIS. A SECONDARY

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BUT IMPORTANT REASON FOR THE TRIP WAS TO DISCUSS WITH CASTRO THE  
SUBJECT OF CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA.

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KOSYGIN REPEATED THE SOVIET  
VIEW THAT CASTRO WAS HARMING THE COMMUNIST CAUSE THROUGH HIS  
SPONSORSHIP OF GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND THROUGH  
PROVIDING SUPPORT TO VARIOUS ANTI-GOVERNMENT GROUPS, WHICH ALTHOUGH  
THEY CLAIMED TO BE "SOCIALIST" OR COMMUNIST, WERE ENGAGED IN DISPUTES  
WITH THE "LEGITIMATE" LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES I.E., THOSE  
FAVORED BY THE USSR. KOSYGIN SAID THAT THE INTERNECINE STRUGGLES  
AMONG THE VARIOUS LEFT REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS WERE PLAYING INTO THE  
HANDS OF THE IMPERIALISTS AND WERE WEAKENING AND DIVERTING THE  
EFFORTS OF THE "SOCIALIST WORLD" TO "LIBERATE" LATIN AMERICA.

4. IN REPLYING TO KOSYGIN CASTRO

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STATED THAT "CHE" GUEVARA HAD GONE TO BOLIVIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
THE SAME "RIGHT" AS THAT UNDER WHICH GUEVARA HAD COME TO CUBA TO  
AID CASTRO IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE AGAINST BATISTA: THE "RIGHT"

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OF EVERY LATIN AMERICAN TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE LIBERATION OF HIS COUNTRY AND THE ENTIRE CONTINENT OF LATIN AMERICA. CASTRO THEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO EXPLAIN THE REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION IN LATIN AMERICA, AND WENT ON TO DESCRIBE THE FEATS OF THE LEADING LATIN AMERICAN "LIBERATORS," NOTABLY BOLIVAR AND SAN MARTIN.

5. CASTRO ADDED THAT CUBA DID NOT AGREE WITH THE SOVIET APPROACH TO "WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" IN LATIN AMERICA. HE ACCUSED THE USSR OF HAVING TURNED ITS BACK UPON ITS OWN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITION AND OF HAVING MOVED TO A POINT WHERE IT WOULD REFUSE TO SUPPORT ANY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT UNLESS THE ACTIONS OF THE LATTER CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES, AS CONTRASTED TO INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES. CASTRO SAID THAT IN RECENT YEARS THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT HONORED THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF TRUE COMMUNISM, I.E., THE LIBERATION OF MANKIND THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. CASTRO CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT REGARDLESS OF THE ATTITUDES OF THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA WOULD SUPPORT ANY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT WHICH IT CONSIDERED WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE.

6. DESPITE THE OPEN DISAGREEMENT CONCERNING REVOLUTIONARY ACTION, THE DISCUSSIONS WITH KOSYGIN CONCERNING ECONOMIC AND

(classification)

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MILITARY AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO CUBA WERE HELD IN AN AMICABLE ATMOSPHERE. THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WILLING TO CONTINUE TO SUPPLY CUBA WITH CONSIDERABLE AMOUNTS OF ECONOMIC AID AND THAT THE MILITARY AID PROGRAMS, ESPECIALLY THOSE CONCERNED WITH THE MODERNIZATION OF THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, WOULD BE CONTINUED.

7. AFTER KOSYGIN'S DEPARTURE THE CUBAN LEADERSHIP ASSESSED THE VISIT AS HAVING BEEN A USEFUL ONE. THE CUBAN LEADERS JUDGED THAT THEY HAD CLEARLY EXPLAINED THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY ATTITUDE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SERIOUS DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS. THE CUBANS WERE ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO SEE THAT ALTHOUGH MAJOR DISAGREEMENT EXISTED IN THE POLITICAL SECTOR, RELATIONS IN THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY SECTORS HAD REMAINED ON A FRIENDLY AND PRODUCTIVE BASIS.

8. [REDACTED] DISSEM: CINCSO, CINCLANT.

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(ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE, NSA,

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19 October 1967

FIDEL CASTRO DELIVERS EULOGY ON CHE GUEVARA *3F*

Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish 0144 GMT 19 Oct 67 7/E

[Speech by Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro from Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion at a mass public ceremony in tribute to Ernesto Che Guevara--live]

[Text] Revolutionary comrades: It was a day in July or August of 1955 when we first met El Che. And in one night, as he tells in his accounts, he became a future Granma expeditionary. But at that time that expedition had neither ships, weapons, nor troops. And this was the way El Che, together with Raul, joined the first two groups on the Granma list.

Since then, 12 years have gone by, 12 years fraught with struggles and obstructions. Through these years death reaped many valuable and irreparable lives, but at the same time, through these years, extraordinary people emerged in our revolution and were molded among the men of the revolution. And ties of affection and friendship were made among these men and the people, ties which went further than it is possible to express.

Tonight we are gathered here, you and I, to try to express these sentiments in some way with regard to one who was one of the most familiar, one of the most admired, one of the most beloved, and, without any doubt, the most extraordinary of our comrades of revolution, to express these sentiments to him and to the heroes who have fought and have fallen beside him--his internationalist army which has been writing a glorious page of history.

Che was one of those persons whom everybody liked immediately because of his simplicity, because of his nature, because of his naturalness, because of his comradeship, because of his personality, because of his originality, even before his other singular virtues were revealed. During those first moments he was the doctor of our troop, and thus our bonds emerged and thus our feelings emerged. He was seen to be impregnated with a profound spirit of hatred and contempt for imperialism, not only because his political makeup was already considerably developed, but because only a short time before he had had the opportunity to witness in Guatemala the criminal imperialist intervention through the mercenary soldiers who overthrew the revolution in that country.

For a man such as he, many arguments were not necessary. It was enough for him to know that Cuba lived under a similar situation. It was enough for him that there were men determined to fight that situation with weapons in hand. It was enough for him to know that those men were inspired by genuinely revolutionary and patriotic sentiments. That was more than enough. In this manner, one day near the end of November 1955, he began the trip to Cuba with us. I recall that the crossing was very difficult for him because, in the circumstances under which it was necessary to organize the departure, he could not even obtain the medicines that he needed, and he suffered a severe attack of asthma during the entire crossing without any relief, but also without a single complaint.

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We arrived. We began the first marches. We suffered the first setback. And after a few weeks, we met again, as you know, that small group of those who were left of the Granma expedition. Che continued to be the doctor of our troop.

The first victorious battle was waged and Che then became a soldier of our troop; at the same time he was still the doctor.

The second victorious battle was waged and Che the soldier became the most distinguished of the soldiers in that battle, for the first time accomplishing one of those singular exploits which characterized him in all the actions.

Our force continued to develop and a battle of extraordinary importance at that time was waged. The situation was difficult. Reports were erroneous in many aspects. We were going to attack a strongly defended position in full daylight, in the morning, at the edge of the sea. It was well armed and we had enemy troops at our rear, very near. Under conditions of confusion in which it was necessary to ask the men to make a supreme effort, after Comrade Juan Almeida had begun one of the most difficult missions, one of the flanks still did not have enough men. It lacked an attacking force, which could endanger the operation. At that moment, Che, who was still the doctor, asked for three or four men, among them a man with an automatic rifle. In a matter of seconds he quickly began to assume the mission of attack from that direction. On that occasion he was not only a distinguished fighter but he also was a distinguished doctor, giving assistance to the wounded comrades and at the same time caring for the wounded enemy soldiers. And when it was necessary to abandon that position, once all the weapons were captured, and begin a long march besieged by various enemy forces, it was necessary for somebody to stay with the wounded. El Che stayed with the wounded, helped by a small group of our soldiers. He cared for them. He saved their lives and joined them in the column later.

From that moment in which he was outstanding as a capable and brave commander, El Che--this type of man who when a difficult mission has to be done does not wait, does not wait to be asked--arrived and completed the mission. This he did during the battle of Uvero, and he did this, too, on an occasion, not mentioned in the early stages, when, because of a betrayal, our small force was attacked by surprise by many planes. As we were retreating under the bombing and had already walked some distance, we remembered some rifles of some peasant soldiers who had been with us during the first actions and who had later asked permission to visit their families--there was still not much discipline in our young army--and at the moment we considered the possibility that the rifles would be lost. No sooner was the problem brought up, under the bombing, when El Che volunteered and, as he did so, left rapidly to bring back the rifles.

That was one of his outstanding characteristics--immediate willingness, instantaneous readiness to volunteer for the most dangerous mission. Naturally this elicited admiration, double admiration for that comrade who fought beside us, who was not born in this land, who was a man of profound ideas, who was a man in whose mind surged dreams of struggle in other parts of the continent--and yet, that altruism, that unselfishness, that willingness to do the most difficult always, to risk his life constantly. It was in this way that he won his rank of major and of commander of the second column that was organized in the Sierra Maestra. In this way his prestige grew. His fame began to grow as a magnificent fighter, which was to carry him to the highest ranks in the course of the war.

Che was an unbeatable soldier, commander. From a military standpoint Che was an extraordinarily capable man, extraordinarily brave, extraordinarily aggressive. If he had an achilles heel as a guerrilla, that achilles heel was his excessive aggressiveness. It has his absolute scorn for danger. The enemies try to draw conclusions about his death. Che was a master of war.

Che was an artist in guerrilla warfare. He demonstrated this an infinite number of times, but above all in two extraordinary exploits. One of them was the invasion at the head of a column, a column which was pursued by thousands of soldiers through territory that was absolutely open and unknown. He accomplished with Camilo a formidable military feat.

But, in addition, he demonstrated it in his brilliant campaign in Las Villas, and he demonstrated it above all in his daring attack on the city of Santa Clara, entering a city defended by tanks, artillery, and several thousand infantry soldiers with a column of barely 300 men.

Those two exploits mark him as an extraordinarily able chief, a master, an artist of revolutionary warfare. Nevertheless, after his heroic and glorious death they attempt to deny the veracity or worth of his guerrilla concepts and ideas. The artist can die, particularly when he is an artist in such a dangerous art as the revolutionary struggle, but what cannot die under any circumstances is the art to which he dedicated his life and to which he dedicated his intelligence.

Why is it so strange that this artist should die in a battle? It is much more extraordinary that on the many occasions that he risked his life he was not killed during some battle. Many were the times in which it was necessary to take action to prevent him from getting killed in actions of minor importance. And so in a battle, in one of the many battles that he waged, he lost his life. We do not have enough evidence to make a judgment as to all the circumstances preceding that battle, as to the degree in which he may have acted in an overly aggressive manner, but we repeat that if as a guerrilla he had an achilles heel, that achilles heel was his excessive aggressiveness, his absolute contempt for danger.

That was where it was difficult to agree with him, because we understand that his life, his experience, his ability as a veteran chief, his prestige, and everything that he signified in life, were much more, incomparably more, valuable than he perhaps realized himself. The idea that men have a relative value in history may have profoundly influenced his conduct; the idea that causes cannot be defeated when men fall and that the uncontainable march of history does not stop nor will it stop because the commanders fall. And this is certain, this cannot be doubted. This shows his faith in mankind, his faith in ideas, his faith in setting an example.

Yet, as I said a few days ago, I would have wholeheartedly wished to have seen him as the mold of victories, molding under his leadership, molding under his direction, the victories, because men of his experience, of his caliber, of his singular ability are uncommon men. We are able to appreciate all the value of his example and we have the most absolute conviction that this example will serve as emulation and will serve to bring men similar to him from the bosom of the peoples.

It is not easy to find in one person all the virtues found in him. It is not easy for a person to be able spontaneously to develop a personality like his. I would say that he is the type of man who is difficult to equal and practically impossible to improve upon. But I would also say that men like him are able with their example to help the rise of other men like him.

We not only admire the warrior in El Che, the man capable of great feats, and what he did and what he was doing, that fact in itself of facing alone with a handful of men an entire oligarchic army trained by Yankee advisers, supplied by Yankee imperialism, supported by the oligarchies of all the neighboring nations, that fact in itself is an extraordinary feat. If one seeks in the pages of history one may not possibly find a single case in which somebody with such a small number of men had embarked on such a large-scale task, in which somebody with such a small number of men had embarked on a struggle against such considerable forces. It is proof of his self-confidence. It is proof of his confidence in the peoples. It is proof of his confidence in the capacity of men for combat. One may seek in the pages of history and nothing comparable will be found.

As he fell. The enemies believe that they have defeated his ideas, that they have defeated his guerrilla concepts, that they have defeated his viewpoints on the armed revolutionary struggle. What they gained with a lucky blow was to eliminate his physical life. What they did was to achieve the accidental advantages which an enemy may achieve in war. That lucky blow, that stroke of fortune, we do not know to what degree it was helped by that characteristic, to which we referred before, of excessive aggressiveness and absolute contempt for danger in a battle like so many battles. It also happened during our war of independence, in a battle at Dos Rios, where they killed the apostle of our independence. In a battle at Punta Brava they killed Antonio Maceo, a veteran of hundreds of battles. In similar battles a number of chiefs were killed, a number of patriots of our independence wars. Nevertheless, that was not the defeat of the Cuban cause.

The death of Che, as we said a few days ago, is a hard blow, it is a tremendous blow to the revolutionary movement because, without any doubt, it deprives it of its most experienced and capable chief. But they who sing victory are mistaken. They are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his ideas, the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts, the defeat of his thesis, because that man who fell as a mortal man, as a man who many times exposed himself to bullets, as a military man, as a chief, he was a thousand times more capable than those who with one stroke of luck killed him.

However, how must revolutionaries face this adverse blow? How must they face this loss? What would be Che's opinion if he had to make a judgment on this subject? He expressed that opinion very clearly when he wrote in his message to the Latin American Solidarity Organization that if death surprised him at any place, it would be welcome, providing that his battle cry had reached a receptive ear and another hand was stretched out to grasp a weapon. And that was his battle cry. It will not reach one receptive ear, but millions of receptive ears, not one hand, but millions of hands outstretching to grasp weapons, inspired by his example. New commanders will arise. Men will need commanders who will rise from the rank and file of the people, just as commanders have arisen in all revolutions. Those hands will not be able to count on a commander of the extraordinary experience, of the enormous ability of El Che. Those commanders will be formed from among the millions who sooner or later will take up arms.

It is not that we think that in the practical order of revolutionary struggle his death is to have immediate repercussions, it is that El Che, upon taking up arms again, was not thinking about an immediate victory, he was not thinking about a swift victory against the forces of the oligarchies and of imperialism. His experienced guerrilla mind was trained for a long struggle of 5, 10, 15, or 20 years if necessary.

And he was ready to struggle 5, 10, 15, 20 years, his whole life, if necessary, and it is with this time perspective that his death--his example, I ought to say--will have a tremendous repercussion, will have an invincible influence.

In vain they try to deny his ability as a commander and his experience, those who cling to the stroke of luck. Che was a military commander who was extraordinarily capable, but when we remember El Che, when we think about El Che, we are not thinking basically about his military virtues. No, for war is a means to an end, war is a tool of revolutionaries. What is important is revolution, what is important is the revolutionary cause, the revolutionary ideas, the revolutionary objectives, the revolutionary sentiments, the revolutionary virtues. And it is in this field, in the field of ideas, in the field of sentiments, in the field of revolutionary virtues, in the field of intelligence, aside from his military virtues, that we feel the tremendous loss for the revolutionary movement, because Che, in his extraordinary personality, had virtues which rarely appear together. He was outstanding as an incomparable man of action. Che was not only an incomparable man of action, but a man of profound intellect, of visionary intelligence, a man of profound culture. I mean to say he was a man of ideas and a man of action.

However, it is not just that he was both a man of profound ideas and a man of action, but that as a revolutionary he had the virtues which could be defined as the most full-fledged expression of the virtues of a revolutionary, and integral man in the fullest sense of the word, a man of supreme honesty, of absolute sincerity, a man of stoic and Spartan life, a man in whose conduct practically no fault can be found. Because of his virtues he was what can be called a true model of a revolutionary. Speeches can be made when men die, virtues can be pointed out, but few are the times when, as on this occasion, what we say about Che, who was a true example of revolutionary virtues, can be said with more justice, more exactitude.

In addition, he had another quality which is not a quality of the intellect, which is not a quality of will, which is not a quality derived from experience, struggle, but a quality of heart. He was an extraordinarily humane man, extraordinarily sensitive. That is why we say that, when we think about his life, when we think about his conduct, this was the case of a very rare man, because he was able to blend in his personality not only the characteristics of a man of action but also those of a thinking man, a man of shining revolutionary virtues and extraordinary human sensitivity blended with a character of iron, a steel will, and indomitable tenacity.

That is why he has willed to future generations not only his experience, his knowledge as an outstanding soldier, but also the work of his intelligence. He wrote with the virtuosity of a classicist of the language. His narrations of the war are unsurpassable. The profundity of his thinking is impressive. He absolutely never wrote on anything without extraordinary seriousness, without extraordinary profundity.



We do not doubt that some of his writings will pass on to posterity as classical documents of revolutionary thinking. And so, as a fruit of that vigorous and profound intelligence, he left us an infinite number of memories and stories which, without his work, his effort, would perhaps be forgotten forever.

A tireless worker in the years that he was at the service of our country, he did not know one single day of rest. Many responsibilities were assigned to him, such as the presidency of the national bank, the directorship of the planning board, the Ministry of Industry, as a commander of military regions, as a chief of delegations of a political, economic, or fraternal type. His multifaceted intelligence was capable of undertaking any task with a maximum of assurance in any field, in any way of thinking. And thus he represented our country in a brilliant manner in many international conferences. In the same manner that he brilliantly led soldiers in combat, in the same way he was a model worker in any of the institutions to which he was assigned.

For him there were no days of rest, no hours of rest. If we looked at his office window the lights burned until late at night. He was studying or, better said, was working because he studied all the problems. He was a tireless reader. His thirst for knowledge was practically insatiable, and the hours he did not sleep, he studied. He dedicated regular days off to volunteer work. He was the inspiration and the top promoter of that work which today occupies hundreds of thousands of persons throughout the nation. He was the promoter of that activity which daily grows stronger among the masses of our people.

As a revolutionary, as a communist revolutionary, really communist, he had infinite faith in moral values, he had infinite faith in the conscience of men and--we ought to say it--in his conception he saw with absolute clarity that morality was the basic fulcrum for the construction of communism in human society.

He thought, developed, and wrote about many things. And there is something that ought to be said on a day like today. It is that Che's writings, Che's political and revolutionary thoughts, will have a permanent value in the Cuban revolutionary process and the revolutionary process of Latin America. And we have no doubt that the value of his ideas--of his ideas as a man of action, as a man of thought, as a man of proved moral virtues, as a man of extreme human sensitivity, as a man of irreproachable conduct--have and shall have universal value.

The imperialists sing victory songs over the fact of the guerrilla killed in combat. The imperialists sing of victory over the stroke of fortune which led them to eliminate such a formidable man of action. However, the imperialists perhaps ignore or pretend to ignore the fact that the quality and personality of this fighter, man of action, was one of many facets. It is a question of pain--we feel pain not only over what has been lost in terms of a man of action, we feel pain over what has been lost in terms of a virtuous man; we feel pain over what has been lost in terms of a man of exquisite human sensitivity; and we feel pain over the intelligence which has been lost. It pains us to think that he was only 39 at the moment of his death. It pains us to think of how many of the fruits of that intelligence and that experience, which was developing all the time, we have lost the chance to perceive.

We have ideas of the dimension of the loss to the revolutionary movement. Nevertheless, this is the weak side of the imperialist enemy? thinking that, along with the physical man, it has liquidated his virtues; thinking that, along with the physical man, it has liquidated his example. And they do not hesitate in publishing in such an impudent manner, as the most natural thing in the world, the circumstances--now almost universally accepted--in which he was executed by them after having been seriously wounded in battle. They have not even reflected on the loathsomeness of the action. They have not even reflected on the impudence of the admission. And they have publicized, as the right of the thugs, they have reported, as the right of the oligarchs and the mercenaries, the act of firing at a revolutionary fighter who was seriously wounded. What is worse is that they also explain why they did it, claiming that it would have required an overwhelming process to try Che; claiming that it would have been impossible to place such a revolutionary in the dock of a court. Not only that, they also have not hesitated in secreting his remains. And, true or false, it is a fact that they announce having cremated his body, thereby demonstrating their fear, thereby demonstrating that (they believe that) by liquidating the physical life of the fighter, they liquidate his ideas and liquidate his example.

Che did not fall defending any interest, defending any cause other than the cause of the exploited and the oppressed in this continent. Che did not fall defending any cause other than the cause of the poor, the humble, of this land. And the exemplary manner and the selflessness with which he defended that cause is not even debated by his greatest enemies. Before history, the men who acted as he did, the men who do everything and give everything for the cause of the humble, become greater with every passing day; they enter deeper into the hearts of the peoples with every passing day. And the imperialist enemies are already beginning to perceive this. They will not be long to realize that his death will in the long run be like a seed from which will emerge many men determined to emulate him, many men determined to follow his example. And we are absolutely convinced that the revolutionary cause in this continent will recover from the blow, that the revolutionary cause in this continent will not be defeated by that blow.

From the revolutionary standpoint, from the standpoint of our duty, how should we view Che's example? Do we perhaps believe we have lost him? It is true that we will not again see new writings. It is true that we will not again hear his voice. But Che has left the world a patrimony, a great patrimony. And from that patrimony we who know him so intimately can to a considerable degree be his heirs. He left us his revolutionary thoughts. He left us his revolutionary virtues. He left us his character, his will, his tenacity, his spirit for work. In a word, he left us his example. And Che's example should be a model for our people. Che's examples should be the ideal model for our people.

If we want to say how we want our revolutionary fighters, our militants, our men to be, we should say without any hesitation: Let them be like Che.

If we want to say how we want the men of future generations to be, we should say: Let them be like Che.

If we want to say how we want our children to be educated, we should say without hesitation: We want them to be educated in Che's spirit.

If we want a model of a man, a model of a man who does not belong to this time, a model of a man who belongs to future times, from the heart, I say that the model, without a single blemish in its conduct, without a single blemish in its attitude, without a single blemish in its actions--that model is Che.

If we want to know how we want our children to be, we should say, with all our (revolutionary mind) and heart: We want them to be like Che.

Che has become a model of man not only for our nation but for any Latin American nation. Che raised revolutionary stoicism, the spirit of revolutionary sacrifice, the combativeness, the working spirit of the revolutionary to their highest expression. Che gave the ideas of Marxism-Leninism their freshest, purest, most revolutionary expression. No man like him in these times has raised the spirit of proletarian internationalism to its highest level. And when one speaks of a proletarian internationalism and when one seeks an example of a proletarian internationalist, that example, above any other example, is the example of Che.

In his mind and in his heart, the flags, the prejudices, the chauvinisms, the egoisms had disappeared. He was willing to shed generously his blood for the fortune of any people, for the cause of any people. He was ready to shed it freely, ready to shed it instantly. And so his blood was shed in this land where he was wounded in various battles. His blood was shed in Bolivia for the redemption of the exploited and the oppressed, the humble and the poor. That blood was shed for all the exploited, for all the oppressed. That blood was shed for all the peoples of America, and it was shed for Vietnam, because he knew that, in fighting against imperialism there, he was offering Vietnam the highest expression of his solidarity.

That is why, comrade ladies and gentlemen of the revolution, we should look to the future with firmness and determination. That is why we should look to the future with optimism, and we will always seek inspiration in Che's example, inspiration for struggle, inspiration for tenacity, inspiration for intransigence before the enemy, and inspiration for internationalism sentiment.

That is why we, on this night, after this impressive ceremony, after this incredible--because of its magnitude, discipline, and devotion--mass demonstration of recognition, which shows that this is a sensitive people, which shows that this is an appreciative people, which shows that this people knows how to pay homage to the memory of the courageous men who fell in battle, which shows that this people knows how to acknowledge those who serve it, which demonstrates how this people supports the revolutionary struggle, how this people raises and will always keep high the revolutionary banners and the revolutionary principles--today, at this moment of commemoration, we shall elevate our thoughts and, with optimism in the future, with absolute optimism about the final victory of the peoples, tell Che and, along with him, the heroes who fought and fell with him: To victory always! Fatherland or death, we shall win!

#### Ceremonies Before Speech

[Editorial Report] Havana Domestic Television and Radio Services in Spanish at 0107 GMT on 19 October 1967 begin live coverage of a mass meeting in Havana's Plaza de la Revolution in memory of Ernesto Che Guevara. Opening camera shots show a large crowd, most of whom are in military fatigues, gathered under the lights in the plaza facing a speaker's platform placed at the foot of the Jose Marti monument.

19 October 1967

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CUBA

Among the prominent Cuban personalities identifiable on the speaker's platform are: Prime Minister Fidel Castro, Deputy Prime Minister Saul Castro, President Osvaldo Dorticos, Cuban Communist Party Central Committee Organization Secretary Dr Armando Hart, Transportation Minister Faure Chomon, Foreign Minister Raul Roa, Cuban Women's Federation President Vilma Espin, Interior Minister Ramiro Valdes, Deputy Armed Forces Minister Juan Almeida, Minister Without Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Cuban Academy of Sciences President Antonio Munoz Jimenez, and others.

Nicolas Guillen, the Cuban poet, opens the program with a poem eulogizing Guevara. A projection screen on the plaza is used to show a movie on an unidentified country. Old film clips of Che Guevara with Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra then follow. There are still shots of Camiri followed by a film sequence of the Vallegrande area and Bolivian rangers with what appears to be U.S. military personnel. The voice of Guevara is heard in the background while film clips shows U.S. counterinsurgency operations and Bolivian government officials. A filmed Guevara speech then follows, concerning the increasing victories of the people of Vietnam against Yankee imperialism, the action in Stanleyville, and other liberation movements elsewhere in the world.

A film clip ridicules the first five years of the Alliance For Progress by showing poor Latin Americans. Magazine and newspaper articles on the return of Che and guerrilla operations are shown. Scenes then follow of military and paramilitary counterinsurgency personnel, in various countries. Teletype machines and code sound effects are used to point up the "increasing wave of liberation movements."

Projected to conclude the film show are extreme closeups, filling the outdoor screen, of Che Guevara's face. The film ends with excerpts of Guevara's speeches being heard while the cameras pan to huge photomurals of Guevara illuminated by floodlights.

The ceremony continues with pan shots of Jose Marti statue and of the crowd in the plaza. Shots of half-masted Cuban flags are superimposed on the huge Guevara photomural while the crowd listens to a recorded Guevara speech.

A 21-gun salute follows and as the volleys are fired the camera pans to the Guevara photomural and then to the guns and their muzzle flashes. A bugler blows taps, Premier Castro then steps to the microphone and begins his speech at 0144 GMT 19 October.

#### CONDOLENCE MESSAGES ON DEATH OF CHE GUEVARA

Rumanian Communist Party

Bucharest Domestic Service in Rumanian 1800 GMT 18 Oct 67 A

[Text] Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, secretary general of the Rumanian Communist Party Central Committee, has sent the following cable to Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz, first secretary of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) Central Committee and prime minister of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Cuba:



**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

**OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR**

24 October 1967

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Cuba  
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LBJ LIBRARY  
Mandatory Review  
Case # NLJ 94-224  
Document # 52

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Mr. George Christian  
Press Secretary to The President  
The White House

**SUBJECT:** Publication of "Che" Guevara's Diary

1. The original diary of Ernesto "Che" Guevara de la Serna is in the hands of the Bolivian Government which is currently negotiating to sell it to the highest bidder. [REDACTED] an unidentified German publishing firm has already offered \$100,000 for the diary provided it is delivered within two weeks. The New York Times and Parade Magazine are also negotiating for publication rights. In our view, the diary will be published and in the public domain in the very near future.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

2. The diary contains daily entries from 7 November 1966 through 7 October 1967. The diary relates general field experiences and does not contain particularly sensitive information. Although the handwriting is frequently difficult to read, the diary could be published in its present form. The publishers may want to edit the manuscript, eliminating entries of little interest. No sterilization is necessary. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

3. It appears that the Bolivian Government has its plans for the publication of the diary well in hand and that it would

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

30 OCT 1996

resent any outside efforts to surface all or parts of it.

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*Rich*

Richard Helms  
Director

USJ LIBRARY

Mandatory Review

Case # NLJ 95-318

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTINE

# Intelligence Information Cable

IN

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PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

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FBI, I & NS

EKO DDI

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CITE

DIST 8 NOVEMBER 1967

COUNTRY BOLIVIA/CUBA/BRAZIL

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1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

DOI

- SUBJECT
- 1) CUBAN PROMISE TO BOLIVIAN EXILES TO STEP UP PACE OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY
  - 2) POSSIBLE ASSASSINATION OF PROMINENT BOLIVIAN WITHIN NEXT FEW MONTHS IN RETALIATION FOR DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA

ACQ

FIELD NO.

1.5(c)  
3.4(b)(1)

SOURCE

1. RAUL ROA GARCIA, CUBAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ON HIS ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES [REDACTED] CARRIED A VERBAL MESSAGE FROM FIDEL CASTRO RUZ TO THE BOLIVIAN EXILES IN THE UNITED STATES TO THE EFFECT THAT THE BOLIVIAN CONFLICT WOULD BE RENEWED. THE MESSAGE ALSO STATED THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT NOT ONLY DID NOT PLAN TO CHANGE ITS PROGRAM OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY, BUT IT MIGHT EVEN STEP UP THE PACE OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY. ROA MENTIONED THAT TAMAYO (FNU), THE BOLIVIAN GUERRILLA, WAS STILL ALIVE. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THIS MAY REFER TO CUBAN LT. LEONARDO TAMAYO NUNEZ WHO IS KNOWN AS "URBANO."

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5 11 OCTOBER 1967, "URBANO" WAS STILL ACTIVE AS ONE OF THE FOREIGN  
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3 GUERRILLAS IN BOLIVIA. [REDACTED]

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(classification) (dissem controls)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

7 OCT 1998



IN

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

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2. A PROMINENT BOLIVIAN MILITARY FIGURE, POSSIBLY PRESIDENT RENE BARRIENTOS ORTUNO OR GENERAL ALFREDO OVANDO CANDIA, MIGHT BE ASSASSINATED WITHIN THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MONTHS, IN REVENGE FOR THE DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA.

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4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY; AIR, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

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**Secret**

~~NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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Document # 43



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*The Che Guevara Diary*

Special Report  
**WEEKLY REVIEW**

**Secret**

No 3

15 December 1967  
SC No. 00800/67A

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
12 FEB 1997

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~~Foreign Affairs~~

## THE CHE GUEVARA DIARY

The diary of Ernesto "Che" Guevara is the protracted memoir of the ill-fated guerrilla movement he led in the Bolivian backlands from 7 November 1966 to 8 October 1967. The account, which was found with Guevara after his capture, reveals that the guerrilla band suffered from the outset from dissension and ineptitude that compounded the hardships of jungle operations. Guevara's movement ultimately failed because the Bolivian peasants received the guerrillas with fear and suspicion.

Guevara, in his diary, wrote simply, without metaphor or embellishing prose. He did not discuss ideological or substantive political matters and avoided personal ruminations and reminiscences. He said virtually nothing that can be turned into inspiring mottoes or myths. It seems, moreover, that when the diary is published the Guevara legend will only be dulled by this account of the pathetic struggle in Bolivia.

### Cuban Attempt to Export Revolution

The diary shows that Guevara's 11-month odyssey was a concerted attempt by Cuba to open the central heartland of South America to international guerrilla insurgency. Since the first Tri-Continent Conference in Havana in January 1966, Fidel Castro had been insisting that "it is the duty of every revolutionary to make revolution." Jules Regis Debray in his *Revolution Within Revolution* charted the ideological fiber of Castro's militant stand, and it was left to Guevara, presumed revolutionary consummate, to lead the "inevitable struggle."

It is clear from the diary that the guerrillas were carefully selected and trained, and were well equipped by Cuba. At least three members of the central committee of the Cuban Communist Party, and perhaps a dozen or so other Cubans--all followers of Guevara and experts in guerrilla tactics--were with the band. In short, Castro and Guevara set out systematically to prove Debray's corollary to militant Castroism: that the Latin American guerrilla movement ought to be an internationalized rural insurgency springing from the rebellion of a frustrated and oppressed peasantry.

Guevara's hopeless struggle and demise, however, proved only

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# BOLIVIA: Area of Guevara's Guerrilla Activity



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the futility of the approach. The Debray strategy and the guerrilla tactics that Che compiled in his handbook *Guerrilla Warfare* proved to be empty theoretics. Guevara was unable to win the support of the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB-S) and could not prevent his own group from splitting into conflicting factions. The peasant support considered essential to the revolutionary thesis was entirely lacking. It was, in fact, the hostility and suspicion of the Bolivian peasants that forced the band to continue its endless flight through the jungles. Finally, after some months of ineffective counterguerrilla activity by Bolivian Army units, the Bolivian Rangers were assigned to the operation. The Rangers, well trained in pursuit and harassment, eventually destroyed most of the guerrillas.

#### Failure of the Guerrilla Tactics

A disciplined, loyal, and tightly organized revolutionary cadre is the first requirement in the Castro-Guevara-Debray blueprint for insurgency. In *Guerrilla Warfare*, Guevara said that "homogeneity, respect for the leader, bravery, and familiarity with the terrain" are the essential characteristics of the guerrilla band. In Bolivia, however, most of these basic concepts were violated or ignored. The band was composed of Cuban, Bolivian, and Peruvian nationals, none of whom was very familiar with the operational zone.

Guevara vainly attempted to remedy these deficiencies. Ac-

cording to the diary, he spent the first three months securing bases of operations and training and indoctrinating the guerrillas. His first attempt at an exploratory familiarization trek through the jungles, however, was plagued by inaccurate maps and the group became discouraged and weakened by heavy rains, insects, and a shortage of food and water. Tensions between the Bolivians and Cubans became serious in the first months, and the initial exploratory patrols were characterized by ineptitude, flagging morale, and poor leadership.

#### Ineptitude

Communications with Havana and La Paz were lost as early as January when a transmitter rusted because it was stored in a damp cave. On 26 February, the band suffered its first personnel loss when a member drowned attempting to cross a turbulent stream. On 17 March, a second member was lost in a similar accident. Thus, neither of Che's initial objectives--training and exploration--was completed, and various accidents had already taken their toll.

On 23 March, the guerrillas ambushed a Bolivian patrol and killed eight of its members. A second battle on 10 April accounted for seven army dead and also for the first Cuban loss. Capt. Jesus Suarez Gayol, a former vice minister of the Ministry of Sugar Industries, was killed. Guevara was discouraged with the results of these skirmishes, which showed that the guerrillas were still divided and insufficiently trained.

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
## "CHE" GUEVARA in BOLIVIA



Disguised - November 1966



Sometime in 1967



Corpse at Vallegrande, October 1967

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### Morale

Che was particularly disturbed with the reluctance of the Bolivians to work with the Cubans, and on 12 April reminded them that "the first blood drawn was Cuban." On 25 April, Capt. Eliseo Reyes Rodriguez (San Luis), a member of the central committee of the Cuban Communist Party, was killed in combat. The loss of San Luis was a major psychological blow to Guevara, who for the first time was unabashedly despondent. He mourned that San Luis was "the best man in the guerrilla band" and a comrade "since (San Luis was) practically a child."

The loss of San Luis was a turning point that caused Guevara to view the guerrillas' chances very critically. In his monthly summary for April, he pessimistically enumerated at least three major problems undermining his efforts. For the first time, he discussed in some detail the isolation of the band. He complained that the peasants were not responding and that there had been no enlistments.

According to Guevara, the arrests of Jules Regis Debray and the Argentine journalist, Ciro Bustos, that month further isolated the band from possible sources of foreign assistance.

Finally, Che opined that "the Americans will intervene here strongly." His basic strategy was to provoke US military intervention in Latin America, but it seems that he was unprepared to cope with such an intervention as early as April.

### Leadership

During the following months, the band suffered a slow attrition while morale continued to plummet. Several more guerrillas were lost in skirmishes and others, including Guevara, were weakened and incapacitated by various ailments and injuries. By the end of July, Guevara was emphasizing only the "negative aspects" of the campaign and reiterated daily complaints about his asthma attacks. He was weak and ill, unable at times to carry his own knapsack.

The band of 22 was entirely on the defensive in remote and unplotted terrain while the Bolivian military was slowly increasing its effectiveness and encircling the guerrillas. In these circumstances, Guevara was facing increasingly serious problems, including chronic food shortages. Once, during a long period on reduced rations, members of the band suffered "fainting spells."

By the end of August, after almost ten months of attrition and debilitation, Guevara admitted that it had been "without a doubt the worst month yet." His illness, Che said, had "caused uncertainty in several others...and (was) reflected in our only encounter (with the army)." This was his only admission that his primacy was ever doubted.

In fact, however, Guevara had discipline problems almost from the outset. These resulted from the friction between the

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Bolivians and Cubans in the band, and from the lessening of morale as the hardships and setbacks increased. Che's leadership may also have been undermined by his own physical weakness and inability to engineer an effective offensive. In 11 months, Che had not been able to nurture his movement beyond the most preliminary stage of incipient insurgency.

#### The Guerrillas' Failure With the Peasants

In his handbook, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Guevara explained in detail how the guerrilla must win first the sympathy and trust and then the full collaboration of the rural peasants in order to sustain the struggle. In Bolivia, however, he found this goal impossible from the beginning because of the suspicions, fears, and torpor of the Indian peasants.

In April, Guevara complained that "the peasant base has not yet been developed although it would appear that through planned terror we shall keep some neutral." He admitted the extent of the guerrillas' isolation on 17 April, when he said that "of all the peasants we have seen, there is only one who appears to be cooperative, but with fear." In June, moreover, he warned that the Bolivian Army was "working on the peasants and we must be careful that they are not changed into a community of informers." Fearing betrayal by virtually everyone they encountered, Guevara and his followers wandered in isolation through the sparsely populated jungles.

#### The End of a Legend

During September and the first week of October, the guer-

rillas were constantly on the run, trapped in a maze of jungle arroyos. During the last weeks, when he must have known that his chances were bleak, Guevara continued to write in the same brief style with mystic hopes for victory. He made his last entry on 7 October, after exactly 11 months in Bolivia. He said the day "was spent in a pastoral setting," but apparently it was a peasant woman from that area who betrayed the guerrillas to the Bolivian forces. The woman had been bribed to keep the guerrillas' location secret, but Che confided in his last entry that he had "little hope she would keep her word."

Guevara was wounded and captured by Bolivian Rangers on 8 October and died the following day. On 16 October, Fidel Castro admitted Guevara's defeat. Two days later, he delivered a lengthy eulogy and declared a month of national mourning in Cuba.

In the diary, Che mentioned frequent communications with Castro. Though his transmitter was destroyed in January, Guevara communicated through couriers and was able to receive coded radio messages from Havana. There were no indications of differences between the two men.

Guevara, his lessons, and his legend were perhaps simultaneously stifled. Though Castro and other revolutionaries may insist that the struggle will endlessly continue in his name, they must now be having serious doubts about their prospects.

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- ROUTINE

Intelligence Information Cable

14

PAGE 1 OF 71PAGES

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**CONCLUSIONS**

CITE

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DIST 28 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY VENEZUELA/CUBA

DOJ DECEMBER 1967

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SUBJECT VIEWS [REDACTED] CONCERNING FIDEL CASTRO AND THE PROSPECTS FOR REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA: THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA; AND CUBAN, CHINESE, AND SOVIET THEORIES OF REVOLUTION.

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**SOURCE**

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### SUMMARY:

CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT RIPE FOR ARMED

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PAGE 2 OF 11 PAGES

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REVOLUTION ANYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA. CUBAN INTERFERENCE IN LATIN AMERICA IS SELF-DEFEATING BECAUSE IT DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE VARYING CIRCUMSTANCES IN EACH COUNTRY, IT SEEKS TO ASSERT CONTROL OVER INDIGENOUS REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, AND REFLECTS THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE REST OF LATIN AMERICA. CASTRO'S EFFORTS HAVE BEEN MARKED BY FAULTY PLANNING AND POOR EXECUTION AND HAVE BEEN DAMAGING TO LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA HAS SHIFTED FROM ARMED STRUGGLE TO POLITICAL STRUGGLE. IT WILL PARTICIPATE IN THE 1968 ELECTIONS AND HOPES IN A FEW YEARS TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. IT REJECTS THE CUBAN SUPPORTED TERRORIST ACTIVITY OF THE DISSIDENT COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER, DOUGLAS BRAVO. WHILE THE CHINESE AND CUBAN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION BOTH CALL FOR IMMEDIATE ARMED STRUGGLE, THE SOVIET THEORY IS MORE FLEXIBLE. THE SOVIET LINE CHANGES ACCORDING TO THE DEMANDS OF THE SITUATION IN A GIVEN COUNTRY AT A GIVEN TIME. THE SOVIETS CANNOT TRY TO ELIMINATE CASTRO, HOWEVER, FOR WITHOUT HIM THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WOULD BE LOST. THE UNITED STATES COULD BE TOLERATING CASTRO BECAUSE HE AIDS IMPERIALISM BY DESTROYING LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. END SUMMARY.

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FIDEL CASTRO, CUBA, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR ARMED REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA

1. ARMED REVOLUTION IS NOT POSSIBLE NOW ANYWHERE IN LATIN AMERICA BECAUSE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS DO NOT EXIST. FIVE YEARS OF FAILURE HAVE PROVED THIS CONCLUSIVELY. CONTINUED ATTEMPTS AT ARMED REVOLUTION WOULD RESULT IN THE TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF ALL REVOLUTIONARY FORCES AND LEADERS. IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF PERMANENTLY ABANDONING THE ARMED STRUGGLE, ONLY OF ADJUSTING TO CURRENT REALITIES. IF SOME DAY ARMED REVOLUTION BECOMES AN APPROPRIATE FORM OF STRUGGLE, THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) WILL RESORT TO IT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE PARTY IS WORKING DILIGENTLY ON CREATING A NEW ARMED ENTITY CAPABLE OF MOUNTING AN INSURRECTION. THIS PARAMILITARY ARM WILL OPERATE MAINLY IN THE CARACAS AREA. [REDACTED] THE SOVIETS AND THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF LATIN AMERICA HAVE MADE THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENT AND HAVE SHIFTED THE STRUGGLE TO THE POLITICAL ARENA. IN GUATEMALA THE CHANCES OF A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION ARE BETTER THAN ELSEWHERE, BUT STILL ARE NOT GOOD. CHILE IS THE ONLY COUNTRY IN LATIN AMERICA WHERE A COMMUNIST REGIME COULD COME TO POWER BY POLITICAL MEANS.

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5 2. FIDEL CASTRO'S POLICY OF EXPORTING VIOLENT REVOLUTION TO  
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3 THE LATIN AMERICA IS BASED ON FANTASY, NOT REALITY. THIS IS PARTLY  
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PAGE 4 OF 11 PAGES

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SECRET [REDACTED] (classification) (dissem controls)

BECAUSE CASTRO GETS ERRONEOUS INFORMATION FROM LATIN AMERICANS WHO HAVE PERSONAL AND SPECIAL POLITICAL INTERESTS TO ADVANCE. THE UNAVOIDABLE RESULT HAS BEEN A SERIES OF REVERSES AND DISASTERS. CASTRO HAS THUS BECOME A NEGATIVE FACTOR IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO ALL LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS. THE OVERRIDING PROBLEMS THAT CASTRO POSES FOR LATIN AMERICA ARE PROBLEMS OF "CONTROL" AND "INTERVENTION" BY HIS INSISTENCE ON CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENTS AND GROUPS HE SUPPORTS. CASTRO SEES THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION AS A CONTINENTAL REVOLUTION BUT ACTUALLY THE FACTORS AND FORCES IN THE FUNDAMENTAL SITUATION ALL HAVE NATIONAL CHARACTER AND ARE DIFFERENT IN EACH COUNTRY. THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY LEADERS IN EACH COUNTRY MUST CONTROL THEIR MOVEMENTS AND ARE BEST ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS.

3. AGGRAVATING THE PROBLEM IS THE FACT THAT CASTRO IS FACING A SERIOUS INTERNAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CRISIS STEMMING FROM HIS ONE-MAN RULE. SINCE CASTRO MAKES ALL THE DECISIONS, MANY OF THEM ARE INEVITABLY WRONG AND THE WHEELS OF GOVERNMENT MOVE SLOWLY. ANOTHER RESULT OF HIS PERSONAL DICTATORSHIP IS THE FAILURE TO INSTITUTIONALIZE THE REGIME. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] IN SPITE OF CASTRO'S DOMESTIC FAILURES, HE STILL HAS POPULAR SUPPORT IN CUBA BUT HOW LONG HE CAN CONTINUE WITH UNFULFILLED YEARLY PROMISES OF BREAD IS VERY UNCERTAIN. SHOULD HE BE SUCCEEDED BY HIS BROTHER RAUL, THE ENSUING RULE BY VIOLENCE AND TERROR WOULD NOT LAST LONG, FOR WITHOUT FIDEL THE REGIME WOULD FALL.

4. AS AN HISTORICAL FIGURE CASTRO IS IMPORTANT TO ALL LATIN AMERICA, AND SO IS THE CUBAN REVOLUTION, BUT ONLY AS AN INSPIRATION, NOT AS A MODEL. LATIN AMERICA MUST BE GRATEFUL FOR CASTRO'S SHOWING THAT A SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION IS POSSIBLE JUST NINETY MILES FROM THE UNITED STATES, EVEN IF HIS REVOLUTION WAS NOT A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION. CASTRO WAS NOT A COMMUNIST THEN. IN FACT, HIS REVOLUTION FOUGHT AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS. TODAY, WHO KNOWS WHAT CASTRO IS? PERHAPS HE IS AN "IRREGULAR COMMUNIST."

5. THE FAULTINESS OF CUBAN PLANNING IS ILLUSTRATED BY THE BOLIVIAN CATASTROPHE AND THE DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA, FOR WHICH BOTH CASTRO AND GUEVARA ARE RESPONSIBLE. WHILE GUEVARA'S DEATH WAS A GREAT DISASTER AND A WORLD TRAGEDY, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO UNDERSTAND HOW GUEVARA COULD

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PAGE 6 OF 11 PAGES

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COMMIT SUCH A BLUNDER AS TO GO TO BOLIVIA AND PERSONALLY LEAD THE ARMED STRUGGLE. HE WAS ACTUALLY A FOREIGNER IN BOLIVIA AND NEEDED AN INTERPRETER TO TALK TO THE PEOPLE. ONE CUBAN INSTRUMENT TO CONTROL REVOLUTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA IS THE LATIN AMERICAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (LASO). IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, LASO IS A NEGATIVE FACTOR AND AN ELEMENT OF DIVISION; IT WILL NOT LAST LONG.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA AND DOUGLAS BRAVO, LEADER OF THE DISSIDENT ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

6. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (PCV) SEEKS TO PURSUE ITS POLICIES AND ADVANCE ITS INTERESTS BY POLITICAL MEANS THROUGH A LEFTIST FRONT AND WITHOUT TERRORISTS. IN SHIFTING TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE THE PCV LEADERSHIP IS UNQUESTIONABLY RIGHT. ALL PLANS OF THE PCV ARE BASED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSESSMENT THAT THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA IS STABLE AND SUCCESSFULLY REFORMIST IN NATURE. THIS IMPORTANT "TRANSFORMATION" HAS CUT THE GROUND FROM UNDER THE COMMUNIST ATTEMPTS TO CHANNEL DISCONTENT ALONG THE LINES OF ARMED STRUGGLE. THE PCV PREFERS SUCH A GOVERNMENT TO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP AND JUDGES THAT WITHIN A FEW YEARS THERE IS THE DEFINITE POSSIBILITY THAT THE PARTY MAY BE ABLE TO JOIN A COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE PARTY WILL

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PAGE 7 OF 11 PAGES

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CERTAINLY PARTICIPATE IN THE 1968 ELECTIONS AND WILL HAVE CANDIDATES. THE GOVERNMENT IS LIKELY TO PERMIT THIS SINCE IT WILL BE CONVENIENT FOR IT TO DO SO. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PCV IS ILLEGAL AND CANNOT PARTICIPATE IN THE COMING ELECTIONS. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] THE MAIN REVOLUTIONARY FORCES IN VENEZUELA ARE THE PCV, THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF NATIONALIST INTEGRATION (PRIN), THE PRIETO WING OF THE RULING DEMOCRATIC ACTION PARTY (AD), AND THE POPULAR DEMOCRATIC FORCE (FDP).

7. DOUGLAS BRAVO AND HIS DISSIDENT COMMUNIST FALN DO NOT CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS REVOLUTIONARY FIGHTING FORCE. BRAVO REPRESENTS STRICTLY A CUBAN EFFORT AND IF CASTRO WITHDRAWS HIS SUPPORT, BRAVO'S EFFORTS WOULD COLLAPSE IN "TWO MINUTES." [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN MAY 1967 BRAVO WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FUNDS FROM CHINA THAT WERE BEING HELD UP BY THE CUBANS. [REDACTED]

1.5(c)  
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[REDACTED] WHILE BRAVO IS BRAVE AND DARING, HIS IDEOLOGICAL LEVEL IS LOW. A MEASURE OF HIS STUPIDITY IS THAT HE STILL VIEWS THE REVOLUTION AS A MILITARY PROBLEM. IN ACTUAL FACT, BRAVO'S MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE ONLY ISOLATED TERRORIST ACTS. ALTHOUGH HE EMPHASIZES

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PAGE 8 OF 11 PAGES

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OPERATIONS IN RURAL AREAS, FOR EVERY TERRORIST ACT HE CARRIES OUT IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, THERE ARE NINETEEN IN THE CITY. THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCORD BETWEEN THE PCV AND DOUGLAS BRAVO AND HIS GUERRILLA FORCES.

8. BECAUSE OF INTERNAL CUBAN PROBLEMS, CASTRO IS DESPERATE FOR A FOREIGN VICTORY AND IS PRESSURING BRAVO TO GO INTO ACTION AND ACHIEVE SOME VICTORIES. BRAVO, HOWEVER, IS UNABLE TO DELIVER THE VICTORIES THAT CASTRO WANTS AND NEEDS. TENSION IS MOUNTING BETWEEN BRAVO AND HAVANA BECAUSE BRAVO IS NOT SO STRONG AS HE HAS LED CASTRO TO BELIEVE AND, IN FACT, IS GETTING WEAKER.

COMMENT:

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EXISTED BETWEEN THE CUBANS AND THE VENEZUELAN IN BRAVO'S FORCES AND THE CUBANS INTENDED TO INFORM FIDEL CASTRO THAT BRAVO HAD GROSSLY EXAGGERATED THE SIZE OF HIS FORCES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF HIS FEATS.

CUBAN, CHINESE AND SOVIET THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

1.5(c)  
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9. THE CHINESE AND CUBAN THEORIES OF REVOLUTION ARE SIMILAR, BOTH CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE ARMED STRUGGLE. THE CHINESE, HOWEVER, CALL FOR A LONG WAR BY THE PEOPLE, BY THE PEASANTS. THE CHINESE HAVE NO

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INFLUENCE OR IMPORTANCE IN LATIN AMERICA. THE CUBAN THEORY CALLS FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE BY SMALL GROUPS OF GUERRILLAS USING SMALL ARMS, NOT HEAVY WEAPONS. JULES REGIS DEBRAY IS TOTALLY DEVOID OF REVOLUTIONARY EXPERIENCE. WHILE DEBRAY IS NO DOUBT THE AUTHOR OF REVOLUTION WITHIN A REVOLUTION, HIS BOOK IS BASED ENTIRELY ON THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE, TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, AND IRRELEVANT TO LATIN AMERICA. INTEREST IN THE BOOK WILL DIMINISH TO JUST NOTHING.

10. THE SOVIET THEORY OF REVOLUTION CALLS FOR ALL FORMS AND METHODS OF STRUGGLE. THERE IS NO SINGLE FORM THAT CAN BE SUCCESSFUL. TO FAVOR THE ARMED STRUGGLE ALONE IS PURE DOGMATISM. THE SOVIETS DO NOT HAVE A SINGLE LINE OR POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA. THEIR LINE CHANGES ACCORDING TO THE DEMANDS OF A SITUATION IN A GIVEN COUNTRY AT A GIVEN TIME. THE SOVIETS ARE PROVIDING NEITHER FINANCIAL OR MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE PCV AND ARE NOT DICTATING WHAT THE PCV POLICY SHOULD BE. DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PCV AND MOSCOW ARE "FRATERNAL EXCHANGES."

COMMENT:

THE PCV RECEIVES A SUBSIDY FROM ABROAD. IT IS BELIEVED THIS SUBSIDY COMES FROM THE USSR.)

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PAGE 10 OF 11 PAGES

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12. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT HAS, OF COURSE, ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. IN LATIN AMERICA, HOWEVER IT HAS ALSO HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT. IT HAS ENCOURAGED THE COMMUNIST LEADERS TO SEARCH FOR THEIR OWN SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF REVOLUTION AND HAS PROMOTED THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER INDEPENDENCE. PRECISELY ONE OF THE BAD EFFECTS OF CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA HAS BEEN TO "PUT LEADERS TO SLEEP" BY ATTEMPTING TO DO THEIR WORK FOR THEM. THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT TENDS TO COUNTER THAT.

13. CASTRO POSES PROBLEMS FOR THE SOVIETS, BUT IT TOO IS DANGEROUS FOR THEM TO TRY TO ELIMINATE HIM. WITHOUT CASTRO, THE REGIME WOULD SOON FALL, AND THE CUBAN REVOLUTION WOULD BE LOST. THERE IS SOME TRUTH TO THE VIEW THAT CASTRO IS AN UNWITTING COLLABORATOR OF IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA FOR CASTRO HAS BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST SERIOUS DISASTERS OF SEVERAL REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE DEATH OF "CHE" GUEVARA AND THE BOLIVIAN CATASTROPHE. IT COULD WELL BE THAT THE UNITED STATES TOLERATES CASTRO BECAUSE CASTRO AIDS "IMPERIALISM" BY DESTROYING REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, THUS DOING GREAT DAMAGE TO THE SOVIETS AND TO COMMUNIST PARTIES. SECURITY LEAKS IN CUBA COULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SUCH DISASTERS AS THE GUERRILLA LANDING <sup>AT</sup> MACHURUCUTO ON

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PAGE 11 OF 11 PAGES

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THE COAST OF VENEZUELA, THE ARREST OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL  
COURIER BELTRAMINI, AND THE BOLIVIAN FAILURE. [REDACTED]

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14. [REDACTED] DISSEM: [REDACTED] SOUTHCOM ONLY, CINCLANT ONLY:

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# INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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C-O-X-F-I-D-E-N-I-A-L

NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Bolivia

REPORT NO. [REDACTED]

SUBJECT Barrientos/Armed Forces Relationship

DATE DIST 10 Jan 68

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES [REDACTED]

DATE OF INFO [REDACTED]

PLACE & DATE ACQ [REDACTED]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1. The relationship between the Bolivian military and President Rene Barrientos is a marriage of convenience with the military playing the role of husband. Barrientos although a general, is not a military professional. He concedes that his rapid rise in the Bolivian Air Force was due more to his political activities as a party worker for the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) than to his military virtues. The professional officer corps resents him for this reason.
2. Sophisticated officers at the level of General Alfredo Ovando Candia, dislike Barrientos because they consider him crude, tactless and earthy. They distrust him because they think he is devious and insincere, and his word cannot be relied upon. They also question his judgment.
3. General Ovando has the complete support of the military and is the real power behind the throne. A patriot of proven leadership and administrative ability, he does not actively seek support for his presidential aspirations, thereby allaying the fears of Barrientos' unprincipled supporters. Though he would run for office if there was mass support for him to do so, he prefers to guide the government from behind the scenes. He recognizes the enormous complexity and difficulty of the problems facing the government, and prefers that Barrientos, under military guidance, take the blame for the unpopular measures required to solve those problems or for the failure of the government to bring order out of chaos. As long as Barrientos follows broad military guidelines and does not become too unpopular, Ovando will continue to support him. However, if the situation becomes unmanageable and civil war breaks out, Ovando is prepared to depose Barrientos and take over control of the government.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: 100-447614-1

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CONTROLLED DISSEM

C-C-N-F-T-D-E-N-T-T-A-T

NO DISSEN ABROAD

COUNTRY Bolivia

REPORT NO.

**SUBJECT: Threats to Barriletoes Region**

DATE DIST. 10 Jan 68

NO. PAGES 2

## REFERENCES

DATE: 01/15/2010

PLANT &amp; DATE ACQ

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

## SUMMARY

1. Though President Rene Barrientos' peasant background earns him a measure of popular support, and his successful "civic action" and anti-guerrilla programs have earned him more, the stability of his regime rests on his close ties with the military. In addition to the military, two other power institutions exist in the country -- the educational structure and organized labor. A successful effort to dislodge Barrientos must have the support of one or more of these power institutions.
2. The political parties as such cannot challenge the government. At best, they can only form loose alliances to support or represent one of the power institutions. Any such political coalition will probably have to have the support of Victor Paz Estenssoro, MNR leader now in exile in Peru. Paz has many adherents in La Paz, including an armed civilian militia. To depose Barrientos, Paz is prepared to ally the MNR with the Falange, the Communist Party of Bolivia, the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers Party, leftist university organizations and dissident labor groups, particularly the textile workers.
3. Organized labor, having the most grievances, can be persuaded most easily to move against Barrientos. It is still smarting from the defeats suffered in May 1965 and June 1967 when Barrientos suppressed the disorders at the mines with military force. More recently, labor is fuming because Barrientos refused to grant pay increases in the nationalized mines and discharged many unneeded workers.
4. The group most likely to challenge Barrientos is the volatile melange of university students and professors. Organized nationally, students have a tradition of supporting idealistic and patriotic causes. They are quickly inflamed by an emotional speech and easily persuaded to take to the streets. A spark of protest in one area frequently lights a fire which sweeps the country.
5. Student leadership is anti-Barrientos and anti-US because the US supports Barrientos. It is leftist and becoming more so. Conservative students are convinced that Barrientos is surreptitiously supporting the election of prominent leftists in the student organizations for his own devious ends. Having attained supremacy over labor and broken the back of the guerrilla

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movement -- acts which gained him much public favor -- Barrientos is preparing to assault the last bastion of opposition, the universities. To prepare the way, he must paint the student leadership in radically leftist colors and align this leadership with the discredited guerrillas.

6. The university groups, peasants and labor have agreed in writing to support each other in making demands on the government. Since the peasants lack cohesion, and labor is effectively controlled by the military, only the university groups can give voice to demands for more social benefits. But Barrientos is unable to provide increased benefits at this time. If a series of student protests occurs in support of increased benefits, and if the protests are led by prominent leftist student leaders, Barrientos will undoubtedly use the occasion to destroy the influence of the educational groups.
7. Fernando Diaz de Medina is Barrientos' principal advisor on handling the university power structure. In addition to being a noted author, Diaz is a political opportunist and a member of Barrientos' cabinet without portfolio.

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DATE 05-31-2004 BY 60322  
Mandatory Review  
Case # NLJ 95-364  
Document # 31

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*Cuban Subversive Activities in Latin America: 1959-1968*

Special Report  
WEEKLY REVIEW

**Secret**

No 1

16 February 1968  
SC No. 00757/68A

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

12 FEB 1997

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## CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA: 1959-1968

The essence of the Castro regime's policy on armed rebellion in the hemisphere was established in the early months of the regime's existence and has not materially changed since then. The record shows that "export of the revolution" has been a dominant ambition of Castro's next to maintaining his own firm grip on power at home. Indeed, the Cuban leader is a "compulsive revolutionary"; a man who sees himself as another Simon Bolivar, destined to bring a new "freedom and unity" to Latin America.

Castro has been consistent in this dream, although he has pursued it with varying degrees of intensity since 1959. Moreover, he has shown himself capable of modulating his overt and covert support for revolution in Latin America, depending on his assessment of the factors governing the situation. The evidence is overwhelming that Cuba made special adventurist efforts in 1967 to establish "other Cubas and Vietnams" in Latin America.

Castro has been singularly unsuccessful, however, in achieving any real breakthroughs in the hemisphere. Despite nine years of effort, no guerrilla group in Latin America constitutes a serious threat to any government today. The demise of the Guevara-led venture in Bolivia proves that even when Cuba puts its "first team" into a country, it will be doomed to failure in the absence of real popular support for the guerrilla cause. On the other hand, while these harassments are minor and containable, they pose expensive challenges to the Latin American governments involved, and force them to tie up resources that are badly needed elsewhere.

### Early Years

Castro waged his revolution during 1957 and 1958 as an indigenous Cuban movement. Once he assumed power, however, it

became evident that he had set for himself the goal of "liberating Latin America from US domination." The earliest public manifestations of this revolutionary mission were the

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armed expeditions that set forth from Cuba to such Caribbean countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic during the first eight or nine months of 1959.

In private statements during this period, Castro made it known that he looked upon his success in Cuba as merely the first stage in a continent-wide effort. Former Venezuelan president Romulo Betancourt said that Castro came to Caracas in January 1959--scarcely three weeks after assuming power--to enlist cooperation and financial backing for "the master plan against the gringos."

Castro sounded the keynote for Cuban subversion on 26 July 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." The following September, he issued his ringing "first declaration of Havana," which unmistakably showed that he looked upon the Cuban revolution as the vanguard of a general Latin American political upheaval.

The Cuban subversive effort gradually became a more carefully organized endeavor far different from the first hastily organized and ill-conceived raids of 1959 and early 1960. By 1961-1962, Cuban support began taking many forms, ranging from inspiration and training to such tangibles as financing and communications support as well as some military

assistance. Mechanisms for conducting subversive operations were established at home and abroad. Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day 1961, and has beamed an increasing stream of propaganda to the Americas ever since.

During this period, the Cuban agency for foreign espionage and subversion, the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI), was established within the Ministry of Interior. The DGI benefited from the advice of at least five Soviet intelligence experts from the very beginning. This organization sent over \$1 million in US currency to the Venezuelan insurgents alone between 1961 and 1964, and over US\$200,000 to Marco Antonio Yon Sosa in Guatemala in 1963.

From late 1961 through 1963, the Cuban regime stepped up the tempo of its foreign operations. The most spectacular event during this period was the discovery of a cache of three tons of weapons on a Venezuelan beach in November 1963. The weapons included light automatic rifles and submachine guns definitely identified as among those shipped to Cuba from Belgium in 1959 and 1960. There were also mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, and ammunition of US manufacture. The motor of a small boat found near the cache site was one of several Cuba had earlier acquired from Canada.

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Communist documents seized by the Venezuelan authorities shortly after the discovery of the cache indicated that the equipment was intended for the paramilitary arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party for Plan Caracas-- aimed at disrupting the presidential elections in December of that year.

During this period, Cuban-trained guerrillas also tried to initiate operations in southern Peru and in Argentina. Cuban agents in La Paz tried to stimulate Bolivian groups to take up armed action against the Paz Estenssoro government. Finally, Cuban financial assistance was sent to Brazilian subversive elements seeking to establish guerrilla training camps in the state of Goias, as well as to peasant leader Francisco Juliao and then-governor Leonel Brizola. After Cuban Foreign Minister Roa's son, Raul Roa Kouri, was appointed ambassador to Brazil in April 1963, he served as a channel for Cuban funds and guidance to Brazilian subversives. At one point Roa described Brizola as "the Brazilian with the greatest revolutionary potential. Two Cuban couriers were on their way to Brazil with clandestine funds earmarked for Brizola and his associates when President Goulart was overthrown in April 1964.

In short, during this peak period of Cuban subversive efforts, Castro encouraged in an almost haphazard fashion a wide variety of extremist groups in many countries to begin the armed struggle.

At least 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans received either guerrilla warfare training or political indoctrination in Cuba between 1961 and 1964.

Disagreement with the  
USSR, 1964

By 1964, Castro's indiscriminate subversive efforts had brought him into disagreement with Soviet leaders and into conflict with leaders of most of the principal orthodox Communist parties in Latin America. During a secret meeting in Havana in November 1964, the Soviets helped to work out a secret compromise agreement which called for support to insurgency efforts in a few Latin American countries, but specified that in all cases the local Communist Party should determine whether violent or non-violent means were to be pursued.

As a result of this meeting and setbacks in Venezuela, Panama, and Brazil during 1963 and 1964, Castro muted his revolutionary exhortations for about a year and narrowed his focus to three countries-- Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia--where bona fide guerrilla bands were in the field and actively engaging government security forces.

The Cubans began chipping away at the edges of the agreement with the Soviets during 1965. At the Tri-Continent Conference in January 1966, Castro issued a more general

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call for insurgency in Latin America. Cuban propaganda returned to the more strident pitch noted in 1963. The operational emphasis, however, in comparison with the earlier years, changed to the selected list of target countries--Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia, and Bolivia. Elsewhere, the Cubans sought more general opportunities that would lend themselves to foreign exploitation.


#### Current Support Mechanisms

Even in those countries where there is no significant insurgency under way, the Cubans have been developing a support mechanism while they wait for a suitable opportunity and ade-

quate assets. Moreover, there is evidence that Castro has created a special 60-man intelligence and commando unit--an arm of the DGI--to promote and support armed clandestine penetrations in various Latin American countries. Cuba's fishing vessels are apparently at the disposal of this unit, which was first identified following its involvement in a landing last May in Venezuela.

The DGI, which manages all of Cuba's espionage and subversive activities, was formed in 1961 following a general reorganization of Cuba's internal security and foreign intelligence services. Its director general is Manuel Pineiro--known as "Red Beard"--who has been closely

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associated with Raul Castro since 1957 and has been working with Cuban foreign intelligence since 1959. Under his leadership and the tutelage of several Soviet advisers, the DGI has been molded into a highly professional intelligence organization along classic Soviet lines.

The DGI is divided into three operational units. These are a department of "legal centers," an "illegal" department, and a department of "national liberation." The department of legal centers conducts operations by handling its agents through Cuban diplomatic missions--in Latin America these exist only in Mexico and Jamaica. The illegal department handles agents stationed permanently in countries with which Cuba does not have diplomatic relations. This is done directly from Havana by a complicated system of communications. The national liberation department is perhaps the largest in the DGI and is responsible for promoting and directing revolutionary activity in Latin America and other areas of the world. These three units are backed by various support elements.

The DGI's methods of selecting, training, and assigning foreign agents reveal a high degree of professionalism. There are two basic categories of these agents: one is a deep-cover clandestine group--recruited, trained, and

subsequently "run" by the illegal department--charged with collecting information as well as penetrating local governments. The second group is recruited and directed by the department of national liberation to guide and support revolutionary activities.

Guerrilla warfare training for the latter group is conducted in national units ranging in size from three to 25. Courses usually last three to six months, although in special cases they may last as long as a year. Training covers all aspects of guerrilla warfare, including weapons handling, explosives, sabotage, demolition, military tactics, combat engineering, and means of countering anti-insurgent activities. At least 2,500 Latin Americans are known to have gone to Cuba for such training since 1961.

This number by no means represents a maximum figure for the guerrilla potential. Many of these trainees, for instance, have in turn trained others when they returned to their home countries. Some, however, probably became disillusioned with the difficulties of initiating armed revolution, and left the field to more enthusiastic Castroites. The only international cooperation among these trainees appears to involve those whose countries are neighbors.

In the last year or so, Havana has demonstrated an improved capability to correspond clandestinely with its agents abroad. This ability has not yet been translated into a

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noticeably more successful subversive effort, at least partly because the Latin American governments have become increasingly aware of the danger. Presumably for the same reason, there has been less evidence of Latin Americans traveling to Cuba for training, and there have been fewer and fewer reports of Cuban efforts to fund Latin American revolutionary groups.

Other support and propaganda mechanisms include Radio Havana, which today is beaming approximately 170 hours a week in Portuguese, Spanish, and even Creole, Quechua, and Guarani to Latin America. It also transmits open code messages to Cuban intelligence agents. Cuba's literature distribution apparatus provides the glossy magazine Cuba, the theoretical monthly Critical Thought, speeches by Cuban leaders in pamphlet form, and the economic review Panorama Latinoamericana. Havana's official press service Prensa Latina has stringers and reporters throughout the world. Its employees function as an intelligence gathering and support mechanism. At the present time, Cuba is also supporting several local Communist newspapers and periodicals--the most recent example being the Uruguayan radical left daily newspaper Epoca.

In addition to the construction of this support mechanism and the growth and improvement of its clandestine

service and propaganda machine, Cuba has been able to bring about limited international cooperation of national movements and parties in some areas. This has helped to create or strengthen infrastructures upon which future revolutionary activities may be built, by making it easier to channel funds, move agents and leaders, transmit communications, and obtain false documents.

Two groups providing such support to the Venezuelan movements were uncovered in Colombia in 1966, and one of the Colombian movements has chosen the Venezuelan border region as its area of guerrilla operations. Thus it can support Venezuelans moving either way across the border, and its members are in position to cross into Venezuela themselves. The Salvadoran Communist Party has provided Salvadoran documentation to Guatemalans for travel to bloc countries, and also provided sanctuary for Guatemalans and Hondurans.

#### The Current Situation

As is evident, Castro's behavior in advocating and assisting revolution has not always been logical and realistic. He usually has been canny enough, however, to keep his risks low. The form and extent of his efforts, vocal and material, have varied with changing circumstances but his essential theme continues. He insists that revolutionary violence is necessary to bring about any meaningful change in Latin

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America. Moreover, he claims that guerrilla units, when boldly led, can take to the field, sustain themselves there, and precipitate the conditions that will assure their eventual success.

"Che" Guevara's ill-fated efforts in Bolivia and Cuban involvement in the insurgent landing in Venezuela last year are excellent examples of Castro's theories in action. His activities during 1967 and his oft-repeated pledges--as recent as 12 January 1968--to "fulfill his duty of solidarity" with revolutionaries throughout the world, clearly demonstrate his determination to spread his revolution.

Despite his declaration of November 1964 that he would not support would-be insurgent groups which were not under the control of the orthodox pro-Moscow Communists, Castro has continued to give moral, material, and financial support and training to selected groups. Furthermore, he made it clear in speeches during 1967 that he does not feel bound by the 1964 agreement and repeated his persistent thesis that violent revolution is necessary to bring about any meaningful political or social change.

Furthermore, on two occasions he flung accusations of cowardice and betrayal at the orthodox Communist parties in Venezuela and Colombia, which do not give full support to dissident guerrillas. He appeared particularly irked that a Soviet delegation had been trying to improve

relations and expand trade in Colombia and Venezuela. He complained that members of the Communist camp--obviously the Soviet Union--who deal with oligarchies in countries where insurgents are active are betraying the revolutionaries.

His statements during 1967 reflected his intense disillusionment with the urban based pro-Moscow Communist parties in general. This same theme was propounded by his theoretical adviser, Jules Regis Debray, who is now languishing in a Bolivian jail for his role in the insurgency there. Debray's thesis, which merely reflects Castro's and Guevara's own thinking, is that Latin America needs a dynamic, offensive, rural-based guerrilla action in which the basic guerrilla group takes precedence over the urban-based party and, in fact, becomes the "authentic" party.

In his speech in March 1967, Castro keynoted these ideas by stating: "If, in any nation, those who call themselves Communists do not know how to fulfill their duty, we will support those who--even though they do not call themselves Communists--behave like real Communists in the struggle." Again, on 12 January 1968, Castro referred to the Latin American parties by implication when he spoke of some parties being in the "rearguard" of the anti-imperialist struggle.

#### The Significance of LASO

The first Latin American Solidarity Organization conference

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(LASO) closed on 10 August 1967 with a major ideological statement on Cuban foreign policy and a blueprint for solidarity with Latin American guerrillas by Castro. Although he made an effort to pay homage to pro-Soviet Communists by stating that "in some countries violent revolution may not be an immediate, but a future task," he left no doubt that Cuba views "armed struggle" as the only valid course to achieve "national liberation." He also indicated that Cuba was prepared to advance this doctrine.

The conference and Castro's return to a militant foreign policy widened still further the policy differences between Cuba and the pro-Soviet Communist parties, and caused discontent among the Soviets themselves. This challenge to Soviet influence in the Latin American Communist movement and Castro's calculated affronts to Moscow, however, have not prompted the Soviets to retaliate by economic aid cutbacks. On the other hand, the Soviets will probably continue to give private encouragement to their friends in the Communist world to persuade Castro to change his radical policies. They can also be expected to continue efforts to build diplomatic, commercial, and other contacts with Latin America, despite Castro's rantings.

#### Current Targets

For the past year, therefore, Havana's effort has been to lay

a solid foundation for future revolutionary action, to attempt to unite feuding factions of the extreme left under one leadership, to extol revolutionaries who are willing to take up the fight, regardless of whether they are bona fide Communists, and in Venezuela and Bolivia actually to send in trained Cuban Army officers and central committee members to advise and lead insurgents.

In Bolivia, the Cubans made a real effort to translate their revolutionary theories into practical guerrilla action by sending Ernesto "Che" Guevara and other high Cuban officials to dominate the guerrilla movement and to begin a continent-wide armed movement to start "other Vietnams." The all but complete annihilation of the insurgents by the Bolivian Army, and the death of "Che" Guevara, however, have severely damaged the myth of Cuban guerrilla invincibility and will probably dim the enthusiasm for the time being of some Latin American revolutionaries who have been considering guerrilla activities.

In Venezuela, Cuban funds, training, propaganda support, and some advisers are going to two separate dissident groups, The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and Douglas Bravo's group. Last May, Venezuelan guerrillas, escorted by Cuban military personnel, landed near the coastal village of Machurucuto. Four Cubans involved in the landing were later captured by Venezuelan authorities. There are indications

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that other landings took place during 1967, and at least one important landing occurred in July 1966.

Venezuelan guerrillas are now being hard pressed by government forces. In August, their urban terrorist organization was paralyzed by the arrest and capture of a number of its leaders. There is also information indicating that friction has developed between the Cuban and Venezuelan members of the guerrilla groups. The Cubans are not satisfied with the revolutionary enthusiasm of their Venezuelan compatriots, and the Venezuelans resent the "advice" the Cubans are giving them--the same type of friction that developed in Bolivia.

In Guatemala, where Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to guerrilla and terrorist groups for more than three years, recent army operations against the insurgents and the formation of rightist vigilant groups have played havoc with guerrilla activities. The rebels, however, are regrouping and are still capable of harassing the government. Terrorist attacks on Guatemalan officials on 16 January clearly demonstrate the rebels' tormenting capabilities. Two US officials were also killed during these attacks.

Havana radio quickly publicized the shooting incident and indicated that "Che" Guevara's death was instrumental in uniting the Guatemalan guerrillas. In view of the often repeated Cuban

offer to help active guerrilla groups, the Guatemalan rebels can probably count on more training and financial assistance from Havana.

In Colombia, there was renewed and intensified guerrilla activity during 1967. The Cubans are giving assistance and training to several groups, some of which are remnants of bandit gangs that have operated in the country for years.

The group which has received by far the most Cuban aid is the Army of National Liberation (ELN). Some of its members were recently arrested while trying to slip back into the country carrying small arms, ammunition, and radio transmitters. They reportedly told Colombian intelligence officers that they and a number of other Colombians had just completed a guerrilla warfare course in Cuba and that the weapons had been given to them there. The ELN stepped up its activity with at least two raids in January, including the ambush slaying of three members of an army patrol. Follow-up action by the military resulted in the killing of five ELN guerrillas.

The pro-Soviet Communist Party (PCC) is reportedly trying to convert its guerrilla arm, the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC), into inactive "self-defense" groups. This follows a request from the Soviet Union to avoid any incidents that might complicate its newly established diplomatic

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relations with the Colombian Government. It is probable that many FARC guerrillas, rather than lay down their arms, will join forces with the ELN or the newly formed Popular Army of Liberation (EPL).

This new group has established itself in northwestern Colombia, has carried out several isolated attacks and reportedly is making preparations for full-scale guerrilla warfare if the government carries out its threats to move into the area. This group is the guerrilla arm of the pro-Chinese Communist Party of Colombia, but may seek assistance from the Cubans if no other source of aid develops. (See maps following text for location of insurgent groups in Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, and Colombia.)

#### Prospects

Cuba has given ample notice that it intends to continue its propaganda, training, and financial support to selected revolutionary groups--especially those in Colombia, Guatemala, and Venezuela. Given Castro's goal of

developing and exploiting opportunities for further armed violence, plus the vulnerabilities that exist in many Latin American countries, new outbreaks of Castro-sponsored rural-oriented violence in Latin America can be expected. Such ventures will have little chance of success, however, unless they exploit genuinely popular antigovernment causes and develop a broad peasant base and a charismatic indigenous leader. Guevara's defeat in Bolivia shows that despite Cuba's mechanism for sponsoring guerrilla groups and Castro's willingness to infiltrate key Cuban Army officers into selected countries, these efforts will at best produce only minor harassments of the central governments for the foreseeable future. The danger increases, however, in those countries where political and economic development has been marginal, and where a threat of a split in the usual guarantors of stability--i.e., the military or oligarchy--is a growing possibility. Should this occur, what had been minor disturbances in the countryside could suddenly mushroom into a political force out of proportion to its numbers. ~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~



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# BOLIVIA: Area of Guerrilla Activity




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# VENEZUELA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity



Bravo group-40/50

MIR-125

PCV-20/30

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# GUATEMALA: Area of Guerrilla Activity




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COLOMBIA: Areas of Guerrilla Activity



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FARC-250/300

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*Political Trends in Cuba*

Special Report  
WEEKLY REVIEW

~~Secret~~

No 1

15 March 1968  
SC No. 00761/68A

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
12 FEB 1997

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SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelligence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Special Reports are published separately to permit more comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically indicated.

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## POLITICAL TRENDS IN CUBA

The strident bellicosity and adventurism characteristic of Cuban foreign policy since early 1966 have obscured a number of modifications in domestic policy that have significantly changed the nature of the revolution and the role of Fidel Castro. With the gradual institutionalization of the regime, he is increasingly dependent on the governing apparatus he has created to implement his policies.

Castro is still unquestionably in charge and is effective in portraying himself as the life force of the revolution. The military and security forces are fervently loyal, and Castro still enjoys a large degree of popular support, especially among the youth, the peasants, and the poor working class. Despite his continued pre-eminence, however, Castro has increasingly isolated himself during the past two years. Meaningful political dialogue has almost ceased, and the regime has become considerably more inflexible. Castro seems to distrust the bureaucracy he has created and has surrounded himself with a "cult of guerrilla heroes" in order to preside over it better.

Castro's contact with the Cuban masses has also been reduced--partially as a result of the barriers imposed by the bureaucracy. He is still obsessively messianic, but his direct appeals to the people have decreased. In 1967 he made only 15 major speeches, fewer than in any year since 1961.

Political discussion has been effectively stifled in the bureaucracy and in the press, and the condemnation of a dissident "microfaction" in January was a reminder of the dangers of questioning Castro. Perhaps realizing that a political vacuum is being created below him, Castro has dramatically emphasized the importance of a small "cult of guerrilla heroes"--confidants from his original 26th of July Movement--who constitute the second rung of leadership.

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### The New Radicalism

From mid-1964 until early 1966, the regime hewed to an essentially moderate domestic course. Great efforts were made to rationalize the badly mismanaged economy, and material incentives were used in an effort to increase lagging labor productivity. The revolutionary purists, such as the late Ernesto "Che" Guevara, who argued that only "moral incentives" were necessary, found their advice ignored by Castro. By early 1967, however, it became clear that the regime was shifting back and that "moral incentives" were again in vogue.

Last summer, antibureaucracy drives were widely publicized, and government ministries were forced to reduce their staffs by as much as 75 percent. Special party commissions reassigned excess workers to agricultural production and penalized more than 16,000 administrators who were accused of allowing bureaucracies to flourish. The regime was probably correct in its belief that the burgeoning ministries harbored many surplus workers, but the pervasiveness of Castro's "antibureaucracy" campaign suggests that he saw a potential threat to some of his policies.

Castro continues to be particularly concerned with Cuban youth. During the past two years, vigorous new campaigns have been launched to mobilize them behind the revolution and to expose them to "guerrilla experience." In 1966, a youth brigade was organized to trace "Che" Guevara's 1958 march through eastern and central Cuba.

Last year, Red Brigades were constituted for agricultural work and for military training. These were replaced in November by "Che" Guevara agricultural brigades. The Union of Youth Communists, with a membership of over 100,000, provides leadership and cadres for the regime's efforts among the youth and functions as a testing ground for future party members.

The new regimen is also a result of Castro's concern that low labor productivity is a major cause of Cuba's continued economic plight. With the virtual abolition of "material incentives," workers are expected to volunteer long hours of overtime. In January, private consumers and public transportation systems were affected when gasoline was added to the long list of rationed goods. Castro has emphasized the need for hard work and sacrifice, pointing out that "the revolution is the abolition of the exploitation of human labor but not the abolition of human work."

### The Cult of the Guerrilla Hero

Since 1959, Castro's most important power base has been essentially the same small group from his 26th of July Movement who form the top echelon in the military and security forces. Armed forces minister Raul Castro, his vice ministers, the members of the General Staff, and virtually all the top officers, are loyal 26th of July veterans. This is also true of Interior Minister Ramiro Valdez and the other important figures in the security forces. Until the end of 1965,

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however, only eleven 26 July members held posts in the 25-man party directorate. In October 1965, when Castro's "prototype party" was formalized as the Cuban Communist Party (PCC), the 26 July group emerged with six of the eight politburo posts and about two thirds of the central committee membership. Servicemen comprise at least one fifth of the party membership, which now totals 60,000.

In addition, about half of the government ministers are military officers whose rank dates from their service with Castro's guerrillas. Politburo member Juan Almeida, a semiliterate former parking lot attendant, frequently served as the acting minister of armed forces in 1967. Following the pervasive antibureaucracy drives last year, it is likely that military officers have assumed larger roles in directing the ministries.

Since late 1967, and especially since the death of "Che" Guevara in Bolivia in October, the regime has been taking measures to glorify that 26th July group. Elaborate mythologies have been contrived and folklore has been encouraged to illustrate the "heroic guerrilla" exploits of Castro, Guevara, and the other revolutionaries who fought in the Sierra Maestra against Batista. In November, the Cuban Communist Party daily, Granma, began a series of feature articles extolling the guerrilla doctors who fought in the Sierra Maestra.

Military service continues to be obligatory for males over



CASTRO

16 and is viewed as a required badge of revolutionary valor. Participation in the anti-Batista and Bay of Pigs campaigns are causes for adulation. Some civilian leaders are appearing more frequently in military attire, and even the usually dapper President Dorticos has begun to don fatigues in one of his auxiliary roles as chief of the militia. In his speech on 2 January, Castro declared that 1968 would be known as the "Year of the Heroic Guerrilla."

#### Political Development

During the past nine years, Fidel Castro has devoted himself with varying degrees of intensity to developing a governing apparatus of total power under his hegemony, durable governing institutions, and a definitive ideology for the revolution. While strengthening his own absolutism, he has institutionalized the regime with the hope that it will survive him.

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In pursuing these objectives, Castro initially manipulated and balanced political factions and then slowly united them. In 1961, he was balancing the radicalism of the 26 July Movement with the "orthodoxy" of the "old" Communists. Later, he directed the gradual coalescence of these factions and began constructing a united revolutionary party and a government bureaucracy. This process was often tumultuous, and in March 1962 it was marked by the purge of leading "old" Communist Anibal Escalante and hundreds of his followers. Two years later, Castro resisted the 26 July group, which was pressing for another purge, and forced the pendulum back to the center. By the end of 1965, however, this group emerged in the superior position because Castro invested it with a dominant role in the party.

Through the entire process of balance and assimilation between 1961-65, there was an active and at times violent competition of ideas. Castro profited from the debates that boiled beneath him, but stayed aloof in his role as supreme arbiter.

By so elevating the martial cult of the "guerrilla hero," Castro is excluding from prominence all but his most trusted followers from the Batista struggle and a few others who joined with him at that time.

#### Press Discussions Muted

During the first seven years of the revolution, many aspects of the process of political develop-

ment were reflected in the Cuban press. For the past two years, however, the regime has insisted that the press should not discuss substantive issues, but should only set forth official policy.

By 1961, ten of the 14 daily newspapers published in Havana before the revolution had been appropriated by the regime. The two major papers to survive were Hoy, which represented the "old" Communists, and Revolucion, the organ of the 26 July group. These two papers were the principal vehicles for the ideological debates between the two groups during the first few years of the revolution. Even after the two groups were joined in the prototype party and after the Escalante purge in 1962, Castro permitted their journalistic fencing to continue.

With the founding of the PCC in October 1965, Granma began publishing as the official party daily, replacing both Hoy and Revolucion. Unlike them, however, Granma is a typical Communist party paper--sterile and largely uncontroversial. It devotes about 40 percent of its coverage to domestic issues, but the bulk of this concerns agriculture, education, and youth activities. Periodically it carries a dull political column.

The theoretical journal Cuba Socialista was published monthly from the spring of 1961 until February 1967. It had an editorial board of five, including three "old" Communist theoreticians. Like the pre-Granma newspapers, it was frequently used by spokesmen of various groups as a vehicle for

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relatively open discussions of domestic issues. It was most dramatically used in this fashion in 1964 when the dispute between "Che" Guevara and his opponents was made public in its pages.

Cuba Socialista was replaced by Pensamiento Critico--a tedious journal that is essentially a "revolutionary's Reader's Digest" of old Castro speeches and tomes by various proponents of Cuba's foreign policy. It has an editorial board of six young militants from the philosophy department at the University of Havana who were associated with Regis Debray. Unlike its predecessor, Pensamiento Critico does not discuss domestic issues.

#### The "Microfaction" Exposed

The exposure of a dissident "microfaction" in January was the latest example of Castro's efforts to prevent policy discussions from originating in the bureaucracy. From 24 to 26 January, the central committee of the PCC met to hear Raul Castro's elaborate charges against Anibal Escalante and a "microfactionary" group of dissidents, including central committee members Ramon Calcines and Jose Matar. Ultimately, Escalante was sentenced to a 15-year prison term, and 34 minor bureaucrats received lesser sentences. Calcines and Matar were expelled from the central committee, and the former also lost his party membership.

Escalante, who had been exiled to Czechoslovakia and the USSR after his purge in 1962, was allowed to return to Cuba in late

1964 and to retire to a state farm. According to Raul Castro, Escalante was soon busy again, leading an antiparty clique in support of the Soviet line on "all the issues" that have caused the strain in relations between Havana and Moscow. In reality, the group posed no serious threat to the regime, and its members were guilty of little more than daring to question high policy matters. Their trial was probably staged as a warning to other malcontents and dissidents that opposition to Fidel Castro's policies will not be tolerated.

#### The Party and State Apparatus

By the end of 1965, the party had entered its final stages of organization. It had a membership of 55,000 and an elaborate apparatus extending to all levels. Since then, it has increasingly taken command through its own organization, through the mass organizations it controls, and through the state administration (Poder Local).

Castro envisions the party as a foil and overseer to the rest of the bureaucracy and has endeavored to keep it a small "vanguard" organization. Most of its important posts are occupied by 26 of July veterans, and it has clearly become the political organ of the "guerrilla heroes."

It appears that membership will not be expanded significantly beyond the present 60,000 for the next few years, but eventually the party will probably absorb a large portion of the youths in the Union of Young Communists. The first

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party congress has been postponed and, according to Castro, it will not take place before 1970.

In August 1967, politburo member Guillermo Garcia was named party chief in Oriente replacing "old" Communist Armando Acosta, who had been political boss in that eastern province since 1962. This past January, former health minister Jose Machado Ventura was appointed as the politburo's representative on the Matanzas provincial party bureau, and, in February, Major Rogelio Acevedo received a similar post in Camaguey. The assignments of these favored comandantes as personal links between Castro and the provincial party organs may be an indication of his cautious approach to the bureaucracy--even within the party.

By the end of 1967, the state administration was finally constituted throughout Cuba as an outgrowth of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), Cuba's largest mass organization with a claimed membership of 2 million. Over 5,000 assemblies were held last September for the "election" of about 22,000 local administrators for Cuba's 43 regional and 321

municipal administrations. About 18,000 of these representatives were elected from the CDRs. The CDR has served as a neighborhood watchdog apparatus and as the regime's basic administrative organ.

#### Outlook

Castro's first priority is to continue the "revolutionary process" and to "prepare" the youth to join in leadership with him and the "guerrilla cult."

In the meantime, there may be some "rationalists" in the bureaucracy who see advantage in the "liberal" economic and political policies that are being discussed in some East European Communist countries.

Following the exposé of the dissident "microfaction" in January, however, they will be even more reluctant to criticize the regime. In any case, they are disorganized and subject to both party controls and the scrutiny of the security forces. They pose no threat to Castro, and with the muting of political and press discussions, there is little they can do to expound their views.

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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*The Latin American Guerrilla Today*

RELEASE IN PART  
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№ 44

22 January 1971  
No. 0354/71

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## THE LATIN AMERICAN GUERRILLA TODAY

For more than ten years Fidel Castro has been encouraging and aiding Latin American revolutionaries to take to the backlands and mountains of their own countries to imitate his guerrilla campaign and victory. Today, however, there are fewer than 1,000 rural guerrillas holding out in only a few countries. They are weak, of declining importance, and do not pose serious threats to the governments. Guerrilla insurgency in the hinterlands became increasingly anachronistic and irrelevant in many Latin American countries in the decade of the 1960s as societies urbanized and modernized at accelerated rates.

As rural guerrilla fortunes have faded, however, a new breed of revolutionary has appeared in the cities. In Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala urban guerrillas have engaged in spectacular acts of terrorism and violence. Six foreign ambassadors have been kidnaped during the last three years, of whom two were murdered. About a dozen other diplomats and a large number of government officials also have been kidnaped. Robberies of banks and arms depots, airline hijackings, arson, sabotage, and killings of police and security officials have reached unprecedented proportions in several countries. Terrorism is likely to increase in at least a half-dozen Latin American countries this year and could challenge the governments of Uruguay and Guatemala.

### *The Rural Guerrilla After a Decade*

Prominent students of the Cuban revolution believe that Castro never intended to wage a rural guerrilla war when he landed in Cuba from Mexico in 1956, but that he hoped to join in a quick urban putsch. His experience during the preceding ten years as a student radical, adventurer, and violent revolutionary was acquired in the cities. Even after Castro was forced into the sierra after his expedition foundered, he continued to rely heavily on urban support groups. His radio appeals were beamed mainly to middle-class, nationalist audiences, and in April 1958 he helped organize an abortive national strike in the towns and cities.

Castro's small guerrilla band won some skirmishes with regular military forces, but ultimately the Batista regime collapsed because

Castro captured the imagination of an oppressed, disenchanted middle class through highly effective public relations. Once in power, however, Castro quickly alienated urban groups through his radical appeals to peasants and workers. The regime exaggerated and glorified the accomplishments of Castro and his guerrilla colleagues, and created a rural, agrarian mystique for the revolution.

In the months following Castro's victory, exiles and revolutionaries from a number of Latin American countries unsuccessfully attempted to initiate guerrilla struggles in their own countries. By 1960 Castro and Che Guevara were giving support to such revolutionaries on a large scale. Misinterpreting their own experiences, they recommended that rural guerrilla methods be employed and gave little consideration to urban tactics. Large numbers of Latin American youths

traveled to Cuba for training in rural guerrilla techniques, and Guevara's guerrilla handbook was widely distributed and used throughout the hemisphere. In fact, the Cuban leaders and their revolutionary disciples were so confident of these methods that from 1959 through 1965 almost every country in Latin America skirmished with revolutionaries inspired or supported by Havana. A few of these efforts endured, but by mid-decade most of the remaining guerrilla bands were of declining importance.

These efforts failed principally because the Cuban leaders themselves refused to understand the true dynamics of how they came to power and because they imposed an unworkable strategy on their followers. As rapidly as new guerrilla efforts were conceived, however, security and counterinsurgent forces in many Latin American countries were expanded and became more effective. The rural guerrillas also failed because of ineptness and disputes over leadership, tactics, and ideology. Generally, they were poorly trained and equipped despite Cuban efforts, and, desiring quick results, were unprepared psychologically for protracted conflict. Rural guerrillas have been unable in virtually every instance to attract significant middle-class support, mainly because their programs and campaigns have been directed at rural groups.

In 1966 and 1967 Cuba attempted to revitalize waning guerrilla fortunes in the hemisphere through an intensified, reckless commitment to continental rural guerrilla war. The Latin American Solidarity Organization was founded as a hemispheric revolutionary front. It held its first conclave the summer of 1967. In the meantime, Che Guevara with 16 other Cubans was spearheading a new guerrilla effort in Bolivia. Cuban advisers were also operating with guerrillas in Guatemala and Venezuela, and possibly in Colombia. Castro insisted more stridently than ever that meaningful change could result only from violent struggle in the countryside. The French Marxist, Regis Debray, earlier had published a treatise expanding the point, asserting

that guerrilla action must be an exclusively rural phenomenon without significant aid from the cities. His *Revolution Within the Revolution* became the new Cuban manifesto on guerrilla war.

Cuba's efforts to "export" the revolution reached their zenith during this period. Guevara's summary defeat in Bolivia in October 1967 and the concurrent failures of guerrillas elsewhere demonstrated more clearly than before the bankruptcy of Havana's approach. Young revolutionaries throughout Latin America began to reappraise Cuba's strategy. Castro unintentionally contributed to an acceleration of this re-evaluation by publishing Guevara's field diary. Che's poignant memoir of ineptitude, hopeless meanderings in dense jungles, and flight from encircling Bolivian troops has undoubtedly convinced many young revolutionaries that other tactics can lead more quickly to dramatic results. It is ironic that Che's detailed account of his own defeat is likely to endure as a more permanent legacy than his guerrilla handbook or speeches.

Carlos Marighella, the Brazilian author of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* has replaced both Guevara and Debray as the primary theoretician of violent revolution in the hemisphere. Debray, who was recently released from a Bolivian prison after serving more than three years of a 30-year term for his part in the Guevara fiasco, admitted on 30 December that he had underestimated the importance of urban terrorism. He now claims to be rethinking his entire treatise on guerrilla tactics, and has endorsed urban terrorism.

Guevara's precipitate failure also led to a reappraisal of tactics in Cuba. During 1968 and the first half of 1969, Havana appeared to be withdrawing from revolutionary liaisons in Latin America. Cuban support to revolutionaries in Venezuela and Colombia terminated, and guerrillas in other countries were told to acquire their own funds and arms. Castro, however, was reluctant to amend his rural guerrilla strategy and was loath to share the spotlight as foremost

revolutionary in the hemisphere with Marighella. Nevertheless, during the second half of 1969 there were signs of a gradual—if grudging—Cuban acceptance of urban methods as urban terrorists accelerated their activities in a number of Latin American cities. In November 1969 Marighella was killed, and two months later Castro came out in support of his line by publishing the *Mini-manual*.

Since then, Havana has been more flexible and cautious about endorsing revolutionary groups. Both urban and rural tactics now are supported, and in view of events in Chile, the nonviolent path to power is also publicly accepted—at least there. Underlying the pragmatism of this approach, however, is the same enduring commitment to rural guerrilla methods that has characterized the Cuban revolution since the early 1960s. Cuban leaders continue to predict that in most countries rural insurgency will be decisive in the long run and that urban tactics should be employed to create favorable conditions for rural conflict. Marighella himself was making plans to initiate rural guerrilla warfare in Goias State prior to his death.

Today, Guatemala may be the only country receiving material support from Cuba for guerrilla operations. A few Cuban advisers are in the Guatemalan countryside, and Cuban funds have been provided. In other countries, Havana appears to be giving little more than training and propaganda support to revolutionaries. Cuban intelligence agents have been active in Chile since Allende's inauguration, and it is possible that Cuba could increase its contacts with South American terrorists under Chilean cover. In the long run, however, rural guerrilla methods increasingly will be replaced with activities in the cities.

#### *The Dawn of the Urban Guerrilla*

The urban guerrilla groups that have sprung up since Che Guevara's fiasco in Bolivia are direct—albeit more sophisticated—descendants of the rural guerrillas of the 1960s. They have

learned from Havana's mistakes of the last decade, but because most of them operate in highly urbanized societies, they realize that rural methods are not applicable anyway. They are young—most of them are believed to be in their early twenties—from middle-class backgrounds, and are frequently either university or former university students. Except in Argentina the urban guerrillas generally profess to be Marxists. In the few instances where they have discussed or publicized their political programs these are vague but ultranationalistic. Today's urban revolutionary desires quick remedies for social and economic ills and has chosen the tactics of terrorism in the cities to achieve rapid results—or at least to make dramatic headlines.

In general, the urban guerrilla endorses Havana's theoretical line by ascribing long-term importance to the rural struggle and to the peasantry, but in practice he concentrates or confines his activities in urban zones. In an interview published in October 1970 in the Cuban Communist Party daily, for example, a Tupamaro admitted that plans called for extending the struggle into the countryside, but "not with the characteristics of typical rural-guerrilla warfare." He emphasized instead that, at least in Uruguay, future operations in the countryside would consist of brief, commando-type raids launched from the cities.

Thus, although urban revolutionaries look to Havana as the spiritual center of revolution in Latin America, they are zealously nationalistic and prefer to maintain tactical and financial independence. Cuba has provided training for some urban guerrillas, backs them with propaganda support, and grants haven to revolutionaries and political prisoners, but there is no evidence of more extensive contacts. There are indications that Havana would like a larger share of the action, but it is probably known among young revolutionaries that Cuba has been heavy-handed and arrogant in dispensing aid in the past.

While Cuba has persisted in emphasizing the rural nature of its revolution and has



concentrated on rural tactics for revolutionaries, the rest of Latin America has been urbanizing at accelerating rates. In 1940 there were five Latin American cities with more than a million inhabitants; in 1960 there were nine. It is estimated that today there are 17, and that in ten years there will be 26. Mexico City, Sao Paulo (Brazil), and Buenos Aires already have more than five million residents, and four other cities have more than 2.5 million. By the end of this decade five more cities will surpass the five-million level, and another five will have more than 2.5 million people. The accelerating rate of urbanization is also reflected in the growth of cities of a quarter million inhabitants or more. In 1970, 19 Latin American cities had between 500,000 and one million inhabitants, and another 32 had between 250,000 and 500,000 residents.

The new revolutionary in Latin America comes from these cities. In his *Minimanual*, Marighella said that it is "ideal" when the urban guerrilla "operates in his own city." In Uruguay and Brazil, and possibly in other countries, guerrillas follow Marighella's advice, organizing themselves into four- or five-man "firing groups." Each group is a largely autonomous tactical squad that initiates its own operations and has little contact with other groups. Marighella also emphasizes individual action, suggesting, for example, that assassinations should be performed by one guerrilla "in absolute secrecy and in cold blood." Such rigid compartmentalization accounts in large part for the ability of urban terrorists to resist police raids.

Urban terrorists have been responsible for the kidnappings of six foreign ambassadors since August 1968—two were murdered. Three US military officers have been killed by terrorists during the last three years, and at least eight other foreign diplomats or officials were kidnapped for ransom in 1970. Local officials are also targets of terrorist action—particularly in Guatemala. Airplane hijackings have become common, and in October 1970 the first combined hijacking-kidnaping occurred when a Costa Rican airliner

was hijacked to Cuba. Five US citizens aboard were threatened with death unless several revolutionaries—including a top Nicaraguan terrorist leader—were released from Costa Rican jails. Urban revolutionaries also struck in the Dominican Republic last April when the US Air Attaché was kidnapped and later released in exchange for prisoners. Terrorists have stolen millions of dollars, ransacked arms depots, engaged in various kinds of sabotage, and murdered local and foreign officials. They contributed directly to the collapse of the Onganía government in Argentina, and have undermined stability in several other countries.

As urban terrorism has increased, contacts and collaboration among urban-based activists have also been on the rise. Bolivia is the principal focus of insurgent interest in South America, and a number of foreigners have participated in ELN activities since last summer. Individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers in urban terrorist techniques were in Bolivia last September. Three Chilean revolutionaries, rumored to be members of the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR) were killed in Bolivia last summer, and three others were allowed to return to Chile after being captured. MIR members reportedly also had contacts with the Uruguayan Tupamaros and are alleged to have participated late last year in a meeting of insurgents from several South American countries that was supposed to establish an "international army."

Argentine terrorists reportedly have contacts with terrorists from neighboring countries, and there is some collaboration between Brazilian and Uruguayan urban guerrillas. Contacts are not extensive, however, and it appears that terrorists in most countries are primarily concerned with sustaining their own activities. The Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR are the two groups most likely to engage in proselytizing. If the MIR or the Altamirano faction of the Chilean Socialist Party is permitted to aid terrorists in other countries, in fact, Santiago could become the primary revolutionary capital in Latin America. Although



Havana has provided some training and backs urban guerrillas with propaganda, the Cubans apparently have few contacts with South American terrorists.

The new breed of urban revolutionary has been most active in Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina. These countries had almost no difficulties with rural guerrillas during the 1960s and few manifestations of urban violence until the last few years. Guatemala, however, has had a long history of rural and urban violence, which intensified during much of the decade of the sixties. Urban terror recently has become more important there than has Castro-line guerrilla struggle, but revolutionaries maintain a significant capability for both kinds of action. In Bolivia there have been two abortive guerrilla episodes since 1967, and revolutionaries appear increasingly interested in adopting new urban methods. In Colombia and Venezuela rural guerrillas continue to operate in the countryside, but they are the weakened and disheartened remnants of large and important guerrilla groups that were threats in the mid 1960s. The current status of the revolutionaries in each of these countries is described in the following paragraphs.

#### *Uruguay*

The National Liberation Movement (MLN)—better known as the Tupamaros—is a revolutionary Marxist organization that has had a spectacular and rapid rise to prominence during the last few years. Since late 1969 it has been the most active and successful insurgent group in South America. It has kidnaped a total of seven Uruguayan and foreign officials during this period, and three of them—the British ambassador, a US agronomist, and the Brazilian consul—are still in captivity.

The Tupamaros are highly organized and disciplined, and through audacious and ingenious offensives have been a disruptive force far out of proportion to their numbers. They initially enjoyed considerable public sympathy, but lost

much of this support after they murdered a US AID official last August. Nevertheless, they are likely to remain a significant disruptive force for some time to come, especially in the tense political atmosphere that probably will precede the presidential election in November.

Named after Tupac Amaru, a Peruvian Indian who organized an important uprising against Spain in 1780, the movement was founded in northern Uruguay in 1962 by Raul Sendic. It was not active until 1966 when it began to conduct sporadic robberies for money, arms, and supplies such as police uniforms and identification papers. Until 1967, the movement concentrated its activities in areas outside of metropolitan Montevideo, but later turned more and more to urban violence.

From 1967 through 1969, the Tupamaros succeeded in portraying themselves as romantic, quixotic revolutionaries. They attempted to minimize personal violence and excesses, and gained considerable popularity and publicity as selfless Robin Hoods. In elaborate public relations efforts, the Tupamaros redistributed to the poor some of the money they had stolen, as well as food, milk, and other provisions. They also "exposed" alleged financial frauds through the dissemination of compromising stolen documents, which did cause considerable alarm in government and financial circles. By daring daylight robberies, they accumulated large sums of money, often robbing banks by recruiting employees or by disguising themselves as policemen or guards.

On 8 October 1969, about 40 Tupamaros raided the small town of Pando, robbing three banks, taking over the police and fire stations, and severing communications. There were casualties on both sides, and the Tupamaros claim that members captured by police were tortured and killed. The Pando raid marked a major turning point for the guerrillas, who thereafter turned increasingly to murder and other extreme forms of urban violence.

Their activities—especially the murder of police and security officials—increased in late 1969 and early 1970. In late July 1970, an Uruguayan judge was kidnaped but later released unharmed. On 31 July, US AID official Daniel Mitrione and the Brazilian consul were kidnaped; on 7 August, US agronomist Claude Fly, was abducted. Mitrione was killed on 10 August after the Pacheco government refused to negotiate with the terrorists. Tupamaro demands for the release of all imprisoned guerrillas in exchange for Fly and the Brazilian gradually faded in the face of government intransigence. By mid-September the terrorists retreated further and agreed to release the captives if major news media publicized their political manifesto. Although two Montevideo papers and a magazine subsequently printed the treatise—in violation of government censorship laws—the hostages have not been released.

The government's determination not to negotiate with the guerrillas has been complemented by a considerable show of force. Aggressive counterinsurgency campaigns—especially an unprecedented crackdown following the August kidnappings—have resulted in significant guerrilla losses. In August, Congress authorized a 20-day, limited state-of-siege as thousands of soldiers and policemen scoured the Montevideo area in search of the terrorists. A number of important guerrilla leaders, including Raul Sendic, were apprehended. As a result, an estimated 250 to 300 Tupamaros are currently imprisoned. According to some estimates, only about 150 Tupamaros remain active.

A hard core of the Tupamaro organization weathered the government's counterterrorist campaign, however. During the last few months of 1970 terrorists remained very active. They took over cinemas to make political promulgations, assaulted important communications facilities, robbed banks, and in early November they carried out one of the largest robberies in the country's history. In conjunction with these spectacular operations, they have also conducted a persistent campaign of low-level harassment designed to

attract constant publicity and to keep security forces off balance. Finally, on 8 January 1971 they added another hostage to the list of foreigners being held, when UK ambassador Jackson was kidnaped. Uruguayan police estimate that about 50 Tupamaros participated in this elaborately coordinated kidnaping in the streets of Montevideo.

The Tupamaros have a fairly extensive base of support among students and youths, who form a potentially large reservoir of new recruits. Student and faculty federations at universities and secondary schools are dominated by extreme leftists and Communists who sympathize with or overtly support guerrilla demands. In late August, for example, secondary school students demonstrated violently in Montevideo in favor of the Tupamaros. This resulted in a government decree closing the schools until the beginning of the new academic year this March. Students have been relatively quiescent in recent months, during the Uruguayan spring and summer, but student Committees for the Support of the Tupamaros have appeared.

The Tupamaros also have been supported by fairly large numbers of middle-class professionals who increasingly are disenchanted with the quality of life and economic stagnation in Uruguay. Middle-class support probably has continued to diminish, however, since the Pando raid, mainly because of the terrorists' increased emphasis on murder and other extreme forms of violence. One Tupamaro leader has stated publicly that the chivalrous tactics employed before the end of 1969 have been replaced by greater revolutionary militance. There have been reports of division within Tupamaro ranks over this decision, and it is clear that if it is followed, much middle-class support will be lost.


The Tupamaros have demonstrated remarkable resiliency, determination, and skill since last summer, and it is likely that, because they enjoy extensive support from students and youths, they will remain a formidable force in Uruguay for



some time. The boldly executed Jackson kidnapping shows that the terrorists retain the capability to carry out complex and important assaults and that the government's refusal to negotiate and police dragnets have had only limited results. Immediate Tupamaro objectives and their full capabilities are not known, but it is likely that the terrorists will remain active in the coming months, perhaps building toward a concerted, large-scale campaign of urban terrorism to coincide with the period preceding the presidential elections.

#### *Brazil*

Since September 1969, Brazilian security forces have moved aggressively and effectively against suspected leftist terrorists. A substantial number of terrorists have been rounded up, and



Carlos Lamarca Engaging in Guerrilla Training


two of the most important Brazilian guerrilla leaders and theoreticians have been killed and others exiled. In early November 1970 the government launched a massive counterterrorist operation in several major cities in an attempt to frustrate a terrorist campaign they had learned about from captured documents. Estimates of the number of persons arrested in the operation vary from 500 to more than 5,000, which has provoked widespread criticism of the police and the military.

Terrorists are still able to carry out major operations, however. This was demonstrated dramatically on 7 December when Swiss Ambassador Bucher was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro and held nearly six weeks for ransom. After protracted negotiations the government on 14 January released 70 political prisoners, who were flown to Chile in exchange for the ambassador. For the first time, however, the government forced the terrorists to reduce their original demands significantly by adhering to a firm negotiating posture. The guerrillas dropped their demands for the publication of communiques and for free railroad transportation and yielded when the government refused to release a total of 37 other prisoners. The terrorists, in fact, were the net losers in the Bucher affair, inasmuch as their credibility and their image of invincibility in kidnap cases were undermined seriously.

The National Liberating Action (ALN), one of the two most important terrorist groups in Brazil, has been active for about three years. Former officials of the Soviet-line Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) who split off in opposition to the party's nonviolent policies form the core of the ALN's leadership as well as that of most of the other major terrorist groups. Carlos Mari ghella, the author of the *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla* and the foremost Brazilian revolutionary of recent years, was the ALN's leader until he was killed by police in November 1969. His deputy, Joaquim Camara Ferreira, took over, but died in October 1970 resisting arrest. In September 1969 ALN members, working jointly with a student group closely affiliated with the ALN, kidnapped US Ambassador Elbrick. He was released unharmed when 15 terrorists were flown to Mexico. Most of them went on to Cuba, where they were greeted by Fidel Castro.

The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), a second important terrorist group, is headed by Carlos Lamarca, a former army captain and counterinsurgency specialist who deserted in January 1969. The VPR was responsible for the first significant terrorist action against a foreign

national in Brazil when, in October 1968, they killed US Army Captain Charles Chandler in Sao Paulo. In March 1970 VPR militants kidnaped the Japanese consul-general in Sao Paulo. He was later released in exchange for five imprisoned terrorists. In April 1970 the US consul in Rio Grande do Sul foiled an abduction attempt by the VPR when he ran down one of the terrorists in his car. In June 1970 VPR terrorists working with the ALN kidnaped the West German ambassador. Forty prisoners were flown to Algeria to secure his release. The Bucher kidnaping in December was the most recent example of VPR capabilities.



The number of militants taking part in terrorist operations is probably not more than 1,000. Most are former university students, but many are cashiered military and police personnel, extreme leftist labor figures, and professional criminals. There is a good deal of sympathy for some of the terrorists' goals among intellectuals and the radical clergy. Several priests have been accused of assisting the ALN's support sector, and military and security officials are convinced that terrorists have important contacts among the Brazilian clergy. Marighella devoted a paragraph in the *Minimanual* to the clergy, saying that "the priest who is an urban guerrilla is an active ingredient" in the struggle.

Some terrorists—particularly in the ALN—have received training in Cuba, and Uruguayan terrorists have assisted Brazilians in illegal border crossings and in obtaining passage to other coun-

tries. Brazilian revolutionaries are probably largely self-sufficient as a result of robberies of financial institutions. It is possible that Havana also has provided some financial backing, but there is no firm evidence of this. Marighella was long one of Castro's favorite revolutionaries. He attended the conference of the Latin American Solidarity Organization in August 1967, and he may have returned to Brazil with definite commitments of Cuban support at a time when Havana was still relatively generous in dispensing aid.

Urban terrorism appears to be becoming a less serious problem in Brazil, even though kidnappings, robberies, and sabotage are likely to continue. Terrorist capabilities appear to have declined during 1970 as police became more effective in apprehending and killing important guerrilla leaders as well as a significant number of militants. The government's performance in the recent Bucher kidnaping enhanced its prestige, just as the terrorists' capitulation on many important points during the negotiations probably strengthened the hand of those military and security officials who advocate a stronger line in dealing with terrorists. It is possible, therefore, that urban terrorism has already reached its peak in Brazil and may now be declining in importance and intensity. Terrorists retain the capability to carry out many types of assaults and acts of sabotage, nevertheless, and undoubtedly will remain a destabilizing factor in Brazil for some time.

#### *Argentina*

Although Argentina experienced a brief episode of Cuban-supported rural guerrilla action in late 1963 and early 1964, urban terrorism did not become a problem until 1969. Some Peronists and other extremists in the labor and student sectors have long engaged in occasional acts of urban violence and strikes, but the phenomena of bank robberies, kidnappings, and other spectacular acts of urban terrorism are relatively new. Unlike terrorists in neighboring countries, most of

whom identify with Castroite or Maoist doctrines, the bulk of Argentine urban revolutionaries claim to be left-wing Peronists. Very little is known about their structure and membership. There may be as many as a dozen small groups, some of which reportedly are attempting to form coalitions or to merge forces. The Peronist Armed Forces group appears to be the most active.

During the early months of 1970, terrorists concentrated on raiding small police and military posts and on robbing banks. In March, members of the Argentine Liberation Front, a group formed in late 1969 or early 1970 from the union of three earlier revolutionary groups, seized a Paraguayan consul in Buenos Aires and demanded the release of two imprisoned leftists. The government rejected the demand. Paraguayan President Stroessner, who was vacationing in Argentina at the time, endorsed the Ongania government's decision and the terrorists later released their captive. This was the first case in Latin America in which a government successfully defied the demands of kidnapers of a foreign diplomat.

An almost immediate reaction to this escape was the attempted abduction of a Soviet diplomat, apparently by right-wing extremists led by an official of the Argentine Federal Police. The effort was foiled by the police. One of the most spectacular events of the year was the kidnap and murder of former president Pedro Aramburu. He was abducted on 29 May, and the kidnapers, who later identified themselves as Montoneros, said on 2 June that he had been tried and executed for crimes allegedly committed when he headed a provisional government from 1955-58. The military government of President Ongania, seriously embarrassed, was ousted by the armed forces a week later.

Terrorism has continued during the administration of General Levingston. On 1 July 1970 a 15-man commando group, whose members identify themselves as Montoneros, terrorized a small town near Cordoba. They robbed a bank, occupied the police station, and severed communica-

tions. Four weeks later, a similar raid was made on a town near the capital. In October, the home of the US Defense Attaché was fire-bombed, and other explosive devices were found at the homes of two other US officials. Later in the month terrorists forcibly entered the homes of three US military officers and made off with arms, uniforms, and identity documents.

Terrorism in Argentina is less spectacular than in Uruguay or Brazil, but the Aramburu murder and its aftermath demonstrate what a small and fanatical group can achieve. It is likely that terrorist bands will increase their activities this year, aiming especially at US officials. Although they have not demonstrated many of the capabilities of the Tupamaros or of one or two Brazilian terrorist groups, Argentine urban bands are slowly increasing their potential both by experience and probably through their contacts with the Tupamaros and the Chilean MIR. Argentine security and police forces have not yet had much success in halting them, and relatively few guerrillas have been imprisoned.

Little is known about the extent of support and sympathy for the terrorists, but as in Brazil and Uruguay, youths and students probably account for a substantial portion. Elements of Argentina's highly politicized labor federations probably sympathize generally with terrorist objectives, and it is also known that some radical priests, members of a group known in Argentina as the Third World Movement, have contacts in terrorist circles. Last December a "Third World" priest was given a two-year suspended prison sentence for his alleged contacts with terrorists involved in the Aramburu murder. Measures announced by the government late last year were designed to move Argentina gradually toward constitutional government during the next four or five years, but they are not expected to have a major impact in reducing terrorists' activities. It is likely, in fact, that terrorist activity will continue to increase during the next few years and may pose a more serious problem to the government.

### *Bolivia*

Because of its geographic location in the center of South America and the weakness of its political institutions, Bolivia has long been a target of cross-border subversion. In 1970 revolutionaries from Bolivia and other South American countries, with Cuban support, attempted to avenge and vindicate Che Guevara by reviving his National Liberation Army (ELN). Even though ELN rural guerrilla efforts failed a second time, revolutionaries have continued their attempts to give the impression that a continental guerrilla movement is being forged in Bolivia. There were reports last November that a "South American Liberation Army" was trying to begin operations in Bolivia, and Cuban propaganda continues to place heavy emphasis on the international character and support of revolutionary activity in Bolivia. Despite this outside interest and rhetoric, efforts to revive rural guerrilla action have been completely frustrated. In recent months, moreover, the ELN appears to be taking an increased interest in urban guerrilla methods, and it is likely that rural efforts will be abandoned, at least temporarily.

The present ELN is the offspring of the movement founded and led by Guevara until it was all but obliterated in 1967. Inti Peredo, one of the survivors of that effort, began to reorganize revolutionary cadres in 1968 and 1969. About 50 Cuban-trained guerrillas infiltrated Bolivia in 1969, demonstrating Havana's continued interest in guerrilla warfare. In September 1969, however, Inti was killed in a police raid, and leadership passed to his brother Chato.

On 19 July 1970, the resuscitated ELN began another phase of guerrilla activity by overrunning a mining camp at Teoponte, north of La Paz. About 75 guerrillas, many of them students from La Paz, dynamited the installation and seized two German employees as hostages. The Bolivian Government later released ten political prisoners in order to free the hostages. The ELN was forced to take the defensive almost immedi-

ately, and counterinsurgency forces picked off the guerrillas systematically in skirmishes during the next few months. By early September, when eight guerrillas were killed in a fire-fight, the ELN probably had been reduced to half its original size. By the end of October, Chato Peredo had been captured and about 55 guerrillas killed. A few remained in the countryside and eight, including Peredo and three Chileans, were granted safe conducts to Chile. Rural guerrilla activity ceased.


The ELN is unusual in the recent history of insurgency in the hemisphere because of the significant level of cooperation and support it receives from revolutionaries in nearby countries. The original pronouncement of the ELN, left at the site of the Teoponte raid, indicated that six Chileans, four Argentines, two Brazilians, and two Peruvians were ELN members. Subsequent information and body counts show that at least the majority of these were with the guerrillas. The present ELN, unlike the original, however, has Bolivians in command, and there are no confirmed reports that Cuban personnel are currently in Bolivia.

In July 1970 the Uruguayan press published the text of a letter allegedly written by Chato Peredo and addressed to the Uruguayan Tupamaro terrorist group. It announced the establishment of "formal" relations between the Tupamaros and the ELN. Chato said that "in the near future we must give more and more proof of integration, not only in the sense of help, but also in the interchange of militants." In January 1970 a committee for the support of the ELN was formed in Chile. Socialist Senator Carlos Altamirano was named director and the then presidential candidate, Salvador Allende, was identified as a member. This committee was publicized heavily by Cuba's official media, but thus far Havana appears to have done no more than provide psychological support.

Following the collapse of its rural guerrilla operation, the ELN appears to be shifting



emphasis to urban tactics with the help of individual Uruguayan and perhaps Chilean advisers.

 Published statements now warn that the ELN will "fight to the final victory in the mountains and the cities." Earlier statements did not refer to urban activities. So far, however, the ELN has demonstrated a limited capacity for urban activities. It robbed a payroll truck in La Paz in December 1969 but lost several trained guerrillas in the process. It has carried out well-publicized murders of several of its political opponents in the last 18 months, including two in the capital recently. It is probably also responsible for some of the bombings that occur sporadically in La Paz, and the dynamiting of the USIS office in Santa Cruz on 7 December 1970.

Like the FAR in Guatemala, the Cuban-oriented ELN is not the only violent revolutionary group in Bolivia. The pro-Chinese Communist Party began its own militant operations in October when party members seized a cattle ranch and handed it over to peasant groups. The action was designed to gain sympathy from the peasants and to create a base for future guerrilla operations. The government's subsequent seizure of the property practically annulled the party's gains, however.

One faction of the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party is also committed to guerrilla activities, but some of its better trained members have joined the ELN. The pro-Soviet Communist Party is opposed to guerrilla activities and, as a result, many of its more activist members have joined the ELN.

Because of the continued interest of Bolivian and foreign revolutionaries in maintaining an active insurgency in Bolivia, the ELN probably will

continue to be active. Significant numbers of university students are ELN members or sympathizers, and the labor unions, which have a long tradition of radicalism, may also contribute members. The ELN has made it clear in repeated announcements that it intends to persevere in the struggle, and propaganda support from Cuba has continued. It is likely that individual Chilean and Uruguayan revolutionaries will continue to donate their services. Havana provides propaganda support and is in close contact with ELN cadres, but it is not known if material backing has been provided.

#### *Guatemala*

During the last two or three years there has been more violence and terrorism in Guatemala—a country of only five million people—than in any other country in the hemisphere. It is estimated that terrorist activities since 1967 have resulted in an average of about 90 deaths a month—a third of whom have been policemen. It is also believed that about 50 prominent businessmen have been abducted for ransoms averaging about \$200,000.

The major perpetrator of the violence is the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), a pro-Cuban revolutionary group with both urban and rural wings. In January 1968, two high-ranking members of the US military group in Guatemala were murdered by the FAR, and in August US Ambassador Mein was killed resisting a kidnap attempt. The FAR was the first Latin American terrorist group to resort to kidnappings, assassinations, and other extreme forms of urban violence.

Since 1969 the FAR has escalated its activities. In the autumn, guerrillas overran an oil-drilling camp near the Mexican border, occupied a rural town, temporarily seized farms in outlying areas, and increased assassinations in rural areas. In December, the FAR launched a particularly violent but unsuccessful campaign to disrupt the March 1970 presidential election. FAR cadres killed more than a dozen security officials, the right-wing candidate for mayor of Guatemala

City, and a highly regarded editor of the country's leading newspaper. Fire bombings in downtown Guatemala City caused damage estimated in the millions of dollars.

In 1970, urban terrorism largely supplanted rural offensives. On the eve of the election the FAR secured the release of a captured colleague by kidnaping the Guatemalan foreign minister, and a week later it obtained the release of two other guerrillas in exchange for the abducted US Labor Attaché. After the election in March, West German Ambassador Von Sprei was kidnaped. He was killed on 5 April when the government reversed its earlier policy and refused to negotiate with the terrorists.

[REDACTED] Rural guerrilla operations apparently have been minimized temporarily, but guerrilla safe zones have been established in the hinterlands, perhaps as havens for urban terrorists on the run. In mid-September 1970, a two-month lull in urban activities ended with dozens of bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and various scattered acts of sabotage.

Guatemala has been one of the top countries on Havana's list of targets since the early 1960s, and today it is probably the only country in the hemisphere where Cuban guerrilla advisers are in the field. It is believed that at least 40 revolutionaries trained in Cuba were infiltrated into Guatemala late in 1969. In February 1969, the FAR reportedly received \$40,000 from Havana, and in May 1970 it received another \$15,000. In early October two more Cuban guerrilla advisers arrived in Guatemala City [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Cubans apparently are teaching both urban and rural methods.

Havana's expectations from the FAR are commensurate with its investment. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] The FAR has had periodic contacts with the Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua and the Honduran Francisco Morazan Movement. FAR instructors reportedly were dispatched to train members of the Salvadoran Revolutionary Action group in July 1969. Only in Nicaragua, however, where the small and harried FSLN is active sporadically, have revolutionaries dared to bring their embryonic units out into the open.

In October 1970 the hijackers of a Costa Rican airliner identified themselves as members of the United Revolutionary Front of Central America. This was the first public mention of this sobriquet, but fragmentary clandestine reports in early 1969 cited a group called the United Revolutionary Forces of Central America. It is not likely that a united or coordinated Central American revolutionary group exists at this time in more than a propaganda context.

The FAR has engaged in some cross-border operations, mainly into neighboring Mexico and Honduras in search of safehavens. It was in such a Mexican hideout, however, where Marcos Antonio Yon Sosa, a veteran of Guatemalan guerrilla struggles since 1960 and leader of the now moribund 13th of November Revolutionary Movement, was killed by a Mexican Army patrol in May 1970.

Terrorism is not the work of the FAR alone. The Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT) is also committed to armed revolution even though its long-term strategy calls for preparing the masses prior to violent operations. Since 1962 the party has tried to gain control over its own guerrilla factions, and it has had a history of rivalry with the FAR, interspersed with occasional abortive periods of unification. Party leaders reportedly are afraid that the political gains they have made might be lost by an all-out terrorist campaign, but this has not prevented them from applauding and masterminding acts of assassination and other

violence. In August 1970, for example, the party publicly commended terrorists in Uruguay who



The upsurge of terrorist activity in November resulted in one of the harshest crackdowns in memory. On 13 November President Arana declared a 30-day state of siege that was extended in December for another month. Stringent counterinsurgency measures were adopted that resulted in the death of at least one guerrilla leader and the capture of another. The government's actions were so exaggerated that the Air Force mistakenly attacked a fleet of Salvadoran shrimp boats in the Pacific believing they were engaged in illicit activity. Four boats were sunk, two Salvadorans were killed, and 15 wounded.

Right-wing counterterrorists have also been active on a large scale. Their operations were responsible for many deaths during the recent state of siege. President Arana has admitted privately that the government is unable fully to control counterterror, for most of which police and security officials are responsible. Government and right-wing sources are believed responsible for the recent murders of two prominent politicians. On 15 January congressman Adolfo Mijangos—a well-known intellectual who had been confined to a wheelchair—was killed. On 17 January one of Guatemala's leading labor officials was machine gunned. The continuing inclusion of prominent political figures on the government's clandestine assassination list will serve to keep the cycle of retributory violence in motion.

Neither the government nor the left-wing terrorists are likely to achieve a decisive victory in the near future. US citizens and other foreigners will continue to be major targets. A US businessman was beaten and killed—perhaps by right-wing

terrorists—in early December, and US officials have escaped kidnaping in recent months largely because of heightened security precautions. FAR terrorists spent almost two days in early December following and attempting to kidnap a US diplomat. They were deterred because of the effective security measures he used, but the FAR can be expected to persevere in such efforts.

#### *Venezuela*

Since the peak of activity from 1962 through 1964, insurgency has fallen to such insignificance in Venezuela that there are now probably less than 100 guerrillas divided into several rival guerrilla factions, and only isolated acts of urban violence occur. Rural guerrillas continue to decline in importance and pose no direct threat to the government. They have conducted a few small raids and ambushes during the last few years, but are not capable of sustained operations and are expected gradually to abandon the struggle or resort to banditry. Low-level violence and crime could increase in the cities this year, but this will not be a serious problem.

The Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) was one of the primary recipients of Cuban support for many years, as well as one of the most active and formidable guerrilla groups in the hemisphere. From 1962 through 1964 it combined a high level of urban terrorism with rural operations. In 1963, the Betancourt administration probably was more beleaguered and threatened by terrorists and guerrillas than any Latin American government since Batista's in Cuba. From 1962 through 1964 urban terrorists burned factories, murdered police and security personnel, kidnaped a popular Spanish athlete, and engaged in various acts of sabotage. In early 1962 the US Embassy was bombed, US businesses were raided, and two US military advisers were kidnaped. Rural operations were carried on simultaneously, and spectacular acts such as the seizure of a Venezuelan merchant ship on the high seas were carried out.



Guerrilla fortunes declined steadily under the Leoni administration (1964-1969), however, and in 1966 the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) formally abandoned violent tactics. Under the leadership of Douglas Bravo, some FALN cadres split with the PCV over this decision, endeavoring with Cuban aid to revive rural guerrilla insurgency. By 1967, however, the FALN had fallen into such lassitude and incompetence, that Castro publicly denounced Bravo as a "pseudo-revolutionary." Cuban guerrilla advisers, including at least two members of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party who had been attached to the FALN, were withdrawn by early 1969. Other forms of Cuban support also dried up. The Pro-Castro Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) has been active since 1960. In September 1969 it split into three rival factions, two of which compete with a total of about 40 guerrillas in the field. The MIR has received Cuban aid in the past, but today it is inactive and unpromising from Havana's point of view.

Guerrilla fortunes were so dim by 1969, in fact, that President Caldera instituted a wide-ranging pacification program in March aimed at absorbing Communists and guerrillas into the legal political framework. He offered an amnesty to guerrillas who would lay down their arms, legalized the Communist Party, established relations with the USSR, reorganized the security forces and restrained aggressive armed forces operations against the guerrillas. The pacification plan has been successful in attracting some guerrillas away from their mountain redoubts and probably has undermined morale and added to the divisions among those who remain in the field.

Some Venezuelan officials appear to be apprehensive that small bands of revolutionaries may seek to emulate the successes of terrorists in other South American countries. The defense minister said publicly on 11 January that the government is concerned about a possible increase in terrorism. He cited as evidence the murder of a former guerrilla by FALN members, a bombing in

Caracas, and an attempted bombing. The US Embassy in Caracas has speculated that the recent split of the PCV into two factions could result in sharper competition among extremist groups and an increase in violence and crime. PCV dissidents, including about a third of the party's leaders, are forming a new party less subservient to Moscow. This faction could resort to robberies in order to fund its activities, even though the use of violent methods would be a departure from the peaceful approach that all factions of the PCV have endorsed since 1966. Thus, despite the current low level of violence and crime and the possibility that it will increase somewhat this year, there is virtually no chance that terrorism or guerrilla activity will be renewed on levels comparable to those of the mid-1960s.

#### *Colombia*

Rural violence has been an integral part of Colombian life since 1948 when rampant banditry and guerrilla strife that lasted a decade were



An ELN Guerrilla Training Camp

unleashed. During the 1960s three rival guerrilla forces looking to Moscow, Havana, and Peking for support emerged from the remnants of earlier rural struggle. None prospered for long, however, and all have declined appreciably during the last


few years. They no longer attract young recruits or receive much publicity in the cities or on the campuses. In all, there are probably only about 600 guerrillas in Colombia—a country of 21 million people.

The guerrillas have generally confined their activities to marginal mountain areas, and they now engage more in banditry than in guerrilla warfare. Because of these activities, they still cause trouble in the countryside and to the security forces, who have great difficulty counter-attacking.

The Army of National Liberation (ELN) is the most active guerrilla group in Colombia. It has enjoyed considerable prominence there and in the rest of Latin America since 1966, when it began guerrilla operations and lost in battle its most famous son—the guerrilla priest Camilo Torres. In early September 1970 the ELN ambushed an army patrol, killing seven soldiers and wounding eight. It was the most serious guerrilla action of any kind in Colombia in more than a year.

The ELN suffers from internal fissures and frequent defections, however, and its urban support apparatus in Bogota is reported to be in disarray. Cuban advisers may have been in the field with the ELN in 1966 and 1967, but Havana apparently had cut off all aid by 1969. The ELN is reported to have 135 men under arms, but they are divided into four groups and operate in scattered areas.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the action arm of the pro-Soviet Colombian Communist Party, is larger than the ELN but less active. Operating in four main groups, the FARC's policy since late 1968 has been to avoid provoking the government, because Moscow is reluctant to have the FAR jeopardize newly established Colombian-Soviet relations or the legal role of the Communist Party. Some small clashes with military forces take place from



The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) is the action arm of the pro-Peking Communist Party of Colombia/Marxist-Leninist. It reportedly consists of some 150-200 men in five groups. The EPL avoids clashes with superior forces, but has attacked small, isolated towns, ranches, and police posts. Such raids apparently are the product of the EPL's weakness and its need to acquire provisions and publicity. There is no evidence that the EPL receives regular financial support from Peking.

These guerrilla groups have not engaged in significant urban violence and appear to have little capacity for such action. They do not pose serious challenges to the government, and are likely to continue to fade in importance.

#### *Outlook*

Rural guerrilla insurgency probably will be eschewed as a viable method by Latin American revolutionaries in most countries in the foreseeable future. Although the Cubans are likely to continue emphasizing this approach and some urban revolutionaries will express the belief that urban and rural tactics should be employed simultaneously, fewer and fewer volunteers are likely to be enlisted for rural action. Guatemala, where all forms of violence and terrorism remain at unprecedented levels, may be the only country where a resurgence of rural guerrilla activity is possible. The Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the Cubans will probably continue to encourage and perhaps materially support revolutionaries from other Central American countries. The potential for revolution in those countries is not very great, however, and it is unlikely that new rural guerrilla groups will emerge in the next year or so.

Urban revolutionaries in South America have been far more successful than their rural counterparts in embarrassing governments and in upsetting stability. They have won important concessions from the governments—especially in forcing the release of political prisoners. In Argentina, they were able to exploit the weaknesses of

the Ongania regime and they contributed to a change of government after they kidnaped and murdered a former president. This year, terrorist activities may increase in Argentina and Bolivia, continue at relatively high levels in Brazil and Uruguay, and they could be initiated by small, fanatical bands at any time in several other countries. Prospects are, therefore, that terrorist activity will increase in as many as half a dozen South American countries.

In the entire South American continent, however, there are probably no more than 3,000 active urban revolutionaries. Police and counter-terrorist techniques became more sophisticated and effective in 1970, and terrorists have been dealt hard blows in several countries. Important guerrilla leaders in Uruguay, Brazil, and Guatemala have been killed or captured, and large numbers of terrorists are in jail. Thus, although internal security forces probably will not be able to extirpate terrorist groups, they may continue to increase their capabilities in neutralizing and suppressing them. Terrorists succeeded at first largely because governments were surprised, confused, and unprepared to deal with them. During 1970, however, as terrorist methods became better known the Guatemalan Government adopted a firm policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists, and the Uruguayan Government persisted in

the same policy despite important kidnappings. Kidnaped foreign officials were murdered in each country as a result, but guerrillas suffered significant losses of popularity for their brutality. Although the Brazilian Government in the past acceded quickly to terrorist demands, it adopted a tougher line in the recent Bucher kidnaping and undoubtedly will uphold this firm position in future dealings with guerrillas.

Small bands of violent urban revolutionaries may be able to harass and embarrass Latin American governments for some time to come, but they are not likely to pose serious challenges to any with the possible exceptions of the regimes of Guatemala and Uruguay. In Guatemala, FAR-initiated violence and right-wing counterterror already amount to a small-scale, bloody civil war that could increase in proportion depending on what actions the government takes. In Uruguay, the Tupamaros continue to demonstrate a remarkable ability to carry out spectacular operations. They probably can add other hostages to the three foreigners they already hold, and they will undoubtedly sustain and seek to increase terrorist activities of all kinds in the months preceding the November 1971 elections. [REDACTED]

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//BOLIVIA: THE ASSASSINATION THIS WEEK IN PARIS OF GENERAL JOAQUIN ZENTENO, BOLIVIAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, BEARS A MARKED SIMILARITY TO THE MURDER OF COLONEL RAMON TRABAL, THE URUGUAYAN MILITARY ATTACHE, WHO WAS SHOT IN HIS PARIS APARTMENT IN DECEMBER 1974.//Y

//BOTH MEN HAD DISTINGUISHED CAREERS IN ERADICATING LEFTIST SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES BEFORE BEING POSTED TO PARIS. TRABAL HAD SERVED AS CHIEF OF MILITARY SECURITY IN URUGUAY AND HAD EXERCISED A PRIMARY ROLE IN PLANNING AND DIRECTING THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE TUPAMAROS. HE REPORTEDLY RECEIVED A DIPLOMATIC ASSIGNMENT AT THE REQUEST OF ARMY SUPERIORS WHO RESENTED HIS AMBITION AND DEMONSTRATED ABILITY. ZENTENO, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAD ACHIEVED INTERNATIONAL PROMINENCE IN 1967 FOR TRACKING DOWN AND CAPTURING CHE GUEVARA. SUBSEQUENTLY HE ROSE TO THE POSITION OF COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES--THE SECOND MOST POWERFUL POSITION IN BOLIVIA--BUT WENT INTO "GOLDEN EXILE" IN 1973 FOLLOWING A SERIOUS DISAGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT BANZER OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL

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MATTERS.//Y

//IN EACH CASE THE ASSAILANTS WERE UNIDENTIFIED, AND PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN TERRORIST ENTITIES CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ACTION. A GROUP CALLING ITSELF THE RAUL SENDIC INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE (NAMED FOR THE FOUNDER OF THE TUPAMAROS) TOOK CREDIT FOR TRABAL'S "EXECUTION," WHILE THE "CHE GUEVARA INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE" NOW PROCLAIMS ITS TRIUMPH IN ELIMINATING ZENTENO.//Y

//IT IS POSSIBLE THAT EITHER OR BOTH ACTIONS ARE THE WORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, BASED IN ARGENTINA, THAT CALLS ITSELF THE REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING JUNTA.

THIS GROUP IS

LED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN BOLIVIA, URUGUAY, PARAGUAY, CHILE, BRAZIL, AND ARGENTINA AND DEDICATED TO THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF MILITARY-BACKED GOVERNMENTS IN THOSE COUNTRIES. MEMBERS OF BANKING FIRMS IN BUENOS AIRES WHO HAVE BEEN THE VICTIMS OF TERRORIST KIDNAPING OPERATIONS HAVE SAID PRIVATELY THAT THE RANSOM MONEY THEY PAID NEVER REACHED LATIN AMERICA, BUT WAS PAID IN GOLD AND DEPOSITED IN BANKS IN BEIRUT, LEBANON AND IN UNMARKED SWISS

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ACCOUNTS IN ITALY.//4

//IN LATIN AMERICA TERRORISTS HAD GENERALLY CONFINED THEIR ACTIONS TO THEIR OWN COUNTRY. MANY STUDENTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, HOWEVER, NOW PREDICT THAT OPERATIONS WILL BE MODELED ON THE ACTIVITIES OF MIDDLE EASTERN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND MAY OCCUR ANYWHERE. PARIS HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS A CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITY, AND WAS REPORTEDLY TO BE THE SITE OF A WORLD CONGRESS OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN OCTOBER 1974. [REDACTED]

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**RICHARD D. KOVAR**

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL, SOURCE: [REDACTED]

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

75-2000

3 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Inspector General

SUBJECT: Statement by [ ] concerning his assignment Bolivia in 1967 and his role in the capture of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA de la Serna.

REFERENCE: Memo dated 29 May 1975

1. The undersigned met with [ ] contract employee, on 2 and 3 June to obtain his story about his assignment to Bolivia in 1967. This query is based upon ref interview, during which [ ] mentioned that he had re-transmitted an order from Colonel [ ] Commander of the 8th Division of the Bolivian Army, to a Bolivian sergeant, which resulted in the execution of Ernesto "Che" GUEVARA de la Serna, Cuban leader of the guerrillas then operating in Bolivia.

2. [ ] said that his assignment came about after an interview held in Miami in June or July of 1967, at which time he was a case officer working for the Miami office. He had been selected for the job interview because of his paramilitary training and experience. He was asked if he would agree to serve with [ ] a fellow Cuban. He accepted. He was told that he was to go to Bolivia with [ ] where they would be engaged in training intelligence teams for the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the Eighth Division of the Bolivian Army. He was also told that he and [ ] would be assigned to the 2nd Ranger Battalion as advisors and would be based in the town of Esperanza. While in Miami, he and [ ] were given briefings about the political and guerrilla situation in Bolivia, and he was given a refresher course in communications. [ ] and [ ] were told that there were strong indications that Guevara was leading the guerrillas. Among the instructions given them was a clear one that in the event that the Bolivian Army captured Guevara, they should do everything possible to keep him alive.

3. They were introduced to their future case officer in Washington, who was to be in liaison with the Bolivian forces in Santa Cruz.

4. Prior to their departure, both [ ] and [ ] were issued false U.S. re-entry permits in the names of [ ] and [ ] respectively. These were received in New York City just prior to their departure on 30 July for La Paz on a Braniff Airline flight. Their case officer had preceded them and met them on 31 July at 7 a.m. at the La Paz airport. [ ] believes that Bolivian visas were stamped in their re-entry permits.

5. The case officer and another American took them to meet [ ] to whom they were introduced as experts on guerrilla warfare. He issued each a personal card in which were handwritten his instructions to all civilian and military officials that they be given full support. At ten that morning, they met [ ] Commander-in-Chief of the Bolivian Armed Forces. (It wasn't until about a month later that [ ] met [ ] in Santa Cruz.) While in La Paz, no new instructions were issued to them about their mission. After about a week there, they were flown to Santa Cruz de la Sierra for a few days and introduced to Colonel [ ] Commander of the Eighth Division. [ ] arranged for [ ] the American officer in charge of the military mission training the 2nd Ranger Battalion, to come to Santa Cruz to meet [ ] and [ ] They were also introduced to Major [ ] G-2 of the Eighth Division. After 3 or 4 days in Santa Cruz, [ ] and [ ] went to La Esperanza, where they were quartered at the Bolivian officers' compound. In La Esperanza they met [ ] the Commander of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and Captain [ ]

6. Prior to their departure from La Paz, [ ] and [ ] were issued Bolivian uniforms and credentials as captains in the Bolivian Army. Nevertheless, they did not receive Bolivian Army insignia. Later, [ ] was given by [ ] a Bolivian tri-color cap-insignia which he wore (escarapela). [ ] and [ ] were issued Smith and Wesson double-action automatic pistols. During their activities as instructors and advisors they assumed the role of Bolivian officers, although they were known as foreign advisors to a number of Bolivian officers. [ ] said that he learned later that the American Ambassador had prohibited anyone other than he and [ ] from becoming involved in the anti-guerrilla activities in the field.)

7. Despite their apparent status as Bolivian officers, [ ] said that they never were given orders by higher-ranking Bolivian officers (One exception to this rule was the order which Colonel [ ] issued to [ ] on the day of Guevara's execution, if [ ] story is to be believed.)

8. [ ] was assigned to Santa Cruz and [ ] was assigned to La Esperanza, where the latter conducted most of the intelligence training. As time went by, [ ] own duties gravitated to becoming basically those of an advisor. He said that his case officer was aware of and approved of this development. Among the things which [ ] and [ ] attempted to accomplish was the preservation of the lives of captured guerrillas, for the collection of intelligence about the guerrilla's locations, as well as for humanitarian reasons. [ ] said that he saved the life of Jose Castillo Chavez, traveling for that purpose to Vallegrande from Santa Cruz, where he spoke briefly to Castillo at the Nuestra Senora de Malta Hospital. At this time [ ] learned of the intent of [ ] of the Rangers, to have the prisoner executed. [ ] prevailed on Major [ ] and [ ] to take his side. The prisoner was flown to Vallegrande where [ ] covered all medical costs and carried out a two-week interrogation. The resulting twenty-page interrogation report provided the Bolivians with a complete concept of the guerrilla's strategy, which turned out to be the key to Guevara's capture, according to [ ]. This report was attributed by the Bolivians to be from their own people.

9. This important development was followed by an encounter in late September between a unit led by a Lt. [ ] and the remnants of the guerrillas. During this action, a Cuban lieutenant named Miguel; the Bolivian Coco Peredo; and a Bolivian physician named Jose Gutierrez Ardaya were killed. [ ] travelled by jeep to Pucara, where the bodies were located, and through the information he had learned from Castillo, he was able to establish that the men were from Guevara's forward element. Upon his return to Santa Cruz, [ ] advised [ ] that the 2nd Ranger Battalion should be immediately deployed, with the remaining two weeks of their training cancelled. [ ] accepted this advice and the Rangers were moved to Pucara, and the Headquarters of the Eighth Division were moved to Vallegrande. [ ] continued in his advisory role, suggesting areas for troop deployment as well as the deployment of the intelligence teams. On the 8th of October, contact was established with Guevara's remaining forces. (At this time [ ] was in Vallegrande and [ ] in Esperanza.) On the 8th, Major [ ] reported over the radio that "the chief" had been captured. [ ] then flew over the area in a PT-6 carrying with him a PRC-10 radio with which he was able to communicate with the Bolivian forces. He then confirmed that Guevara was "the chief" who had been captured. He returned to Vallegrande where he told [ ] that Guevara had been wounded and captured.

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10. That day [ ] was sent to Higuera to interrogate the guerrilla prisoners and assembled the captured documents. Since Colonel [ ] was planning to fly by helicopter to Higuera on the 9th, [ ] asked him on the evening of the 8th if he could accompany him to interrogate Guevara. [ ] consulted his staff and agreed. (The helicopter had room only for a pilot and two passengers.) [ ] prepared a 100-word message to the [ ] in code reporting Guevara's capture and asking that an Embassy representative be sent to the area to prevail upon the Bolivians to spare Guevara's life, since he did not believe that he could succeed in doing so. This message was prepared for the scheduled 10 a.m. transmission of 9 October, and was not transmitted to the relay point in Asuncion, Paraguay, until about 10:30 a.m., after [ ] arrived in Higuera and set up his radio transmitter an RS-48.

11. [ ] and the pilot, [ ] set out by helicopter from Vallegrande at 7:15 a.m. on the 9th, and arrived in Higuera at about 7:40 a.m. [ ] accompanied [ ] and Major [ ] when they visited Guevara in the school room which was his improvised jail. Guevara would not answer [ ] when spoken to. He was bound, hand and foot, and had a leg wound.

12. [ ] and Major [ ] then reviewed the captured documents and [ ] obtained permission from [ ] to photograph all the papers, including Guevara's diary, and also [ ] permission to retain the original accommodation addresses found.

13. While [ ] and all the other Bolivian officers (with the exception of a Lieutenant [ ] were outside of the village attending to other military affairs, [ ] remained in Higuera as the highest ranking "Bolivian officer". In this capacity he answered a call received on the military field telephone and answered as Captain [ ]. He was given the code numbers 500 and 600 as orders which were to be implemented by command of "higher authorities". He said that the connection was not clear and he could not recognize the voice but it could have been that of Major [ ]. In any case, [ ] said that since it was a line only available to the military he was confident that it was order re-transmitted through military channels. He said that he knew that 500 referred to Guevara, 600 to the word execute and 700 to the preservation of Guevara's life. These simple codes had been identified to him previously.

14. Upon [ ] return, [ ] told him of the message and [ ] took it as an authentic order and made no effort to have it confirmed. [ ] asked if Guevara's life could be preserved since he had these instructions. [ ] replied that his own position would be placed in jeopardy if he did not comply. [ ] asked him to make the attempt anyway. [ ] believes that [ ] had already resigned himself to the inevitability of Guevara's execution. [ ] said that he was in sympathy with [ ] wish but that it was not in his power to reverse the order. He told [ ] that he was well aware of the treatment which Fidel had meted out to Cubans and told him to execute Guevara in any manner which he might choose. [ ] said that he had to leave for Vallegrande at 10:00 a.m. and would send a helicopter back to pick up Guevara's "body" at 2 p.m., and "as a friend", asked that the body be ready. [ ] reiterated his request that the order be appealed and agreed to make the attempt, and said he would advise if he were successful.

15. Failing a counter-manding of the order and as the senior "Bolivian officer" left in Higuera, [ ] said he was left with the implementation of the execution. After [ ] left, [ ] was able to talk to Guevara, who identified [ ] either as a Puerto Rican or a Cuban working for U.S. intelligence. He said he made this judgment on the basis of the questions asked and on [ ] accent. While [ ] was with Guevara, shots were fired in adjoining rooms and [ ] later determined that these involved the execution of two other prisoners. Recognizing these shots for what they were, nevertheless, Guevara blanched when [ ] confirmed that he too would be executed; although [ ] later composing himself.

16. After leaving Guevara, [ ] told a sergeant of the order to execute Guevara and entrusted the mission to him. He was told to fire below the head. The order was given to the sergeant at 1:00 p.m. and [ ] heard the shots fired at Guevara at 1:20 p.m. At 2:00 p.m., the helicopter returned to Higuera. A Father [ ] performed the last rites and Guevara's remains were strapped to one of the helicopter's skids and [ ] accompanied them to Vallegrande, where they landed at 2:30 p.m. [ ] said that he lost himself quickly in the crowd gathered at the airport, but that [ ] took charge of the remains and was photographed. [ ] said that the title of the photograph, which appeared in the press, gave an incorrect identification of the name [ ] used, [ ]

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17. [ ] said he reported the executions to Major [ ] and the Chief of Operations, a [ ] and then was taken back to identify the bodies of the three executed guerrillas. They then drove to Santa Cruz with the documents, films and equipment and then flew to La Paz, where [ ] contacted his case officer. He was taken to a home where the [ ] and other Americans were briefed by him. Everything which he had been able to retain was turned in then to be carried by a special courier to Washington. [ ] then flew back to Santa Cruz where a C-130 ordered by General Porter, CINCSOUTH, was to pick him and [ ] up for a flight to the Canal Zone. This plane arrived with a flat tire on the 10th or 11th. The U.S. Mission aircraft, a C-54, was then flown to Santa Cruz and he and [ ] were flown back to La Paz. After overnighing there, another C-130 carried them to Panama where [ ] was asked to relate his story to General Porter. After 2 weeks in Panama, [ ] and [ ] were documented as GS-16s so that they could board a over-booked military flight to Charlotte, South Carolina. After their arrival there, they journeyed to Miami, where [ ] briefed General Cushman. [ ] believes that in both high-level briefings he mentioned his own personal role in the execution of Guevara.)

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